In re Pagán

71 P.R. 712
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedJuly 26, 1950
DocketNo. 75
StatusPublished

This text of 71 P.R. 712 (In re Pagán) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Pagán, 71 P.R. 712 (prsupreme 1950).

Opinion

Per Curiam :

On ■ December 5, 1949 the Fiscal of this Court, in behalf of the Attorney General, filed a petition of disbarment against Attorney Luis M. Pagán. In his answer, respondent stated, in addition to other defenses,1 the following: 1. That the Attorney General is not authorized either personally or through the Fiscal of this Court, to file a petition of disbarment. 2. That in the present case the procedure established by the Act of March 11, 1909, creating the Committee on Character, has not been followed, but on the contrary that the procedure followed was not authorized by law.

After the answer was filed, this Court appointed Attorney Gabriel de la Haba as Master on March 31, 1950 to hear and receive the evidence of both sides and to render his report containing his conclusions of fact, which he did on May 17, 1950. Subsequently, respondent and the Fiscal filed their objections to the same.

Before examining the Master’s report it seems pertinent to discuss the defenses alleged by the respondent.

Indeed, the Act of March 11, 1909, creating the Committee on Character, does not confer on the Attorney General of Puerto Rico the power to file petitions of disbarment, but if respondent had examined Act No. 43 of May 14, 1932 (Sess. Laws, p. 522) organizing the Bar Association of Puerto Rico, he would have noticed that under § 2(g) it expressly provides:

[714]*714“. Nothing provided in this paragraph shall be understood to restrict or alter the power of the Attorney General of Porto Rico to institute such proceedings on his own initiative.’.’

But the fact is that apart from any provision which would be merely directive for thi$ Court, the removal, as well as the admission to the practice of law, is an inherent power to the judicial branch and this Court may, pursuant to such power, follow the procedure which it might deem proper, so long as it is in harmony with the due process of law and the procedure followed in this case is clearly so.

Having disposed of the legal questions we shall turn to the Master’s report. It literally says:

“Report and Findings of Fact
“The Fiscal of this Honorable Court filed a petition against Attorney and Notary Luis M. Pagán requesting that he be- suspended from the practice of attorney-at-law and notary.
“By an order of this Honorable Court of March 31, 1950, the writer of this report was appointed as Master to hear and receive all the evidence and to certify and send it to the Court with his findings of fact.
“By an order of April 3, 1950, this Honorable Court set April 24, 1950 at 9 in the morning for the hearing of the charges and presentation of evidence.
“On the day and hour fixed, the Honorable Fiscal of the Supreme Court appeared before the Master to sustain the charges and respondent, Attorney Luis M. Pagán, appeared in person and represented by counsel.
“Public hearings were held on April 24, 25 and 26, 1950, in continuous sessions, in the morning and afternoon until both parties concluded ” introducing the evidence and submitted the case for the Master’s report.
“Mr. Durán, stenographer of the Department of Justice, acted as court reporter with the consent of both parties. The witnesses for the prosecution and for the defense testified under oath, having been sworn in by the Secretary of this Honorable Court.
“The hearings were held during the afore-mentioned three days with the attendance of the Secretary and the Marshal of this Court.
[715]*715“Eleven' witnesses testified for the Fiscal and eleven other witnesses and respondent himself, Attorney Luis M. Pagán, testified for the defense and one witness for the prosecution in rebuttal.
“The documentary evidence consists of 55 exhibits for the prosecution and 8 exhibits for the defense. From this documentary evidence 43 exhibits of the prosecution were admitted without objection and 12 with respondent’s objection which appear in the stenographic record of the hearing. The 8 exhibits offered by respondent were admitted without objection from prosecution.
“As a result of the testimony offered by witnesses for both parties and of an examination of the documentary evidence admitted and which the Master has considered relevant and material to the controversy, as well as from his personal observations of thé witnesses and the way and manner in which they testified to the questionaires of both parties the Master finds that the following facts were proved:
“Findings of Fact
“1. Respondent was admitted to the bar by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico on April 20, 1944 and as notary on May 3, 1944.
“2. The Home Expansion Company, a corporation engaged in building homes, employed the services of respondent as attorney and notary.
“3. By letter of June 26, 1948 addressed to the Home Expansion Company by Enrique Pagán Viera, (Fiscal’s Exhibit 3) the-latter authorized the company to sell 10 lots which he owned in the Truman Development in Río Piedras, at $8.00 per square meter and agreed to pay to the Company a 5 per cent commission. This was the commencement of the business relations between Home Expansion Co. and Enrique Pagán Viera. Apparently, the complaint in this case, covers only the transactions related with seven of the ten lots as may be seen from Exhibits 6 to 12, both inclusive, admitted as evidence for the prosecution.
“4. It appears from the oral evidence that Enrique Pagán Viera agreed to convey the title of ownership to all the purchasers of .the lots without having received the purchase price and to state in deed of conveyance that the price had been received, under an agreement with the Home Expansion Co. This agreement was to the effect that he would receive in cash a sub[716]*716stantial amount of the purchase price as soon as the buyers obtained a mortgage loan on.the lots and the construction to be erected thereon by the Home Expansion Co. These loans were to be obtained from any local bank through the federal agency known as the Federal Housing Administration which secures such loans to the banks making them. The remainder was to be received by Mr. Pagán Viera within one year either from funds which were to be raised on a second mortgage by the purchasers of the lots who were veterans, by transactions with the Veterans Administration which were to be conducted by the Home Expansion Co. for the purchaser of the lots.
“5. The transaction with the Veterans Administration was not successful. As a consequence the funds with which the Home Expansion Co. had proposed to liquidate the remaining debt with vendor Pagán Viera were not raised.
“6. It also appears from the documentary and oral evidence that Attorney Luis M. Pagán, respondent in this case, prepared then deeds of second mortgages in favor of Enriqué Pagán Viera and obtained the signatures of the purchasers of the lots, but not the signature of Pagán Viera who refused to sign them. See Exhibits 23 to 33 both inclusive.

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71 P.R. 712, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-pagan-prsupreme-1950.