In re of Noneman

299 N.E.2d 698, 36 Ohio Misc. 122, 65 Ohio Op. 2d 165, 1973 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 212
Paulding County Court of Common Pleas·Decided April 23, 1973·No. No. 20490·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

Hitchcock, J.

This court in In re Appeal of Williamson (1969), 18 Ohio Mise. 67, 246 N. E. 2d 618, at page 72, said:

“Consequently, the court finds that it has jurisdiction to consider what it conceives to be the basic issue which is, ‘Does that part of Article I, Section 16, Ohio Constitution, reading, “All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods, person, or reputa[123] tion, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice administered without denial or delay. * * *” permit the Bureau of Motor Vehicles to suspend a driver’s license for sis months for refusing, while such driver’s faculties are allegedly impaired, to submit to a chemical test for ascertaining the level of alcohol in body fluids, when, upon the first occasion thereafter when his faculties are not impaired and he has the benefit of sober reflection or the assistance of counsel, he pleads “guilty” to a properly laid charge of the offense for which he was arrested?’ This court answers this question, ‘No,’ for reasons hereinafter set out.”

The present case, in the view of this court, presents the identical issue and the question is, “Should the answer be the same in the light of subsequent developments in the law?” This court finds that the answer should still be “No.” The issue is again presented to this court because the judge of the Paulding County Court has disqualified himself and this court has been designated to hear this appeal pursuant to R. C. 2937.20.

On May 28,1970, in an unreported case, No. 19962, entitled In the matter of Darrel D. Pease this court made an order in a similar fact situation reversing a license suspension as contrary not only to Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, but also as a denial of liberty without due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Neither cause was further appealed nor can the court find any decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Appellate District wherein this precise issue has been forthrightly dealt with. So it adheres to the concept of law expressed in the syllabus of Williamson (18 Ohio Mise. 67), adding only to paragraph two thereof “and is contrary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”

After the decision in Williamson was made, the prosecuting attorney who was such when the case was heard informed the court he thought the decision was correct and right. A successor was' prosecuting attorney when the [124] judgment entry was filed. He told the court that he did not appeal the judgment because he could not see that it frustrated any salutary enforcement of the law. Moreover, not a single officer among the court’s many police officer acquaintances ever so indicated.

Because the law firm of which the prosecuting attorney is a member is general counsel for a number of appellant’s enterprises a special prosecutor was appointed to defend and argue this appeal.

As decisions and comment agreeing and disagreeing with Williamson have followed in its wahe and have been noticed by this court it is deemed appropriate to review and discuss them.

In early 1970, Williamson was discussed in a comment bv Terrv A*. Bethel, 31 Ohio St. L. J. 607, entitled MOTOR VEHICLES — Implied Consent Statute, which listed cases from western states which agreed with this court’s preeep-tión of the purpose of R. C. 4511.191 but disagreed as to its perception of the effect a guilty plea should have in the circumstances (a judgment concurred in by the then Attorney General of Ohio)1 and concluded, at page 609, that:

[125] “Viewed in light of the construction and purpose of Section 4511.191, the position adopted by the Western states seems clearly superior to the present Ohio decisions. There is nothing in Section 4511.191 to indicate that the legislature intended a result such as Williamson and its Attorney General’s encore. The statute expressly provides that the ‘registrar * * * shall suspend’ the license of any person who refuses the test, with no person or class excepted. It seems obvious that had the legislature intended to except individuals like Williamson it would have patterned a statute after Vermont’s, or otherwise expressly provided for the exception. Judge Hitchcock’s reading of the statute, then, given the absence of little, if any, legislative concurrence, must have sent legislators scurrying to the library to re-examine their work.
“If the legislators were surprised by the court’s interpretation of Section 4511.191, they must have been bewildered by Judge Hitchcock’s statement of the law’s purpose. The court decided that the administrative suspension is designed to protect the public by denying driving privileges to someone who is probably dangerous. The court also contends that an administrative suspension after a guilty plea in criminal court would be unconstitutional. This is a curious kind of constitutional law at [126] best. It is submitted that the administrative punish-m'ent of Section 4511.191 arises because of the defendant’s refusal to cooperate, not because he is probably dangerous. His refusal, in effect, revokes the permission that he has already given by operating an automobile on the highway. The administrative suspension, then can be seen as either a deterrant to refusal or a punishment for refusal, or, perhaps both. The only constitutional problem presented is when the purpose of the statute is said to be punishment administratively for what cannot be done judicially. The defendant, if guilty of drunken driving, is to be assessed a penalty under Section 4511.191 of the Ohio Revised Code. To say that the implied consent law is to function in lieu of this penalty when adequate evidence for a conviction is unattainable seems so clearly violative of due process requirements that it is strange the court should even suggest it.”

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In re of Noneman, 299 N.E.2d 698, 36 Ohio Misc. 122, 65 Ohio Op. 2d 165, 1973 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 212 (Ohio Super. Ct. 1973).

299 N.E.2d 698 (In re of Noneman) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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