In re P.S.

2024 IL App (4th) 240888-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: November 15, 2024
• Docket: 4-24-0888
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE This Order was filed under 2024 IL App (4th) 240888-U FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is November 15, 2024 not precedent except in the NO. 4-24-0888 Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re P.S., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Knox County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 21JA32 v. ) James S., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Curtis S. Lane, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lannerd and Grischow concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed the trial court’s judgment terminating respondent’s parental rights.

¶2 Respondent James S. appeals from the trial court’s judgment terminating his

parental rights to P.S. (born in 2019). Respondent’s court-appointed appellate counsel moves to

withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing this appeal presents no

issue of arguable merit for review. See In re S.M., 314 Ill. App. 3d 682, 685-86 (2000) (holding

Anders applies to termination of parental rights cases and providing the proper procedure to be

followed by appellate counsel). For the reasons that follow, we grant appellate counsel’s motion

to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 A. Adjudication of Wardship ¶5 In August 2021, the State filed a single-count petition for adjudication of wardship,

alleging that P.S. was neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987

(Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2020)) in that P.S. was subjected to an

environment injurious to her welfare. The State alleged, among other things, that respondent

(1) was homeless; (2) was previously adjudicated as an unfit parent to a different minor in a 2017

juvenile matter, and his parental rights were terminated; and (3) failed to complete any services in

the 2017 juvenile matter to become fit. P.S.’s biological mother was also a party to these

proceedings but is not a party to this appeal. Following a shelter care hearing, the trial court found

probable cause to support the allegations of neglect and placed temporary custody and

guardianship with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).

¶6 At a subsequent hearing, respondent stipulated to an amended petition filed by the

State containing the same allegations laid out above. The trial court admonished respondent, and

the State provided a factual basis. The court determined P.S. was neglected and made her a ward

of the court. Custody of P.S. remained with the guardianship administrator of DCFS. At a

dispositional hearing, respondent was found to remain unfit from the prior juvenile matter and had

not begun services.

¶7 B. Petition for Termination of Parental Rights

¶8 In December 2022, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental

rights. The petition alleged that respondent was an unfit parent under the Adoption Act (750 ILCS

50/1(D) (West 2022)) in that he failed to (1) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions

serving as the basis of the removal of P.S. during the relevant nine-month period (January 4, 2022,

to October 4, 2022) (id. § 1(D)(m)(i)), (2) make reasonable progress toward the return of P.S.

-2- during the relevant nine-month period (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)), and (3) maintain a reasonable degree of

interest, concern, or responsibility as to P.S.’s welfare (id. § 1(D)(b)).

¶9 1. The Fitness Hearing

¶ 10 In March 2024, the trial court conducted a fitness hearing. Respondent was not

present for the hearing. Tara Wilder testified that she was assigned as the caseworker from January

2022 through July 2022. Respondent’s service plan required that he complete a substance abuse

assessment; participate in mental health services, domestic violence counseling, and parenting

classes; comply with drug screens; and maintain employment, along with stable and appropriate

housing. Respondent failed to complete any of the services during the relevant time period but

completed some of the services afterward. Respondent lived with his mother during the pendency

of this matter, but the home was not an appropriate placement for P.S. because she could not pass

the required background check. Respondent held several different jobs during the course of the

case and switched jobs frequently. He did not provide proof of employment, but Wilder witnessed

him working one of the jobs. Respondent was also required to comply with weekly drug tests, but

he only completed “ten to twenty” percent of those tests. Respondent regularly visited P.S. and

was appropriate during those visitations.

¶ 11 Karen Moore was the caseworker from July 2022 through October 2022. The

services respondent was required to complete while Moore was the caseworker had not changed

from those in place when Wilder served in that role. Respondent failed to complete the required

services and was twice removed from required programs due to positive drug tests, inconsistent

participation, and an altercation with another individual in one of the programs. He submitted to

drug tests while Moore was the caseworker, but the majority of the results were positive.

