STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN SUPREME COURT
A22-0523
Original Jurisdiction Per Curiam Dissenting, Anderson, Thissen, JJ. Took no part, Procaccini, J.
In re Petition for Reinstatement of Filed: October 4, 2023 Adam W. Klotz, a Minnesota Attorney, Office of Appellate Courts Registration No. 0390925.
________________________
Nicholas M. Ryan, Eric T. Cooperstein, Law Office of Eric T. Cooperstein, PLLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota, for petitioner.
Susan M. Humiston, Director, Joshua H. Brand, Senior Assistant Director, Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility, Saint Paul, Minnesota, for respondent.
SYLLABUS
Based on our independent review of the record, the panel’s conclusion that
petitioner has not undergone the requisite moral change was not clearly erroneous.
Petition denied.
1 OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Adam W. Klotz filed a petition for reinstatement following his indefinite
suspension from the practice of law. After a hearing, a panel of the Lawyers Professional
Responsibility Board recommended against Klotz’s reinstatement. The panel concluded
that Klotz failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he had undergone
the requisite moral change for reinstatement. Klotz contests the panel’s findings,
conclusions, and recommendation, and asserts that he should be reinstated. The Director
of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibility (Director) agrees with the panel’s
recommendation.
After independently reviewing the record, we conclude that Klotz should not be
reinstated to the practice of law because he failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that he underwent the requisite moral change required for reinstatement.
FACTS
Klotz was admitted to practice law in Minnesota in 2010. In 2018, we indefinitely
suspended Klotz with no right to petition for reinstatement for a minimum of 18 months
for misappropriating client funds; making false statements to the Director and attempting
to conceal from the Director the full scope of his misconduct; creating a false and
misleading document; failing to maintain required trust account records; failing to
safeguard and promptly refund an unearned retainer; making false statements to clients;
neglecting client matters; and failing to communicate with clients. In re Klotz, 909 N.W.2d
327, 330–31, 335 (Minn. 2018). We concluded that Klotz violated many rules of
2 professional conduct by his misconduct. Id. at 337. We explained that several stressors in
Klotz’s life, his inexperience in the practice of law and a lack of a selfish motive, were
mitigating factors. Id. at 338–40. Because of the “long duration and severity of Klotz’s
misconduct,” we held that the referee’s recommended suspension (minimum of 1 year)
would be insufficient and instead imposed an indefinite suspension with no right to petition
for reinstatement for 18 months. Id. at 341.
Klotz filed a petition for reinstatement in February 2020. The Director investigated
and provided Klotz with a draft report summarizing the investigation. After receiving the
Director’s report, Klotz withdrew his petition on September 30, 2021.
About 7 months later, in April 2022, Klotz filed his current reinstatement petition.
The panel conducted a 2-day hearing. Klotz testified on his own behalf and called four
witnesses. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Director announced her opposition to
Klotz’s reinstatement.
In December 2022, the panel issued its findings, conclusions, and recommendation.
The panel concluded that Klotz failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence moral
change and that the public would be at risk if Klotz were to be readmitted to the practice
of law, and as a result, it recommended not reinstating Klotz. Klotz ordered a hearing
transcript, and he asks us to reinstate him to the practice of law in Minnesota.
ANALYSIS
We are responsible for determining whether an attorney will be reinstated. In re
Kadrie, 602 N.W.2d 868, 870 (Minn. 1999). When deciding whether to reinstate an
attorney, we “conduct an independent review of the entire record; although we consider a
3 panel’s recommendation, we are not bound by it.” In re Tigue, 960 N.W.2d 694, 699
(Minn. 2021). When an attorney orders a transcript, like Klotz did here, we will uphold
the panel’s findings so long as the record supports them and they are not clearly erroneous.
In re Stockman, 896 N.W.2d 851, 856 (Minn. 2017).
