An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. COA24-1107
Filed 3 September 2025
Union County, No. 20JT000094-890
IN THE MATTER OF: O.G.-B.
Appeal by Respondent-Father from Order entered 3 October 2024 by Judge
Erin Hucks in Union County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 June
2025.
Union County Division of Social Services, by Marc S. Gentile, for Petitioner Union County Division of Social Services.
Parent Defender Wendy C. Sotolongo, by Deputy Parent Defender Annick Lenoir-Peek, for Respondent-Appellant Father.
Alston & Bird LLP, by Matthew P. McGuire, for Guardian ad litem.
HAMPSON, Judge.
Factual and Procedural Background IN RE: O.G.-B.
Opinion of the Court
Respondent-Father appeals from an Order terminating his parental rights to
Opal.1 The Record before us tends to reflect the following:
Opal, the minor child, was born to Mother2 and Respondent-Father on 11
March 2022. On 12 March 2022, Union County Division of Social Services (DSS)
received a report from the hospital staff alleging the parents “did not appear to be
doing well with the baby” and would ignore the child while she was crying. The report
also alleged Respondent-Father had previously committed domestic violence against
Mother, and Mother had issues with substance abuse. Because of additional concerns
about Mother’s mental health, DSS arranged a safety plan with the parents in which
Opal would not be left alone with Mother but would always be supervised by
Respondent-Father or Opal’s paternal grandmother.
On 13 May 2022, DSS received a report that Mother was living alone with Opal
in violation of the safety plan. DSS immediately filed a Petition alleging Opal was a
neglected and dependent juvenile. That same day, DSS was granted nonsecure
custody of Opal. After an adjudication and disposition hearing on 19 July 2022, the
trial court adjudicated Opal neglected and dependent. The trial court found
Respondent-Father had “pending charges regarding illegal substances[,]” and there
was a history of domestic violence in the parents’ relationship. The trial court noted
Respondent-Father had taken a substance use assessment and the results were
1 A pseudonym agreed upon by the parties. 2 Mother is not party to this appeal.
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“clean”. Respondent-Father had also taken a domestic violence assessment and was
set to begin domestic violence prevention classes as well as parenting classes.
At the 27 September 2022 permanency planning hearing, the trial court found
Respondent-Father was “working on his plan with DSS” and had been taking
domestic violence prevention classes and parenting classes as instructed. The trial
court adopted a primary plan of reunification and a secondary plan of guardianship
for the minor child. The trial court found both parents were “making adequate
progress within a reasonable period of time under the plan.” The trial court ordered
Respondent-Father to continue cooperating with DSS and taking classes.
A second permanency planning hearing was held on 20 December 2022. The
trial court again found Respondent-Father was “actively working on his case plan”
and had completed his parenting classes but had not completed the domestic violence
prevention classes because he could not afford the cost. The trial court also noted a
DSS social worker had witnessed the parents have “an altercation in the hallway”
during court, and Mother had indicated Respondent-Father was “emotionally
abusive”.
A third permanency planning hearing was held on 12 September 2023. The
trial court found visitation between the parents and the minor child had begun to
deteriorate: the parents had been having “arguments during the visits” and
Respondent-Father “missed several visits or has arrived late or left early since the
last court date.” The trial court also noted there continued to be domestic violence
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between the parents despite Respondent-Father having completed his domestic
violence prevention classes. The trial court described an incident between the
parents where Mother “smeared bodily fluids” on Respondent-Father because she
believed he was cheating on her, and Respondent-Father punched Mother in the face
in response.
The trial court also found that Respondent-Father had “needs” to be addressed
in the areas of “substance use, housing and parenting.” The trial court observed
Respondent-Father had “been arrested several times for drug related charges[ ]” since
his initial substance use assessment. DSS had requested Respondent-Father obtain
a reassessment “due to these charges[ ]” but Respondent-Father “refused.” The trial
court found the parents were no longer making adequate progress within a
reasonable period of time under the plan and were “acting in a manner inconsistent
with the health or safety of the juvenile.” The minor child’s primary plan was
changed to adoption, with a secondary plan of guardianship. The trial court
additionally determined that visitation was no longer in the best interest of the child.
