In re N.P. CA6

Opinion

Filed 9/8/26 In re N.P. CA6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re N.P., et al. H053909 __________________________________ (Santa Clara County Superior Ct.

Nos. 24JD027835, 24JD027836)

COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY AND CHILDREN’S SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

B.P.,

Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT1

Appellant, B.P., mother of N.P. and J.P., appeals from dispositional orders issued after a hearing on a Welfare and Institutions Code section 387 petition. Respondent, County of Santa Clara Department of Family and Children’s Services (Department), and B.P. jointly move for a summary reversal of the orders. The parties agree that the trial court failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), and request that we remand the matter to the trial court for the limited purpose of ICWA compliance. We grant the motion and reverse the order pursuant to the stipulation of the parties.

1 Before Greenwood, P. J., Grover, J. and Danner, J.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 24, 2025, the juvenile court held a Welfare and Institutions Code section 387 disposition hearing, where it removed the children, N.P. and J.P., from B.P.’s care. The court found that the previous family maintenance plan had failed and ordered reunification services. Additionally, the juvenile court found the Department’s ICWA inquiry sufficient and concluded that ICWA does not apply. This timely appeal ensued. After B.P. filed an opening brief, the parties jointly moved for summary reversal.

II. DISCUSSION

On appeal, B.P. contends that the orders must be reversed and the matter remanded for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with ICWA. B.P. argues that the Department failed to contact all reasonably available relatives as well as the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the California Department of Social Services (CDSS), and any implicated tribes pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (e). B.P. asks this court to direct the juvenile court to order the Department to conduct further inquiry and, if necessary, effectuate proper notice pursuant to ICWA. B.P. concludes in the opening brief that if, after proper inquiry and notice, the trial court finds that ICWA does not apply, the court’s dispositional order can be reinstated. (In re N.D. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 620, 624.) In the motion for stipulated reversal, the parties acknowledge that the juvenile court erred when it found that ICWA did not apply because the Department had not made sufficient efforts to contact all known relatives who may have had information about possible Indian heritage, and it had not sought BIA or CDSS assistance in identifying tribes in which the children may be a member. The parties agree that this court is likely to reverse the trial court’s orders because of its failure to comply with ICWA. To minimize delay, they request that we reverse based on their stipulation.

The parties’ joint motion supports the conclusion that a summary reversal pursuant to stipulation is appropriate under the facts of this case and the law. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a)(8).) For the reasons stated in the motion, the court finds that there

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is no possibility that the interests of nonparties or the public will be adversely affected by the reversal. Summary reversal of the judgment would place the parties in the same position they would be in if the appeal were successfully prosecuted to completion, would save both private and judicial resources because it would obviate the need for further briefing by the parties and review of the record by this court, and most importantly would minimize delay in permanency for the children. (In re Rashad H. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 376, 380, as modified (Mar. 2, 2000).) Both public policy and the public interest are served by these outcomes.

This court further finds that the parties’ grounds for requesting reversal are reasonable. The parties agree that the trial court erred in finding ICWA did not apply, but they also agree that if the matter is remanded for ICWA compliance, the prior orders can be reinstated after ensuring such compliance and making the proper findings. These grounds outweigh the erosion of public trust that may result from the nullification of a judgment and outweigh the risk that the availability of a stipulated reversal will reduce the incentive for pretrial settlement. Public trust in the courts is enhanced, not eroded, when parties recognize and acknowledge errors and agree to resolve them with limited delay. (See Union Bank of California. v. Braille Inst. of America (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1330-1331.)

III. DISPOSITION

The November 24, 2025 orders are reversed pursuant to the stipulation of the parties. The matter is remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with ICWA. If the court determines that the requirements of ICWA have been met and once again finds that ICWA does not apply, the court shall reinstate the orders issued after the November 24, 2025 hearing. The remittitur shall issue forthwith.

_______________________________

Greenwood, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

___________________________________________

Grover, J.

______________________________________

Danner, J.

H053909 - In re N.P. et al.; Santa Clara County DFCS v. B.P.