To be reinstated, the attorney must prove: “(1) moral change; (2) the intellectual
competence to practice law; (3) compliance with the conditions of suspension; and
(4) compliance with the requirements of Rule 18, RLPR. In re Mose (Mose III),
993 N.W.2d 251, 261 n.5 (Minn. 2023). We further weigh four additional factors
when considering reinstatement: “the attorney’s recognition that the conduct was wrong,
the length of time since the misconduct and suspension, the seriousness of the
misconduct, and any physical or mental pressures susceptible to correction.” Id. Because
the key issue here is whether Klotz has demonstrated the requisite moral change, we focus
on that requirement.
In determining whether to reinstate an attorney, “[s]howing a moral change is the
most important factor.” Stockman, 896 N.W.2d at 857. In general, “to prove moral change
a lawyer must show remorse and acceptance of responsibility for the misconduct, a change
in the lawyer’s conduct and state of mind that corrects the underlying misconduct that led
to the suspension, and a renewed commitment to the ethical practice of law.” In re Mose
(Mose II), 843 N.W.2d 570, 575 (Minn. 2014). Evidence of moral change must come from
“an observed record of appropriate conduct” and “the [attorney’s] own state of mind and
his values.” Stockman, 896 N.W.2d at 857 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
4 Here, the panel made thorough findings in evaluating Klotz’s remorse and
acceptance of responsibility for his misconduct, his change in conduct and state of mind,
and his renewed commitment to the ethical practice of law. Ultimately, the panel
concluded that Klotz did not undergo the requisite moral change that would allow him to
practice law.
Remorse and Acceptance of Responsibility for the Misconduct
To establish a moral change, Klotz must first prove that he “show[s] remorse and
acceptance of responsibility for the misconduct.” Mose II, 843 N.W.2d at 575. The panel
determined that Klotz did not express the requisite remorse and acceptance of
responsibility for his misconduct. Klotz contends that the record, as a whole, shows that
he expressed remorse and accepted responsibility.
The panel found that even though Klotz expressed remorse to his witnesses, the
actual remorse that Klotz conveyed failed to fully consider the totality of his misconduct,
and the evidence showed that Klotz felt a general sense of remorse overall for having been
suspended. Notably, the panel found that Klotz’s inconsistent statements and minimization
of his conduct at the hearing countered any expressions of remorse and acceptance of
responsibility for his misconduct. 1
1 We acknowledge that Klotz challenged some of the findings regarding his moral change, such as that Klotz failed to disclose to “several” witnesses the nature of his misconduct until shortly before the reinstatement hearing, that Klotz excused his misconduct as not as “nefarious” as it seemed, or that Klotz continues to view his misconduct as an “accounting mistake.” But even if these findings are clearly erroneous, as the dissent contends, they do not undermine the panel’s other factual findings and overall determination that Klotz did not demonstrate the requisite remorse or accept responsibility for his misconduct.
5 The panel addressed the witnesses’ testimony regarding Klotz’s remorse and
acceptance of responsibility. The panel found that even though the witnesses’ testimony
was credible, based on Klotz’s own testimony and demeanor at the hearing, the panel did
not find that Klotz’s statements to his witnesses that he accepted responsibility or expressed
remorse for his conduct were credible. Specifically, the panel found that even though one
witness’s testimony was helpful and credible, it was not enough to overcome the panel’s
direct observations regarding Klotz’s behavior.
Klotz contends that the panel erred because it did not view the evidence of his
remorse as a whole. Klotz emphasizes his own transparency and honesty about his
misconduct. Yet the panel found that Klotz’s testimony regarding accepting responsibility
for his misconduct or expressing remorse was not credible. The record supports these
findings, and we defer to the panel’s credibility determinations and findings. In re Mose
(Mose I), 754 N.W.2d 357, 362 (Minn. 2008); Tigue, 960 N.W.2d at 701.
