2020 IL App (2d) 191102-U No. 2-19-1102 Order filed May 26, 2020
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(c)(2) and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
In re P.H., a minor ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Kane County. ) ) No. 16-JA-101 ) ) Honorable (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner- ) Linda S. Abrahamson, Appellee v. K.M., Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Jorgensen and Bridges concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s finding that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of parental rights was in the minor’s best interest is not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Affirmed.
¶2 Following a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found respondent, K.M., unfit to parent
her child, P.H., and that it was in P.H.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. On
appeal, respondent does not challenge the unfitness finding made by the trial court. Rather, she
only contests the finding made by the trial court that it was in the best interest to terminate her
parental rights in P.H. For the reasons below, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND 2020 IL App (2d) 191102-U
¶4 We have thoroughly read the record and the parties are familiar with the facts.
Accordingly, we will recite only those facts which we find relevant to the disposition of this appeal.
¶5 Respondent is the biological mother of P.H., born April 26, 2015. The biological father of
P.H., who signed a consent for P.H.’s adoption, is not a party to this appeal.
¶6 P.H. was born prematurely requiring extended hospitalization after her birth. She was
diagnosed with global developmental delay, failure to thrive, congenital hypothyroidism,
oropharyngeal dysphagia (G-tube dependent), mild cerebral palsy, and reactive airway disease.
P.H.’s medical conditions require continued care, therapy, and attention from numerous medical
specialists. Because P.H. is a medically complex child, she needs daily care. P.H. and her younger
sibling both received nursing care in respondent’s home, Monday through Friday.
¶7 The State became involved with this particular case in December 2016, when respondent
cancelled the nursing staff and, without making anyone aware of where she and her five children
were going, moved them from Chicago to a hotel in Kane County, where P.H.’s younger sibling
died. P.H. was approximately sixteen months old at the time. The State filed a petition for an
adjudication of neglect on December 13, 2016, claiming, inter alia, that P.H. was placed in an
injurious environment because respondent failed to follow through with the recommendations of
medical professionals regarding P.H’s needs, specifically placing P.H. at risk of harm by not
allowing nursing staff access to P.H. Respondent did not enter into any stipulations regarding
P.H.’s younger sibling’s death.
¶8 On June 27, 2017, at the adjudication hearing, respondent stipulated to the factual basis
that she was not fit to parent. Thereafter, following a dispositional hearing, the court found P.H.
was neglected, and made her a ward of the court, placing her in the guardianship and custody of
the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
-2- 2020 IL App (2d) 191102-U
¶9 In November 2017, respondent was hospitalized after being seriously injured by P.H.’s
father in a domestic violence incident. The first permanency review took place a month later, by
which time P.H. had been in foster care for nearly one year. This also was the point when
respondent had moved to Florida to distance herself from the father and to be with her family. The
trial court allowed respondent to take her other children with her to Florida over the objection of
the State but kept P.H. here in foster care out of concern for respondent’s ability to care for her.
Over time after moving to Florida, respondent stopped making reasonable efforts to achieve
unification with P.H.
¶ 10 On July 30, 2019, the State filed an amended petition seeking to terminate respondent’s
parental rights for (1) failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility
as to P.H.’s welfare; (2) failure to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were
the basis for the removal of the child from respondent; (3 and 4) failure to make reasonable
progress toward the return of the child within the nine-month period after adjudication of neglected
minor, namely, June 28, 2017, through March 28, 2018, and March 29, 2018, through December
29, 2018; (5) deserting the child for more than three months next preceding the commencement of
the adoption proceeding; and (6) evidencing an intent to forego her parental rights, as manifested
by her failure for a period of 12 months to maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child,
though physically able to do so.
¶ 11 Following the hearing, the court found the State had proved by clear and convincing
evidence that respondent was unfit pursuant to the first four allegations of unfitness. See 750 ILCS
50/1 (D)(b), (m)(i), m (ii) (West 2018). The primary concern underlying the court’s finding was
respondent’s failure to gain the knowledge, familiarity, and training regarding P.H.’s medically
complex needs “to effect a safe return home.”
-3- 2020 IL App (2d) 191102-U
¶ 12 The court subsequently proceeded to the best-interest phase of the bifurcated proceeding.
