In re Pearl-street

19 Wend. 651
CourtNew York Supreme Court
DecidedMay 15, 1839
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 19 Wend. 651 (In re Pearl-street) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Pearl-street, 19 Wend. 651 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1839).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Cowen,

who held the special term, overruled the first objection, and in reference to the second and similar objections by other parties, delivered the following opjnion .

I do not deny that cases may arise in which a reconsideration of the report should be awarded, upon the mere weight of evidence ; but to induce to such a course, the facts should be of a very decisive character, and border strongly on the conclusive. I am not prepared to say that, in reviewing the decision of these commissioners, even a prima facie case against their award, derived from proofs independent of their opinion, should be listened to as a valid objection. It must, in general, be enough to sustain their estimates and assessments, that no positive rule of law has been violated. If we do not find that the legal interest of the tenant, owner, &c. has been misapprehended, their decision then stands as a matter of opinion on the value of an article in the market. So many considerations of time, locality and other circumstances enter into the estimate, that the only means of finally settling the question is an appraisal. That is committed by the statute to commissioners appointed by this court and carefully selected. 2 R. L. of 1813, 409, § 178. They have power, and it is made their duly, to view the premises if necessary, examine experts to whom they may administer an oath, and explore all the best sources of information. Id. 410. Statutes, sess. of 1818, p. 196, § 2. With these means they generally combine a considerable degree of previous local knowledge. Great differences of opinion may and frequently do exist among witnesses. It is hardly ever safe to disturb the decision of such a question, or any other question of fact, made by the tribunal to whom it is primarily committed. Whether it come from a jury, a master, referees or commissioners, we must be governed by the same principle. The very circumstance that it is open to difference of opinion should lead us to conclude that the first decision can rarely be bettered by a reversal founded on the partial and refracted light of an appellate tribunal.

[653]*653In the case of the estate of Christian Baehr, deceased, we have a narrow strip of about 40 square feet, taken from a lot now in charge of trustees. I say lot; the whole is only 255 square feet: about a tenth of a lot 25 feet by 100. It is, however, situated on the corner of Pearl and Wall streets. This small fragment was admitted on the argument to be the most valuable land in the city of New-York. It is taken for the widening of Pearl street. The whole lot which the deceased originally owned was 1120 square feet, and all except the present small area was taken by the widening of Wall-street; the report of the commissioners in respect to which was confirmed a few months since. For that the estate was allowed $72,000. For the present strip the commissioners allowed at a less rate, and indeed an allowance at the Wall-street rate would very greatly exceed the present valuation. The strip is all front land. Such is the aspect which the case wears on the presentation of the trustees claiming compensation, and it is well sustained by three affidavits of value, one of which is by Mr. Mills, an auctioneer residing on the opposite corner, and who was the former tenant of the premises in question. One of the affidavits would make a full lot, at the rate which it affixes to the 40 feet, worth more than half a million, and another nearly as much. We ought- not, however, to test these estimates by extending them to an extire lot, the value of which would plainly diminish as we go to the rear. A greater value seems to arise from this corner being situated in front of other land, the owners of which would give almost any price for the sake of connecting themselves with the street. This, among other marketable advantages, the trustees are undoubtedly entitled to urge as an item in the estimate. The circumstance of its projecting beyond an opposite corner of Pearl-street, thus forming a conspicuous point known as The Light House, now to be cut off and reduced to the general line of the street, may also be added. The counsel for the trustees consented to apply the rate of valuation on the Wall-street side as one acquiesced in by both parties, and it is not pretended that the 40 feet is worth less than a corresponding strip on Wall-street.

[654]*654If the objection stood alone on affidavits of opinion-, I can no means say that I ought to hesitate in adopting the rePort- The attention of the commissioners must have been particularly drawn to the forty feet. They have made a large allowance, if we look to the abstract amount \ and it is said by the counsel of the corporation, that after full inquiry and much reflection, they felt that they could not in conscience allow more. I have no doubt that is trae; I agree also that if this were a case of naked opinion of value, however honest and, cautious, we should have but slight evidence compared with the unanimous and deliberate estimate of impartial commissioners. They turn their eyes on all sides,' and their attention is aroused to many things which would escape the utmost exertion of ex parte vigilance, Looking at the numerous valuations in the course of this business, the number which have been questioned, the corrections made under sharp collision between parties, whatever qualifications these appraisers may have brought into the commission, they must have become masters of the market in the progress of their original report. After it was filed and advertised, they acted with more singleness on points of value made by individual objectors. On the other hand, opinions of value, even those which are ore terms and open to cross-examination before a jury, are barely admissible. To receive them at all, is a departure from a general rule of evidence ; and judges who preside at nisi prius sometimes have reason to regret that they should in practice form an exception. The practice is inveterate, however, and is sanctioned by some of our books and adju dications. Swift’s Ev. 111. Kellogg v. Kranzer, 14 Serg. & Rawle, 137, 141, 2. Some entirely exclude it. In Rochester v. Chester, 3 N. Hamp. R. 349, 364 to 366, the court refused to receive opinions as to the value of land, even from those skilled in the market. They said the land must ’be described, and the jury must then judge from*facts. Kellogg v. Kranzer was directly the contrary; but the whole history of this kind of evidence shows that it is separated from incompetency by a very thin partition. At any rate, •receiving such opinions indiscriminately is but a waste of [655]*655time. It always seemed to me that the question, What is your opinion V’ ought never to be put until it is first ascertained from the witness that he is a dealer, or well acquainted with the trade in the article which he is called to appraise, He may then come within the spirit of the exception which receives scientific opinions or the opinions of experts. Mr. Mills probably comes nearest to that exception among the three witnesses who have made affidavits in this case. He was admitted on -the argument to be an auctioneer of extensive business in the city, though he gives no such account of himself. He resides in the neighborhood ; he formerly oc-cupied this corner; and offers in his affidavit three times the amount of the appraisal. He thinks it worth more than any -other front. It is in his opinion not only equal but superior to the land taken a few months ago on Wall-street. Then add the appraisal of that property, not

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Bluebook (online)
19 Wend. 651, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-pearl-street-nysupct-1839.