The record supports the panel’s finding that Klotz did not express the requisite
remorse or accept responsibility because he minimized his misconduct. 2 The panel found
that Klotz minimized his misconduct when he referred to his dishonesty toward the
2 Klotz relies on the referee’s April 3, 2017 findings and recommendation from his disciplinary hearing. In 2017, we acknowledged that Klotz’s remorse was a mitigating factor but did not heavily weigh it. Klotz, 909 N.W.2d at 340. Klotz contends that this finding shows that Klotz was remorseful for his conduct, and the panel would have to find that the earlier remorse finding was wrong or that he had become less remorseful. The panel focuses on the attorney’s mental state at the time of the reinstatement hearing, however. In re Trombley, 947 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Minn. 2020). Given the several-year-delay between the referee’s findings and the reinstatement hearing, the panel appropriately evaluated and determined Klotz’s present-day remorse at the time of the reinstatement hearing.
6 Director as an “accounting mistake.” See In re Holker, 765 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Minn. 2009)
(finding that because the petitioner had minimized his misconduct, his showing of remorse
was not credible). We acknowledge that Klotz referred to his misconduct as an “accounting
mistake” when describing how he used to think of it. The comments regarding Klotz’s
attitude before the reinstatement hearing should not be considered. See In re Dedefo,
781 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Minn. 2010) (holding that the proper inquiry is not whether the petitioner
has undergone a moral change before the suspension or immediately subsequent; instead,
the court looks at the petitioner’s mental state and values at the time of the reinstatement
hearing).
Nevertheless, we note that even if Klotz used “accounting mistake” to refer to his
thoughts regarding his misconduct before the reinstatement hearing, Klotz used the word
“mistake” at other points during his testimony, which shows how he currently views his
misconduct. For example, Klotz stated that he called P.C. after he realized his “mistakes”
and that he drew up false records to the Director to hide his mistakes. Notably, Klotz never
acknowledged that he intentionally put a client’s money into his business account or spoke
of this misconduct as “misappropriation” until cross-examination. Calling intentional
misappropriation of client funds and intentional creation of false records to disguise
misconduct a “mistake” certainly minimizes Klotz’s dishonesty.
Moreover, Klotz minimized the seriousness of his repeated misconduct in other
ways. For instance, Klotz explained that his dishonesty toward the Director—lying to the
Director and covering up his misconduct with a false document—was “the path of least
resistance.” And Klotz continued to give context for this misconduct. He suggested that
7 part of his dishonesty toward the Director stemmed from their written communication,
which made his dishonesty “a little easier” than if he had personally spoken with someone.
He stated that he wanted “people to understand the context, that it wasn’t like [he] was on
the phone with an investigator and lying.” Additionally, Klotz suggested at the
reinstatement hearing that, regarding his misconduct toward D.R.M., he had likely mailed
out her complaint. This statement is contrary to Klotz’s testimony (and what the referee
found) at his suspension hearing—that Klotz never actually mailed out the complaint.
These are only some of the examples showing that Klotz minimized and did not recognize
the seriousness of his misconduct throughout the reinstatement hearing.
Furthermore, the panel found that Klotz did not demonstrate remorse for the
improper loans to clients, in part because Klotz never apologized to them and testified that
he did not even know their names. And in response to his misconduct regarding D.R.M.,
Klotz noted that he did not neglect her case because she was unrealistic with her timeline
expectations. In doing so, Klotz shifted the blame of the misconduct to D.R.M. This shift
shows a lack of remorse and acceptance of responsibility for the client neglect. See Holker,
765 N.W.2d at 638 (finding that the petitioner’s shifting of blame to others made his
supposed acceptance of responsibility less credible). The record supports these findings.