The court admitted into evidence two court appointed special advocate (CASA) reports of July 3,
2019, and August 28, 2019, and Youth Services Board (YSB) reports from the same time frame.
At respondent’s request, and due to the absence of respondent and Beverly Hoskins, P.H.’s great
grandmother, from the hearing, the court took judicial notice of their testimony from the unfitness
hearing. The court also admitted several exhibits submitted by respondent, stating that it would
give them the appropriate weight.
¶ 13 P.H.’s foster mother, Cassy B. testified that P.H. had been living with her and her paramour,
the foster father, Casey K., full time since August 2019. Prior to that she had known P.H. for over
a year during which time she would provide respite care and care over the weekends, and thus
P.H.’s transition to living with them full time had been an easy adjustment. P.H lives with four
other foster children: two sibling Hispanic boys, ages 7 and 12, and two sibling African Americans,
a 4-year-old boy and a 3-year-old girl. All the children get along very well. It has helped P.H.
because she sees what the other children are doing and P.H. strives to keep up with them. P.H.
loves her foster parents and calls them “mom” and “daddy.”
¶ 14 They live in a large four-bedroom house. P.H. shares a bedroom with her foster sister.
P.H.’s bed is fitted with a safety railing to prevent her from falling. Cassey B. also installed safety
gates on the stairs, although P.H. can go up and down the stairs holding the handrail with someone
behind her. P.H. rides a bicycle but maneuvers it with her feet. The family encourages P.H. to do
as much as possible by herself.
¶ 15 Cassy B. was a full-time registered nurse but decreased her hours to two to three days per
week so that she could care for P.H. Her nursing background gives her the special knowledge and
training to assist with P.H.’s developmental issues. Casey K. is a CNA and currently does in-home
-4- 2020 IL App (2d) 191102-U
healthcare for three young gentlemen outside of the foster home, two of whom have autism and
one cerebral palsy.
¶ 16 Cassy B. is very close with her extended family, who live about 10 minutes away from her.
They spend every Sunday and holidays together. P.H. is treated as part of the extended family.
The foster family is active in their church.
¶ 17 Cassy B. further testified as to P.H.’s ongoing physical, occupational, and speech therapy,
which she is able to supplement at home. For instance, Cassy B. provides puzzles and scissors to
work on P.H.’s occupational skills and she encourages P.H. to use her walker. Cassy B. is familiar
with P.H.’s diagnoses, the attending doctors, and the current medical equipment P.H. needs to
assist her with mobility and vision. P.H. does not need as much medication as she previously did,
but she still uses the nebulizer daily. P.H. has grown “tremendously” in the year and a half since
Cassy B. has known and cared for her.
¶ 18 P.H. is African American and Cassy B. plans on teaching P.H. about her cultural identity
through books, friends, and role models. Cassy B. stated that it is very important that P.H. remains
in communication with her biological family. She noted that in the last six months, there had been
four to five video chats between P.H. and respondent. The foster parents wish to adopt P.H.
¶ 19 Before testifying, the court took judicial notice of the entire testimony of Rebecca Krise,
P.H.’s current YSB caseworker, from the unfitness portion of the termination proceeding.
¶ 20 Krise then testified that it was apparent that P.H. was loved by the foster family. She found
that there is a definite attachment, and the foster parents love her like one of their own. Krise had
no safety concerns about P.H. and believed that the foster home was safe and appropriate for P.H.’s
special needs. Krise observed that P.H. is happy, healthy, and feels safe with the foster family.
She believed that P.H.’s speech has greatly improved. Krise also observed that keeping up to date
-5- 2020 IL App (2d) 191102-U
on P.H.’s medical care was “pretty crucial” and that her care giver must know P.H.’s requirements,
such as therapies, medications, and treatment techniques. Krise believed that the foster family met
those needs and that both foster parents have the medical background important for P.H.’s health,
safety, and development. In her opinion, it was in P.H.’s best interest that the foster family adopt
her.
