In Re Orris

166 B.R. 935, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 641, 1994 WL 174768
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedMay 3, 1994
Docket17-44369
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 166 B.R. 935 (In Re Orris) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Orris, 166 B.R. 935, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 641, 1994 WL 174768 (Wash. 1994).

Opinion

DECISION AND ORDER ON FEE REQUESTS

PHILIP H. BRANDT, Bankruptcy Judge.

In each of these Chapter 13 1 cases, Debt- or’s counsel has, in conjunction with a substantive motion or application, requested attorney’s fees after confirmation of a plan which provides for payment of fees, and within 120 days of a prior application.

The requests are:

CASE MOTION FEES AND COSTS
Orris Temporary Reduction of Plan Payments $195.00
Ramsey Sale of Real Property and Moratorium $120.00
Stratton Reduction in Plan Payments $105.00
Spracklin Refund and Reduction in Payments $ 50.00

I granted each of the motions, taking the fee requests under advisement.

I. BACKGROUND

In this district, standard Chapter 13 practice includes the approval of original attorney’s fees in the $700 — $1,000 range, depending upon complexity of the case, in the Confirmation Order. The amount of original fees requested is specified in the Order and Notice For Meeting of Creditors ... [and] for Confirmation Hearing ... in each case.

*937 Each of the applications here considered relates to services rendered in adjusting the Chapter 13 plans to accommodate the debtors’ changing circumstances post-confirmation. As the practice has evolved in the Western District of Washington, Chapter 13 counsel customarily request fees on an incremental basis, in conjunction with whatever substantive motion or application is necessary, and without a separate or detailed fee application. The notices given to creditors of the motions usually specify the amounts requested, as in each request here considered.

II. JURISDICTION

These are core proceedings, and this court has jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A); GR 7, Local Rules W.D.Wash.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Context: By operation of § 103(a), the provisions of §§ 327-331 relating to the appointment and compensation of professionals apply in Chapter 13 cases. However, as noted by Judge Lundin:

The manner and timing of payment of debtors’ attorneys’ fees in Chapter 13 eases varies dramatically from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.

Keith M. Lundin, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy § 4.17 at 4-13 (J. Wiley & Sons, 1992).

Although the pending applications do not so state, I assume the services for which compensation is requested are outside the scope of counsels’ initial agreements with their debtor-clients, and therefore outside the scope of the confirmation orders’ fee awards, which, absent contrary indication from counsel or the Chapter 13 Trustee, I take as covering all pre-confirmation services, including conferences with the debtor-clients, preparation of the schedules, statement of affairs, and Chapter 13 plan, and attendance at the Section 341 meeting and confirmation hearing (if necessary). See In re Pearson, 156 B.R. 713 (Bkrtcy.D.Mass.1993) and cases cited at 716-717.

These applications for additional fees raise two problems. First, Section 331 provides: “... a debtor’s attorney, ... may apply to the court not more than once every 120 days ... or more often if the court permits, ...” for compensation and reimbursement of expenses; and second, they are not made with the detail and representations called for in Rule 2016(a) and LBR 2016 (Appendices A and B, respectively). However, no one has objected, and I have no doubt that the work was done, the fees earned, and the costs incurred.

The applicants’ arguments that enforcing a 120-day interval between interim fee applications in Chapter 13 eases is impractical and counter-productive are well articulated by Orris’s counsel in her Memorandum:

Chapter 13 Debtors often need additional services from their attorney after the initial filing and confirmation of their Plans. When a modification is necessary, the common practice in a Tacoma Chapter 13 case is for the Debtor to contact his or her attorney directly to communicate a request; the attorney consults with the Trustee to determine the feasibility of the Debtor’s request; the attorney prepares a petition, setting a hearing when necessary, mails appropriate notices and documents to creditors, and gives notice of the request for interim fees.
When interim fees are requested within a pleading, it is unnecessary for the Debt- or’s attorney to file a subsequent, costly additional fee request. Further, the Court can see on the face of the pleading the work that was performed; the Debtors understand from the face of the pleading the specific services that were performed by their attorney and the amount charged; and the Chapter 13 Trustee can monitor the fees requested in each pleading and make a recommendation to the Court as to the reasonableness of the fees.
If the Court denies a request for attorney’s fees made within 120 days of a prior fee approval, then the Debtor’s attorney must follow-up after 120 days have passed and file a subsequent petition for fees. Filing a subsequent fee request causes the Court, the Chapter 13 Trustee and the Debtor’s attorney to review the file and clarify when and why the fees were incurred. It also causes another hearing to be set. The Debtors will often be confused about the additional fees requested if the services were performed up to four (4) months prior. Most importantly, the *938 Debtors will be charged again by their attorney for the additional pleadings and hearing. In short, allowing fees in Chapter 13 cases on a petition by petition even if requested more frequently than every 120 days, will simplify Chapter 13 practice and be more economical for the Debtor and the Court.

The standing Chapter 13 Trustee in these cases concurs:

As Trustee, one of my functions is to review motions filed by Debtors’ attorneys and to sign off on the proposed orders prior to their presentation to the Court. In every case, I specifically monitor the attorney fees requested with regard to the amounts and the timeliness of the distribution. I have objected to attorney fee requests in the past when I believed that the fees were unreasonable or would cause problems with the administration of the plan. In those cases, the attorneys would have the opportunity to present the orders, including fee requests, to the Court. Thus, a monitoring system for attorney fees is automatically set up as part of my duties as Chapter 13 Trustee.
Additionally, if attorney’s fees are requested and ordered on a per petition bases, it would be easier and thus more economical for the Chapter 13 office to review the requests. The petition would explain the time expended by the attorney, and the petition would be filed at the same time that the work was performed.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
166 B.R. 935, 1994 Bankr. LEXIS 641, 1994 WL 174768, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-orris-wawb-1994.