Opinion issued October 9, 2025
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00742-CV ——————————— IN RE PAIGE ELAINE LAUREN AND RAYMOND HENRY TAYLOR, Relators
Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relators Paige Elaine Lauren and Raymond Henry Taylor seek mandamus
relief to vacate the trial court’s July 25, 2025 order granting a new trial and ask that
we reinstate the final judgment.1 The Court requested a response from real parties
1 The underlying case is Paige Elaine Lauren and Raymond Henry Taylor v. DV Communities LLC, Doorvest Inc., Kundra Sachin, Quyen Le, and Jackie “Jack” Sheely, cause number 2022-71961, pending in the 80th District Court of Harris County, Texas, the Honorable Sonya L. Aston presiding. in interest DV Communities, LLC, Doorvest, Inc., Sachin Kundra, Quyen Le, and
Jackie “Jack” Sheely, who filed a response, asserting that the parties know the basis
for the new trial, but agree that the trial court’s order did not contain legally
appropriate and reasonably specific reasons for granting a new trial and ask that we
permit the trial court to issue a modified order. Relators also requested emergency
relief staying the new trial. We conditionally grant the petition.
The underlying case was a breach of contract action brought by relators. The
case was tried to a jury and the jury returned a verdict for the relators, awarding
damages in the amount of $2,344.67 and attorney’s fees of $93,545.10. The trial
court advised that it was going to visit with the jury for a few minutes in the jury
room and stated that they might be asked to give a written statement though there
was no obligation to do so. Nothing further appears in the transcript.
Relators state in their petition and Christopher A. Stevenson, attorney for real
parties in interest, stated in his affidavit attached to the motion for new trial, that
after the attorneys had been dismissed and left the courthouse on June 5, 2025, they
received a call from the bailiff instructing them to return to the courtroom. Once
there, the trial court advised attorneys for both parties that the trial court had
witnessed a juror, “who was a paralegal at a large, prestigious law firm,” tell other
jurors about the $1,000 per hour fee lawyers at her firm charged. This meeting
between the trial judge and the attorneys was not recorded.
2 Stevenson stated in his affidavit that he moved for a mistrial, which the trial
court granted. Despite the apparent grant of a mistrial (no order appears in the
mandamus record), the trial court signed a final judgment on the verdict on June 17,
2025. On July 10, 2025, real party DV Communities, LLC filed a motion for new
trial, supported by Stevenson’s affidavit concerning the unrecorded June 5, 2025
trial court statements to both counsel. Stevenson also states that, because the only
source for the information about the juror’s comment was from the trial judge,
Stevenson thought it was inappropriate to seek an affidavit from the trial judge.
Stevenson added that he did not believe affidavits from any of the jurors was
necessary and he stated he was uncomfortable contacting jurors.
The motion for new trial was set for submission on July 28, 2025, but on July
25, 2025, the trial court signed an order stating:
After considering defendant, DV Communities, LLC’s motion for new trial, the response, the pleadings and arguments of counsel, the Court GRANTS the motion and orders a new trial. On August 8, 2025, relators filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that
no evidence was submitted in support of the real party’s motion, no hearing was
held, and no reasons were stated in the order. The trial court signed an order on
August 21, 2025, denying the motion for reconsideration.
Relators contend the trial court abused its discretion in granting new trial
without specifying any grounds or providing any explanation despite the lack of
3 evidence of juror misconduct. Thus, relators essentially offer two reasons that the
order granting new trial was an abuse of discretion: (1) it failed to include specific
reasons and (2) it was not based on evidence of juror misconduct.
Mandamus relief is available “to correct a clear abuse of discretion or
violation of a duty imposed by law, when an adequate remedy by appeal does not
exist.” In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204,
207 (Tex. 2009) (citations omitted). The requirement of an abuse of discretion is
established “where a trial court acts without reference to guiding rules or principles
or in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.” In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex.
2018).
Concerning the adequacy of relators’ remedy by appeal, the Texas Supreme
Court has held that when a motion for new trial is timely filed and the motion is
granted during a trial court’s plenary power, the order granting new trial is not
reviewable on appeal. See Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 209. Here, the
motion for new trial was timely filed in that it was filed within 30 days of the date
the trial court signed the judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b((a). When a timely
motion for new trial has been filed, the trial court’s plenary power extends until thirty
days after the motion is overruled, whether by written order or by operation of law,
whichever occurs first. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(e). In this case, the order granting
4 the motion was signed fifteen days after the motion for new trial was filed, and thus,
the order was signed during the trial court’s plenary power.