Respondent was discharged twice from the domestic violence program for inconsistent attendance

-3- and because he was “having an issue with another person that was in the program.” Visitation with

P.S. was consistent and went well, as respondent was always “appropriate and nurturing” and

“used positive parenting skills.” Eventually, he was required to produce a negative drug test prior

to visitation, and he was denied visitation when he tested positive. Respondent had an apartment,

but Moore was unable to inspect it despite several scheduled visits because “he always had other

things or he would not respond.”

¶ 12 The trial court found that P.S. was no closer to being returned to respondent’s care

than when the case began and determined respondent was unfit based on the grounds articulated

in the State’s petition.

¶ 13 2. The Best Interest Hearing

¶ 14 The best interest hearing ensued. Wilder again testified, stating she was the

caseworker assigned to the case from January 2022 until Moore took over the case and she resumed

working on the case after Moore. P.S. had been in foster care for over two and a half years and had

been in the current placement for almost two years—half of her life. Respondent was appropriate

and loving during visitation. P.S. knew respondent was her father and Wilder could tell “she loves

her dad and he loves her.”

¶ 15 Wilder visited the foster home monthly. There were no issues with the home, and

P.S. referred to the foster parents as “Mom” and “Dad.” P.S. did not understand the workings of

the situation but understood “she has two dads.” The foster parents provided for her physical and

emotional needs, and P.S. was bonded to her foster parents and foster siblings. P.S. was “thriving”

in the placement, and the foster parents expressed a desire to adopt P.S. and give her permanence.

¶ 16 The foster mother testified that she and her husband were willing to adopt P.S. P.S.

was bonded with the other children in the home and the extended families of the foster parents.

-4- P.S. loved respondent and looked forward to her visits with him. If the matter proceeded to an

adoption, the foster mother would not cut respondent out of P.S.’s life, as “she’d have a hard time

with that.” Rather, the foster mother would facilitate the relationship, as long as it was “safe and

healthy.” If it became problematic, they would take a break and try to reengage at a later time.

¶ 17 Respondent testified that he lived with his mother and was not employed but was

starting full-time employment the following week; he also delivered for DoorDash. He loved P.S.

and believed that she loved him. He described their visitation and how she called him “Dad.” P.S.

had not lived with him for over two and a half years. He had attempted to have P.S. placed at his

mother’s house, where he lived, but DCFS stated the placement was not possible. He had an

apartment for a period of time during the case but ended up moving back in with his mother when

“it didn’t end up working out.”

¶ 18 The trial court recalled Wilder to the stand to inquire why the grandmother’s home

was not an acceptable placement. Wilder stated that the grandmother did not receive clearance

based on “her history.” When pressed, Wilder could not remember the exact issue precluding

placement except that it was due to an issue with her criminal history. The grandmother “became

belligerent” when DCFS tried to discuss the issue with her, causing concern about placement at

the home in general. During closing arguments, counsel for respondent contested the assertion by

Wilder that there was any criminal issue preventing placement. Counsel stated, “My client’s

mother has no criminal history whatsoever.”

¶ 19 The trial court considered the statutory best interest factors and found that they

favored the termination of respondent’s parental rights. The court reasoned, “While it’s wonderful

that there is a sense of attachment and there is a bond to at least the father, that bond is clearly

outweighed by the remainder of the best interest factors.”

-5- ¶ 20 This appeal followed.

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 Appellate counsel now moves to withdraw pursuant to Anders and argues that

respondent’s appeal presents no potentially meritorious issue for review. See S.M., 314 Ill. App.

3d at 685-86. Counsel states he has reviewed the record on appeal and has identified two potential

issues for review: (1) whether the trial court’s determination that respondent was unfit was against

the manifest weight of the evidence and (2) whether the court’s determination that termination of

respondent’s parental rights was in the best interest of P.S. was against the manifest weight of the

evidence. Counsel provided respondent notice of the motion to withdraw, and this court followed

with its own notice. Respondent has not filed a response. After reviewing the record and appellate

counsel’s memorandum, we agree with counsel that this appeal presents no issue of potential merit.

We therefore grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the court’s judgment.

¶ 23 A. Unfitness Finding

¶ 24 Section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2022))

provides for a two-step process to involuntarily terminate parental rights. The State must first prove

by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is “unfit” as defined in section 1(D) of the

Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)). In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 28.