On 13 October 2023, DSS filed a Petition to Terminate Parental Rights. An
Amended Petition was filed on 21 December 2023. A hearing on the Petition was set
for 31 July 2024. However, Mother’s Guardian ad litem was absent on the date of the
hearing, so the trial court held another permanency planning review hearing. The
trial court did not find any progress on the part of either parent. Respondent-Father
had eventually complied with DSS’ request he obtain a second substance use
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assessment but had not fully disclosed his drug-related criminal history and pending
charges to the assessor. As such, the trial court ordered Respondent-Father to obtain
a third substance use assessment and “disclose his criminal history and current
charges related to substances.” The trial court further noted Respondent-Father was
living in a motel with Mother and “this is not appropriate housing [for the minor
child].”
A hearing on the Petition to Terminate Parental Rights was held on 3
September 2024. The evidence presented at trial included testimony from DSS social
worker Amanda Shelton (SW Shelton) and the minor child’s Guardian ad litem.
Respondent-Father also testified.
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court found grounds existed to
terminate both parents’ parental rights in Opal under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111(a)(1), (2), and (6). The trial court’s Order was entered on 3 October 2024. On 9
October 2024, Respondent-Father timely filed Notice of Appeal.
Issues
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly concluded grounds
existed to terminate Respondent-Father’s parental rights in the minor child pursuant
to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a).
Analysis
Respondent-Father contends the trial court erred in determining grounds
existed to terminate his parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2),
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and (6). “[A]n adjudication of any single ground in N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a) is sufficient
to support a termination of parental rights.” In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. 388, 395, 831
S.E.2d 49, 53 (2019) (citations omitted).
“At the adjudicatory stage of a termination of parental rights hearing, the
burden is on the petitioner to prove by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that at
least one ground for termination exists.” In re O.J.R., 239 N.C. App. 329, 332, 769
S.E.2d 631, 634 (2015) (citations omitted); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109(f) (2023).
“If the trial court’s findings of fact are supported by ample, competent evidence, they
are binding on appeal, even though there may be evidence to the contrary.” In re
S.C.R., 198 N.C. App. 525, 531, 679 S.E.2d 905, 909 (2009) (citation and quotation
marks omitted). Likewise, “[u]nchallenged findings are deemed to be supported by
the evidence and are binding on appeal.” In re K.N.K., 374 N.C. 50, 53, 839 S.E.2d
735, 738 (2020) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “Moreover, we review only
those findings necessary to support the trial court’s determination that grounds
existed to terminate respondent’s parental rights.” In re T.N.H., 372 N.C. 403, 407,
831 S.E.2d 54, 58-59 (2019) (citation omitted). We review the trial court’s conclusions
of law de novo. In re B.S.O., 234 N.C. App. 706, 708, 760 S.E.2d 59, 62 (2014) (citation
omitted).
Respondent-Father challenges the trial court’s adjudication of willful failure to
make reasonable progress under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2). Section 7B-
1111(a)(2) authorizes the termination of parental rights if “[t]he parent has willfully
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left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside the home for more than 12 months
without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the
circumstances has been made in correcting those conditions which led to the removal
of the juvenile.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (2023).
“To terminate rights [under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2)], the court must
determine two things: (1) whether the parent willfully left the child in foster care for
more than twelve months, and if so, (2) whether the parent has not made reasonable
progress in correcting the conditions that led to the removal of the child from the
home.” In re C.M.S., 184 N.C. App. 488, 494, 646 S.E.2d 592, 596 (2007) (citation
omitted). “In the context of Section 7B-1111(a)(2), willfulness means something less
than willful abandonment, which involves purpose and deliberation.” In re K.J.D., _
N.C. App. _, _, 909 S.E.2d 795, 799 (2024) (citing In re Nolen, 117 N.C. App. 693, 699,
453 S.E.2d 220, 224 (1995)). “Voluntarily leaving a child in foster care for more than
twelve months or a failure to be responsive to the efforts of DSS are sufficient grounds
to find willfulness.” In re C.M.S., 184 N.C. App. at 494, 646 S.E.2d at 596 (citation
omitted). “A finding of willfulness is not precluded even if the respondent has made
some efforts to regain custody of the children.” In re Nolen, 117 N.C. App. at 699, 453
S.E.2d at 224. “Similarly, a parent’s prolonged inability to improve his or her
situation, despite some efforts and good intentions, will support a conclusion of lack
of reasonable progress.” In re C.M.S., 184 N.C. App. at 494, 646 S.E.2d at 596
(citation omitted).