Because the motion for new trial was timely filed and the order granting that
motion was signed during the trial court’s plenary power, there is no review by
appeal of the order. See Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 209. Therefore, relators
have no adequate remedy by appeal. But to establish their right to mandamus relief,
relators must also show that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to specify
the grounds for granting a new trial.
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 320 provides that a new trial may be granted
and the judgment may be set aside for “good cause, on motion or on the court’s own
motion on such terms as the court shall direct.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 320. The motion
must state the bases so that the trial court can understand the basis for the motion.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 321.
In the Columbia Medical Center case, the trial court had granted a new trial
“in the interests of justice and fairness.” 290 S.W.3d at 206. The Texas Supreme
Court stated that, although a trial court has broad discretion to grant a new trial, “that
discretion is not limitless.” Id. at 210. The Court observed that appellate courts are
required to explain by written opinions the analyses and conclusions concerning the
issues raised. See id. at 211. Although the Court recognized the differences between
appellate court review and trial court decisions, the Court discerned no “meaningful
5 difference to the parties between an appellate court reversing a judgment based on a
jury verdict and a trial court setting the verdict aside or disregarding it” because the
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Opinion issued October 9, 2025
In The
Court of Appeals For The
First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-25-00742-CV ——————————— IN RE PAIGE ELAINE LAUREN AND RAYMOND HENRY TAYLOR, Relators
Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relators Paige Elaine Lauren and Raymond Henry Taylor seek mandamus
relief to vacate the trial court’s July 25, 2025 order granting a new trial and ask that
we reinstate the final judgment.1 The Court requested a response from real parties
1 The underlying case is Paige Elaine Lauren and Raymond Henry Taylor v. DV Communities LLC, Doorvest Inc., Kundra Sachin, Quyen Le, and Jackie “Jack” Sheely, cause number 2022-71961, pending in the 80th District Court of Harris County, Texas, the Honorable Sonya L. Aston presiding. in interest DV Communities, LLC, Doorvest, Inc., Sachin Kundra, Quyen Le, and
Jackie “Jack” Sheely, who filed a response, asserting that the parties know the basis
for the new trial, but agree that the trial court’s order did not contain legally
appropriate and reasonably specific reasons for granting a new trial and ask that we
permit the trial court to issue a modified order. Relators also requested emergency
relief staying the new trial. We conditionally grant the petition.
The underlying case was a breach of contract action brought by relators. The
case was tried to a jury and the jury returned a verdict for the relators, awarding
damages in the amount of $2,344.67 and attorney’s fees of $93,545.10. The trial
court advised that it was going to visit with the jury for a few minutes in the jury
room and stated that they might be asked to give a written statement though there
was no obligation to do so. Nothing further appears in the transcript.
Relators state in their petition and Christopher A. Stevenson, attorney for real
parties in interest, stated in his affidavit attached to the motion for new trial, that
after the attorneys had been dismissed and left the courthouse on June 5, 2025, they
received a call from the bailiff instructing them to return to the courtroom. Once
there, the trial court advised attorneys for both parties that the trial court had
witnessed a juror, “who was a paralegal at a large, prestigious law firm,” tell other
jurors about the $1,000 per hour fee lawyers at her firm charged. This meeting
between the trial judge and the attorneys was not recorded.
2 Stevenson stated in his affidavit that he moved for a mistrial, which the trial
court granted. Despite the apparent grant of a mistrial (no order appears in the
mandamus record), the trial court signed a final judgment on the verdict on June 17,
2025. On July 10, 2025, real party DV Communities, LLC filed a motion for new
trial, supported by Stevenson’s affidavit concerning the unrecorded June 5, 2025
trial court statements to both counsel. Stevenson also states that, because the only
source for the information about the juror’s comment was from the trial judge,
Stevenson thought it was inappropriate to seek an affidavit from the trial judge.
Stevenson added that he did not believe affidavits from any of the jurors was
necessary and he stated he was uncomfortable contacting jurors.
