In re P.C.

2024 IL App (4th) 241019-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: December 18, 2024
• Docket: 4-24-1019
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 241019-U FILED This Order was filed under December 18, 2024 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-24-1019 Carla Bender not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re P.C., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Tazewell County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 18JA200 v. ) Timothy C., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Timothy J. Cusack, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lannerd and Knecht concurred in the judgment.

ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

¶2 In June 2019, P.C. (born November 2007), the minor child of respondent,

Timothy C. (Father), was adjudged a neglect and/or abused minor pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b)

of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018)) and placed in the

custody of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). In June 2022, the

State petitioned to terminate the parental rights of Father and P.C.’s mother, who is not a party to

this appeal, but voluntarily dismissed the petition after the trial court changed P.C.’s permanency

goal to guardianship. In June 2024 and July 2024, the court entered permanency orders finding,

inter alia, Father was dispositionally unfit pursuant to section (1)(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii)(West 2024)). Father appeals, arguing the court’s unfitness findings

were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On November 19, 2018, the State filed a shelter care petition alleging P.C. was

neglected and his environment was injurious to his welfare. The petition alleged P.C.’s mother

threatened her boyfriend with a knife while P.C. was in the house and intentionally cut herself,

which resulted in her boyfriend calling 911. The petition further alleged she and her boyfriend

used cocaine frequently and her boyfriend abducted P.C. at her request. The petition also alleged

Father was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance in Woodford County case

No. 12-CF-56, was currently on probation, and “ha[d] not been compliant with probation for

several years.” The trial court entered a temporary custody order placing P.C. in the custody and

guardianship of DCFS.

¶5 On February 28, 2019, Father filed an answer to the shelter care petition asking

the court to grant him custody of P.C. In an integrated assessment filed that same day, Father

admitted to “abusing” cocaine and crack cocaine beginning in 2017 and most recently using

crack cocaine in July 2018. He was arrested for possession of a controlled substance in 2012 and

received four years’ probation. However, he failed to comply with the terms of his probation,

which was subsequently revoked, and he was currently completing a new 24-month probation

term. Father had four arrests and four convictions for possession of a controlled substance, all of

which occurred between 2012 and 2018. Father had been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress

disorder and was prescribed medication, which he stopped taking because he did not like the side

effects. The integrated assessment recommended Father complete substance abuse treatment,

comply with random drug screens, engage in individual psychotherapy, complete a psychiatric

-2- consultation and medical assessment, develop a comprehensive social and emotional support

system, and maintain stable income and housing. Father expressed anger at having to participate

in services because he believed he was not responsible for P.C. being placed in the care of

DCFS.

¶6 The dispositional hearing report filed May 28, 2019, asserted Father was not

taking his recommended medication or participating in services, relapsed on cocaine and

marijuana, and was admitted into a residential substance abuse treatment program. Father

completed the program on June 15, 2019, but he still refused to take his medication, and he did

not complete any of his scheduled drug drops.

¶7 On June 30, 2019, the trial court adjudged P.C. an abused and/or neglected minor,

finding his environment was injurious to his welfare and the abuse or neglect was inflicted by his

mother, his mother’s boyfriend, and Father. See 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018). The court

found Father dispositionally unfit due to his substance abuse issues, refusal to comply with drug

drops, and his need for additional time to complete residential drug treatment. See 750 ILCS

50/1(D)(k) (West 2018)). Father appealed the dispositional order, and the appellate court’s

majority reversed the unfitness determination, finding the record did not establish Father

“indulged in an ongoing pattern of drug use within the one-year period prior to the dispositional

hearing” or that he was unable or unwilling to refrain from drug use. In re P.C., 2020 IL App

(3d) 190510-U, ¶¶ 20-21.

¶8 While his appeal was pending, Father relapsed and was admitted into a residential

treatment program, which he successfully completed on January 6, 2020. Father was admitted

into another residential treatment program on July 10, 2020, but he was involuntarily released

before completing the program after getting into an argument regarding his medications. On

-3- November 7, 2020, Father was arrested for theft, and caseworkers learned he had been using

opiates for the previous eight months. On January 22, 2021, Father was arrested on an

outstanding warrant for theft. On April 1, 2021, Father once again entered a residential substance

abuse treatment program. On July 8, 2021, Father was arrested again, the State petitioned to

revoke his probation, and the State requested Father receive two-and-a-half-years’ imprisonment.

