In Re Pratt

78 B.R. 277, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 979
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Montana
DecidedJune 24, 1987
Docket19-60244
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 78 B.R. 277 (In Re Pratt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Montana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Pratt, 78 B.R. 277, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 979 (Mont. 1987).

Opinion

ORDER

JOHN L. PETERSON, Bankruptcy Judge.

The creditor Nollmeyer Farms, Inc. has contested the eligibility of the Debtors as family farmers under 11 U.S.C. § 101(17). The issue involves the application of the gross income test, which requires that an individual family farmer and his spouse receive more that 50% of their gross income from farming operations.

The facts are undisputed. The Debtors filed this Chapter 12 case on April 6, 1987. Under § 101(17) of the 1986 Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986, P.L. 99-554, 11 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq., the income test for eligibility requires the Debtors to show gross income for the taxable year 1986 in excess of 50% from their family farm operation. 1 In 1986, the Debtors received in *278 come from the following sources according to Debtors’ Schedules and testimony, to-wit:

Farm Income:
Cattle sales — $59,832.00 less cost of cattle $39,803.00 — net $20,029.00
Farm labor 1,500.00
Total $21,529.00
Non-Farm Income:
Quoteal Pratt salary 14,052.69
Rental Income 6,000.00
Contracting Income from dwelling unit — $76,335.69 less expenses $69,335.69 — net 7,000.00
Total Non-Farm Income $27,052.69
Total Gross Income $48,581.00

According to the legislative history of P.L. 99-554 (H.R. 5316), the income limitations were added to the legislation to prevent high income, low non-farm debt tax shelter investors from qualifying for relief under Chapter 12. The statement in the Senate from Senator McConnell was as follows:

“The language that I propose to add to Senator Grassley’s bill would establish more reasonable guidelines to insure that the use of chapter 12 bankruptcy is restricted for family farms and corporations, not for corporations involved in farming just for the tax shelter that farming has provided in the past. There would be a requirement added to the definition of ‘family farmer’ that requires that, for the purposes of this definition, that a farmer must receive at least 50% of his gross income from farming. In addition, a corporation who seeks to file under chapter 12 must have 50 percent of its stock or equity owned by a person who is actually farming.” 132 Cong.Rec. S. 5614 (daily ed. May 8, 1986).

Determining eligibility under the gross income test requires a careful review of the Debtors’ tax and financial records for the prior tax year. However, the term gross income is not defined in the Code. There is, nevertheless, case authority which interprets the term gross income as it is used in § 101(19) in defining farmers. § 101(19) also uses the term gross income, and relates the test to the preceding tax year from the date the case was commenced. The case of Matter of Wagner, 808 F.2d 542 (7th Cir.1986), holds the term gross income in the definition of farmer under § 101(19) [formerly § 101(17) ] is intended to refer to gross income as defined in Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Coae of 1954, as amended. Wagner states:

“Prior to the 1978 overhaul of the bankruptcy law the definition of ‘farmer’ had undergone a painful statutory evolution each stage of which had generated considerable litigation. See Oler, The Farmer and the Bankruptcy Laws, 40 Dickinson L.Rev. 122 (1936). In the last stage, the statute, still worded unclearly, had been interpreted to mean ‘an individual personally engaged in farming,’ provided that ‘the principal part of his income’ was derived from farming. See 11 U.S.C. § 1(17) (1976 ed.); In re Beery, 680 F.2d 705, 713 (10th Cir.1982). The substitution of an income test for the earlier tests of whether the individual was ‘chiefly’ or ‘primarily’ engaged in farming — tests hopelessly vague in practice, as shown by such cases as Powers v. Silberman, 3 F.2d 802 (3d Cir.1925), and In re Macklem, 22 F.2d 426 (D.Md.1927) —was a step toward greater precision; but the statute defined neither ‘principal part’ nor ‘income,’ and in particular it failed to indicate whether gross or net income was intended. See In re Beery, supra, 680 F.2d at 713-17. Against this *279 background Congress in the 1978 Code made a fresh start by defining ‘farmer’ as one who ‘received more than 80 percent of [his] gross income during’ his immediately preceding ‘taxable year ... from a farming operation owned or operated’ by him. 11 U.S.C. § 101(17). (Section 101(18) defines ‘farming operation’ to include ‘farming, tillage of the soil, dairy farming,’ etc.) No legislative history bears on the question whether ‘gross income’ in the new statute should be given the same meaning that it has in federal income tax law.
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From the statutory references to ‘taxable year’ and ‘gross income,’ both themselves technical terms, though of tax law rather than bankruptcy law, it is possible to infer that Congress intended to use these terms in section 101(17) in their tax sense. Certainly ‘taxable year’ is so used; Wagner does not dispute that. Whether ‘gross income’ was intended to be used in its tax sense is less certain. Maybe, as Wagner argues, Congress used ‘taxable year’ merely to spare the farmer the bother of having to keep an additional set of books in order to be sure not to lose his bankruptcy exemption.
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Yet, on balance, the interpretation that will best carry out Congress’s purposes in the Bankruptcy Code is that gross income for purposes of the farmer’s exemption has the same meaning as in the Internal Revenue Code. The language and background of section 101(17) show that Congress wanted a mechanical, which is to say an easily applicable, test for ‘farmer’ rather than a test that would reflect the economic realities of agriculture.
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But for either creditor or debtor to decide what the debtor’s gross income is in some sense of ‘gross income’ that is significant for the policy of the bankruptcy law would be an altogether more uncertain undertaking, at least until the courts had evolved a jurisprudence of gross income for this purpose. The threshold determination of eligibility for the exemption should not be subject to such uncertainty.

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Bluebook (online)
78 B.R. 277, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 979, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-pratt-mtb-1987.