The motion for new trial was set for submission on July 28, 2025, but on July
25, 2025, the trial court signed an order stating:
After considering defendant, DV Communities, LLC’s motion for new trial, the response, the pleadings and arguments of counsel, the Court GRANTS the motion and orders a new trial. On August 8, 2025, relators filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that
no evidence was submitted in support of the real party’s motion, no hearing was
held, and no reasons were stated in the order. The trial court signed an order on
August 21, 2025, denying the motion for reconsideration.
Relators contend the trial court abused its discretion in granting new trial
without specifying any grounds or providing any explanation despite the lack of
3 evidence of juror misconduct. Thus, relators essentially offer two reasons that the
order granting new trial was an abuse of discretion: (1) it failed to include specific
reasons and (2) it was not based on evidence of juror misconduct.
Mandamus relief is available “to correct a clear abuse of discretion or
violation of a duty imposed by law, when an adequate remedy by appeal does not
exist.” In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204,
207 (Tex. 2009) (citations omitted). The requirement of an abuse of discretion is
established “where a trial court acts without reference to guiding rules or principles
or in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.” In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex.
2018).
Concerning the adequacy of relators’ remedy by appeal, the Texas Supreme
Court has held that when a motion for new trial is timely filed and the motion is
granted during a trial court’s plenary power, the order granting new trial is not
reviewable on appeal. See Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 209. Here, the
motion for new trial was timely filed in that it was filed within 30 days of the date
the trial court signed the judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b((a). When a timely
motion for new trial has been filed, the trial court’s plenary power extends until thirty
days after the motion is overruled, whether by written order or by operation of law,
whichever occurs first. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(e). In this case, the order granting
4 the motion was signed fifteen days after the motion for new trial was filed, and thus,
the order was signed during the trial court’s plenary power.
Because the motion for new trial was timely filed and the order granting that
motion was signed during the trial court’s plenary power, there is no review by
appeal of the order. See Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 209. Therefore, relators
have no adequate remedy by appeal. But to establish their right to mandamus relief,
relators must also show that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to specify
the grounds for granting a new trial.
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 320 provides that a new trial may be granted
and the judgment may be set aside for “good cause, on motion or on the court’s own
motion on such terms as the court shall direct.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 320. The motion
must state the bases so that the trial court can understand the basis for the motion.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 321.
In the Columbia Medical Center case, the trial court had granted a new trial
“in the interests of justice and fairness.” 290 S.W.3d at 206. The Texas Supreme
Court stated that, although a trial court has broad discretion to grant a new trial, “that
discretion is not limitless.” Id. at 210. The Court observed that appellate courts are
required to explain by written opinions the analyses and conclusions concerning the
issues raised. See id. at 211. Although the Court recognized the differences between
appellate court review and trial court decisions, the Court discerned no “meaningful
5 difference to the parties between an appellate court reversing a judgment based on a
jury verdict and a trial court setting the verdict aside or disregarding it” because the
end result is the same—the prevailing party loses its jury verdict or judgment. Id. at
211–12.
Noting that more than forty states and the District of Columbia require courts
under certain circumstances to specify reasons for setting aside a jury verdict, and
that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(d) requires a trial court to specify reasons
for granting a new trial on its own motion, the Court determined that a trial judge
should not substitute his view for that of the jury without stating a valid basis for
doing so. Id. at 212. Therefore, the Court held that a trial court must specify the
reasons it refused to enter judgment on the jury verdict and ordered a new trial. See
id. at 215. “The reasons must be clearly identified and reasonably specific.” Id.
Broad statements that the new trial was granted “in the interest of justice” are not
sufficiently specific. See id.
Real parties agree with relators’ argument that the trial court’s order is legally
deficient, explain that they drafted the deficient order, and agree that the trial court
must specify reasons. Because the trial court in this case provided no reasons for
6 granting the new trial, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion.2 See id.
at 212, 215.
Because relators have established their right to mandamus relief, we
conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus and direct the trial court to
vacate the order of July 25, 2025 granting real party’s motion for new trial and enter
a new order specifying the reasons it ordered a new trial. We are confident the trial
court will comply and the Court will issue the writ only if it does not. Relators’
request for emergency relief is dismissed as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Guerra, Guiney, and Johnson.
2 Relators also argue that the trial court abused its discretion in granting a new trial because there is no evidence of juror misconduct. We decline to address this issue because the trial court’s order did not specify that it was based on juror misconduct.