COURT OF APPEALS EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO, TEXAS
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No. 08-25-00277-CV
In re Pikes Peak Energy Services, LLC
AN ORIGINAL PROCEEDING IN MANDAMUS
M E MO RA N D UM O PI NI O N
Relator, Pikes Peak Energy Services, LLC (Pikes Peak), has filed a petition for writ of
mandamus asking this Court to vacate the order signed by the Honorable Pete Gomez, Judge
Presiding, 112th Judicial District Court of Pecos County, on October 21, 2024, wherein he granted
the Real Party in Interest’s motion for sanctions for spoliation of evidence. 1 We conditionally grant
in part and deny in part.
1 This original proceeding arises from the case styled, Jaclyn Rodriguez, Individually, on behalf of the Estate of Jesus Perez Jr., and as Next Friend of McKinley Jade Perez, a minor v. Pikes Peak Energy Services, LLC, trial court cause I. BACKGROUND
On March 11, 2018, Jesus Perez, Jr. was operating a company pickup truck owned by Pikes
Peak when he sustained fatal injuries in a single-vehicle collision. On March 21, 2018, Real-Party-
in-Interest Jaclyn Rodriguez, individually, on behalf of Perez’s estate, and as next friend of his
minor child, hired an attorney who sent Pikes Peak a certified letter formally requesting that it
preserve all component parts of the pickup truck involved in the collision. Pikes Peak forwarded
the letter to its insurer, who had then taken title to the truck after the collision. On May 16, 2018,
Rodriguez’s first attorney notified Pikes Peak that he no longer represented Rodriguez. On June
20, 2018, Rodriguez’s newly retained counsel sent a second preservation letter requesting the truck
be preserved in its entirety so it could be inspected. On July 2, 2018, Pikes Peak’s insurer sold the
truck, and it was soon destroyed.
Rodriguez filed a wrongful death and survival action against Pikes Peak alleging that Pikes
Peak knew the airbags and seatbelts in the truck were broken. Among other claims, Rodriguez
alleged that Pikes Peak had negligently maintained the vehicle in question, failed to repair and
inspect it after receiving knowledge of its defects, and it failed to provide Perez with a properly
working company vehicle. Pikes Peak generally denied liability and asserted various defenses
including the affirmative defense of comparative negligence.
Rodriguez moved for sanctions for spoliation of evidence, which the trial court granted
following a hearing. The trial court’s written order awarded the following remedies and forms of
relief:
1. The Court will award [Rodriguez] attorney fees, expenses and the costs of seeking discovery to this evidence. The amounts will be determined later.
number 19-06-07979-CV, pending in the 112th District Court of Crockett County, Texas. Respondent is the Honorable Pedro (Pete) Gomez, Jr. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.2.
2 2. The Court establishes the following facts against [Pikes Peak]:
a. [Pikes Peak] breached its duty to preserve the subject vehicle and its components[;] b. The seatbelts had been defective for a period of time as the [Event Date Recorder] would've confirmed[;] c. The airbags had been defective for a period of time as the EDR would’ve confirmed[.]
3. The Court will instruct the jury substantially as follows:
You are instructed that, when a party has possession of a piece of evidence at a time he knows or should have known it will be evidence in a controversy, and thereafter he disposes of it, makes it unavailable, or fails to produce it, there is a presumption in law that the piece of evidence, had it been produced, would have been unfavorable to the party who did not produce it. There is a presumption that evidence contained in the subject truck, and its component parts, including the seatbelts, airbags, and downloadable data if produced, would be unfavorable to Pikes Peak.
4. The Court limits or excludes the following evidence:
a. Any testimony related to the speed of the subject vehicle immediately prior to the March 11, 2018, incident[;]
b. [Pikes Peak] is prohibited from opposing the claims of defective seatbelts and airbags and knowledge thereof[;]
c. [Pikes Peak] is prohibited from cross examination of [Rodriguez’s] expert regarding seatbelt and airbags.
Pikes Peak next sought mandamus relief. It asks this Court to vacate the trial court’s order,
contending it imposed “excessive sanctions” for spoliation of evidence. Along with its petition,
Pikes Peak filed a motion for stay pending disposition of this proceeding. See Tex. R. App. P.
52.10. We granted the motion for stay and ordered that the trial court’s order and any trial setting
in the underlying case be stayed pending further order of this Court. See id. We also requested a
response to the petition for writ of mandamus. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(b). Rodriguez filed a
response in opposition contending the trial court had tailored remedies that appropriately addressed
Pikes Peak’s wrongful actions.