All of which proved the point of Justice Schmidt’s dissent in P.C., 2020 IL App (3d) 190510-U,

which said, “One need only read the majority’s statement of facts to conclude that the trial

court’s ruling was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Even assuming that

reasonable people could disagree with the finding, the court’s ruling [that Father had a current

‘substance abuse problem’ and was actively addicted to drugs for at least one year prior to the

unfitness proceeding] was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.”

¶9 On August 5, 2021, the trial court conducted a permanency review hearing. The

State argued Father was unable to care for P.C. due to his “significant legal issues,” his failure to

address his mental health difficulties, and the prison sentence he faced. The court found Father

remained unfit and had not made reasonable efforts to obtain custody of P.C. Father appealed,

and the reviewing court affirmed the trial court’s judgment and permitted Father’s appointed

appellate counsel to withdraw as counsel. See In re P.C., No. 3-21-0411 (Ill. 2022) (unpublished

order under Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶ 10 On June 8, 2022, the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both

Father and P.C.’s mother, alleging Father failed to make reasonable progress toward P.C.’s

return to his custody from September 1, 2021, through June 1, 2022. See 750 ILCS

50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022)). On September 7, 2022, the trial court changed P.C.’s permanency

goal to guardianship based on Father’s lack of progress, and the State voluntarily dismissed the

-4- petition. Father appealed the goal change, but the appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction, as the goal change was not a final order and Father did not petition for leave to

appeal the interlocutory order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(b) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).

In re P.C., No. 1-23-0226 (2023) (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 23(c)(1)).

¶ 11 On November 30, 2022, the trial court enter a permanency order, which found

Father remained unfit.

¶ 12 On June 3, 2024, a permanency hearing report was filed indicating Father was

recently discharged from inpatient treatment and was cooperating with his caseworker. It was

unclear whether Father was still using substances, but he did not appear to be under the influence

of any substances during his visits with P.C., which he attended regularly. Neither Father nor his

attorney appeared at the permanency hearing held on June 5, 2024, and the trial court entered a

permanency order finding Father unfit.

¶ 13 On July 5, 2024, Father filed a motion to reconsider the permanency order. On

July 9, 2024, Father filed an “Objection to Permanency Hearing Report Dated 06/05/2024,” and

a petition to regain fitness, insisting he “[did] not have a single allegation by D.C.F.S. asserting

he is unfit for the caretaking of his son” and he “had participated in all the programs required.”

¶ 14 During a hearing on July 10, 2024, the trial court denied Father’s motion to

reconsider and withheld judgment on his objection and petition to regain fitness, finding they

were not timely filed. No parties presented any further additions, deletions, or corrections to the

permanency hearing report, and Father’s counsel did not make any responsive argument to the

State’s recommendation that Father be found unfit. The court entered a permanency order

finding Father remained unfit and maintaining guardianship as P.C.’s permanency goal.

-5- ¶ 15 On July 24, 2024, Father filed a “Notice of Interlocutory Appeal,” which sought

to challenge the trial court’s permanency orders entered on June 5, 2024, and July 10, 2024.

¶ 16 This appeal followed.

¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18 On appeal, Father argues the unfitness findings contained in the trial court’s

permanency orders entered on June 5, 2024, and July 10, 2024, were against the manifest weight

of the evidence. The State argues this court lacks jurisdiction over Father’s appeal. We agree

with the State and dismiss the appeal.

¶ 19 “[T]his court has an independent duty to consider whether it has jurisdiction over

an appeal and to dismiss the appeal if it finds that jurisdiction is lacking.” In re Tiona W., 341 Ill.

