In Re Parrish

19 B.R. 331
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Colorado
DecidedApril 6, 1982
Docket16-21245
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 19 B.R. 331 (In Re Parrish) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Parrish, 19 B.R. 331 (Colo. 1982).

Opinion

19 B.R. 331 (1982)

In re Cather Dean PARRISH, Debtor.

Bankruptcy No. 81 B 05870 K.

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Colorado.

April 6, 1982.

*332 Milnor H. Senior, III, Denver, Colo., for debtor.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ROLAND J. BRUMBAUGH, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter came on for hearing upon the objection to confirmation filed by the Standing Chapter 13 Trustee. Even though the Attorney General for the State of Colorado was properly notified that a state statute was being challenged as unconstitutional, he made no appearance and did not file a brief. The Standing Chapter 13 Trustee also made no appearance and did not file a brief in support of her written objection.

The written objection filed by the Trustee gave as the bases for the objection the following:

(1) The debtor owns residential real property in Colorado appraised as $63,000.00 which is subject to a lien of $59,000.00.

(2) The petition herein was filed December 16, 1981, and therefore the debtor is restricted to the State of Colorado exemptions because Colorado has chosen to "optout" under 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1) when it passed Senate Bill 369 (effective July 1, 1981). See C.R.S. XX-XX-XXX.

*333 (3) The debtor does not live in the subject property and therefore is not entitled to claim the Colorado Homestead Exemption provided for in C.R.S. XX-XX-XXX.

(4) The debtor has wrongfully claimed the equity in the subject property to be exempt pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1).

(5) Therefore, since under the plan unsecured creditors are to be paid 1% of their claims, and this 1% is less than they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation in view of the non-exempt equity in the subject property, the plan should not be confirmed.

The debtor claims that the Colorado "optout" statute, C.R.S. XX-XX-XXX, is unconstitutional because it conflicts with Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution, which section grants Congress the power to establish uniform bankruptcy laws; and that this statute, and the underlying Colorado scheme of exemptions, are in conflict with the Bankruptcy Code and therefore violate the supremacy clause (Article VI, Clause 2) of the United States Constitution.

At the outset, it is necessary to state what this case does not involve. Contrary to the assertions in the debtor's brief, it does not involve the question of whether or not Colorado exceeded its authority in establishing its scheme of exemptions by discriminating in favor of homeowners by providing a Homestead Exemption to them with no comparable exemption to non-homeowners. That issue was decided in the case of In re Hellman, 474 F.Supp. 348 (D. of Colo.1979), where the Court held that ". . . property occupied and used by husband and wife as their home is entitled to a homestead exemption, whether occupied by the husband and wife under a lease for a term of years or by virtue of ownership of fee simple title". 474 F.Supp. at 350. Thus, the homestead exemption in Colorado is available to homeowners and to nonhomeowners alike.

The facts necessary to determine the constitutionality of the Colorado "opt-out" statute, and its underlying scheme of exemptions, are not in dispute. From the petition it appears that the debtor owns a residential dwelling in Colorado and has an equity of approximately $3,670.00. The debtor does not occupy this dwelling, but rather rents it to someone else for $550.00 per month and pays $556.00 per month to the holder of a mortgage on the property.

If the debtor were allowed to claim the federal exemptions, specifically the $7,900.00 "floating" exemption provided for in 11 U.S.C. §§ 522(d)(1) and (d)(5), she could protect her $3,670.00 equity in the subject real property, and the refrigerator ($75.00), stove ($25.00) and dishwasher ($35.00) located in the subject real property. If the debtor is not allowed to claim these federal exemptions, i.e., if she can only claim the Colorado exemptions, then she cannot protect this equity because she does not reside in the subject real property.

The Colorado statutes involved provide as follows:

XX-XX-XXX. Exemptions in bankruptcy. The exemptions provided in section 522(d) of the federal bankruptcy code of 1978 (Title 11 of the United States Code), as amended, are denied to residents of this state. Exemptions authorized to be claimed by residents of this state shall be limited to those exemptions expressly provided by the statutes of this state. XX-XX-XXX. Homestead exemption. Every homestead in the state of Colorado occupied as a home by the owner thereof or his family shall be exempt from execution and attachment arising from any debt, contract, or civil obligation not exceeding in value the sum of twenty thousand dollars in actual cash value in excess of any liens or encumbrances on the homesteaded property in existence at the time of any levy of execution thereon.

I.

In her first argument, the debtor maintains that application of the Colorado "optout" statute, and its underlying scheme of exemptions, violates the uniformity requirement of Article I, Section 8, U.S. Constitution.

*334 However, Article I, Section 8 is only controlling as to the congressional exercise of power, and is, therefore, a restriction on Congress, not on the various states. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943).

Thus, the Colorado statutes cannot, and do not, violate the uniformity clause of Article I, Section 8, U.S. Constitution.

II.

The second argument of the debtor is that C.R.S. XX-XX-XXX and Colorado's underlying schedule of exemptions (most of which appear in C.R.S. XX-XX-XXX and XX-XX-XXX) conflict with the Bankruptcy Code, and therefore violate the Supremacy Clause, Article VI, Clause 2, U.S. Constitution.

In Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (1971), the Supreme Court set forth the test to determine if there is a conflict between state law and bankruptcy law. ". . . [T]he test calls for a two-step process of first ascertaining the construction of the two statutes and then determining the constitutional question whether they are in conflict". 402 U.S. at 644, 91 S.Ct. at 1708.

Judge Krasniewski in In re Vasko, 6 B.R. 317 (Bkrtcy.N.D.Ohio, 1980), extensively analyzed the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code. After reviewing the legislative history of the Code, he concluded:

The purpose of Congress in passing the new Bankruptcy Code was to give debtors a "fresh start". Being highly concerned with the inadequacy of existing state exemption laws, Congress formulated federal exemptions. In a compromise between the House and the Senate, the states were allowed to `opt out' under Section 522(b)(1) from the federal exemption scheme. However, as the legislative history indicates, Congress had hoped that the states would update and revamp the existing laws, bringing them closer into line with the federal exemptions. 6 B.R. at 322.

I agree with both his analysis and conclusions.

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Bluebook (online)
19 B.R. 331, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-parrish-cob-1982.