In re: Paige v. Digital Business Networks Alliance, Inc. et al

• Court: District Court, S.D. New York
• Decided: October 6, 2025
• Docket: 7:24-cv-03169
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

atic ECEIVE Michele Paige 13223 Haldane Alley Orlando, 32827 | SEP 29 202s | 347.827.8579 U.3.D.C., dbnaetal@gmail.com W.P September 17, 2025

In re: Paige v. Digital Business Networks Alliance, Inc. et al No. 7: 24-cv-03169-KMK Fifth Motion to Recuse J Hon. Kenneth M. Karas. [3 (5 a l Y [2 U.S, District Court Southern District of New York | SEP 29 202 | 300 Quarropas St., Chambers 533 nner ne meme White Plains, NY 10601 PRO SE OFFICE Dear Judge Karas: oa Even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that all of your decisions in this case have been 100% correct, you must be recused; thus, my Motions to Recuse have nothing whatsoever to do with the merits of your decisions. Strangely, however, you continue to insist — contrary to all evidence — that my Motions to Recuse are based upon some unspecified disagreement with your decisions, See, e.g., Memo Endorsements (Dkt. #169, 166); buf cf Petition (Dkt. #133), p. 18 (“Nevertheless, I am NOT arguing that this Court should infer extrajudicial bias from the Respondent’s decisions alone; rather, I am arguing that this Court must infer, at the very least, the appearance of extrajudicial bias from his opinions and/or from the process that this Respondent used to reach his decisions.*). See also In re International Business Machines Corp., 618 F.2d 923, 928 n. 6 (2™4 Cir. 1980) [emphasis added; italics in original]. More specifically, I presented extrajudicial evidence of your extrajudicial prejudice in the form of your prior opinion at Johnson v. Stop & Shop Supermarket Co., LLC, No. 22-cv-9691, 2024 WL 1217074 (S.D.N.Y. March 21, 2021) (J. Karas). Your prior opinion in an unrelated case is, by definition, extrajudicial evidence because it’s not something that you said or wrote int this case. In Johnson, you wrote: “Although she asked only to be transferred to a different department within the Danbury Store, Plaintiff was placed on involuntary paid leave and then—over her objections— transferred to different Stop & Shop supermarkets, first in Connecticut and then in New York.” Jd. at *2. Thus, between Johnson and my case, you have held that a woman cannot sue her individual employer in the state to which she was involuntarily transferred to a defendant-owned location AND that a woman cannot sue her corporate employers in the state in which she began working at her own home or business. In other words, the only commonality between these two (2) cases is that women always lose in your courtroom. That, at the very least, creates the appearance of

gender animus, and the mere appearance of impropriety is all that’s required for recusal. See, □□□□□ Apple v. Jewish Hosp. and Medical Cntr. , 829 F.2d 326, 333 (2™ Cir. 1987) (*...[TJhe substantive standard for recusal is whether a reasonable person, knowing all the facts, would conclude that the court's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”). Quite simply, the facts of these two (2) cases, Johnson and my case, are so wildly dissimilar that it’s difficult to imagine how or why anyone would think that your decision in Johnson controls here, but it’s YOU, not I, who insists that your prior ruling in Johnson controls your ruling in this case. See Opinion (Dkt. #100), pp. 11, 13, 18, Thus, the fact that the plaintiffs* gender is the only common fact in both cases is alarming. The standard for recusal, however, is much lower. See, e.g., Apple v. Jewish Hosp. and Medical Cntr., 829 F.2d 326, 333 (2™ Cir. 1987). Although you and I -have our disagreements, I have done everything in my power to comply with: both the letter and the spirit of your rulings and Individual Rules; consequently, 1 respectfully submit that I need briefing to fully document my allegations, but — to the extent that 1 must present my argument via letter, rather than written motion □ I have. The standard here is that you must demonstrate that no reasonable person would doubt your impartiality after reading both of your decisions. And, quite simply, that’s impossible. Either you have implicitly held that female employees cannot sue their employers under specific jurisdiction (because the female plaintiff in Johnson was not a remote employee while I was) or you have held that female employees cannot sue under specific jurisdiction in the state to which they were transferred (Johnson) or in the state in which they were hired and began working (my casé). That is, there’s no rational basis to justify your decisions in both cases because the only common fact between your two (2) decisions is the plaintiffs’ gender. Even assuming arguendo that you have some explanation for your decisions, it’s too little, too late. The “decision” that triggered my allegations is more than six (6) months old, and you’ve declined opportunity after opportunity to rectify the situation. Now, there are two (2) matters pending in the Second Circuit. See Dkt. #133, 173. Even as a matter of judicial economy, your continued presence in this case is a needless waste of judicial resources. It’s almost unimaginable that we’re 173 filings, eighteen (18) months, and two (2) Second Circuit matters into this case without any discovery or even an Answer because you are simply unwilling or unable to explain the obvious contradiction that I first pointed out more than six (6) months ago, but here we are. Quite simply, why should I be able to sue these Defendants in Florida, a state to which they claim to have even fewer and less substantial ties than New York, if I can’t sue them in New York? See Notice of Removal (Dkt. #12), And if I can’t sue them in either New York or Florida, then what state has specific jurisdiction over this case? Your steadfast inability and failure to answer these obvious questions in a manner that reconciles your conflicting opinions in Johnson and here requires your recusal regardless of the merits of your decisions. Therefore, the issue in this Motion, and in this case, is NOT whether or not you got it right; the issue is whether or not you should continue to participate in this case given your apparent bias against women that you either cannot or will not explain of justify and that I demonstrated through

your statements and actions in matters outside of this case (namely, your opinion in a prior unrelated case). WHERERFORE, I respectfully request that this Court recuse itself or grant me an opportunity to brief the issue. Respectfully submitted, Motion to recuse is again denied. Plaintiff has again fe a eee failed to point to any conduct by the Court that calls for /s/Michele Paige Va recusal. Citing the Court’s decisions in other, unrelated cases and expressing disagreement with those Michele Paige decisions does not justify recusal. The Clerk is Plaintiff, pro se respectfully directed to mail this document to Plaintiff. So Ordered.

10/6/25

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