In re Peiler

64 F.2d 984, 20 C.C.P.A. 1059, 1933 CCPA LEXIS 75
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedMay 22, 1933
DocketNo. 3032
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 64 F.2d 984 (In re Peiler) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Peiler, 64 F.2d 984, 20 C.C.P.A. 1059, 1933 CCPA LEXIS 75 (ccpa 1933).

Opinions

Gkaham, Presiding Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Board of Appeals of the United States Patent Office, affirming a decision of the examiner, rejecting claims 19, 82, and 89 of appellant’s application, which was filed March 28, 1917. The specification states that the application is á continuation of appellant’s prior application, filed August 13, 1914, serial No. 856548.

Said claims 19, 82, and 89 read as follows:

19. The combination, with glass feeding mechanism for intermittently feeding molten glass from a container in successive suspended masses, of periodically acting sheer mechanism for cutting off mold charges successively from the suspended masses in timed relation to the operations of the glass feeding mechanism, and means for putting the shear mechanism out of operation and out of cutting position independently of the glass feeding mechanism and restoring it to its said timed relation.
82. In apparatus for separating molten glass into mold charges, the combination with a container for the glass having a discharge outlet from which masses of molten glass may be suspended, of an implement projecting into the glass adjacent to the outlet and operable periodically to cause the discharge and suspension of successive masses of the glass from said outlet, a pair of shear blades movably mounted and guided to meet beneath the outlet in spaced relation thereto and operable alternately to meet and to be withdrawn from beneath the outlet for severing mold charges from suspended [1061]*1061masses of the discharged glass, and means for operating the implement and the shear blades periodically in timed relation to cause the repeated discharge, suspension, and severance in suspension of mold charges at predetermined times, said means being adapted to start and stop the operation of the shear blades at will during the continued periodic operation of the implement and to restore the said timed relation when the operation of the shear blades is started.
S9. In combination, a glass-feeding mechanism for intermittently feeding molten glass from a container in successive suspended masses, severing means operating periodically in timed relation to the operations of an associated glassware fabricating machine for severing mold charges from said suspended masses, and means operable at will during the continued operation of the feeding mechanism for stopping the operation of the severing means and for restoring the severing means to operation in its former timed relation to the glassware fabricating machine.

The alleged invention is sufficiently described in the claims, and it is the last element in each of said claims, in combination with the other elements of the claims, that is particularly involved here, viz, that element relating to the shear mechanism being put out of operation and being restored in timed relation to the operation of the glass-feeding mechanism.

The references cited by the examiner to the claims here in issue are:

Hitchcock, 805068, November 21, 1905.
Mansfield, 854511, May 21, 1907.
Bowman, 1166576, January 4, 1916.
Peiler, 1277254, August 27, 1918.
Peiler, 1401921, December 27, 1921.

Said references are also cited in the decision of the board.

Prior to the oral argument before us, and after briefs had been filed, counsel for appellant and the Solicitor for the Patent Office made certain motions, as follows:

Appellant moved to strike out certain portions of the brief for the Commissioner of Patents upon the ground that all discussion of the references other than the last above-named Peiler and Hitchcock patents was improper because none of said other references were before this court for consideration, and that certain other matters discussed in the brief were irrelevant to the issues here because they relate to questions and issues not presented to or considered by any of the Patent Office tribunals.

The Solicitor for the Patent Office moved to strike out the transcript of record upon the ground that it fails to comply with the statutory requirements, and moved to strike out appellant’s brief upon the ground that it was filed after the time permitted by our rules for the filing of briefs had expired.

Upon hearing, all of said motions were tentatively denied in order that a full hearing might be had, and appellant’s counsel was given [1062]*1062leave to file a brief in 'reply to the solicitor’s brief, which, has been done.

It was understood that we would formally rule upon said notions when we made final disposition of the case.

The motion of the Commissioner of Patents to strike out the transcript of record is denied. It appears to comply with the statutory requirements, and if the commissioner was of the opinion that the record, as certified, was incomplete, he should have entered a seasonable motion for diminution of the record. Dreyfus v. Lilienfeld, 18 C. C. P. A. (Patents) 1526, 49 F. (2d) 1055.

We would further note that this motion to strike out the transcript of record was not made until after the brief for the commissioner had been filed.

With respect to the motion to strike out appellant’s brief because filed too late under our rules, said motion is denied. The filing of the brief was permitted upon a sufficient showing by appellant’s counsel, and the motion papers disclose a written statement of the Solicitor for the Patent Office that he had no objection to the filing of the brief.

The motion of appellant to strike out specified portions of the brief for the Commissioner of Patents is denied. While there may be arguments contained in said brief which are upon immaterial issues, in the main said brief has been helpful to the court. Such matters as are therein discussed which we deemed immaterial have been disregarded, and the appellant has not been prejudiced thereby.

A considerable part of the briefs of counsel for both sides is devoted to a discussion of whether this court is restricted to a consideration of two references specifically referred to by the Board of Appeals in its decision, and as to the scope of the written reasons for appeal filed in this case. As we view the matter, however, the court is not called upon here to enter into a discussion of these points. Assuming, without so holding, that the Solicitor for the Patent Office is right and that every reference cited, and reason for rejection given, by the Board of Appeals is properly before us for consideration, we have, nevertheless, arrived at the conclusion that the Board of Appeals was in error in rejecting appellant’s said claims, for the following reasons:

The Board of Appeals held that, except for the element relating to the shear throw-out mechanism, appellant’s combination is disclosed and claimed in appellant’s patent, fío. 1277254, and is also disclosed in the Hitchcock reference.

Appellant admits that this is true, so far as his said prior patent is concerned, but contends that Hitchcock does not disclose a suspended charge feeder, which is an element in each of the claims [1063]*1063under consideration. The board held that Hitchcock does disclose such a feeder, and we agree with its conclusion upon this point.

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392 F.2d 653 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1968)

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Bluebook (online)
64 F.2d 984, 20 C.C.P.A. 1059, 1933 CCPA LEXIS 75, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-peiler-ccpa-1933.