In Re Phillip "Baby Shark" Scott v. the State of Texas
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Opinion
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-24-00118-CV
In re Phillip “Baby Shark” Scott
ORIGINAL PROCEEDING FROM COMAL COUNTY
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relator Phillip “Baby Shark” Scott, an inmate in the Comal County Jail, has filed
a pro se petition for writ of mandamus identifying as respondents the 22nd and 207th Judicial
District Courts and complaining of the district courts’ alleged refusal to rule on a number of
pro se motions in cause number CR2023-382, including a motion to dismiss the underlying
criminal matter apparently filed on June 9, 2023. Scott asks us to “compel performance of
duties” by the district courts, directing the courts to rule on the pending motions. Having
reviewed the petition and the record provided, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus. See
Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).
To obtain mandamus relief for a trial court’s refusal to rule on a motion, a relator
must establish that (1) the motion was properly filed and has been pending for a reasonable time;
(2) the relator requested a ruling on the motion; and (3) the trial court refused to rule. In re
Roberts, No. 03-12-00513-CV, 2012 WL 3629367, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 21, 2012,
orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (citing In re Sarkissian, 243 S.W.3d 860, 861 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, orig. proceeding); see also In re Hearn, 137 S.W.3d 681, 685 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2004, orig. proceeding)). A relator must show that the trial court received, was aware of, and
was asked to rule on the motion. Id. (citing In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d 659, 661 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding)).
It is relator’s burden to properly request and show entitlement to mandamus relief.
Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tex. 1992); In re Davidson, 153 S.W.3d 490, 491 (Tex.
App.–Amarillo 2004, orig. proceeding); see also Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex.
App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“Even a pro se applicant for a
writ of mandamus must show himself entitled to the extraordinary relief he seeks”). In this
regard, the relator must provide the reviewing court with a record sufficient to establish his right
to mandamus relief. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 837; In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d at 661–62; see
also Tex. R. App. P. 52.7(a)(1) (relator must file with petition “a certified or sworn copy of every
document that is material to the relator’s claim for relief and that was filed in any underlying
proceeding”), 52.7(a) (specifying required contents for record), 52.3(k) (specifying required
contents for appendix).
In support of his petition, Scott attaches an unsworn record including what
appears to be copies of various trial court submissions on which he now alleges refusal to rule,
some of which—though not certified as required by Rule 52.7—appear to bear the file stamp of
the district clerk. Assuming the motions were properly filed, Scott has not demonstrated that the
motions in question were brought to the trial court’s attention or that the trial court is aware of
the motions. See In re Hearn, 137 S.W.3d at 685 (holding that simply filing matter with district
clerk is not sufficient to impute knowledge of pending pleading to trial court); see also In re
2 Sarkissian, 243 S.W.3d at 861 (mere filing of motion with trial-court clerk does not constitute
request that trial court rule on motion).
Scott has not provided this Court with a sworn record or certified copies of
correspondence from Scott addressed directly to the trial judge (or appropriate court
coordinator) of either court expressly requesting a hearing on the pending motions. We
therefore conclude that, based on the record provided, Scott has failed to show his
entitlement to mandamus relief. Accordingly, we deny his petition for writ of mandamus.
See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a).
Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Smith and Theofanis
Filed: February 27, 2024
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