¶ 21 Krise testified on cross-examination that respondent had not been there for P.H. In
response to whether termination was necessary if respondent could be trained in the same way the
foster parents have been, Krise stated that P.H. needs a parent who is willing to meet P.H.’s needs
“day-after-day,” and respondent has not been able to demonstrate this level of care. Krise opined
that she felt it was necessary to terminate respondent’s parental rights based on respondent’s lack
of progress over the past year or two, i.e., not being involved in P.H.’s medical care, not attending
visits with her or video chats, not participating in therapies, and not being up-to-date on her medical
care, which was crucial.
¶ 22 In the CASA report of August 28, 2019, the CASA had no concerns with the foster family
meeting P.H.’s medical needs. She noted that P.H. was more verbal and her speech articulate and
assumed that this was due to daily interaction with the other foster children. The CASA reported
that P.H. engages with and plays happily with her foster siblings. She reported that both foster
parents are openly affectionate with all the children and P.H turns to them for her needs and
attention. She believed that all of P.H.’s needs—educational, medical, emotional, and social—are
being met.
¶ 23 Following argument, the court methodically considered the applicable best-interest factors
set forth in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West
2016)). The court observed that the “parent/child relationship was significantly altered and
-6- 2020 IL App (2d) 191102-U
impaired when [respondent] went to Florida.” Although respondent had moved to Florida for her
own safety, the court found that it had a big impact on her ability to stay involved in P.H.’s life
and she had not provided for or met P.H.’s needs for about three years. The court noted that, at
the time of the ruling, P.H. had been in care for three years and was 4 1/2 years’ old. The court
found that P.H. was “entitled to permanence sooner than later” and the foster parents are committed
to providing permanency for this child. And so, after assessing all the relevant factors and giving
them their appropriate weight, the trial court found that the State proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that it was in P.H.’s best interest that respondent’s parental rights be terminated.
¶ 24 Respondent timely appeals, challenging only the trial court’s best-interest finding
terminating her parental rights in P.H.
¶ 25 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 26 Initially we note that respondent does not challenge the trial court’s finding that she was
unfit by clear and convincing evidence, but instead appeals only the court’s finding that it was in
P.H.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. After a parent is found unfit, the trial
court shifts its focus in termination proceedings to the child’s best interest. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d
347, 364 (2004). At the best-interest stage, a “parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child
relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” Id. See In re B.B., 386
Ill. App. 3d 686, 697 (2008) (the purpose of the best-interest hearing is to minimize further damage
to the child by shifting the court’s scrutiny to the child’s best interest). Before a parent’s rights
may be terminated, the trial court must find that the State proved, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that it is in the child’s best interest those rights be terminated. In re D.T. 212 Ill. 2d at
366.
¶ 27 We will not overturn the trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights is in the
-7- 2020 IL App (2d) 191102-U
child’s best interests unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Shru. R., 2014
IL App (4th) 140275, ¶ 24. Such a determination is against the manifest weight of the evidence
only if the opposite conclusion is clear or the determination is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based
on the evidence presented. In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498 (2002).
¶ 28 When considering whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interest, the
trial court must consider various statutory factors within “the context of the child’s age and
developmental needs.” These include the following: “(a) the physical safety and welfare of the
child, including food, shelter, health, and clothing; (b) the development of the child’s identity; (c)
the child’s background and ties, including familial, cultural, and religious; (d) the child’s sense of
attachments, including: (i) where the child actually feels love, attachment, and a sense of being
valued (as opposed to where adults believe the child should feel such love, attachment, and a sense
of being valued); (ii) the child’s sense of security; (iii) the child’s sense of familiarity; (iv)
continuity of affection for the child; (v) the least disruptive placement alternative for the child; (e)
the child’s wishes and long-term goals; (f) the child’s community ties, including church, school,
and friends; (g) the child’s need for permanence which includes the child’s need for stability and
continuity of relationships with parent figures and with siblings and other relatives; (h) the
uniqueness of every family and child; (i) the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute
care; and (j) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child.” 705 ILCS 405/1-3
(4.05) (a) to (j) (West 2016).
¶ 29 In ruling, the court discussed the evidence presented at the hearing as it related to each of
the best interest factors it found relevant and concluded factors (a), (d), (e), (f), (g), (i), and (j)
weighed in favor of termination. Factors (b) and (c) favored against termination, and factor (h)
was neutral. Specifically, the judge noted:
-8- 2020 IL App (2d) 191102-U
“The best interests evaluation is not and should not be a rehash of fitness and I
know that some of those facts kind of can be relevant and kind of bleed into what we are
doing here now, but I note that in ten days this child will have been in care for three years.
