In Re Pitt

240 B.R. 908, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1590, 1999 WL 1051103
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. California
DecidedOctober 14, 1999
Docket16-31219
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 240 B.R. 908 (In Re Pitt) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Pitt, 240 B.R. 908, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1590, 1999 WL 1051103 (Cal. 1999).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION CONCERNING POST-PETITION INTEREST ON NON-DISCHARGE ABLE SUPPORT CLAIMS

ARTHUR S. WEISSBRODT, Bankruptcy Judge.

The County of Santa Clara (“Creditor”) *909 objected to confirmation of the Chapter 13 1 plan filed by the Debtor in each of the above-numbered cases (collectively, “Debtors”). The plan in each case has been confirmed without prejudice to determination of the issue raised by the objection of Creditor, which is: when a non-discharge-able support debt is paid through a Chapter 13 plan in the amount that existed on the date of the bankruptcy petition, does post-petition interest on such debt constitute a non-dischargeable debt that remains to be paid after completion of the Chapter 13 plan?

The facts relevant to the subject issue are not in dispute and the matters have been briefed and argued. Debtors were represented by Edward A. Kunnes, Esq. of Boone, Miller, Prukop & Wolny. Creditor was represented by Deputy District Attorney Victor Chen, Esq. and Assistant District Attorney Philip L. Strauss, Esq. of the Family Support Division of the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s office.

I.

BACKGROUND

Charles Pitt filed a Chapter 13 petition on April 27, 1998, which commenced Case No. 98-53331-ASW. Creditor asserts a claim for pre-petition child support arrears of $7,792.86.

Edward and Pamela De Jesus filed a Chapter 13 petition on May 14,1998, which commenced Case No. 98-53879-ASW. Creditor asserts a claim for pre-petition child support arrears of $17,052.33.

Gary Michael Carucci filed a Chapter 13 petition on May 14, 1998, which commenced Case No. 98-53883-ASW. Creditor asserts a claim for pre-petition child support arrears of $93,624.85.

In each case, it is unclear whether the parties dispute the extent to which each claim is non-dischargeable and the extent to which each claim is entitled to priority status. However, the issue currently before this Court concerns only the non-dischargeable portion (if any) of each claim and, as discussed below, priority status is irrelevant to that issue.

II.

PARTIES’ POSITIONS

Debtors propose to pay through their respective Chapter 13 plans their respective non-dischargeable support obligations in the amounts that were outstanding when their respective Chapter 13 cases were commenced. Creditor concedes that some of the pre-petition support debt in each case may not be entitled to priority under § 507(a)(7), but Debtors are nevertheless treating all non-dischargeable pre-petition support debt as if it were entitled to priority status, and there has been no objection to such treatment by the Chapter 13 trustee or by any creditor.

Debtors cite § 1322(a)(2), which provides that a Chapter 13 plan must:

provide for the full payment, in deferred cash payments, of all claims entitled to priority under section 507 of this title, unless the holder of a particular claim agrees to a different treatment of such claim....

Debtors point out that this section does not define “full payment” to include payment of interest. They also note that the language of this section differs from that of § 1129(a)(9)(B)(i) and § 1129(a)(9)(C) concerning priority claims in Chapter 11 cases, which refer to “deferred cash payments of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim” — Chapter 11 permits priority claims to be paid over time (as does Chapter 13) but requires that the amount ultimately paid reflect the claims’ present value (as Chapter 13 does not), which necessarily means that some amount in addition to principal (ie., interest) must be paid in order to compensate the creditor *910 for delay in payment and make the future payment equivalent to a current payment. Debtors argue that, if Congress had intended for “full payment” under § 1322(a)(2) to include payment of post-petition interest, it either would have expressly said so, or would have referred to present value as it did in § 1129. Accordingly, Debtors contend, if they treat their non-dischargeable pre-petition support debts as priority debts, § 1322(a)(2) only requires “full payment” of such debts to the extent that they existed pre-petition and does not call for the payment of any post-petition interest. Debtors argue that, since § 1322(a)(2) does not require payment of post-petition interest on priority debts, full payment of the pre-petition amount of their support debts is all that is required to comply with § 1322(a)(2) and such compliance operates to discharge them of any obligation to pay post-petition interest on such debts, citing cases from other jurisdictions.

Creditor argues that there is a difference between what is required to confirm a Chapter 13 plan and what is required to discharge a debt. Creditor notes that § 1322(a)(2) is one of several criteria for confirmation of a plan, but contends that it does not affect the dischargeability of debts that are the basis of priority claims. Rather, dischargeability is governed by § 1328, which excepts support debts from discharge and makes no reference to whether a plan purports to pay such debts in full. Obviously, if a support debt has been paid in full by the time a Chapter 13 plan has been completed (including all accrued interest), no part of the debt will remain unpaid to be excepted from discharge, so the issue would be moot under such circumstances. In this case, however, Debtors do not propose to pay post-petition interest during the terms of their respective plans, so such interest will be outstanding when the plans are completed — Creditor’s position is that such accrued and unpaid interest will remain owing after completion of the plans and will not be discharged under § 1328. Creditor cites Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 84 S.Ct. 906, 11 L.Ed.2d 772 (1964) (“Bruning”) and In re Pardee, 218 B.R. 916 (9th Cir. BAP 1998) (“Pardee ”).

III.

ANALYSIS

In Pardee, the concurring opinion of Bankruptcy Judge Klein analyzes interest-bearing debts under Chapter 13 by dividing them into three categories.

The first category is priority debts that can be discharged in Chapter 13 but not in Chapter 7 (ie., debts for certain taxes). As priority debts, these must be paid in full through a Chapter 13 plan under § 1322(a)(2). Although such debts bear interest under non-bankruptcy law, § 1322(a)(2) does not require that such interest be paid through the plan, since the section does not refer to interest and does not call for payment of present value — in fact, Bruning and § 502 provide that a claim for post-petition interest on unsecured debt is not allowable against a bankruptcy estate, so an objection to a priority tax claim that included post-petition interest must be sustained as to interest.

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240 B.R. 908, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1590, 1999 WL 1051103, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-pitt-canb-1999.