In Re Powers

140 B.R. 476, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 840, 1992 WL 117362
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedApril 27, 1992
Docket19-02539
StatusPublished
Cited by34 cases

This text of 140 B.R. 476 (In Re Powers) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Powers, 140 B.R. 476, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 840, 1992 WL 117362 (Ill. 1992).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM, OPINION AND ORDER

FACTS

ROBERT E. GINSBERG, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter is before the court on the trustee’s motion to amend Janice Powers’ (“Debtor”) Chapter 13 plan to provide for 100% payment to unsecured creditors.

The facts are not in dispute. The debtor filed for relief under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on May 14, 1990. Pursuant to the debtor’s plan confirmed on September 7, 1990, the debtor was required to pay the trustee $545 per month for 60 months. Under the plan, her unsecured creditors were to receive 54% of their claims. This was the minimum dividend required to satisfy the “best interests” test, i.e., to assure creditors they would receive payments under the Chapter 13 plan at least equal in present value terms to what they could have expected to receive had the debtor opted for Chapter 7 instead of Chapter 13. See, 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). The main asset that would have been available to creditors in a Chapter 7 case for this debtor was her Vs interest in real property located at 7521 W. 62nd, Summit, Illinois. At the time of the petition, she scheduled the total value of the property at $124,000.

In January of 1992, about fifteen months after her plan was confirmed, the debtor brought a motion to sell her interest in the property to her mother and sister for $41,-667, which was one-third of the appraised value. The court approved the motion. The draft order, submitted by debtor’s counsel, approved the debtor’s motion to sell the property, provided for some of the sale proceeds to be distributed to the creditors via the trustee, and provided that the debtor would be discharged from her debts when the trustee distributed sufficient sale proceeds to those creditors such that each unsecured creditor who had filed a timely proof of claim received 54% of its claim. *478 That draft order was signed on January 13, 1992, and was docketed on January 15, 1992.

On January 29, 1992, the trustee filed a motion seeking to vacate the January 15, 1992 order, on the grounds that the order effectively modified the plan in an impermissible manner by reducing the plan’s term to 15 months while providing the unsecured creditors with only 54% of their claims. As the trustee sees it, this violated the “best effort test” found in § 1325(b) of the Bankruptcy Code requiring the debtor to either pay all creditors in full in 36 months or to make all disposable income available for a 36-month period. Because many of the debtor’s scheduled unsecured creditors failed to file timely proofs of claim, the trustee contends, and the debtor-concedes, that the nonexempt net proceeds produced by the sale of the debtor’s interest in the Summit property are more than enough to provide payment in full to those unsecured creditors who did file timely proofs of claim. The debtor and trustee have briefed the issue of whether the trustee may seek to amend the debtor’s plan to provide for a 100% distribution to the unsecured creditors. For the reasons stated below, the court grants the trustee’s motion to modify the debtor’s plan.

JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE

This court has jurisdiction over this dispute under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) as a matter arising under § 1329 of the Bankruptcy Code. This matter is before the court for determination under Local Rule 2.33 of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois which automatically refers bankruptcy cases and proceedings to this court for hearing and determination. This is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(L) as a matter relating to the confirmation of plans of reorganization.

DISCUSSION

The issue to be resolved is whether the trustee may modify the debtor’s plan under § 1329 of the Bankruptcy Code. 1 Section 1329 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) At any time after confirmation of the plan but before the completion of payments under such plan, the plan may be modified, upon request of the debtor, the trustee, or the holder of an allowed unsecured claim, to—
(1) increase or reduce the amount of payments on claims of a particular class provided for by the plan;
(2) extend or reduce the time for such payments; ...
(b)(1) Sections 1322(a), 1322(b), and 1323(c) of this title and the requirements of section 1325(a) of this title apply to any modification under subsection (a) of this section.

The language of the Code is clear and unmistakable; the trustee has standing to seek a modification of payments under the plan and of the duration of the plan at any time between confirmation of the plan and completion of the plan payments. More specifically, the statute allows the trustee to do exactly what the trustee seeks to do here, i.e., propose a modification of the debtor’s plan to seek an increase in the dividend payable to unsecured creditors under the debtor’s confirmed Chapter 13 plan. *479 It is hard to imagine a clearer case for the application of Justice Scalia’s constant admonition that when the plain language of the Code is clear, there is no need to look to the legislative history or other extraneous sources for guidance. See, e.g., Dewsnup v. Timm, — U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d 903 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting.); Union Bank v. Wolas, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 527, 116 L.Ed.2d 514 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring.); U.S. v. Nordic Village, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1991). The statute unmistakably says the trustee can do what the trustee seeks to do. This court agrees with Justice Scalia’s approach and believes the Trustee’s motion should be granted. With all due deference to Lewis Caroll’s Humpty Dumpty, words do not mean what I say they mean. They mean what they mean in common parlance. See, Carroll, Lewis, Through the Looking Glass (C.L. Dodgson, ed.) 205 (1934). 2

Despite the clear language of the statute, some courts add a precondition to § 1329 relief that nowhere appears in the statute by requiring the party seeking a plan modification to show that the debtor has experienced a substantial and unexpected change in financial circumstances. See, e.g., In re Euerle, 70 B.R, 72 (Bankr.D.N.H.1987); In re Fitak, 92 B.R. 243 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1988). The source of this requirement is less than clear. There certainly is no such requirement in the language of § 1329. “The statutory language clearly expresses Congressional intent, and, in the absence of any ambiguity, a court may not read another meaning into the statute.” Matter of Cotton, 102 B.R. 891 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1989). By its terms, § 1329 does not require the movant to demonstrate a substantial, unanticipated change in the debtor’s financial circumstances. See, In re Perkins, 111 B.R.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
140 B.R. 476, 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 840, 1992 WL 117362, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-powers-ilnb-1992.