Change in Conduct and State of Mind
Next, Klotz must prove “a change in his conduct and state of mind that corrects the
underlying misconduct that led to the suspension.” Stockman, 896 N.W.2d at 859 (citation
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The panel determined that Klotz did not
establish a change in his conduct and state of mind. The panel found that even though
8 Klotz claimed to have identified and corrected his tendencies that led to his misconduct, he
actually demonstrated those tendencies in his testimony. For example, the panel found that
much of Klotz’s testimony “sounded arrogant and lacking in humility.” Klotz did not
challenge this finding. In our review of the record, we see examples of this attitude, an
attitude that Klotz admitted contributed to his misconduct in that he was reluctant to ask
for help or to admit that he had undertaken more than he could handle. 3
The panel also found that, in response to the panel’s questions about whether he
could assure the panel that he would not engage in misconduct again, Klotz provided a
“rambling” response and could not promise or guarantee that he would not engage in the
type of dishonest misconduct—lying, falsifying documents, and misappropriating client
funds—that led to his suspension. Because the record supports this finding, we defer to
the panel’s credibility determinations and findings. Mose I, 754 N.W.2d at 362.
Additionally, the record shows that the witness testimony did not demonstrate that
Klotz had changed his conduct and state of mind. The witnesses testified that Klotz had
reflected on his shortcomings and had thought about how to be a better person. But the
witnesses generally focused on the circumstances that led to Klotz’s dishonesty, such as
3 Here, the panel had the opportunity to evaluate Klotz’s demeanor and the import of his explanations and assertions. For example, Klotz said, “I know this is kind of like a pat on my own back kind of thing” before he asserted that he handled more than 1,000 matters and that from those matters, only one client, D.R.M., was upset with him. Additionally, Klotz boasted that he was part of a “select few” and an “inner circle” of lawyers working on Children in Need of Protection Services (CHIPS) cases and that he was the “go-to person” for court administration on CHIPS cases. He also claimed that he always had a lot of matters open at the public defender’s office and that he handled them “very well.” These are a few examples that support the panel’s determination that Klotz did not prove a change in his state of mind that had led to his previous misconduct.
9 the external factors occurring in his life at the time of the misconduct, instead of his
dishonest and negligent misconduct itself. For example, the panel made several findings
regarding Klotz’s therapist, which Klotz does not challenge. Klotz’s therapist testified that
Klotz has shifted his focus from just thinking about his career to thinking about who he is
as a whole person. The panel, however, found that the therapist’s testimony did not address
whether Klotz has gained insight or learned through therapy how to be an ethical lawyer
who does not lie, who does not neglect his clients, and who does not misappropriate client
funds by mismanaging trust accounts. Most importantly, although the panel found one
witness’s testimony regarding Klotz’s change of conduct helpful, the testimony of the
witnesses was not sufficient to overcome the panel’s direct observations of Klotz.
Renewed Commitment to the Ethical Practice of Law
Finally, the panel concluded that Klotz did not demonstrate a renewed commitment
to the ethical practice of law. 4 The panel made a series of findings about Klotz’s proposed
mentoring and professional network as possible evidence of a renewed commitment to the
ethical practice of law. The panel ultimately concluded that his mentoring and professional
network was too vague and undefined, so the panel did not give much weight to it in
determining whether Klotz has demonstrated a renewed commitment to the ethical practice
of law. Klotz does not challenge these findings.
4 We acknowledge that Klotz has a concrete plan to continue therapy and testified that he will reach out to other friends and colleagues to ask for their support if he is reinstated. Although this general plan represents a good step in returning to the ethical practice of law, it falls short of a plan that shows that Klotz will not again engage in the type of misconduct that led to his suspension.
10 We do not require that an attorney show an airtight plan to return to the practice of
law; rather, “an attorney’s plan to return to the practice of law or implement systems to
avoid future misconduct are factors that may be relevant to whether an attorney has shown
a renewed commitment to the ethical practice of law.” In re Severson, 923 N.W.2d 23, 32
(Minn. 2019). In Mose II, the petitioning attorney’s disciplinary history involved client
neglect, failure to follow through on commitments, and failure to represent his clients
diligently. 843 N.W.2d at 576. We concluded that the petitioning attorney needed to
“provide evidence of a deliberate plan to return to the practice of law and have systems in
place to avoid future misconduct.” Id.
