In Re Pecht

53 B.R. 768, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 973, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 5186
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedOctober 8, 1985
Docket19-10230
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 53 B.R. 768 (In Re Pecht) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Pecht, 53 B.R. 768, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 973, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 5186 (Va. 1985).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BLACKWELL N. SHELLEY, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on a hearing to approve the disclosure statement of the debtor, Ronald L. Pecht, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b). After an examination of the proffered disclosure statement and the plan of reorganization to which it pertains, and upon the representations of counsel, this Court makes the following findings and conclusions of law.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The debtor, Ronald L. Pecht (“Pecht”), filed a petition under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on June 22, 1984. However, Pecht’s case was converted to one under Chapter 11 because his unsecured liability exceeded the permissible limitations imposed on Chapter 13 by 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). 1 This matter is before the Court pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b), which requires a debtor after court approval to provide a disclosure statement containing adequate information to his creditors be *769 fore votes on the plan of reorganization can be solicited. 2

Pecht is the sole proprietor of a business known as “Pecht’s Firewood,” an offshoot of an operation which originated as a partnership between Pecht and his brother, Charles Pecht, in 1976. The two brothers operated “Pecht’s Power Equipment” for a year or so, until they also went into the retail sale of gasoline. The partnership between the two added an entity known as “Pecht’s Gas,” although it operated out of the same facility as Pecht’s Power Equipment. During the time that the brothers operated Pecht’s Gas, Ronald Pecht began cutting, splitting, and selling firewood to supplement his income, since the funds generated from the gasoline and power equipment sales were inadequate to support his family. In 1980, the profitability of Pecht’s Power Equipment and Pecht’s Gas began to diminish, and Pecht began focusing on his firewood business which was his own venture separate from the partnership. Pecht obtained a $20,000 loan from Freedlander Mortgage secured by a first deed of trust on his home to pay off the unsecured creditors of the partnership entered into with his brother. Pecht asserts that by May of 1984 Pecht’s Power Equipment was insolvent and the partnership was dissolved, leaving Pecht with partnership debts and his sole source of income being Pecht’s Firewood. Charles Pecht filed a Chapter 7 petition on August 30, 1984, and he received a discharge on January 8, 1985. There may be insufficient assets in that estate which will result in no distribution to the Pecht brothers’ joint creditors. Ronald Pecht chose to file a petition under Chapter 11 because he asserts that the value of his proprietorship interest in Pecht’s Firewood exceeds the amount he could claim exempt under the Code in Chapter 7.

Pecht’s Firewood operates by gleaning the remaining timber from parcels of cut over timberland, and subsequently preparing the land for reforestation. Pecht asserts this operation is now his sole means of support. In attempting to put forth a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11, Pecht is required to submit a disclosure statement containing adequate information to allow his creditors to make an informed decision on how to vote on such a plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b). It is pursuant to an examination of the disclosure statement and Pecht’s proposed plan that this Court makes the following conclusions of law.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This opinion is prefaced by the conclusions reached in In re McCall, 44 B.R. 242 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1984); In re Kehn Ranch, Inc., 41 B.R. 832 (Bankr.D.S.D.1984) and In re Genesee Cement, Inc., 31 B.R. 442, 10 B.C.D. 1212 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1983) which provide that if the disclosure statement does not adequately explain the provisions of a plan of reorganization, or if the disclosure provides that the plan is not in compliance with 11 U.S.C. § 1129, 3 the court can decline to approve the disclosure statement. In Kehn Ranch, the court stated that it would not proceed with the time consuming and expensive proposition of hearings on a disclosure statement and plan where the plan by its terms is not confirmable. Kehn Ranch, 41 B.R. at 832, 833. Thus, a clear showing in a proffered disclosure statement that the plan could not be confirmed justifies a court in denying approval of the disclosure. Submitting the debtor to the attendant expense of soliciting votes and seeking court approval on a clearly fruitless venture would be costly *770 and it would unduly delay any possibility of a successful reorganization.

The crux of the case at bar is the proposed nondistribution of funds to any of Pecht’s unsecured creditors. The disclosure statement notes that of Pecht’s total debt, general unsecured claims equal $103,-877.50 and under secured claims equal $18,-350.13, creating a total unsecured indebtedness of $122,227.70. The problem confronting Pecht under this no-payment plan is that when a class of creditors receives nothing under a Chapter 11 plan, the Bankruptcy Code deems that class to have rejected the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1126(g). 4 As a result, Pecht's unsecured creditors are deemed not to have accepted his plan, and § 1129(a)(8) of the Code requires each class in the plan which is impaired to accept the plan, or in the alternative, if an impaired class does not accept the plan, then confirmation can be obtained only by enacting the “cram-down” provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b).

Under § 1129(b), if all of the elements required for confirmation other than § 1129(a)(8), 5 are present, the court must confirm the plan if it does not discriminate unfairly, and it is “fair and equitable” to each class of claims that have not accepted the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1). Included among the definitions of what constitutes fair and equitable treatment for unsecured claims is a provision which requires that no class junior to the objecting class receive or retain any property under the plan. 6 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). Pecht, while proposing to pay his unsecured creditors nothing, will retain his entire proprietary interest in Pecht’s Firewood.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
53 B.R. 768, 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 973, 1985 Bankr. LEXIS 5186, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-pecht-vaeb-1985.