In Re Norplant Contraceptive Products

899 F. Supp. 315
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Texas
DecidedSeptember 29, 1995
Docket1:95CV5062, 1:95CV5061. MDL No. 1038
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 899 F. Supp. 315 (In Re Norplant Contraceptive Products) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In Re Norplant Contraceptive Products, 899 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Tex. 1995).

Opinion

899 F.Supp. 315 (1995)

In re NORPLANT CONTRACEPTIVE PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION.
Yolanda Sotelo OZUNA, Plaintiff,
v.
AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.
Maria Isabel BOCANEGRA, Plaintiff,
v.
AMERICAN HOME PRODUCTS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

Nos. 1:95CV5062, 1:95CV5061. MDL No. 1038.

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Beaumont Division.

September 29, 1995.

*316 Frank Herrera, Jr. of Law Offices of Frank Herrera, Jr., San Antonio, TX, for plaintiff.

John W. Vardaman, F. Lane Heard, III of Williams & Connolly, Washington, DC, Lawrence L. Germer, of Germer & Gertz, LLP Beaumont, TX, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING HUHTAMKA OY, LEIRAS OY, DOW CORNING FRANCE, AND WYETH-AYERST INTERNATIONAL, INC.'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND GRANTING LEIRAS PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER

SCHELL, Chief Judge.

Before this court is the motion of Defendants Huhtamki Oy, Leiras Oy, Leiras Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Dow Corning France, and Wyeth-Ayerst International, Inc. (collectively "Defendants") to reconsider this court's earlier denial of these Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Additionally, the movants filed the declaration of Hannu Allonen pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 in support of their motion. Plaintiffs did not file a response. Upon consideration of the motion, declaration, and attached memoranda of law, the court is of the opinion that the motion should be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

On May 12, 1995, this court entered an order denying the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction. In the order, this court stated that the declaration of Hannu Allonen filed on behalf of Leiras Pharmaceuticals did not expressly contradict the Plaintiffs' allegations. Because the court must take the facts alleged in the complaint as true unless expressly contradicted by some evidence, this court had no choice but to deny Defendant Leiras Pharmaceuticals' motion to dismiss. Further, the court's order held that the exercise of jurisdiction over the Defendants did not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, as required by due process. Defendants, in their motion, have asked the court to reconsider its rulings on both of these points.

DISCUSSION

Leiras Pharmaceuticals

Plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. WNS, Inc. v. Farrow, 884 F.2d 200, 203 (5th Cir.1989) (citing D.J. Investments, Inc. v. Metzeler Motorcycle Tire Agent Gregg, Inc., 754 F.2d 542, 545 (5th Cir.1985)). As this court's earlier order stated, Plaintiffs have only the allegations in the complaint to rely upon. These allegations include:

Leiras Pharmaceuticals ... designed, manufactured, sold and/or distributed, and *317 continue to design, manufacture, sell and/or distribute, silicone coated levonorgestrel implants, called NORPLANT Contraceptive System, and/or the component parts thereof, for/to hospitals and physicians who implant/place them in the bodies of women, or assumed the liabilities of those who did so.

Further, Plaintiff Ozuna's complaint alleges that "[a] substantial part of the events or omissions forming the basis of this complaint occurred in Bexar County[, Texas]."[1] Finally, although not specified in Plaintiff Bocanegra's complaint, she appears to be alleging that the events surrounding the basis of her complaint occurred in Brownsville, Texas.[2]

To determine whether these unsubstantiated allegations are sufficient to support a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over Leiras Pharmaceuticals, this court must look to any evidence presented by Leiras Pharmaceuticals, in this case the declaration of Hannu Allonen. As this court has previously stated, when unsubstantiated allegations are controverted by affidavit or declaration, the affidavit or declaration trumps the allegations. See Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 826, 831 (5th Cir.1986), modified, 836 F.2d 850 (1988). The supplemental declaration filed by Leiras Pharmaceuticals does expressly contradict the allegations in the complaints that it manufactured, sold, or distributed either Norplant or a component part of Norplant.[3] Therefore, such evidence trumps the allegations in the complaint, and Plaintiffs have not established a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over Leiras Pharmaceuticals.

"Fair Play and Substantial Justice"

This court, in its order of May 12, 1995, found that Defendants had minimum contacts with Texas and that the exercise of jurisdiction over the Defendants in this case comported with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Defendants do not dispute the court's finding of minimum contacts. However, Defendants do ask this court to reconsider its interpretation of the standards for "fair play and substantial justice."

As this court's previous order stated, to determine whether requiring a defendant to defend a suit in a distant forum comports with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," a court must consider several factors:

(1) the burden upon the nonresident defendant;
(2) the interests of the forum state;
(3) the plaintiff's interest in securing relief;
(4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and
(5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.

Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 647 n. 3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 115 S.Ct. 322, 130 L.Ed.2d 282 (1994) (citations and quotations omitted).

Defendants argue that the burden on them is as "severe" as was the burden on the defendant in Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987), in which the Court found that exercising jurisdiction over the foreign defendant would not comport with fair play and substantial justice. Defendants' assertion is based on the language of Asahi in which the Court discussed the burden on a defendant of being forced to "traverse the distance" between its foreign headquarters and a United States courthouse. However, Defendants fail to mention that the Court's recognition of the "unique burden[]" was further based on the fact that the foreign defendant would be required to litigate a dispute with another foreign corporation in the United States. This point alone makes the burden on the Defendants somewhat less *318 uniquely burdensome than in Asahi, because in the case at bar, the dispute is between Texas plaintiffs and domestic and foreign defendants.

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