Here, Klotz’s misconduct included client neglect and a failure to represent his
clients diligently, as well as misappropriation of client funds and trust fund
mismanagement. Even though Klotz has expressed that he is trying to change—by
understanding what led to his misconduct—Klotz has not shown a renewed commitment
to the ethical practice of law.
The record supports the panel’s findings (that Klotz does not challenge) that Klotz
did not have a formal mentor selected, 5 and that most of the proposed members in his
professional network were not peers in the legal profession who could give him objective
advice regarding practice management, trust account management, or dealing with his
5 Klotz generally mentions two possible mentors, but he does not provide additional details, and neither mentor submitted an affidavit nor testified at the reinstatement hearing. The possible mentors were not identified as witnesses in the current petition because Klotz “had not spoken to them in some time.” He also said that he had not advised the two that he had withdrawn his initial petition.
11 obligations under the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct—all of which contributed
to the misconduct that led to his suspension. 6
Klotz bears the burden of proof to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he
meets the requirements for reinstatement. Klotz minimized his misconduct and failed to
accept responsibility for the misconduct. Even though Klotz’s witnesses provided positive
testimony, the panel found that their testimony was not enough to outweigh his own
testimony. The panel made many findings about whether Klotz changed his conduct and
state of mind that led to the underlying misconduct; most critically, the panel found that
Klotz’s testimony was not credible. Notably, the panel determined that Klotz has not
demonstrated a renewed commitment to the ethical practice of law, and Klotz does not
challenge those findings.
Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude that Klotz did not meet
his heavy burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that he has undergone the
requisite moral change. Accordingly, we deny his petition for reinstatement.
PROCACCINI, J., not having been a member of this court at the time of submission,
took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
6 Klotz testified that, if reinstated, he would neither practice civil law again nor “have anything to do with trust accounts.” This limitation of future practice to criminal law, however, does not alleviate our concerns that Klotz’s identified system of support is too disconnected from the practice of law and undefined to demonstrate a renewed commitment to the ethical practice of law.
12 DISSENT
ANDERSON, Justice (dissenting).
Petitioner Adam W. Klotz has not practiced law since 2018 when we suspended him
for misappropriating client funds, dishonesty toward the Director of the Office of Lawyers
Professional Responsibility (Director), creating a false and misleading document, and
neglecting and lying to clients. In re Klotz, 909 N.W.2d 327, 330–31, 335 (Minn. 2018).
During the time that Klotz has not practiced law, he has started therapy, taken several
continuing legal education courses related to the area of misconduct, and worked to
understand what led him to commit professional misconduct.
Klotz now seeks reinstatement to the practice of law. The Director primarily
opposes Klotz’s reinstatement petition because the Lawyers Professional Responsibility
Board panel concluded that Klotz should not be reinstated because he did not demonstrate
the requisite moral change. I disagree. I conclude that the record shows that Klotz
demonstrated the requisite remorse and acceptance of responsibility, a change in conduct,
and a working plan to return to the ethical practice of law. Because I would grant Klotz’s
petition for reinstatement, subject to probation conditions regarding Klotz’s professional
support system and the type of law that Klotz can practice, I respectfully dissent.
In reinstatement cases, we “independently review the entire record,” and “consider,
but are not bound by, the panel’s recommendations.” In re Trombley, 947 N.W.2d 242,
245 (Minn. 2020) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Klotz
ordered a transcript, the factual findings of the panel must have support in the record and
the factual findings must not be clearly erroneous. In re Mose, 843 N.W.2d 570, 573
D-1 (Minn. 2014). That said, “we have rejected a panel’s factual finding that had some support
in the record when the overwhelming evidence presented at the hearing shows the
contrary.” Trombley, 947 N.W.2d at 245 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
A petitioning attorney seeking reinstatement must prove that he has undergone
“moral change.” In re Stockman, 896 N.W.2d 851, 856 (Minn. 2017). Critically, we must
be assured that the petitioning attorney “has undergone such a moral change as now to
render [the petitioner] a fit person to enjoy the public confidence and trust once forfeited.”