¶ 25 In this case, the trial court determined respondent was unfit on two of the three

bases alleged in the State’s petition. However, a “parent’s rights may be terminated if a single

alleged ground for unfitness is supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re D.C., 209 Ill.

2d 287, 296 (2004). Here, we focus on the ground that respondent failed to make reasonable

progress toward the return of P.S. during the relevant nine-month period pursuant to section

1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022)).

-6- “Reasonable progress is examined under an objective standard based upon the

amount of progress measured from the conditions existing at the time custody was

taken from the parent. [Citation.] The benchmark for measuring a parent’s

reasonable progress under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act encompasses the

parent’s compliance with the service plans and court’s directives in light of the

condition that gave rise to the removal of the child and other conditions which later

become known that would prevent the court from returning custody of the child to

the parent. [Citation.] Reasonable progress exists when the trial court can conclude

that progress being made by a parent to comply with directives given for the return

of the minor is sufficiently demonstrable and of such a quality that the trial court

will be able to order the minor returned to parental custody in the near future.” In re

D.T., 2017 IL App (3d) 170120, ¶ 17.

¶ 26 The trial court is in a superior position to observe witnesses and evaluate their

credibility. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498-99 (2002). Accordingly, the court’s findings regarding

parental unfitness are afforded great deference and will not be reversed unless against the manifest

weight of the evidence. Id. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the

opposite conclusion is clearly evident.” In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208 (2001).

¶ 27 Respondent in this case failed to complete any of the court-ordered services during

the relevant time period and produced positive drug tests when he did comply with the testing

regimen. Respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of P.S. during the

relevant nine-month period, and the trial court did not err in finding respondent was making no

progress toward having P.S. returned to his custody in the near future. Therefore, it would be

-7- frivolous to argue that the court’s unfitness finding was against the manifest weight of the

evidence.

¶ 28 B. Best Interest Determination

¶ 29 If a trial court finds a parent to be unfit, it then determines whether the best interest

of the child requires that parental rights be terminated. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 352 (2004). At

the best interest stage of termination proceedings, the State bears the burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interest.

In re C.P., 2019 IL App (4th) 190420, ¶ 71. In reaching a best interest determination, the trial court

must consider, within the context of the child’s age and developmental needs, the following

factors, which are derived from section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS

405/1-3(4.05) (West 2022)):

“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child’s

identity; (3) the child’s familial, cultural[,] and religious background and ties;

(4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, continuity

of affection, and the least disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes

and long-term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for

permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with

parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the

risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the person available to

care for the child.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re J.B., 2019 IL App (4th)

190537, ¶ 32.

¶ 30 “The court’s best interest determination [need not] contain an explicit reference to

each of these factors, and a reviewing court need not rely on any basis used by the trial court below

-8- in affirming its decision.” In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19. Additionally, a trial

court “may consider the nature and length of the child’s relationship with his present caretaker and

the effect that a change in placement would have upon his emotional and psychological

well-being.” In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d 239, 262 (2004). We afford great deference to the trial

court’s best interest finding due to the court’s superior position in viewing the witnesses and

judging their credibility. J.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190537, ¶ 33. We will not disturb the trial court’s

judgment at this stage unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.

¶ 31 In this case, P.S. had been in foster care for the majority of her life. The foster

parents provided for her safety, shelter, and general welfare. P.S. was bonded with her foster

parents and her foster family, and the foster parents sought to provide permanence. We share the

sentiment of the trial court in its acknowledgment that there is clearly a loving bond between P.S.

and respondent and that P.S. recognizes him as her biological father. However, the bond between

respondent and P.S. is alone insufficient to reverse the court’s decision. See D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at

364 (“[A]t a best-interests hearing, the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship

must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.”). While P.S. is attached to

respondent, P.S.’s familial background and ties, as well as continuity of affection and least

disruptive placement, all reside with the foster parents. On balance, the factors do not show that

the judgment of the trial court was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 32 Having reviewed the record, we agree with counsel that there is no arguable issue

of merit that could be advanced challenging the trial court’s best interest finding.

¶ 33 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 34 For the reasons stated, we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

-9- ¶ 35 Affirmed.

- 10 -