In Re: NMSR Rentals Texas, LLC v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: November 6, 2024
• Docket: 05-24-00893-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

DISMISSED and Opinion Filed November 6, 2024

S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-24-00893-CV

IN RE NMSR RENTALS TEXAS, LLC, Relator

Original Proceeding from the 380th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 380-06433-2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Justices Pedersen, III, Smith, and Garcia Opinion by Justice Smith Before the Court is relator’s August 2, 2024 petition for writ of mandamus.

Relator challenges the trial court’s April 25, 2024 order denying relator’s amended

motion to dissolve writ of attachment as an abuse of discretion and asks this Court

to compel the trial court to issue a new order granting the motion. During our review,

we questioned whether this mandamus proceeding was moot because it appeared

that the trial court lacked plenary power on the date of the challenged order based

on the trial court’s June 1, 2023 judgment. Accordingly, we ordered relator to file

either a motion to dismiss or a letter brief explaining why this original proceeding is

not moot. Relator filed a letter brief contending that this proceeding is not moot because

the June 1, 2023 judgment did not actually dispose of all claims and parties and

because a Mother Hubbard clause cannot convert a partial judgment into a final

judgment. Therefore, relator concluded, the trial court retained plenary power on

December 18, 2023, when it granted relator’s motion for new trial and on April 25,

2024, when it denied relator’s motion to dissolve writ of attachment.

Relator is correct that a Mother Hubbard clause, standing alone, is not

sufficient to create a final judgment and that a judgment is final when it actually

disposes of every pending claim and party. See Patel v. Nations Renovations, LLC,

661 S.W.3d 151, 154–55 (Tex. 2023) (per curiam). But that is not the end of the

story. We must also deem a judgment without a trial to be final when “it clearly and

unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and parties, even if it does

not actually do so.” Id. Although “no magic language is required,” when the trial

court “describ[es] its action as (1) final, (2) a disposition of all claims and parties,

and (3) appealable,” there is a “clear indication of finality.” Id. at 155. If the

judgment, on its face, “clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all

claims and parties, the assessment is resolved in favor of finding finality, and the

reviewing court cannot review the record.” Id. at 154.

Here, the June 1, 2023 judgment stated that it “is intended to be FINAL for

purposes of appeal. The Judgment disposes of all parties to this action and all claims.

All relief requested by any party to this action not expressly granted herein is

–2– DENIED.” Because the judgment described the trial court’s action as “(1) final,

(2) a disposition of all claims and parties, and (3) appealable,” we must deem this a

final judgment. See Patel, 661 S.W.3d at 154–55.

After signing a final judgment, a trial court retains plenary power only for the

next thirty days unless the judgment is modified, corrected, or reformed during that

thirty-day period or a party timely files a motion that extends the trial court’s plenary

power, such as a motion for new trial. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b. Based on the record

before us, neither of these plenary-power-extending events occurred. Therefore, we

conclude that the trial court lost plenary power thirty days after the June 1, 2023

final judgment, making the December 18, 2023 order granting a new trial and the

April 25, 2024 order denying relator’s amended motion to dissolve writ of

attachment void. See In re Dansby, 583 S.W.3d 838, 840 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2019,

orig. proceeding) (“Judicial action taken after the trial court’s plenary power expires

is void.”).

Consequently, the trial court lacks plenary power to provide relator the relief

it seeks, and this mandamus proceeding is moot. See Elec. Reliability Council of

Tex., Inc. v. Panda Power Generation Infrastructure Fund, LLC, 619 S.W.3d 628,

634–35 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding) (discussing mootness doctrine). We lack

jurisdiction over a moot proceeding. See id.

–3– Accordingly, we dismiss relator’s petition for writ of mandamus.

/Craig Smith/ CRAIG SMITH JUSTICE

240893F.P05

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