[Cite as In re P.W., 2026-Ohio-1478.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT MONTGOMERY COUNTY
IN RE: P.W. : : C.A. No. 30671 : : Trial Court Case No. G-2024-000335- : 0F,0I : : (Appeal from Common Pleas Court- : Juvenile Division) : : FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY & OPINION ...........
Pursuant to the opinion of this court rendered on April 24, 2026, the judgment of the
trial court is affirmed.
Costs to be paid as stated in App.R. 24.
Pursuant to Ohio App.R. 30(A), the clerk of the court of appeals shall immediately
serve notice of this judgment upon all parties and make a note in the docket of the service.
Additionally, pursuant to App.R. 27, the clerk of the court of appeals shall send a certified
copy of this judgment, which constitutes a mandate, to the clerk of the trial court and note
the service on the appellate docket.
For the court,
ROBERT G. HANSEMAN, JUDGE
EPLEY, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur. OPINION MONTGOMERY C.A. No. 30671
ROBERT ALAN BRENNER, Attorney for Appellant, Mother JONATHAN D. MURRAY, Attorney for Appellee Montgomery County Department of Job and Family Services, Children Services Division GARY C. SCHAENGOLD, Attorney for Appellee Father
HANSEMAN, J.
{¶ 1} Appellant-Mother appeals from a judgment of the Juvenile Division of the
Montgomery County Common Pleas Court that granted legal custody of her child P.W. to
Father following an adjudicatory hearing finding the child neglected and dependent. Mother
claims the trial court abused its discretion in determining that it was in P.W.’s best interest
to grant legal custody to Father. For the following reasons, the trial court’s judgment is
affirmed.
I. Facts and Course of Proceedings
{¶ 2} P.W. was born in April 2019 to Mother, an unmarried woman. After P.W.’s birth,
Father made efforts to see P.W. by contacting Mother regularly; however, Mother was
inconsistent in returning calls or facilitating contact. Father periodically dropped gifts off for
P.W. and provided Mother with continuous monthly financial support. But due to Mother’s
lack of contact with Father, he had minimal contact with P.W. during her first five years of
life.
{¶ 3} In December 2023, the Montgomery County Department of Job and Family
Services, Children Services Division (“MCCS”) received a case referral concerning Mother,
which alleged that she abused illegal substances and was not adequately caring for the
children. Mother’s home was also reported to be filthy. Besides P.W., Mother had twins
younger than P.W. and two other children older than P.W. When MCCS attempted contact
2 with Mother, she was uncooperative. After six failed attempts, in January 2024, MCCS
attempted contact using law enforcement officers. Mother allowed the officers inside, but
she refused MCCS entry.
{¶ 4} Mother’s home lacked smoke detectors and was in filthy condition. Officers saw
feces, dirty diapers, and other unclean and unsanitary conditions throughout the home. A
stained mattress was laying on the living room floor, and Mother indicated it was her bed,
which she shared with some of the children. Code enforcement arrived and condemned the
home. Mother appeared under the influence, had an active warrant, and was arrested.
Physical injuries were visible on the twins, and they were taken to the hospital. Later, Mother
was charged with endangering children. P.W. and one of her older siblings were placed with
Maternal Grandmother.
{¶ 5} On January 22, 2024, MCCS filed a neglect and dependency complaint, and
after a hearing in April 2024, P.W. was adjudicated neglected and dependent. MCCS was
granted temporary custody and put together a case plan for Mother. Father expressed
interest in having contact with P.W., and MCCS provided Father with objectives to complete.
{¶ 6} While P.W. was in the care of Maternal Grandmother, Mother maintained all
scheduled visits with P.W. and fixed the conditions of her home. However, around November
2024, Mother violated conditions of community control in a criminal case and had a drug
possession related criminal case. Around the same time, in Mother’s community control
case, she was court ordered to complete a residential drug treatment program, which
prevented her from maintaining in-person visits with P.W. Mother did, though, maintain
regular contact with P.W. through telephone and FaceTime. Mother’s residential treatment
program lasted approximately six months and ended in April 2025. Thereafter, she ejected
3 squatters from her home. She did not complete an MCCS home study prior to the hearing
regarding P.W. in April.
{¶ 7} Regarding Father, he completed a mental health, drug, and alcohol assessment
and a home study, with no concerns reported. Father also began visitations with P.W. at
Maternal Grandmother’s home. Father’s visits progressed to twice a week and, over time,
to full-weekend visits in his home.