App. 3d 615, 619, 793 N.E.2d 105, 108 (2003). The nature of the order appealed is relevant

when determining whether jurisdiction exists. In re Faith B., 216 Ill. 2d 1, 16, 832 N.E.2d 152,

161 (2005). A permanency order is generally not considered a final order for purposes of appeal

because it is subject to review and reevaluation within at least six months. In re K.C., 2024 IL

App (1st) 231166, ¶ 106, 243 N.E.3d 314; see 705 ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 2022). “[A]

permanency order may be considered a final judgment *** if the order appears to be ‘final and

immutable’ at the time it was made, meaning that if a permanency ‘goal has been reached,’ the

order may constitute a final judgment.” (Emphasis omitted.) K.C., 2024 IL App (1st) 231166,

¶ 107 (quoting Faith B., 216 Ill. 2d at 17-18). Such an order may not be final and appealable if it

“does not permanently determine the rights of the parties or definitely resolve any issue in the

case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) K.C., 2024 IL App (1st) 231166, ¶ 107. The orders in

question neither permanently determined Father’s rights nor definitely resolved any issues. Both

orders set guardianship as P.C.’s permanency goal, found the permanency goal had not been

-6- achieved, found Father remained unfit, and set a date for the next permanency hearing.

Accordingly, neither order is a final appealable judgment. See K.C., 2024 IL App (1st) 231166,

¶ 107.

¶ 20 Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(6) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017), upon which

Father’s brief relies for jurisdiction, a party may appeal an interlocutory order “terminating

parental rights or granting, denying or revoking temporary commitment in adoption

proceedings.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 307(a)(6) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017). Father’s reliance on Rule 307(a)(6) is

inapt, as the permanency orders from which he appeals did not terminate his parental rights, nor

are adoption proceedings involved in this case.

¶ 21 Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(5) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020), “[a] party may

petition for leave to appeal *** from interlocutory orders affecting the care and custody of ***

unemancipated minors.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 306(a)(5) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). As an initial matter, because

defendant filed his notice of appeal on July 24, 2024, his efforts to appeal the order entered June

5, 2024, are untimely. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 306(b)(1) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (stating petitions requesting

leave to appeal from interlocutory orders affecting the care and custody of unemancipated

minors must be filed within 14 days of the order from which review is sought). While his notice

of appeal was filed 14 days after the July 10, 2024, order was entered, Father did not file the

requisite petition for leave to appeal under Rule 306. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 306(a)(5) (eff. Oct. 1,

2020). Reviewing courts have excused noncompliance with Rule 306 in the interest of judicial

economy (see In re Marriage of Agustsson, 223 Ill. App. 3d 510, 517, 585 N.E.2d 207, 212

(1992)) or where an appellant relied upon rule language subsequently deemed unconstitutional

(see In re Curtis B., 203 Ill. 2d 53, 63, 784 N.E.2d 219, 225 (2002)). However, these decisions

are discretionary. See In re Alicia Z., 336 Ill. App. 3d 476, 494, 784 N.E.2d 240, 253 (2002).

-7- Courts have not extended similar leniency where “no case or statute suggested that such an order

was final and appealable” and the appellant had “no reason to believe that *** his

noncompliance with Rule 306 would be excused.” Alicia Z., 336 Ill. App. 3d at 493.

¶ 22 We find no reason to excuse Father’s noncompliance with Rule 306. As in

Alicia Z., the orders from which Father appeals were not final and appealable, and he had no

reason to believe his noncompliance with Rule 306 would be excused. See Alicia Z., 336 Ill.

App. 3d at 493. We note this is not the first time Father failed to follow the rules governing

interlocutory appeals—in In re P.C., No. 1-23-0226 (2023) (unpublished summary order

pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)(1)), Father’s appeal was dismissed for failing to

comply with the requirements of Rule 306(b). See People v. Jackson, 182 Ill. 2d 30, 66, 695

N.E.2d 391, 409 (1998) (“[A] court will take judicial notice of its own records.”).

¶ 23 The permanency orders at issue were not final and appealable. See K.C., 2024 IL

App (1st) 231166, ¶¶ 106-07. Father failed to comply with Rule 306 by not submitting a petition

for leave to appeal under Rule 306(a)(5), which allows for interlocutory appeals of permanency

orders, and we find no reason to excuse his noncompliance. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 306(a)(5) (eff. Oct.

1, 2020); Alicia Z., 336 Ill. App. 3d at 494. Finally, the rule upon which Father relies for

jurisdiction does not apply to his case. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 307(a)(6) (eff. Nov. 1, 2017).

Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal.

¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 25 For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal.

¶ 26 Dismissed.

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