In re O'Neal

57 F. 293, 1893 U.S. App. LEXIS 2777

This text of 57 F. 293 (In re O'Neal) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re O'Neal, 57 F. 293, 1893 U.S. App. LEXIS 2777 (circtndal 1893).

Opinion

BRUCE, District Judge,

(orally.) Tlie conclusion seems to be a clear one. The question has been argued, to some extent at least, as if it were whether, in cases like these, the appointment being for four years, the president of the United States has power, in vacation of the senate, to remove an officer before his four years have expired. That question is not before the court now. It could he made only in some formal proceedings, recognized by law as a mode in which such questions could be raised and decided. This is not such a case. It is not even a motion; nothing like á quo warranto proceeding. This is the day to which the March term of this court was adjourned. Causes on the criminal docket áre to be called for trial, and the judge of the court must recognize some one as entitled to speak for the United States, and some one to act as the executive officer of the court. Mr. O’Neal and Mr. Musgrove present commissions respectively as district attorney and marshal, signed by the president of the United States and the attorney general of the United States, and under the seal of the department of justice.

Is any effect to be given to these commissions? And are they now, in this hearing, to be held void, on the ground, as it is claimed, that the condition of the law on the subject is such that the president of the United States has no power to make these appointments? [294]*294Courts must proceed in an ordinary manner, and will not presume that the departments of the government will act otherwise than in accordance with their powers and duties. Acts of the lawmaking power of the government are presumed to be within the constitutional powers of the congress until the contrary is shown to the courts in some formal and proper mode recognized by the law of proceedings in the courts. It is not less so in regard to the executive department of the government, and on this hearing it must be presumed that the president acted, in making these appointments, in accordance with the constitutions and laws. The department of justice is a department of the government of the United States recognized by law, and the attorney general of the United States is at the head of the department, and district attorneys and the United States marshals are under his order and direction. How can it be maintained that the district attorney and marshal are in the actual possession of the offices they claim when they are acting in opposition to the orders and directions of the attorney general of the United States? The new appointees to the offices of district attorney and marshal whose names are in the commissions they bear and present here are recognized on this hearing as the persons entitled to represent the United States in their respective offices. Other ' questions have been argued, but it is not deemed necessary to discuss them.

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Bluebook (online)
57 F. 293, 1893 U.S. App. LEXIS 2777, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-oneal-circtndal-1893.