{¶ 8} On November 27, 2024, MCCS filed a motion for extension of temporary
custody of P.W. On December 19, 2024, Father filed a motion for legal custody of P.W., and
on April 11, 2025, MCCS also filed a motion for Father to have legal custody. The
dispositional hearing on the motions took place on April 23, 2025. The juvenile court heard
evidence from an MCCS caseworker, Father, and Maternal Grandmother. Mother was at
the hearing with counsel, but she did not testify. The guardian ad litem (“GAL”) for P.W. was
also present and recommended legal custody to Father.
{¶ 9} On May 2, 2025, the magistrate issued a written decision granting Father legal
custody of P.W., with Mother to have no less than two hours of parenting time per week.
The juvenile court adopted the magistrate’s decision. Mother timely objected, and after all
parties briefed the issues, the juvenile court conducted an independent review and overruled
Mother’s objections on October 30, 2025. The juvenile court determined that the magistrate’s
decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and that granting legal custody
to Father was in the best interests of P.W. This appeal followed.
II. Mother’s Assignment of Error
{¶ 10} In her appeal, Mother raises a single assignment of error.
THE JUVENILE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED
LEGAL CUSTODY TO FATHER.
4 In her issue presented for review, Mother asks “[w]hether the juvenile court abused
its discretion when it granted legal custody to father who had not been involved in P.W.’s life
until this juvenile case was opened.”
III. Legal Custody
{¶ 11} “Legal custody is significantly different from, and not as drastic a remedy as,
the termination of parental rights . . . .” In re S.P., 2021-Ohio-4335, ¶ 13 (2d Dist.). “An award
of legal custody of a child does not divest parents of their residual parental rights, privileges,
and responsibilities.” In re C.R., 2006-Ohio-1191, paragraph one of the syllabus.
{¶ 12} The Revised Code defines “legal custody” as “a legal status that vests in the
custodian the right to have physical care and control of the child and to determine where
and with whom the child shall live, and the right and duty to protect, train, and discipline the
child and to provide the child with food, shelter, education, and medical care, all subject to
any residual parental rights, privileges, and responsibilities.” R.C. 2151.011(B)(21). Only a
permanent custody determination would divest Mother of all parental rights, privileges, and
obligations, including all residual rights and obligations. See R.C. 2151.011(B)(31) (defining
“permanent custody”).
{¶ 13} “R.C. 2151.353(A)(3) provides that if a child is adjudicated a dependent child,
the court may award legal custody of the child ‘to either parent or to any other person who,
prior to the dispositional hearing, files a motion requesting legal custody of the child.’” In re
J.C., 2020-Ohio-5540, ¶ 14 (2d Dist.), quoting R.C. 2151.353(A)(3). In order for a juvenile
court to award legal custody of a child to a parent, or other individual, the court must find
that legal custody is in the best interest of the child by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.,
citing In re C.B., 2019-Ohio-890, ¶ 17 (2d Dist.), citing In re M.O., 2015-Ohio-2430, ¶ 7
(2d Dist.). “‘Preponderance of the evidence simply means “evidence which is of a greater
5 weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it.”’” S.P. at
¶ 13 (2d Dist.), quoting In re Starks, 2005-Ohio-1912, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.), quoting Black’s Law
Dictionary (6th Ed. 1998).
{¶ 14} “When making a legal custody determination under R.C. 2151.353, the
juvenile court must apply the ‘best interest of the child’ standard set forth in
R.C. 3109.04(F)(1).” J.C. at ¶ 15, citing In re A.F., 2018-Ohio-310, ¶ 52 (2d Dist.), citing In re
D.S., 2014-Ohio-2444, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.)’ In re Poling, 64 Ohio St.3d 211 (1992), paragraph two
of the syllabus; In re G.D., 2023-Ohio-1913, ¶ 9 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 15} R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) provides the following non-exhaustive list of factors to
consider in determining the best interest of a child: (a) the wishes of the child’s parents;
(b) the wishes and concerns of the child; (c) the child’s interaction and interrelationship with
the child’s parents, siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child’s
best interest; (d) the child’s adjustment to the child’s home, school, and community; (e) the
mental and physical health of all persons involved in the situation; (f) the parent more likely
to honor and facilitate court-approved parenting time rights or visitation; (g) whether either
parent has failed to make all child support payments; (h) whether either parent or any
member of the household of either parent previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty
to any criminal offense involving any act that resulted in a child being an abused or neglected
child; (i) whether the residential parent or one of the parents subject to a shared parenting
decree has continuously and willfully denied the other parent’s right to parenting time in
accordance with an order of the court; and (j) whether either parent has established a
residence, or is planning to establish a residence, outside this state. R.C. 3109.04(F)(1).
“Under the best-interest test, no single factor is controlling, and the weight to be given to any
6 factor lies within the trial court’s discretion.” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-963 34 (2d Dist.), citing In
re L.L., 2020-Ohio-5609, ¶ 8 (1st Dist.).
