In re Piñero Rodríguez

68 P.R. 726
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedMay 18, 1948
DocketNo. 71
StatusPublished

This text of 68 P.R. 726 (In re Piñero Rodríguez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Piñero Rodríguez, 68 P.R. 726 (prsupreme 1948).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Todd, Jr.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Attorney G-eneral of Puerto Rico, through the Fiscal of this Court, filed a complaint against-Attorney Antonio Pi-nero Rodriguez containing twelve charges as a result of which he has instituted the present disbarment proceeding. The respondent was notified of the complaint and in his answer merely set forth (a) that as to the eighth charge of the complaint the Fiscal admits that the internal revenue stamps which were missing in the deeds of his notarial protocols were delivered by the respondent to the Keeper of General Archives of the District and that the latter affixed and cancelled them in the proper deeds; that a majority of the stamps missing were of twenty-five cents and this was due to an erroneous computation and not to bad faith; (b) that the other violations of the Notarial Act alleged in the com plaint are similar "to those committed by Attorney Pablo Andino Espejo (In re Andino, 67 P.R.R. 78) and that this Court held in that case .that none of them involved the commission of fraud or of any public offense, nor that any person has been prejudiced by the lack of care on the part of the notary, and (c) that the [727]*727respondent places himself at the disposal of this Court to comply with and abide by any decision that might be rendered, “taking into consideration the complaint, the sworn statement given by the respondent before the Hon. Fiscal as well as the allegations in his answer, without a hearing. ’ ’

When the Fiscal was served with respondent’s answer, he informed the Court, in writing, that the other violations of the Notarial Act specified in the complaint and which according to the respondent are similar to those in In Be Andino, supra, are different from the facts which gave rise to the complaint therein and that in order to enable this Court to so determine, a hearing should be had.

We then allowed the respondent a term within which to inform this Court, in writing, whether he insisted in submitting the case on the pleadings and without a hearing. On April 21, 1948 the respondent filed a motion stating that “he insisted that this court decide the present case without a hearing and he so prayed.”

Thus, and by express motion of the respondent the case has been submitted to this Court on the charges of the complaint and on the answer thereto without a hearing.

It if should be true that, as alleged by the respondent, the charges specified in the complaint, except the eighth, are similar to those in In re Andino, supra, our decision in this case would prove an easy task. Nevertheless, a slight examination of the charges in both cases clearly shows that there is no such similarity. A summary of the charges in the present case shall so demonstrate.

The first charge refers to the protocol of 1935, which consists of three volumes. It is alleged in the complaint that the last deed appearing in the third volume is No. 125 executed on August 16,1935, without the closing memorandum; that said deed No. 125 was executed by Doña Georgina Ferrer Pérez, doña Margarita González, don Alfredo Feliciano and don José Padin. Yet the index sent to the District. Court [728]*728of Arecibo by the respondent (photostatic copy is attached to the complaint) shows that deed No. 125 was executed by Emma Miró and José Padin on July 6, 1935; that although deed No. 125 appears as having been the last one executed in the third volume of 1935, the protocol of that year does not contain the deeds executed before the respondent during the period between June 15, 1935 and July 28, 1935, according to the notarial indices sent to said court, and, lastly, that the respondent did not protocol deeds No. 126 to No. 173,'ex-ecuted before Mm from June 15 to December 8, 1935, as the • same appear' reported in the notarial indices whose photostatic copies are attached.

The first charge is serious. It is not only the discrepancy between the date and the names of the parties in deed No. 125, but it also charges the respondent with having failed to make the protocol of forty-seven deeds executed before him during the period between June 15 and December 8, 1935. Respondent’s silence as to this charge and his failure to explain in the preliminary investigation where the deeds are,1 implies that, either the deeds were never bound in the fourth volume of 1935 or, if they were, that said fourth volume has been lost. The bare fact is that neither the volume nor the deeds were delivered by the respondent to the [729]*729Keeper of General Archives. The unexplained disappearance of these deeds may be of serious legal consequence to the parties executing the documents and possibly to third persons. The first charge was established and it not only shows a gross negligence on the part of the respondent but a violation of the Notarial Act in the discharge of his duties as a notary.

In the second charge it is alleged that ninety-six deeds executed before him as notary and which appear in the three volumes of the protocol of 1935 do not agree in their numbers, dates and names of parties with the numbers, dates and names of parties in the deeds which he.reported in the notarial indices sent by him to the District Court of Areeibo as having been executed before him. This charge was established by photostatic copies of said indices and because the respondent gave no explanation in his sworn statement in relation thereto.

The third charge sets up that the respondent failed to state in his notarial indices which he sent to the court the date of execution of deeds Nos. 160 to 173 executed before him from October 13 to December 8, 1935. This charge has been confirmed by said indices.

The fourth and fifth charges allege that the respondent [730]*730allowed, thxougii inexcusable carelessness and negligence, that fifteen deeds of the protocols of 1934 and 1935 and seven deeds of the protocol of 1942 be destroyed by moths and some acid, respectively, and of these, eight deeds are in such bad condition that their contents can not be read and, therefore, no copies thereof can be issued. The respondent merely stated that this destruction was dne to the rain and moths.

It is alleged in the sixth charge that the signatures of some of the parties do not appear in six deeds executed before the respondent in 1935, 1940, 1941, 1942 and 1945, and in the ninth, that in 119 deeds executed from 1939 to 1945 respondent did not require the parties to stamp their fingerprints or the witnesses to affix their initials at the folios of said deeds. The only explanation given by the respondent in his testimony is that these facts were due to an oversight or that the parties did not appear. These charges have been established and they involve violations to §§ 9 and 14 of the Notarial Act, the latter as amended by Act No. 7 of March 23, 1937. As to the legal consequence of these violations, § 20 of the Notarial Act provides that any public instrument shall be null and void ‘ ‘. . . where the signature of the parties and witnesses, . . . .when required, do not appear.” And in Rosario v. Registrar, 59 P.R.R. 430. we held that “the legal [731]

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
68 P.R. 726, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-pinero-rodriguez-prsupreme-1948.