3 II. MANDAMUS STANDARD
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only when the trial court clearly abuses
its discretion and the relator has no adequate remedy by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.,
148 S.W.3d 124, 135 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts
without reference to guiding rules and principles such that its ruling is arbitrary or unreasonable.
Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992).
III. SPOLIATION SANCTIONS
Pikes Peak contends the trial court abused its discretion by finding it had spoliated evidence
because it had no duty to preserve the truck and, if it did, it did not breach the duty because there
was no intent to conceal the evidence. Pikes Peak further asserts that the trial court’s awarded
sanctions operated as death-penalty sanctions, which were excessive and improper. Because
certain of the imposed sanctions effectively adjudicated claims, Pikes Peak contends it has no
adequate remedy by appeal.
A. Adequate remedy by appeal
“A sanctions order is subject to review on appeal from the final judgment, Tex. R. Civ. P.
215.3, but, under certain circumstances, is subject to review before final judgment by writ of
mandamus.” In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. 2018). “An appeal is inadequate when parties
are in danger of permanently losing substantial rights,” such as “when the parties ability to present
a viable claim or defense is vitiated, or when the error cannot be made part of the appellate record.”
In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 203, 210–11 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam). “Sanctions that thwart effective appellate review by precluding a decision on the merits”
and “sanctions that have the effect of adjudicating all or a substantial part of a dispute and for
which appeal is realistically an inadequate remedy” are reviewable by mandamus. In re Garza,
4 544 S.W.3d at 840. Stated otherwise, when death penalty sanctions have the effect of adjudicating
a dispute, there is no adequate remedy by appeal. TransAm. Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d
913, 919 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding).
Here, the challenged order includes four individually listed sanctions: (1) it awarded
attorney’s fees to Rodriguez; (2) it ordered that an adverse-inference jury instruction be given to
the jury; (3) it made affirmative fact findings that the airbags and seatbelts of the subject vehicle
were defective and inoperable; and (4) it limited and excluded evidence that related to the speed
of the vehicle immediately prior to the collision, prohibited Pikes Peak from opposing Rodriguez’s
claims that the seatbelts and airbags were defective, and prohibited Pikes Peak from cross
examining Rodriguez’s expert regarding the state of condition of the seatbelts and airbags.
Although Pikes Peak challenged the entire sanctions order, it presents no issue on the trial
court’s award of attorney’s fees. Even so, the award of monetary sanctions is not reviewable on
mandamus. In re Dynamic Health, Inc., 32 S.W.3d 876, 882 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.)
(“Because Relators have an adequate remedy by appeal, we deny mandamus relief as a means of
review of the monetary sanctions levied by the trial court.”). As for the spoliation instruction, Pikes
Peak has an adequate remedy by appeal to address any abuse of discretion in giving the instruction
to the jury. See In re Medtronic, Inc., No. 10-14-00077-CV, 2014 WL 2159555, at *5 (Tex. App.—
Waco May 22, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding spoliation instruction was reviewable on appeal);
In re Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 12-17-00156-CV, 2017 WL 3225051, at *1 (Tex. App.—Tyler July
31, 2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (stating that a “jury instruction on spoliation does not
constitute a death penalty sanction because it only creates a rebuttable presumption” and
concluding that mandamus relief was not appropriate to review the order granting the spoliation
5 instruction). For these reasons, we conclude mandamus relief is not available to the extent of the
challenged order’s sanctions for attorney’s fees and the jury instruction at issue.
Turning to the trial court’s two other sanction awards, we conclude the affirmative fact
findings and exclusion of evidence qualify as a type of sanction that constitutes a death-penalty
sanction that has the effect of adjudicating a dispute. See TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell,
811 S.W.2d 913, 919 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding) (providing that sanctions which adjudicated a
dispute, struck pleadings, dismissed an action, or rendered a default judgment lacked adequate
remedy by appeal); In re First Transit Inc., 499 S.W.3d 584, 591 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2016, orig. proceeding) (providing that death penalty sanctions were those that had the effect of
adjudicating a claim or precluding a decision on the merits of the case); In re Ramsey, No. 10-16-
00003-CV, 2016 WL 3564407, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco June 29, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (finding
a sanction that the defendant was “not be allowed to support his affirmative claims made in his
counter-petition or from introducing any evidence in support of those claims” was a death-penalty
sanction and constituted an abuse of discretion because there was nothing in the record to show
the trial court attempted or even considered lesser sanctions). For this reason, those sanction are
more prone to mandamus review. See In re On Track Experience, LLC, No. 03-21-00304-CV, 2021
WL 4876949, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 20, 2021, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (holding
relator lacked adequate remedy by appeal when sanction prevented relator from asserting a case-
determinative affirmative defense); In re Xterra Constr., LLC, 582 S.W.3d 652, 666 (Tex. App.—
Waco 2019, orig. proceeding) (holding that “imposed sanctions that adjudicated any dispute
regarding causation in this case” lacked an adequate remedy by appeal). Thus, based on the nature
of the penalty imposed, mandamus relief may be appropriate for the remaining two sanctions
imposed. See In re Newkirk Logistics, Inc., 718 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tex. 2025) (orig. proceeding)
6 (“Mandamus relief is appropriate where ‘a trial court imposes sanctions which have the effect of
adjudicating a dispute,’ such as ‘striking pleadings.’”). We proceed to determine in this instance
whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion in awarding affirmative fact findings and in
excluding evidence as forms of relief.
