In re O.L. and A.L., Minor Children

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: September 27, 2023
• Docket: 23-1109
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1109 Filed September 27, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF O.L. and A.L., Minor Children,

A.A., Father, Appellant,

E.C., Mother, Appellant. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Susan Cox, District

Associate Judge.

The mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental

rights. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.

Lori M. Holm, Ankeny, for appellant father.

Francis Hurley, Des Moines, for appellant mother.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie L. Moran, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Brooke J. Thompson of Miller, Zimmerman, & Evans, PLC (until withdrawal)

and Sonia M. Elossais of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, attorney and

guardian ad litem for minor children.

Considered by Ahlers, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Potterfield, S.J.*

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023). 2

POTTERFIELD, Senior Judge.

The mother and father separately appeal the termination of their respective

parental rights to O.L. (born in 2021) and A.L. (born in 2020). The juvenile court

terminated each parent’s rights to both children pursuant to Iowa Code

section 232.116(1)(h) (2023). The mother argues the court should have given her

an additional six months to work toward reunification and that termination of her

rights is not in the children’s best interests. The father challenges whether (1) the

State proved the statutory ground for termination, (2) the loss of his rights is in the

children’s best interests, and (3) a permissive factor should have been applied to

save the parent-child relationships.

Our review is de novo. In re A.H., 950 N.W.2d 27, 33 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020).

It is confined to those issues that—after being properly preserved—are actually

raised and briefed on appeal by the parent challenging termination. See Hyler v.

Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 870 (Iowa 1996). Because “each parent’s parental rights

are separate adjudications, both factually and legally,” we consider each parent’s

appeal separately. In re J.H., 952 N.W.2d 157, 171 (Iowa 2020) (citation omitted).

That said, these parents live together and remain in a romantic relationship, and

we cannot ignore reality and the extent these parents’ lives are intertwined when

deciding their respective legal challenges. See In re G.B., No. 22-0439, 2022 WL

1657190, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 25, 2022). 3

I. Mother’s Appeal.

A. Additional Time.

The mother asks for six more months to work toward reunification with O.L.

and A.L.1 To give the mother the extension she requests, we must be able to

conclude the need for removal will no longer exist at the end of the extension. See

Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). And we cannot do that here.

The parents consented to the removal of A.L. from their custody in July

2021—when A.L. was less than one year old—and, soon thereafter, also

consented to the adjudication of A.L. as a child in need of assistance (CINA). The

mother admitted she was using heroin daily; she was pregnant with O.L. at the

time, and he was born just a few months later. O.L. was quickly adjudicated a child

in need of assistance (CINA) but was not initially removed from the parents’

custody. Then in January 2022, the mother engaged in a physical altercation with

the maternal grandmother with O.L. present. The same day, the mother went to

the father’s residence—then with the paternal grandmother—and the mother and

father engaged in an argument that required the involvement of law enforcement.

O.L. was then removed from the parents’ care, and both O.L. and A.L. were placed

in the custody of the paternal great-grandmother. The children remained in the

great-grandmother’s custody at the time of the termination trial, which took place

on April 5 and 6, 2023.

1 We assume without deciding the mother preserved her request for more time in

her written closing argument, which she filed during the period the court left the record open after the conclusion of the termination trial. 4

At trial, there was evidence that the mother tested positive for fentanyl

multiple times throughout the pendency of the CINA case, including as recently as

February 2023. And after trial—while the record was still open—the results from

the mother’s April 3 drug test came in, with another positive result for fentanyl.

After her positive February drug test, the mother revoked her release regarding

her drug and mental-health treatment, so the Iowa Department of Health and

Human Services was unable to verify whether the mother was engaged in

treatment. The mother reported switching to a new service provider, but when the

social worker reached out, that provider denied the mother was a patient. At the

termination trial, the mother testified she became a patient at the new provider on

March 18—a few days after the social worker reached out requesting information

from the provider. The mother maintained she attended mental-health therapy two

or three times and was engaged in medication-assisted treatment (MAT) program.

The mother continued to use fentanyl as of two days before the termination

trial, and it is unclear how engaged she was in either mental-health or substance-

abuse treatment. We cannot say the mother will be in a position to resume caring

for the children in six months, so delaying permanency is not warranted.

B. Best Interests.

The mother argues the loss of her parental rights is not in the children’s best

interests. When making a best-interests determination, we focus on the children’s

safety and their need for a permanent home. In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 801

(Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring specially). And we consider the best placement

for furthering their long-term nurturing and growth and their physical, mental, and

emotional condition and needs. Iowa Code § 232.116(2). 5

Here, A.L. had been removed from the mother’s custody for more than

twenty-one months while O.L. had been removed for about fourteen months at the

time of the termination trial. The mother was not yet able to provide the children a

safe home, free of illegal drug use. And it is possible the mother will never be able

to do so. These children deserve permanency now, and termination of the

mother’s parental rights will enable them to achieve it.