In re Tigue, 960 N.W.2d 694, 700 (Minn. 2021) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). A panel determination that a petitioner lacks moral
change because of a lack of credibility cannot be upheld if the facts and circumstances
prove moral change. Trombley, 947 N.W.2d at 250. Here, I conclude that Klotz has
demonstrated the requisite moral change. Consequently, I would reinstate him to the
practice of law, subject to probation conditions.
Klotz must prove that he “show[s] remorse and acceptance of responsibility for [his]
misconduct” in order to demonstrate moral change. Mose, 843 N.W.2d at 575. Shifting
blame to another or minimizing misconduct can make a purported acceptance of
responsibility less credible. See In re Holker, 765 N.W.2d 633, 638 (Minn. 2009). The
panel found that Klotz failed to accept responsibility for his actions and minimized his
misconduct. Klotz challenges a number of the panel’s findings and argues that the evidence
D-2 at the hearing, as a whole, shows that he proved by clear and convincing evidence that he
accepted responsibility and demonstrated remorse. I agree with Klotz.
The Director contends that Klotz should not be reinstated because he did not show
by clear and convincing evidence that he accepted responsibility for his actions. The panel
found that Klotz did not accept responsibility because Klotz did not disclose the full details
of his misconduct to several of his witnesses until shortly before the reinstatement
hearing. This finding is clearly erroneous. Klotz shared the details of the misconduct with
all but one of his witnesses well in advance of the reinstatement hearing. Moreover, every
witness, including Klotz, testified that Klotz took sole responsibility for his actions and did
not blame anyone else. Accordingly, I would conclude that the panel inappropriately relied
on this fact in determining that Klotz failed to accept responsibility for his actions.
The Director also argues that Klotz failed to come to terms with the impact of the
wrongfulness of his misconduct because he minimized his conduct toward the Director,
calling his actions a “mistake,” and failing to use the word “misappropriation” to describe
his misconduct. The panel found that Klotz’s testimony showed that he minimized his
misconduct, in part based on these findings. This conclusion, too, however, also rested on
partially erroneous findings. First, the panel found that Klotz had excused his conduct by
saying it was not as “nefarious” as it seemed. There is no support in the record that Klotz
made that statement. Second, the panel focused on Klotz’s characterization of his
misconduct as an “accounting mistake.” In doing so, the panel improperly considered
Klotz’s previous thoughts in finding that he minimized his misconduct. We have held that
the proper inquiry into remorse consists of looking at the petitioner’s “mental state and
D-3 values” at the time of the reinstatement hearing. In re Dedefo, 781 N.W.2d 1, 9
(Minn. 2010). Klotz did at times call his misconduct an “accounting mistake,” but he only
did so when referring to how he viewed his misconduct at the time he committed
it. Accordingly, this testimony should not bear on the panel’s findings regarding Klotz’s
mental state at the time of the hearing.
The court brushes aside the panel’s findings, explaining that even if Klotz did not
use the phrase “accounting mistake,” Klotz still minimized his misconduct by calling it a
“mistake.” I disagree. Black’s Law defines “mistake” as “[a]n error, misconception, or
misunderstanding; an erroneous belief.” Mistake, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
Klotz’s misconduct was certainly the result of an error in judgment. But the word
“mistake” does not refer only to unintentional actions. I concede that his conduct was not
merely a mistake and if Klotz had exclusively referred to his actions as mistakes, I would
consider it a greater cause for concern. But that is not what happened here. While
testifying, Klotz repeatedly used the word “misconduct” in discussing the reasons for his
suspension. But he also called his behavior “wrong,” admitted that he “lied,” and
transparently laid out the actions that led to his misconduct and subsequent suspension.