B. Clear abuse of discretion
The Texas Supreme Court has adopted a framework for governing the imposition of
remedies for evidence spoliation. See Brookshire Brothers, Ltd. v. Aldridge, 438 S.W.3d 9
(Tex. 2014). The question of whether a party spoliated evidence and whether a particular remedy
is appropriate are both questions of law. Id. at 20. For the trial court to find that spoliation occurred,
it must first make an affirmative determination that: (1) the party who failed to produce evidence
had a duty to preserve the evidence, and (2) the nonproducing party must have breached its duty
to reasonably preserve material and relevant evidence. Id.
(1) Duty to preserve evidence
First, looking at whether Pikes Peak had a duty to preserve evidence, “[s]uch a duty arises
only when a party knows or reasonably should know that there is a substantial chance that a claim
will be filed and that evidence in its possession or control will be material and relevant to that
claim.” Id. Rodriguez asserts that Pikes Peak’s duty to preserve evidence arose for multiple
reasons, including the severity of the collision, the fact that the vehicle’s seatbelts and airbags were
not functioning before the collision at issue, and the receipt of actual notice through counsels’
preservation letters. Pikes Peak maintains it had no duty to preserve the truck at issue because,
although Perez died in the accident, no evidence established it knew or should have known there
was a substantial chance a legal claim would be filed. Pikes Peak alleges that Perez was off duty
at the time of the collision and he knew the seatbelts and airbags were not functioning. For these
7 reasons, Pikes Peak argues there was no reason for it to believe it would be sued for a claim. We
disagree.
“A subjective belief that it is not liable does not relieve a party of its duty to preserve
evidence; rather, we apply an objective standard in making the determination whether a party
should have reasonably anticipated litigation.” See In re J.H. Walker, Inc., No. 05-14-01497-CV,
2016 WL 819592, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 15, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (citing Brookshire
Bros., 438 S.W.3d at 20 (applying a “reasonable person” standard to duty determination)). The
record shows that Rodriguez notified Pikes Peak only days after the collision that she was
represented by counsel “in regard[] to the death of [Perez]” and the motor vehicle accident that
occurred on March 10, 2018. She formally requested that Pikes Peak preserve the truck for
inspection.
Because of the severity of the crash and because Pikes Peak was notified by Rodriguez’s
attorney to preserve the truck, we conclude an objective party in Pikes Peak’s position would know
or “reasonably should know that there is a substantial chance that a claim [would] be filed and that
evidence in its possession or control [would] be material and relevant to that claim.” Brookshire
Bros., 438 S.W.3d at 20.
(2) Breach of duty
Next, we determine whether there is record evidence supporting the trial court’s finding
that Pikes Peak intentionally destroyed the vehicle. Intentional spoliation means “the party acted
with the subjective purpose of concealing or destroying discoverable evidence.” Brookshire Bros.,
438 S.W.3d at 24. Intentional spoliation includes “‘willful blindness,’ which encompasses the
scenario in which a party does not directly destroy evidence known to be relevant and discoverable,
but nonetheless ‘allows for its destruction.”’ Id.
8 Rodriguez asserts intentional spoliation is established in this case due to Pikes Peak’s
knowledge of the preservation letters and the formal requests included for the vehicle to be
preserved in its entirety for inspection, photographing, and downloading of electronic data, if any.
Additionally, the record shows Pikes Peak emailed its insurer, days before receiving the first
preservation letter, informing it that: “Pikes Peak does not want the pickup for salvage. Please pick
it up.” Then, once it received the first preservation letter, it merely forwarded the letter to its insurer
stating: “We received the following letter today. It is requesting the vehicle be preserved. I have
attached the letter for your review.” Other than forwarding the letter, however, the record shows
Pikes Peak made no other effort to follow up and ensure proper preservation of the truck. Pikes
Peak simply explained its failure by claiming that it “viewed this accident as a property damage
claim” and “believed this meant there was not going to be a lawsuit, as it was a single vehicle
accident seemingly with no one else at fault.”