We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights as to O.L. and A.L.

II. Father’s Appeal.

A. Statutory Ground.

The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights to O.L and A.L.

pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h), which allows for termination when:

(1) The child is three years of age or younger. (2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96. (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days. (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102 at the present time.

The father challenges only the fourth element—whether the children could have

been returned to his custody at the time of the termination trial. See In re D.W.,

791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting “at the present time” as the time of

the termination trial).

The father notes he had both employment and stable housing—an

apartment he leased, in which he lived with the mother. The father consistently

attended visits and was engaged in both mental-health and substance-abuse 6

treatment. While the father was also actively using opiates early on in the case,

his drug test results showed he had not used any since December 2022. 2 For all

of these reasons, he argues the children could be returned to his custody at the

time of the termination trial.

We recognize the father had made progress toward his own sobriety. But

four months without using opiates is not enough time to convince us the father will

maintain sobriety long-term. See, e.g., In re P.S., Nos. 21-0395, 21-0779, 2022

WL 120411, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 12, 2022) (concluding four months of sobriety

was not enough to return child to parent’s custody); In re K.B., No. 01-0615, 2001

WL 1448564, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 16, 2001) (same). And, like the mother,

we cannot say the father can provide the children with a safe, drug free home, as

the father continues to reside with the mother even though she continues to use

opiates.3 We agree with the juvenile court that the children could not be returned

to the father’s custody at the time of the termination trial.

2 The father has consistently maintained that he did not intentionally use fentanyl

in December; he claimed he used someone else’s vape pen—meaning to ingest illegal marijuana—and ultimately ingested some amount of fentanyl. According to the father, his last intentional use of opiates was in late September 2022—a period of more than six months at the time of the termination trial. The juvenile court did not credit the father’s explanation for his positive result in December; the court “believe[d] the parents knowingly ingested fentanyl together.” 3 The father testified the mother was not on the apartment lease and, if the court

would return the children to him alone, he would have the mother move out. But we base our decision on the facts as they were at the time of trial, not some hypothetical future. See In re Z.P., 948 N.W.2d 518, 524 (Iowa 2020) (reiterating that the issue to be decided under section 232.116(1)(h)(4) is whether the parent is prepared to assume a parenting role at the time of trial). 7

B. Best Interests and Permissive Factors.

Next, the father challenges whether termination of his parental rights is in

the children’s best interests. The father notes the children remain in the custody

of the paternal great-grandmother and argues that “[w]hile it may very well have

been in the best interests of the children to remain in the paternal grandmother’s

care, the termination of [his] parental rights” was not necessary. In the same vein,

the father argues his rights need not be terminated because of his close bond with

the children, see Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c), and because the great-grandmother

had legal custody of the children, see id. § 232.116(3)(a). We understand the

father’s argument to be that the court should have taken a less permanent action

than terminating his parental rights and should have instead placed the children in

a guardianship with the great-grandmother. See Iowa Code § 232.117(5) (allowing

the court to avoid termination and enter an order in accordance with section

232.104); see also id. § 232.104(2)(d)(2) (allowing the court, after a permanency

hearing, to transfer guardianship and custody of the child to an adult relative).

To order a guardianship under section 232.104(2)(d)(2), the court must find

all of the following by clear and convincing evidence:

a. A termination of the parent-child relationship would not be in the best interest of the child. b. Services were offered to the child’s family to correct the situation which led to the child’s removal from the home. c. The child cannot be returned to the child’s home.

Id. § 232.104(4). Services have been offered to both parents and, as we have

already concluded, the children cannot be returned to father at this time. The

question is whether termination of the father’s parental rights is in the children’s

best interests. See id. § 232.104(4)(a). 8

Here, the social worker was asked whether the department would

recommend a guardianship in lieu of termination in this case, and the worker

testified it would not due to the children’s young ages and because of questions

about the great-grandmother’s ability or willingness to set appropriate boundaries

when it comes to the father and the children. See In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467,

477–78 (Iowa 2018) (noting the child’s age of two years when concluding

termination was in child’s best interests); see id. at 478 (noting “there was physical

and verbal aggression” in the relationship between the parent and potential

guardian when concluding termination was in the child’s best interests). Moreover,

the great-grandmother did not testify, and we do not know if she was open to

entering a guardianship. While the great-grandmother expressed willingness to

adopt the children, she may not want the juvenile court to remain in her life until

O.L. reaches the age of majority in sixteen years. See Iowa Code §§ 232.117(7)–

(8) (setting out requirements for the guardian to report to the court every six

months), .118(3) (providing that “[t]he authority of a guardian appointed by the

court terminates when the child reaches the age of majority or is adopted”). For

all of these reasons, we conclude termination of the father’s parental rights, which

will allow the children to achieve permanency through adoption, is in the children’s

best interests. See A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 478 (concluding termination was in the

child’s best interests because the young child “deserve[d] a normal life with an

adoptive family”).

We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights to O.L. and A.L.

AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.