IV. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it granted legal custody
of P.W. to Father because the juvenile court considered the statutory factors in
R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) and determined that it was in P.W.’s best interest.
{¶ 16} When reviewing a juvenile court’s order of legal custody, we apply an abuse
of discretion standard of review. A.F., 2018-Ohio-310, at ¶ 54 (2d Dist.). An abuse of
discretion means that the juvenile court’s decision is unreasonable, arbitrary or
unconscionable. AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp.,
50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 (1990). “It is to be expected that most instances of abuse of
discretion will result in decisions that are simply unreasonable, rather than decisions that are
unconscionable or arbitrary. A decision is unreasonable if there is no sound reasoning
process that would support that decision.” Id.
{¶ 17} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated:
The discretion which a trial court enjoys in custody matters should be accorded
the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the impact the
court’s determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned. The
knowledge a trial court gains through observing the witnesses and the parties
in a custody proceeding cannot be conveyed to a reviewing court by a printed
record. Trickey v. Trickey (1952), 158 Ohio St. 9, 13, 47 O.O. 481, 483, 106
N.E.2d 772, 774. In this regard, the reviewing court in such proceedings should
be guided by the presumption that the trial court’s findings were indeed correct.
See Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland (1984), 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80, 10 OBR
408, 410, 461 N.E.2d 1273, 1276.
7 Miller v. Miller, 37 Ohio St.3d 71, 74 (1988).
{¶ 18} In her argument, Mother asserts that because P.W. was with her and Maternal
Grandmother her whole life and because Father was a stranger up until the MCCS
intervention, it was an abuse of discretion to award Father legal custody over reunification
with Mother. While not specifically stated, it appears Mother argues that since she was
P.W.’s primary caregiver for the first five years of P.W.’s life, the juvenile court abused its
discretion in awarding legal custody to Father.
{¶ 19} Regarding the primary caregiver, we have stated that a court is not limited to
the listed factors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) and should consider any other relevant factor,
including which parent is the child’s primary caregiver. In re Maxwell, 8 Ohio App.3d 302,
306 (2d Dist. 1982); Francis v. Francis, 2003-Ohio-1940, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.). However, we have
also stressed that “a party’s role as the primary caregiver is not given presumptive weight
over other relevant factors.” Chelman v. Chelman, 2008-Ohio-4634, ¶ 43 (2d Dist.). This is
especially true since Ohio’s legislature requires courts to consider the best interests of the
child when determining all legal custody issues in abuse, neglect, and dependency cases.
R.C. 2151.353; R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). While it appears from the juvenile court’s decision that
it did not explicitly consider Mother’s status as P.W.’s “primary caregiver,” we do not find this
alone to be an abuse of discretion because the trial court addressed the statutory factors
listed in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1). Additionally, while Mother was the primary caregiver, P.W. was
adjudicated neglected and dependent. “A juvenile court adjudication of abuse, neglect, or
dependency is a determination about the care and condition of a child and implicitly involves
a determination of the unsuitability of the child’s custodial . . . parents.” C.R., 2006-Ohio-
1191, at paragraph two of the syllabus.
8 {¶ 20} In its decision, the juvenile court analyzed the facts from the hearing under
each of the applicable statutory factors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) and concluded that legal
custody to Father was in the best interests of P.W. Upon review, we determine that the
juvenile court exercised a sound reasoning process and did not abuse its discretion.
{¶ 21} Regarding the wishes of P.W.’s parents, both Mother and Father are P.W.’s
parents, and the juvenile court correctly noted in its decision that Mother wished to reunify
with P.W. while Father wished for legal custody. As for the wishes and concerns of the child,
at the time of the hearing in April 2025, P.W. was six years old. The juvenile court indicated
in its decision that the GAL reported that P.W. was not mature enough to articulate her
wishes and that it did not conduct an in-camera interview. Neither of the first two factors
weighs in favor of Mother over Father.
{¶ 22} Regarding P.W.’s interaction and interrelationship with her parents, siblings,
and any other person who may significantly affect her, the trial court heard evidence from
Maternal Grandmother that P.W. indicated a desire to be with Mother. Mother had cared for
P.W. since her birth in April 2019 until Mother’s arrest in January 2024. However, the juvenile
court noted that between January 2024 and the hearing in April 2025, P.W. had been in the
care of Maternal Grandmother, and that due to Mother’s criminal cases and court-ordered
residential drug treatment, Mother had not had physical contact with P.W. between
November 2024 and April 2025, although she had maintained regular telephone and
FaceTime contact. While not specifically noted by the juvenile court, it can be inferred that
P.W. was bonded with Mother. The juvenile court also heard evidence that P.W. was bonded
with Maternal Grandmother.