She is four-and-a-half years old, so she was just like about a year-and-a-half when she came
into care. And so[,] applying the evidence that I heard here today to the best interests
factors, which are found at 405/1-3(4.05) which are mandated that I consider.
Number A, physical safety and welfare of [P.H.], including food, shelter, health,
and clothing. Those needs have not been met by her mom for three years and not even
remotely by her mom since -- for about two years, since December of 2017 when she went
to Florida. And I do not disagree with [respondent’s counsel] reminding that she did that
for her open safety. Absolutely. But it—it had a big impact on her ability to stay involved
in this child's life. So[,] [respondent] has not been—has not provided those needs or has
not met [P.H.’s] needs in that regard.
The development of [P.H.’s] identity. It is not disputed that the foster parents here
today are Caucasian or white and [P.H.] is African/American, so is her mom, so is her dad,
so is Ms. Hoskins, and her entire family, but the testimony was from Foster Parents they
have a commitment to acknowledge [P.H.] culture and a willingness to even include
members of her personal and birth family so long as that can be safe. I do note that they
are now caring for two other African/American kids in their home. I am not going to give
that particular factor a lot of weight because they are not necessarily going to be there
forever, and I don’t know their status, and so I can’t—I can’t put a lot of weight on that,
but they are there now.
-9- 2020 IL App (2d) 191102-U
Number C, her background ties, including familial, cultural, and religious, kind of
merges into B, and so I don’t have anything in addition to say on C.
And so[,] I think that those factors may—Number A favors termination. B and C
may favor not termination. Number D the child’s sense of attachments, including where
she feels love, her sense of security, familiarity, and affection and the least disruptive
placement. I think that under D all of those strongly favor termination of parental rights.
Again, [respondent] has not parented this child for three years and has been a half
a country away for her for two. One of the notes that I made at one point in our proceedings
is skyping even now is not and cannot be a substitute for parent/child time. It is—it’s not
even close.
Anyway, I think that that parent/child relationship was significantly altered and
impaired when [respondent] went to Florida.
The child’s wishes and long-term goals. [P.H.] is far too young to have those and
so I put the Guardian Ad Litem’s argument kind of in that category, so that one would favor
termination.
Her community ties, including church, school, and friends. To the extent that she
has those as now a four-and-a-half-year-old, she wouldn’t have had many or any of those
as a year-and-a-half- old, so that factor favors termination.
Her need for permanence, including her need for stability, continuity of
relationships, etcetera. I believe that that factor favors termination. When there are
observations that when [P.H.] is flustered or need[s] that she goes to the—Cassie and Casey
who are in this room, her current foster parents, for comfort, nurturance, and her needs are
- 10 - 2020 IL App (2d) 191102-U
being met by them that a—that a lay person could make an observation of attachment when
a child goes to an adult for those kinds of things.
Further, that the argument in—by mom that there would have needed to be evidence
that [respondent] could not or would not provide permanency to [P.H.] at this time is not
well taken. There has been a finding that she is not fit to parent. So[,] at this moment she
is not a permanency option because she has been found by clear and convincing evidence
to be not fit. So that argument is not well taken. And we should not at this point have to
wait for a child to disregulate. She is entitled to permanence sooner than later and so,
again, Number G favors termination.
Uniqueness of every family and child. I frankly don’t know what that means[,] and
I have never known what that means, so I am going to call that neutral. But the risks
attendant to entering and being in substitute care, again goes—so we didn’t need to have
to wait for her to disregulate, because if she stays in care to the point of disregulation,
getting her regulated again may be beyond anybody’s ability. And so that factor also favors
And Number J, the preferences of the people available to care for her. The Foster
Parents who are here today have committed to providing permanency to this child, so that
factor would also favor termination. So assessing all of the relevant factors and giving
them there appropriate weight, I believe that the State has shown by a preponderance of
the evidence that it is in [P.H.] best interests at this time to terminate [respondent’s] parental
rights.”
