NOTICE 2023 IL App (5th) 220953-U NOTICE Decision filed 03/23/23. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 4-22-0953 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ________________________________________________________________________
In re N.J., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Boone County. ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 21-JA-31 ) Bianca T., ) Honorable ) Janet R. Holmgren, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge, presiding. ________________________________________________________________________
PRESIDING JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Moore and McHaney concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We reverse that portion of the circuit court’s dispositional judgment finding that the respondent was unfit, and that the health, safety, and best interest of the minor child would be jeopardized if he remained in the custody of the respondent, as against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 The respondent, Bianca T., is the mother of N.J., born February 2016. On October
17, 2022, the circuit court of Boone County found the respondent, for reasons other than
financial circumstances alone, unfit to care for, protect, train, or discipline the minor child,
and that placement with the respondent was contrary to the health, safety, and best interest
of the minor child. As such, pursuant to section 2-27 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987
1 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-27 (West 2020)), the circuit court found that it was consistent with
the health, welfare, and safety of the minor child, and in the best interest of the minor child,
to be made a ward of the court, and placed guardianship and custody of the minor child
with the minor child’s natural father. The circuit court further entered an order of protective
supervision under section 2-24 of the Act (id. § 2-24) on the same day.
¶3 The respondent now appeals the circuit court’s dispositional judgment arguing that
the circuit court’s findings that the respondent was unfit to care for the minor child, and
that the health, safety, and best interest of the minor child would be jeopardized if he
remained in the custody of the respondent, were against the manifest weight of the
evidence. For the following reasons, we reverse that portion of the circuit court’s
dispositional judgment.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 During the execution of a warrant by law enforcement at the home where the
respondent resided with the minor child, over 300 grams of heroin, 50 grams of cocaine,
300 grams of cannabis, and an unknown quantity of oxycodone were located, along with
two unsecured firearms. All of these items were within reach of the minor child. The
residence belonged to the respondent’s mother. The respondent was arrested, and the minor
child was taken into protective custody on July 13, 2021. The respondent was charged with
four Class X felonies for manufacturing/delivering cocaine and heroin, and four Class 1
felonies for possession of cocaine and heroin. The respondent pleaded not guilty to the
charges, she was released on bond, and the charges remain pending.
2 ¶6 On July 15, 2021, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship in the circuit
court of Boone County. 1 The petition contained four counts alleging that the minor child
was neglected within the meaning of section 2-3(1)(b) of the Act (id. § 2-3(1)(b)), due to
the minor child being in an environment that was injurious to his welfare. Count I was
based on the allegation that the respondent kept illegal narcotics, such as heroin and
cocaine, in the bedroom she shared with the minor. Count II alleged that minor child’s
natural father was previously indicated by the Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS) due to his storage of illegal narcotics in the minor child’s bedroom. Count III
alleged that guns and associated ammunition were stored in the minor child’s home, and
count IV alleged that illegal narcotics were stored in the minor child’s home.
¶7 The circuit court conducted a shelter care hearing the same day and the respondent
stipulated that there was probable cause to believe that the minor child was neglected
within the meaning of section 2-3(1)(b) of the Act (id. § 2-3(1)(b)), concerning count IV
only. The respondent further stipulated that there was an immediate and urgent necessity
to have the minor child removed from the home. As such, the circuit court entered a
temporary custody order pursuant to section 2-10 of the Act (id. § 2-10) and placed
guardianship and temporary custody of the minor child with the guardianship administrator
of DCFS.
1 The State’s petition for adjudication of wardship related to the respondent and the minor child’s natural father, E.J. This appeal involves the circuit court’s finding regarding the respondent; however, facts relating to E.J. will be discussed as necessary to provide relevant background for the issues presented in this appeal. 3 ¶8 A DCFS report filed with the circuit court on September 13, 2021, stated that the
respondent was cooperating with the agency, and that her service plan recommendations
included individual counseling, substance abuse assessment/services, and maintaining a
safe and stable home environment free from illegal activity, with legal income, and safe
individuals. The respondent’s service plan also required that the respondent cooperate with
DCFS and the courts to process her criminal involvement, demonstrate sobriety, and
prevent future illegal activity.
¶9 The DCFS service plan filed with the circuit court on October 27, 2021, stated that
the respondent continued to reside at the residence where the drugs and firearms were
located and her recommended services were to cooperate with a substance abuse
assessment and demonstrate sobriety through negative drug testing, engage in individual
therapy, create a safe home environment, ensure that all individuals in the household are
safe and appropriate to be around the minor child, establish a legal income, and refrain
from any further illegal activity. After the respondent participated in an integrated
assessment on January 18, 2022, it was recommended that she participate in individual
psychotherapy, parenting education, and parent coaching.
¶ 10 On June 9, 2022, the circuit court conducted an adjudication hearing 2 and entered a
written adjudicatory order the same day. The adjudicatory order stated that the circuit court
2 Section 2-14(b) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-14(b) (West 2020)) states that the circuit court shall conduct an adjudicatory hearing within 90 days of the date of service of the petition for adjudication. Section 2-21(2) of the Act (id. § 2-21(2)) states that a dispositional hearing is required not later than 30 days after the entry of a finding of abused or neglected. The time limits of sections 2-14 and 2-21, however, may be waived by the consent of all parties and approval by the court. Id. §§ 2-14(d), 2-21(3). In this matter, the circuit court’s continuation orders indicate that the parties agreed to waive the time requirements for the hearings, and the timeliness of the hearings are not at issue in this appeal.
