In Re Paddock

81 B.R. 51, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 2131, 1987 WL 32335
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, D. Montana
DecidedNovember 20, 1987
Docket16-60837
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 81 B.R. 51 (In Re Paddock) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Montana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Paddock, 81 B.R. 51, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 2131, 1987 WL 32335 (Mont. 1987).

Opinion

ORDER

JOHN L. PETERSON, Bankruptcy Judge.

At Butte in said District this 20th day of November, 1987.

Hearing was held on September 24,1987, on confirmation of Debtors’ Chapter 12 Plan, together with objection to the Plan by Federal Land Bank of Spokane (FLBS). At the close of trial, all parties were granted fifteen days to file briefs regarding their respective positions. The briefs have now been filed and this case is deemed submitted and ready for decision. Objections of FLBS concern issues of feasibility and *52 appropriate market rate of interest to determine present value of the FLBS claim.

The Debtors, as to the issue of market rate of interest, believe an interest rate of nine per cent (9%) should be applied to their long-term debt owed the Federal Land Bank of Spokane (FLBS). The FLBS, on the other hand, offered expert testimony that the "prevailing market interest rate” on its debt should be set at prime rate plus four percent. Impact of the applicable interest rate was shown by calculations made by the FLBS’s expert witness, which showed that for every one percent increase from 9%, the increase in the yearly cost to the Debtors’ Plan would be almost $10,-000.00 per year. Therefore, over $50,-000.00 in yearly Plan payments could be attributable to the determination of the appropriate interest rate. Needless to say, such increase directly impacts on the feasibility of the Plan.

The Plan, as proposed, calls for payments in the first three years of $45,983.70, and payments in years four and five of $44,828.70. In these payments, the FLBS’s debt of $309,814.22 is to be paid off in twenty (20) years at 9%. Testimony from both the Debtor and FLBS’s expert witness, Dr. Ken Casavant, showed that the Debtors’ Plan (with the 9% interest rate) would leave the Debtors with money to be carried over from year to year in the Plan. The Plan projects disposable income of $3,300.00 to be paid to unsecured creditors ($1,100.00 per year), but with all disposable income committed to the Plan.

The first issue becomes what interest rate is reflective of the “market rate of interest” for a “present value of deferred payments”. Is the Debtors’ proposed rate of 9% per annum or the FLBS’s rate of 13% (prime of 9% plus 4%) the proper market rate of interest? The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently rendered a decision in three consolidated bankruptcy cases on the issue of “what rate of interest on deferred payments of federal taxes will provide the government with payments having a present value to the allowed amount of its claim as required by 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(c)”. In re Camino Real Land Maint. Contractors, et al., 818 F.2d 1503, 1504 (9th Cir.1987). The issue of present value is the same in the case sub judice, for, as the Circuit Court noted, “ * * * Congress used the phrase ‘value, as of the effective date of the plan’ in other sections of the Bankruptcy Code that have nothing to do with a deferred payment of taxes” so that “Congress presumably intended the phrase to have a single meaning in all cases, including this one. Neal [Neal v. U.S. Pharmacal Co.], 789 F.2d [1283] at 1288-89 [8th Cir.(1986)]; Southern States [In re Southern States Motor Inns], 709 F.2d [647] at 651-52, N. 6 [11th Cir. (1983)].” Id. at 1506-07. All Circuit Courts, which have rendered a decision on the issue are in agreement that the proper market rate of interest must be decided on a case-by-case basis, from a rule which applies a rate “the debtor would pay a commercial lender for a loan of equivalent amount and duration, considering the risk of default and any security”. Id. at 1504. This Court cited Camino Real in its October 28, 1987, decision, In re Janssen Charolais Ranch, Inc. (Janssen II), 83 B.R. 743, _ Mont. B.R. _ (Bankr.Mont.1987). Many points addressed in Janssen are applicable in the case sub-judice:

“Camino Real made other observations in adopting the ‘open market’ standard, namely, (1) the decision should be made by the Bankruptcy Court on a case-by-case basis, Id. at 1508; (2) the debtor’s characteristics, i.e., the nature of collateral and risk, determine the rate not the creditor’s characteristics, such as cost of money or loan costs, Id. at 1506; and (3) the standard of open market is adopted to determine the ‘value’ of the deferred cash payments, irrespective of the financial burden a debtor would have to bear in order to obtain a hypothetical new loan, the latter being irrelevant under the Code. Id. at 1505, 1507, N. 2.
‘ * * * the government concedes in principle that the § 1129(a)(9)(c) rate should reflect the term of deferment of present use and risk of default, as affected by any security * * *.’ Id. at 1507.
*53 For example, Camino Real stated in approving a reduction of the rate due to the secured nature of the claim:
‘The adjustment was proper because market interest rates are usually lower when a loan is secured. See Neal, 789 F.2d at 1288, N. 11.’ Id. at 1507-08.
Admitting that the proper rule on interest rates is unanimous among the courts and text authorities, Camino Real nevertheless recognizes such ‘Unanimity disappears upon application * * * ’. Id. at 1505. See, e.g., In re Orosco, 77 B.R. 246, 252-56 (Bankr.N.D.Cal.1987), holding:
‘A number of the secured claimants argue that debtor, being the subject of proceeding under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code and having the accompanying record of loan defaults, is not a qualified borrower under their standard lending practices and that this fact must be taken into account in the setting of the appropriate interest rate. In support of this contention, the creditors refer to the “debtor’s characteristics” language in the Camino Real opinion. The Court does not read the Opinion in this manner. If this were the test, every Chapter 11 debtor would ipso facto be required to pay interest at a rate in excess of market rate without regard to the debtor’s financial condition at the time of confirmation, the security, the term of deferment, or the risk of a future default, the very factors which the Ninth Circuit Court emphasized as being of primary relevance.’
Orosco engaged in an examination of the security and potential risks to the lender in fixing a variable rate of V-k% over a Bank of America reference rate. Neal, supra, 789 F.2d at 1286, however, held that since value is to be fixed ‘as of the effective date of the plan’, the statute contemplates the use of a fixed interest rate, as opposed to a variable rate, since a variable or floating rate is not capable of allowing for a determination of present value. A fixed rate is thus mandated by the Code. In re Lewis Industries, 75 B.R. 862, 4 Mont.B.R. 434, 444, N. 2 (Bankr.Mont.1987).” Id. 83 B.R.

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Bluebook (online)
81 B.R. 51, 1987 Bankr. LEXIS 2131, 1987 WL 32335, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-paddock-mtb-1987.