In Re Pence

469 B.R. 643, 2012 WL 1400650, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1793
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Virginia
DecidedApril 19, 2012
Docket19-50039
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 469 B.R. 643 (In Re Pence) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Pence, 469 B.R. 643, 2012 WL 1400650, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1793 (Va. 2012).

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER

ROSS W. KRUMM, Bankruptcy Judge.

On February 1, 2012, a hearing was held on the Motion of Judy A. Pence (hereinafter “Debtor”) to Extend the Automatic Stay, filed on December 28, 2011. Debtor filed the above-captioned Chapter 13 petition on December 16, 2011. Debtor previously filed a Chapter 13 petition on April 21, 2011, but the petition was dismissed because Debtor had received a discharge under Chapter 7 within the four preceding years. 1 Debtor’s most recent petition was *645 filed more than four years from the date of the Chapter 7 discharge. However, because Debtor’s most recent petition was filed within a year of the dismissal of the April 2011 case, the automatic stay was to expire thirty days after the December 16, 2011 filing date. An initial hearing on the Motion to Extend was held on January 4, 2012. The stay was extended until the February 1, 2012 hearing date. After considering the pleadings and arguments, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law.

I. FACTS

On December 28, Debtor filed a motion to extend the automatic stay until February 1, 2012. The same day, Debtor filed a motion to extend the automatic stay beyond February 1, 2012. Debtor stated that she filed a joint Chapter 13 petition with her husband on April 21, 2011, which was dismissed as to the Debtor because a Chapter 7 petition filed by Debtor was discharged fewer than four years prior to the April 2011 filing. Debtor alleged that the current petition (December 2011) was filed more than four years after her Chapter 7 discharge. At the January 4, 2012 hearing, Debtor’s Motion was granted and the automatic stay was extended until February 1, 2012. At the February 1, 2012 hearing, Debtor stated that she received a raise in October 2011, and that her husband is not a joint debtor on this petition. 2 Debtor stated that for these reasons, she believes she will be better able to successfully complete a Chapter 13 plan. 3 Additionally, Debtor asserted that in her current proposed Plan, her monthly plan payments were $180.00 for December through February and $147.50 for 36 months thereafter.

Subsequent to the February 1, 2012 hearing, Debtor’s husband’s monthly wages decreased. As such, Debtor’s combined net monthly income was reduced from $208.99 to $147.50. Debtor valued her assets at $4,866 and she listed approximately $54,914 in nonpriority unsecured debt. 4 Her Plan proposes to pay approximately 10% to unsecured creditors. There have not been any objections by any creditors to the Motion to Extend.

II. DISCUSSION

As of the filing of a bankruptcy petition, the automatic stay prohibits Creditors from commencing or continuing to collect on the pre-petition claims against a debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1). The automatic stay remains in effect until the ease is closed, dismissed, or discharged, or until the property is no longer property of the estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(l)-(2). However, the Bankruptcy Code provides for certain limits on the application of the automatic *646 stay. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(e)(3)(A), if a debtor files a Chapter 7, 11, or 13 bankruptcy petition within one year of the dismissal of the debtor’s last petition, the automatic stay “with respect to a debt or property securing such debt or with respect to any lease shall terminate with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the latter case.... ” 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A). In this case the Debtor falls within the purview of 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(A).

However, 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B) allows for an extension of the automatic stay:

on the motion of a party in interest for continuation of the automatic stay and upon notice and a hearing, the court may extend the stay in particular cases as to any or all creditors (subject to such conditions or limitations as the court may then impose) after notice and a hearing completed before the expiration of the 30-day period only if the party in interest demonstrates that the filing of the later case is in good faith as to the creditors to be stayed; ...

11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(B). 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(C) provides for a presumption that the filing is not in good faith if any one of the three criteria set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(C)(i) is present. A presumption of lack of good faith arises under 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(C)® if: (I) more than one previous case was pending within the last year; (II) the Debtor failed to perform certain requirements in the previous filing; or (III) if “there has not been a substantial change in the financial or personal affairs of the debtor since the dismissal of the next most previous case under Chapter 7, 11, or 13.... ” See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(C)(i)(D-(III) (emphasis added).

Once the existence of the presumption of bad faith arises the debtor may rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3)(C); In re Chaney, 362 B.R. 690, 693 (Bankr.E.D.Va.2007). Courts use a “totality of the circumstances” standard to determine whether a Debtor has rebutted a § 362(c)(3)(C) presumption. See 16 CollieR on BaNEruptcy ¶ 362.06[3][b]. If no presumption arises, the Debtor’s good faith pursuant to § 362(c)(3)(B) should be evaluated using a preponderance of the evidence standard. See In re Thomas, 352 B.R. 751, 754 (Bankr.D.S.C.2006).

There is no evidence to suggest that a presumption of bad faith arises in Debtor’s current bankruptcy filing. Debt- or had only one other petition pending within the year preceding her December 16, 2011 petition. This eliminates § 362(c)(3)(C)(i)(I) as a criteria for bad faith. Further, Debtor’s previous petition was not dismissed for any of the reasons stated in § 362(c)(3)(C)(i)(II). Finally, Debtor did provide sufficient facts to indicate her changed financial circumstances.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
469 B.R. 643, 2012 WL 1400650, 2012 Bankr. LEXIS 1793, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-pence-vawb-2012.