In Re Paz

179 B.R. 743, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 52, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 386, 1995 WL 139988
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia
DecidedMarch 30, 1995
Docket13-11783
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 179 B.R. 743 (In Re Paz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Paz, 179 B.R. 743, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 52, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 386, 1995 WL 139988 (Ga. 1995).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JAMES D. WALKER, Jr., Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Motion for Relief From Stay filed by Gold Key Lease, Inc., (“Gold Key”) a creditor in this Chapter 13 ease. At issue is the characterization of an agreement as either a lease which must be assumed or rejected, or a security instrument capable of bifurcation into secured and unsecured component claims. This is a core matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G). Based on the following discussion, the Court will deny Gold Key’s Motion for Relief From Stay subject to the requirement that Debtor amend his plan.

FINDINGS OF FACT

On June 16, 1994, Johan Paz (“Debtor”) and Nalley Brunswick Automobiles, Inc., (“Nalley”) entered into an agreement which Nalley subsequently assigned to Gold Key. In the agreement, Debtor obtained the right to possession and use of a new 1994 GMC Sonoma truck. In return, Debtor agreed to pay Gold Key the sum of Two Hundred Seventy-five Dollars and Twenty-six Cents ($275.26) per month for a period of forty-eight months. Debtor paid Six Hundred Sixteen Dollars and Twenty-six Cents ($616.26) at the inception of the agreement, which included a security deposit of Three Hundred Dollars ($300.00). Upon expiration of the *744 agreement, Debtor would have had the option of purchasing the vehicle for either Three Thousand Four Hundred Fifty-eight Dollars and Thirty-six Cents ($3,458.36) or Ninety-five percent (95%) of the value of the vehicle as determined by the NADA Official Wholesale Used Car Trade-in Guide, whichever is less. Debtor had the option to purchase the vehicle during the term of the agreement by paying Gold Key a sum determined by the number of unpaid payments in relation to the NADA Wholesale value. The agreement is entitled “Lease Agreement— Gold Key”, and is the subject of this dispute between Debtor and Gold Key.

Debtor testified that he was told he would be permitted to keep the car at the conclusion of the 48 month term if he would keep paying the same payment for twelve more months. At the end of that additional twelve month term he would acquire ownership. If Debtor were to exercise this option, the twelve additional payments, totaling Three Thousand Three Hundred Three Dollars and Twelve Cents ($3,303.12), would approximate the predicted residual value of the vehicle. The cash price of the car was Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00). The title to the vehicle remained in Gold Key’s name at all times during the term of the agreement.

On February 14, 1995, this Court granted Gold Key’s Motion to Modify the Automatic Stay and directed Debtor to turn the vehicle over to Gold Key until Debtor could provide proof of insurance on the vehicle or until further order. To date, there is no evidence of proof of insurance.

Gold Key has filed a proof of claim for Twelve Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty-five Dollars and Sixty-four Cents ($12,-725.64). Gold Key’s proof of claim states that the basis for the debt is a lease, and asserts secured status. Debtor contends that the agreement is a disguised sale, and proposes to bifurcate Gold Key’s claim into secured and unsecured components. Gold Key contends that the agreement is a true lease, and Debtor must either assume or reject the lease without modifying its terms.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

The characterization of this agreement as either a lease or sale will resolve the dispute between the parties and determine how Gold Key’s claim will be treated in this bankruptcy ease. In order to understand why such a characterization impacts so profoundly upon the bankruptcy process, it is necessary to review the economic circumstances associated with leasing compared to purchasing.

A transaction is often characterized as a lease rather than a sale so that the lessee can write off the lease payments as a tax deductible expense rather than amortizing the purchase of the property as a capital asset. A lease may provide for the lessee to be able to surrender the property and reheve himself from the responsibility to continue payments on the property. When the lessee opts for that result, there would be no incentive for the lessee to argue for recharacterization.

On the other hand, where a lessee plans to become the owner of the property, the lease transaction may not favor his interest. Lessee obtains no equity, or ownership interest, in property under a lease. The lease fees and costs associated with a lease agreement often amount to a significant increase over what a lessee would pay to purchase goods in a cash or credit transaction. For example, the ultimate price Debtor would pay for the subject vehicle at the end of the lease term upon exercising the purchase option would be a minimum of $16,515.60 as compared to the original purchase price of $10,000.00 had Debtor paid cash.

Financing the vehicle in a purchase transaction for the same five year period would yield a significantly lower cost over the same period as the lease. For example, assuming the cost of the vehicle is $10,000.00, including a sales tax of 6% the purchaser would need to finance $10,600.00 for the purchase of the vehicle. At a 7% interest rate, amortized over a five year period, the purchaser would pay $209.89 per month for a total of $12,-593.40. Of that amount, $1993.40 would represent interest. 1 When one compares the *745 total amount spent over the same period, the cost of leasing versus purchasing becomes apparent.

The fact that debtors are often uninformed regarding the consequences of the nature of a transaction is not surprising given the fact that the law does not require the disclosure of the purchase price of the vehicle or the interest rate in a leasing transaction. Entering into a lease with an option to buy allows creditors to finance the sale of a new car to marginally credit worthy purchasers and charge a higher price and a higher interest rate. Both factors are not readily apparent to the lessee aspiring to purchase.

Bankruptcy adds another dimension to the leasing transaction. Lessees who file for relief under the Bankruptcy Code may propose to characterize the transaction as a sale, as in this case, then value the property and bifurcate the claim between secured and unsecured components. The significance of this distinction is aptly described as follows:

The Code permits a debtor to modify the rights of secured creditors and to remain in possession of the secured property, [footnote omitted]. The plan must provide that the secured creditor receive 100 percent of the fair market value of the property plus interest, but the difference between the value of the property and the debt secured by the property is treated as an unsecured claim. On this portion of the claim, the creditor may receive only pennies on the dollar. In ordinary usage, this has become known as the cram down.
The theory behind the cram down starts with the premise that the debtor is unable to pay debts in full and on schedule. Thus, the creditor is not going to be paid by the debtor, at least, not in accordance with the terms of the debt.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
179 B.R. 743, 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (West) 52, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 386, 1995 WL 139988, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-paz-gasb-1995.