We conclude that the record evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Pikes Peak
acted with the subjective purpose of concealing or destroying discoverable evidence or that it acted
with willful blindness to that effect. Id.; see also In re Sw. Pub. Serv. Co., No. 13-19-00111-CV,
2020 WL 1887762, at *17 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 16, 2020, orig. proceeding)
(mem. op.) (holding there was a breach of duty to preserve when relator failed to preserve the
missing data and could not be justified on the basis that the evidence was destroyed in the ordinary
course of business).
(3) Appropriateness of sanctions
Upon finding that spoliation occurred, the trial court must exercise its discretion in
imposing a remedy. Petroleum Sols., Inc. v. Head, 454 S.W.3d 482, 488 (Tex. 2014). It may impose
an appropriate remedy under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215.2. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 215.2. While
9 the trial court’s discretion to remedy an act of spoliation is broad, it is not limitless. Petroleum
Sols., 454 S.W.3d at 489. We review a trial court’s imposition of sanctions under an abuse of
discretion standard. Id. (citing Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838 (Tex. 2004).
Sanctions must not be more severe than necessary to satisfy its legitimate purpose and must
be “just.” Petroleum Sols., 454 S.W.3d at 489. A direct relationship must exist between the
offensive conduct, the offender, and the sanction imposed. Id. To meet this requirement, the remedy
crafted by the trial court must be proportionate when weighing the culpability of the spoliating
party and the prejudice to the nonspoliating party. Brookshire Bros., 438 S.W.3d at 21. Further, a
sanction must not be excessive, which means it should be no more severe than necessary to satisfy
its legitimate purpose. TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917. “The punishment should fit the crime”
and that the sanction “should be no more severe than necessary to satisfy its legitimate purposes.”
Id. This requires a trial court to consider the availability of lesser sanctions, and “in all but the most
exceptional cases, actually test the lesser sanction.” Id.; see also Cire, 134 S.W.3d at 841. The goal
is to restore the parties to a rough approximation of their positions if all evidence were available.
Brooksire Bros., 438 S.W.3d at 18.
Here, the trial court ordered four types of remedies in response to Pikes Peak’s spoliation
of evidence. As previously mentioned, the award of attorney’s fees and the spoliation instruction
are not reviewable on mandamus, and we do not review the appropriateness of either of them.
Therefore, our appropriateness-of-sanctions review only concerns the imposition of affirmative
fact findings and the exclusion of evidence sanctions.
Here, while it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that the truck’s destruction
prevented Rodriguez from establishing the existence of defects in the condition of certain safety
features of the vehicle at the time of the collision, the failure to preserve the vehicle did not prevent
10 Rodriguez from establishing remaining elements of her negligence claim. In effect, however, the
reach of the sanction order prohibited Pikes Peak from challenging certain aspects of causation
and pursuing its affirmative defense of comparative negligence. For this reason, we conclude there
is no direct relationship between its offensive conduct and the sanction imposed. In re J.H. Walker,
Inc., No. 05-14-01497-CV, 2016 WL 819592, at *10 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 15, 2016, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (concluding there was “no direct relationship between the offensive conduct
(destroying the tractor) and the sanction imposed (striking Walker Trucking’s pleadings and
entering a default judgment as to gross negligence liability”)). Additionally, it is not apparent from
the record that the trial court concluded that lesser sanctions would be inadequate under the
circumstances. In fact, the trial court did order lesser sanctions in the form of monetary sanctions
and a spoliation instruction. There is no indication that those sanctions were inadequate
punishment for the conduct at issue. Cire, 134 S.W.3d at 841.
IV. CONCLUSION
Having examined and fully considered the petition for writ of mandamus, the response,
and the reply, the Court is of the opinion that Rodriguez has shown entitlement to mandamus relief,
in part. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus and we direct the
trial court to vacate the portions of its October 21, 2025 spoliation order granting death-penalty
sanctions in the form of (1) affirmative fact findings against Pikes Peak (Item number 2), and (2)
the limitation or exclusion of Pike Peak’s evidence (Item number 4). Otherwise, we deny relief
sought with regard to the award of attorney’s fees (Item number 1), and the ordering of a spoliation
jury instruction (Item number 3). Our writ will issue only if the trial court fails to comply. We lift
the stay previously imposed in this case.
11 GINA M. PALAFOX, Justice
May 19, 2026
Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.