The panel’s determination and the court’s conclusion that Klotz minimized his misconduct
and was not remorseful does not take into consideration the entire record. I conclude that
the “overwhelming evidence” from the hearing shows that Klotz demonstrated, by clear
and convincing evidence, that he accepted responsibility and expressed remorse for his
misconduct. See Trombley, 947 N.W.2d at 245.
D-4 Change in Conduct and State of Mind
The second requirement of moral change that a petitioner needs to prove is that he
has undergone a “change in [his] conduct and state of mind that corrects the underlying
misconduct that led to the suspension.” Mose, 843 N.W.2d at 575. The panel found that
Klotz had not demonstrated a change in conduct or state of mind in part because his
testimony “sounded arrogant and lacking in humility.” We generally defer to the panel’s
credibility determinations and findings. Id. at 573. But, when the panel fails to make
specific findings about a petitioning attorney’s credibility and we find some of the panel’s
findings to be clearly erroneous, it can “create doubt about the Panel’s ultimate
recommendation.” Dedefo, 781 N.W.2d at 9. Although the court points to Klotz’s
testimony describing the number of clients he worked for and the type of work that he did
as an attorney, it wrongly posits Klotz’s explanations of the conditions giving rise to his
misconduct as sufficient support for the panel’s determination that Klotz sounded arrogant.
Crucially, the panel did not point to specific instances in which Klotz acted arrogantly.
Arrogance, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder; it is entirely possible that a petitioning
attorney may show remorse and moral change and also legitimate pride in accomplishment.
Klotz has shown personal growth in the approximately 5 years since he was
suspended. He withdrew his initial petition for reinstatement based on the Director’s
concern with his progress, and he accepted the Director’s recommendation that working
with a therapist could help resolve the underlying issues that led to his misconduct. For
example, leading up to his suspension, Klotz tended to take on too much work, which led
him to neglect clients. He also acted dishonestly when he tried to cover up his misconduct.
D-5 But throughout his testimony, Klotz expressed self-awareness about needing to ask for help
and not engaging in that dishonest behavior again.
Furthermore, several witnesses testified about Klotz’s changed behavior. His
therapist explained that Klotz had an improved ability to handle stress. Crucially, the
therapist stated that Klotz has undergone a “really specific behavioral change” that has
allowed him to recognize when he has the capacity to manage additional complications in
his life. Also, Klotz’s neighbor testified that he believed Klotz had identified the cause of
his misconduct and was in “a different spot” at the time of the reinstatement hearing. Yet
the panel found that even though Klotz’s neighbor was a credible witness, because he was
not a mental health professional, he was “not qualified to express an expert opinion” on
whether Klotz had undergone moral change. The panel found that his testimony was only
“minimally helpful.”
We have never held that a suspended attorney must produce an “expert” on moral
change, and this added “expert” requirement is concerning. I do not discount the value of
an expert witness, but I reject the conclusion that only “experts” (however defined) are the
palace guard in determining whether moral change has occurred. A neighbor or family
member might well have a much deeper, and more accurate, understanding of moral
change, if any, in the petitioning attorney than an expert with more limited exposure to the
attorney. Credible testimony that Klotz had underwent a change in conduct was therefore
erroneously discounted here. Although I acknowledge the existence of some contrary
evidence in the record, I conclude, on balance, that Klotz showed by clear and convincing
D-6 evidence that he had a change in conduct and state of mind that corrected the underlying
misconduct of client neglect and dishonesty.
A petitioning attorney “should provide evidence of a deliberate plan to return to
the practice of law and have systems in place to avoid future misconduct.” Mose,
843 N.W.2d at 576. We have never held, however, that a petitioner must secure
employment conditioned on reinstatement or that other lawyers must testify at the
reinstatement hearing. Id. (holding that a suspended attorney did not need to have a job
available to prove he had an adequate plan to return to the practice of law). Yet, here, the
panel weighed both factors heavily in finding that Klotz did not demonstrate an adequate
commitment to the ethical practice of law, and it overlooked the support network Klotz has
set up to avoid future misconduct. A plan to return to the ethical practice of law will look
different for each attorney petitioning for reinstatement. In re Severson, 923 N.W.2d 23,
32–33 (Minn. 2019) (explaining that “our precedent reflects a more nuanced approach,
accounting for each petitioning attorney’s misconduct and circumstances when considering
whether moral change has been proven”).