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“A parent’s failure to fully satisfy all elements of the case plan goals is not the
equivalent of a lack of ‘reasonable progress.’ ” In re J.S.L., 177 N.C. App. 151, 163,
628 S.E.2d 387, 394 (2006) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (2005)). However,
“ ‘parental compliance with a judicially adopted case plan is relevant in determining
whether grounds for termination exist pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(2)’ provided
that ‘the objectives sought to be achieved by the case plan provision in question
address issues that contributed to causing the problematic circumstances that led to
the juvenile’s removal from the parental home.’ ” In re T.M.L., 377 N.C. 369, 379, 856
S.E.2d 785, 793 (2021) (quoting In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. 372, 384, 831 S.E.2d 305, 313-
14 (2019)).
Here, the minor child was placed in DSS custody on 13 May 2022. At the time
of the termination hearing on 3 September 2024, Opal had been in foster care for over
two years. At the hearing, the trial court found Respondent-Father had “not engaged
in services to address identified needs,” and made comprehensive Findings in the
areas of “substance use,” “parenting skills,” “family relationships,” and “housing.”
As to substance use, the trial court found Respondent-Father had “submitted
to two separate [substance use] assessments and there were no recommendations[,]”
but “failed to inform the assessor that [he] has been in prison for drug related charges,
so he has a history with illegal substances and has numerous pending drug related
charges, including possession of marijuana, possession of cocaine and possession with
intent to sell and deliver cocaine.” The trial court also found Respondent-Father had
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obtained three separate drug-related criminal charges during the life of the case and
had “numerous pending drug related charges.”
Respondent-Father challenges these Findings, arguing he “answered all
questions put to him during the assessments fully and truthfully.” However, SW
Shelton testified at the termination hearing that Respondent-Father did not tell the
assessor that he had been previously incarcerated and had pending charges for drug-
related offenses. Respondent-Father further argues he did not have sufficient time
to obtain a third substance use assessment between the time the trial court entered
its order directing him to obtain a third assessment—20 August 2024—and the
termination hearing on 3 September 2024. However, Respondent-Father knew he
was responsible for complying with his case plan and undergoing a substance use
assessment as early as June 2022. Thus, while Respondent-Father may have lacked
sufficient time to obtain a third assessment between the entry of the trial court’s 20
August 2024 order and the termination hearing, he had over two years to fully
disclose his history of drug-related charges.
Respondent-Father also argues there was no evidence he used drugs or was
addicted to illegal substances, and the trial court’s Findings as to his “substance use”
are irrelevant to Opal’s welfare. However, the trial court did not find Respondent-
Father used drugs—it found Respondent-Father “has a history with illegal
substances and he has numerous pending drug related charges”. Indeed, the Record
shows Respondent-Father was arrested multiple times on drug-related charges
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between the time Opal entered DSS custody and the termination hearing. Moreover,
this Court has noted a finding that a parent has pending criminal charges is relevant
to determining whether the parent is creating an acceptable and safe living
environment. See In re H.D., 239 N.C. App. 318, 324, 768 S.E.2d 860, 864 (2015)
(“These findings, particularly the pending criminal charges, all indicated repeated
failures at creating an acceptable and safe living environment certainly suggest that
reunification efforts would be futile.” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). As
such, we disagree with Respondent-Father that his criminal charges do not relate to
his ability to care for Opal.
Next, Respondent-Father challenges the trial court’s Findings as to his
parenting skills. Specifically, Respondent-Father challenges Finding 16(C)(1)(b)(ii),
which states:
[Respondent-Father] has allowed [Mother] to care for the juvenile outside of his sight during visits with the juvenile even while she was having a mental health crisis, to the point that this court found that it was not in the best interest of the juvenile to continue to visit with [Respondent-Father] and [Mother].
At the hearing, SW Shelton testified that during visits with Opal, Respondent-Father
and Mother would “mostly stay separate,” “were argumentative with each other[,]”
and Respondent-Father “would defer to [Mother], because she would become upset if
he was in the room while she would change diapers.” SW Shelton also testified, and
the 28 September 2023 permanency planning review order shows, visitation between
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the parents and minor child was stopped in September 2023. This evidence is
competent to support the trial court’s Finding.3
Respondent-Father also challenges the trial court’s Findings as to his family
relationships. The trial court found Respondent-Father completed domestic violence
prevention classes, but “there continues to be domestic violence in the relationship
between” Respondent-Father and Mother. Respondent-Father argues there is no
evidence he has continued to commit domestic violence against Mother.