{¶ 23} However, evidence also demonstrated that Father was bonded with P.W. In
addition, Father’s wife of six years also lived in his home, and evidence showed P.W. was
9 bonded with her. P.W. called Father “Daddy”, was excited to see Father for visits, and ran
to Father’s truck during visits. P.W. expressed sadness when Father took her back to
Maternal Grandmother’s home at the end of visits.
{¶ 24} While P.W. has four other siblings, there was no evidence presented to the
juvenile court regarding P.W.’s relationship or interactions with them. However, the juvenile
court noted in its decision that the twins were in foster care, one of P.W.’s older siblings was
residing with his or her biological father, and the other older sibling was residing with his or
her paternal grandfather. The third factor also does not weigh in favor of Mother over Father.
{¶ 25} With respect to P.W.’s adjustment to her home, school, and community, the
juvenile court heard evidence that P.W. struggled with adjusting to changes in her life. If a
schedule changed, P.W. would act out by screaming and crying. Though Maternal
Grandmother said that P.W. acted out when Father visited, Maternal Grandmother admitted
the acting out was limited to the start of visits with Father. It was not an ongoing issue.
{¶ 26} Father testified that his home is a two-bedroom house and P.W. has her own
room with a bed, stuffed animals, toys. He explained that he and his wife maintain a schedule
with P.W. When P.W. was with them, she did not act out but instead was a happy child. P.W.
allowed Father to play with her and gave her kisses. When P.W. was with Father’s wife,
P.W. was also affectionate by giving her frequent hugs and kisses. P.W. was either in
preschool or kindergarten, but there was no evidence presented as to P.W.’s adjustment to
her school. Father testified that he was committed to keeping P.W. in the same school so
P.W. did not have to make an adjustment.
{¶ 27} Father also testified that he and his wife were integrating P.W. into his
community by taking P.W. out. With Father, P.W. had enjoyed a local park, a trampoline
park for her sixth birthday party celebration, and Easter egg hunting for P.W.’s first Easter
10 holiday with Father. The fourth best-interest factor weighs more heavily in favor of Father
over Mother as there is sufficient, credible evidence that P.W. was adjusting positively to
Father, his wife, and the community in which they resided.
{¶ 28} In relation to the mental and physical health of all people involved, testimony
from Mother’s caseworker indicated Mother was easily overwhelmed and had quit a job after
one day due to stress. In comparison, Father was gainfully employed, stable, and presented
with no mental health concern. Evidence also indicated that despite Mother’s completion of
an in-patient drug treatment program, she had a history of substance abuse and failed to
follow through with a recommendation to reside in a sober living home after her in-patient
treatment. Father did not have substance abuse issues. Regarding the mental and physical
health of the parties, this factor weighs in favor of Father over Mother.
{¶ 29} Considering the parent more likely to honor and facilitate court-approved
parenting time rights or visitation, the juvenile court noted Father’s testimony that he would
ensure P.W. maintained her relationships with Maternal Grandmother, siblings, and Mother.
In comparison, the juvenile court noted that Maternal Grandmother demonstrated some
reluctance in facilitating visitations with Father. This factor weighs more heavily in favor of
Father over Mother as well.
{¶ 30} As the remaining factors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1)(g) through (j) do not apply, we
need not discuss them, as the juvenile court also found them to be inapplicable. To the
extent that Mother also argues that she was compliant with her case plan and made good
faith efforts to reunite with P.W., we have repeatedly held that while case plan compliance
is relevant to the child’s best interests, it is not dispositive. Z.C., 2023-Ohio-963, at ¶ 38
(2d Dist.); In re C.W., 2020-Ohio-6849, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.); In re J.M., 2020-Ohio-822, ¶ 15
(2d Dist.). “This is so because the best-interest factors encompass much more than the
11 parent’s case-plan objectives, and they do so from the perspective of the child’s particular
needs. In short, the focus of a best-interest analysis is on the child, not the parent.” In re
A.K., 2017-Ohio-8100, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.).
{¶ 31} Based on its review of the record, the juvenile court found, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that the statutory best-interest factors supported awarding legal custody of
P.W. to Father. The trial court engaged in a thorough analysis and reached a conclusion
that was entirely reasonable. Having reviewed the relevant factors under
R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in granting legal
custody of P.W. to Father. Mother’s assignment of error is overruled.
V. Conclusion
{¶ 32} Having overruled Mother’s assignment of error, the judgment of the juvenile
court is affirmed.
.............
EPLEY, J., and HUFFMAN, J., concur.