In Re: Pyne v.
This text of 231 F. App'x 295 (In Re: Pyne v.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Charles Kehinde Pyne petitions for a writ of prohibition seeking an order preventing District Judge Alexander Williams, Jr., from participating in his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2000) proceedings, transferring the action to another judge, and vacating all “discretionary judicial actions” taken by Judge Williams subsequent to his recusal during the pre-trial hearing. We conclude Pyne is not entitled to relief.
A writ of prohibition should not issue unless it “clearly appears that the inferior court is about to exceed its jurisdiction.” Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 176, 6 S.Ct. 570, 29 L.Ed. 601 (1886). Because it is a drastic remedy, a writ of prohibition should only be granted when the petitioner’s right to the requested relief is clear and indisputable, In re Vargas, 723 F.2d 1461, 1468 (10th Cir.1983); In re Missouri, 664 F.2d 178, 180 (8th Cir.1981), and there are no other adequate means of relief, In re Bankers Trust Co., 775 F.2d 545, 547 (3d Cir.1985). A writ of prohibition may not be used as a substitute for the normal appellate process. Missouri, 664 F.2d at 180.
Pyne has failed to demonstrate that he is entitled to the relief he seeks. Therefore, although we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis, we deny Pyne’s motion for release and petition for a writ of prohibition. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
231 F. App'x 295, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-pyne-v-ca4-2007.