The Record shows there has been at least one incident of domestic violence
between the parents since Respondent-Father completed his domestic violence
prevention classes; this incident was discussed at the hearing and is described in
DSS’ 8 September 2023 Court Summary and the trial court’s 28 September 2023
permanency planning review order.4 Additionally, SW Shelton testified there were
at least two other incidents between the parents where law enforcement was called
and Mother reported that Respondent-Father had hit her. This evidence is competent
3 Respondent-Father also argues the trial court abused its discretion in “failing to continue
visitation between [Respondent-Father] and [Opal] where [Mother] was not present.” As Respondent- Father concedes, review of that order is outside the scope of this appeal. Moreover, we note “[a]n order that . . . continues the juvenile’s placement outside the home shall provide for visitation that is in the best interests of the juvenile consistent with the juvenile’s health and safety, including no visitation.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-905.1(a) (2023) (emphasis added). 4 Respondent-Father argues he was acting in self-defense during this incident. We decline to
adjudicate whether Respondent-Father was acting in self-defense or used excessive force, as that issue is outside the scope of this appeal. Moreover, there is sufficient evidence of multiple other incidents of domestic violence perpetrated by Respondent-Father against Mother which support the trial court’s Finding.
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to support the trial court’s Finding that there continues to be domestic violence in the
relationship.
Lastly, Respondent-Father challenges the trial court’s Finding that “there is
no evidence” Respondent-Father’s new apartment is appropriate. The trial court
found, and Respondent-Father concedes, Respondent-Father had “unstable housing”
throughout the case. Respondent-Father testified he had secured an apartment
within three days prior to the termination hearing. However, the trial court noted it
did not have “any evidence as to whether that apartment is appropriate or any
information beyond the fact that [Respondent-Father] does have a lease for a two-
bedroom apartment.” Respondent-Father argues “the little evidence available” shows
his apartment is appropriate, but the trial court heard no evidence about the
apartment other than that it has two bedrooms; thus, we cannot agree with
Respondent-Father that the trial court’s Finding that it lacked evidence as to whether
the apartment is “appropriate” is unsupported by the evidence.
Here, the trial court’s Findings of Fact support the Conclusion that
Respondent-Father did not make reasonable progress to correct the conditions that
led to the removal of the minor child from his care and that his failure to do so was
willful. See In re Bishop, 92 N.C. App. 662, 669, 375 S.E.2d 676, 681 (1989) (upholding
termination of mother’s parental rights while acknowledging her “contentions that
her inability to improve her situation stems from her mental disability, her poverty,
and other personal problems”). Opal was adjudicated neglected and dependent based
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on domestic violence between Respondent-Father and Mother. Respondent-Father’s
involvement with substance use and unstable housing became concerns raised by
DSS shortly thereafter. See In re B.O.A., 372 N.C. at 381, 831 S.E.2d at 311
(“[N]othing in the relevant statutory language suggests that the only ‘conditions of
removal’ that are relevant to a determination of whether a particular parent’s
parental rights in a particular child are subject to termination pursuant to N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-1111(a)(2) are limited to those which are explicitly set out in a petition seeking
the entry of a nonsecure custody order or a determination that a particular child is
an abused, neglected, or dependent juvenile.”).
The Findings demonstrate that although Respondent-Father completed
domestic violence prevention classes, domestic violence remained ongoing in the
parents’ relationship. Further, although Respondent-Father had undergone two
substance use assessments, he had not been fully truthful with the assessor at either
of them. Moreover, Respondent-Father had been indicted on at least three drug
charges since Opal had been taken into DSS custody and had other charges pending.
The trial court’s Findings also establish that Respondent-Father had unstable
housing throughout the case, and the trial court lacked sufficient information about
Respondent-Father’s current living situation to determine his apartment was safe
and appropriate. Thus, these Findings support the trial court’s Conclusion that
Respondent-Father failed to make reasonable progress in addressing the conditions
that led to the juvenile’s removal. Therefore, the trial court did not err in concluding
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Respondent-Father’s parental rights were subject to termination pursuant to N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2).5
Conclusion
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s Order
terminating Respondent-Father’s parental rights in Opal.
AFFIRMED.
Judges STROUD and GORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
5 Because we conclude this ground has ample support in the trial court’s Findings, we need
not address Respondent-Father’s arguments as to the remaining termination grounds found by the trial court under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) and (6). See In re E.H.P., 372 N.C. at 395, 831 S.E.2d at 53 (citations omitted).
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