¶ 30 In arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in terminating her parental rights,
respondent maintains that the court gave too much weight to testimony regarding her conduct
- 11 - 2020 IL App (2d) 191102-U
during the unfitness portion of the hearing. We note, however, that at the best-interest hearing the
“full range of the parent’s conduct” must be considered, including the grounds for finding the
parent unfit. In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 217 (2002). Such evidence is a “crucial consideration”
at the best-interest hearing. In re D.L., 326 Ill. App. 3d 262, 271 (2001).
¶ 31 Respondent argues factor (a) ( the physical safety and welfare of the child, including food,
shelter, health, and clothing describe factor) favors her because she provided proof about the
various services which she had completed in Florida, i.e., that she has met the minimum parenting
standards, completed individual therapy, continues to visit P.H. as allowed, maintained
employment, and there is no proof that respondent would not provide for the welfare and safety of
the children or is unable or lacks the resources to provide food, shelter health, and clothing for
P.H. Respondent further maintains that factors (f) ( the child’s community ties, including church,
school, and friends) and (g) (the child’s need for permanence which includes the child’s need for
stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures and with siblings and other relatives;
describe) also favor her because the need for stability and permanency lies through P.H.’s
reunification with respondent. As the trial court observed, these arguments are not well taken
because respondent was found by clear and convincing evidence to be unfit and respondent is not
a viable placement for permanency.
¶ 32 Respondent also argues that, even though the court correctly found factors (b) and (c)
weighed against termination, it abused its discretion by not weighing these factors as a “contrasting
determination of strong support” for respondent’s parental rights. Respondent further asserts that
factors (d) and (e) favor her because the exhibits and the testimony support her love and attachment
for P.H. Respondent contends that factor (j) favors her, asserting that P.H.’s special needs and
disability have changed and gradually improved over time and that there has been less need for
- 12 - 2020 IL App (2d) 191102-U
medical care. Given P.H.’s gradual improvement and the relatively brief time of placement with
the foster family, respondent argues the special needs of P.H do not weigh in favor of termination
but weigh in favor of respondent’s parental rights.
¶ 33 All the above arguments essentially ask this court to reweigh the evidence presented below
to reach a different conclusion. However, “[i]t is not the function of this court to reweigh the
evidence or assess the credibility of testimony and set aside the trial court’s determination merely
because a different conclusion could have been drawn from the evidence.” In re Marriage of
Pfeiffer, 237 Ill. App. 3d 510, 513 (1992). Rather, we reverse a best interest finding only if the
opposite conclusion is clear or the determination is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the
evidence presented. In re D.F. at 498.
¶ 34 Here, the trial court’s determination is amply supported by the record. Krise testified that
it would be in P.H.’s best interest to be adopted by the foster parents. The foster parents had been
involved in taking care of P.H. on a part or full-time basis for a year and a half, including providing
a safe, stable, nurturing home environment, and have the training to properly attend to her
significant continuing medical needs. Further, they indicated their desire to adopt P.H., who refers
to her foster parents as “mom” and “daddy.” Similarly, she views her foster siblings as her brothers
and sister. P.H.’s development and progress in her current foster placement has been significant.
¶ 35 As it relates to respondent, P.H. had little opportunity to develop a bond with her due to
respondent’s failure to make reasonable efforts or progress toward the goal of return home. Even
if there existed a bond between respondent and P.H., this would not automatically ensure that a
parent will be fit or that the child’s best interest will be served by that parent. See In re K.H., 346
Ill. App. 3d 443, 463 (2004). An adoptive home is available not only to satisfy P.H.’s vital medical
needs but also her need for permanency and stability. The trial court’s observation that further
- 13 - 2020 IL App (2d) 191102-U
delay and lack of permanency and stability certainly would not be in P.H.’s best interest was
reasonable. See In re K.H., 346 Ill. App. 3d at 463 (permanency and stability are important for a
child’s welfare).
¶ 36 Given the applicable standard of review, we conclude that the court’s finding that it is in
the best interest of P.H. to terminate respondent’s parental rights is not against the manifest weight
of the evidence.
¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 38 Based on the preceding, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court of Kane County
terminating respondents' parental rights.
¶ 39 Affirmed.
- 14 -