The Director criticizes Klotz’s plan to return to the practice of law, noting that his
plan is focused on relying on others rather than making appropriate changes himself. Klotz
explained that, if reinstated, he would focus on asking for help and placing guardrails to
ensure he avoids future misconduct. I conclude that Klotz has shown that he has a robust
system in place to avoid future misconduct through his commitment to lean on his support
network, in stark contrast to his previous independent attitude. Klotz testified that he plans
D-7 to have regularly scheduled check-ins with his former neighbor to discuss his professional
life. He and his wife, also an attorney, have said that they will intentionally share with
each other their work challenges and other stressors.
To assuage any concerns that Klotz would not have the assistance of other lawyers,
I would impose on Klotz, as a condition of his probation, that Klotz show that he is in
regular communication with attorneys in his practice area that could guide him and provide
support as he reenters the profession. Notably, we have previously imposed these
conditions on reinstated attorneys. Dedefo, 781 N.W.2d at 12 (holding that the attorney
must be supervised by a licensed Minnesota attorney as a condition of reinstatement);
Severson, 923 N.W.2d at 35–36 (same). Overall, it is clear that Klotz has sought, and will
continue to seek, others in his life who have made it known that they would help him. This
plan shows that Klotz has worked to identify the sources of his misconduct and
demonstrated his commitment to reform.
In conclusion, the panel in this case seemed to be searching for talismanic language
from Klotz (language that we have never identified or specifically required) that would
demonstrate a moral change. I conclude that the evidence in the record shows that Klotz
has undergone a moral change. In the more than 5 years since Klotz was suspended, he
has experienced significant personal growth and prepared himself for a return to the ethical
practice of law. And to address any concerns regarding Klotz’s future practice, I would
reinstate Klotz subject to limitations on his practice—a ban on solo practice, a regimented
mentorship with another attorney in the same practice area, and significant supervision. If
Klotz were reinstated, we could reasonably conclude that his clients could “submit their
D-8 most intimate and important affairs to him with complete confidence in both his
competence and fidelity.” Severson, 923 N.W.2d at 29 (citation omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
* * *
At its core, the purpose of attorney discipline is to “protect the public, safeguard the
judicial system, and deter future misconduct by the disciplined attorney and other
attorneys.” In re Severson, 860 N.W.2d 658, 671 (Minn. 2015). We are to be concerned
with “whether the petitioner will likely recommit the conduct that got him suspended” in
the first place. Tigue, 960 N.W.2d at 711 (Thissen, J., dissenting). Therefore, we must
consider the specific misconduct that gave rise to the petitioner’s suspension and
determine, if the petitioner were to be reinstated, whether we are confident that he would
not repeat that misconduct. See Mose, 843 N.W.2d at 575.
We suspended Klotz for misappropriating client funds, dishonesty toward the
Director, creating a false and misleading document, and neglecting and lying to clients.
Consequently, we must decide whether we are confident Klotz will not replicate that
misconduct. In making this determination, we must keep in mind any conditions we
impose on Klotz’s practice of law. Klotz must demonstrate moral change when it comes
to his misconduct that involved dishonesty or “moral turpitude.” See Tigue, 960 N.W.2d
at 715–16 (Thissen, J., dissenting). His dishonesty toward the Director, creation of a false
and misleading document, and lies to clients all are dishonest acts. And, as demonstrated
above, he has shown moral change when it comes to these instances of misconduct.
D-9 In order to be reinstated, a petitioner bears the burden of proving “moral change.”
Stockman, 896 N.W.2d at 856. In my view, Klotz has met this burden.
THISSEN, Justice (dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Anderson.
D-10