4 had found that the minor child was neglected within the meaning of section 2-3(1)(b) of
the Act (id. § 2-3(1)(b)), because the minor child was in an injurious environment due to
illegal narcotics being stored in the minor child’s home as stated in count IV of the State’s
petition for adjudication of wardship. The adjudicatory order also stated that counts I, II,
and III of the State’s petition for adjudication of wardship were dismissed. The circuit
court’s finding that the minor child was neglected was based on the respondent’s stipulation
that the State could prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the allegations contained
in count IV of the State’s petition for adjudication of wardship. The circuit court further
found that the neglect was inflicted by the respondent, and that DCFS had made reasonable
efforts in providing services to the respondent.
¶ 11 The DCFS report, filed with the circuit court on September 8, 2022, stated that the
respondent had completed her mental health and substance abuse assessments and was not
recommended for any services. DCFS, however, requested that the respondent participate
in individual counseling and the DCFS report indicated that the respondent was consistent
in attending her individual counseling. The respondent had also successfully completed her
parenting education courses. The respondent self-reported that she had moved from her
mother’s residence, where the drugs and guns were found, and that she was residing with
her father. DCFS conducted a home safety check at the respondent’s father’s home and no
safety concerns were noted. The respondent had also obtained legal employment. Based on
her progress, the DCFS report stated that the respondent would be approved to begin
unsupervised visitation with the minor child.
5 ¶ 12 The September 8, 2022, DCFS report further stated that the natural father had
completed an integrated assessment and was recommended for individual counseling and
parenting education. The DCFS report also stated that the natural father had completed a
mental health assessment and no services were recommended, and a substance abuse
assessment that recommended that the natural father attend Level I outpatient services. The
DCFS report further stated that instead of parenting classes, the natural father was
requested to attend a father’s program along with his individual counseling.
¶ 13 On September 16, 2022, the circuit court conducted a dispositional hearing. The
respondent was present and represented by counsel. The circuit court admitted 23 exhibits
into evidence, without objection, including all written reports and services plans,
previously filed with the circuit court. The respondent was the first witness called to testify
at the hearing. The respondent testified that she was residing at her father’s home and had
been residing there since January 2022. The respondent stated that her father, his wife, and
their son also reside there, and that she and the minor child would share a room. She further
testified that she had not stayed for more than one day at her mother’s residence where the
drugs had been located.
¶ 14 The respondent stated that she had never had a drug or alcohol problem, and that
she had worked at two daycare centers. At the first daycare center, she left after the daycare
center became aware of her pending drug charges. The respondent stated that she had left
the second center after being informed by DCFS that she was not permitted to work at a
daycare center because she had an indicated report from DCFS. The respondent testified
that she saw the minor child almost daily waking him up, taking him to school, then going
6 back at night to give him a bath, and ensuring he had everything ready for school the next
day. The respondent further stated that, most of the time, she was also with the minor child
on Saturday and Sunday, unless the minor child was with his father. The respondent stated
that she and minor child’s father, along with the foster parents, communicated regarding
visitation and that there was not a set visitation schedule.
¶ 15 The respondent also testified that, since July 2022, she was employed full-time,
engaged in therapy sessions, and attending accounting classes at Rock Valley College. The
respondent stated that when the minor child’s natural father was paroled to her mother’s
residence in November 2021, she was not residing there, and that she had never spent the
night when the minor child’s natural father was there.
¶ 16 The respondent went on to admit that the natural father took the minor child to
school every day, but that the respondent would help as well, and sometimes would go over
and get the minor child ready for school. The respondent further stated that she did not
assist with getting the minor child ready for school every day the previous year because
she started work at 5:30 a.m. some days. The respondent also stated that she still had items
at her mother’s residence, that she would visit her mother once or twice a week, and that
she still received her mail at her mother’s residence since her mother takes care of all of
her paperwork for her. Finally, the respondent testified that she sees the minor child almost
every day; provides him clothes, shoes, and school supplies; feeds him; bathes him; and
although she has attempted to provide some financial support, the foster parent would not
accept any financial aid.
7 ¶ 17 Next, the minor child’s natural father, E.J., was called to testify. E.J. stated that he
was paroled in November 2021, and initially, his parole address was the respondent’s
mother’s residence. E.J. stated that the respondent was not residing there at that time. E.J.
stated that he had been employed since November 2021 and had been employed prior to
being incarcerated. E.J. testified that he knew the minor child’s foster parents and knew
them prior to the minor child being placed with them.
¶ 18 E.J. stated that the minor child was in kindergarten in November 2021, and that E.J.
was not on third shift at that time, so he had more time to spend with the minor child. As
such, E.J. testified that he would go the foster home, take the minor child to school in the
mornings, pick him up after school, and spend most of the afternoon with him. E.J. stated
that he would occasionally see the respondent at the foster home while coming or going,
but that he and the respondent were not visiting at the same time.
¶ 19 E.J. testified that he currently worked from 3 p.m. until 2 or 3 a.m. and that he still
took the minor child to school every morning and picked him up from school. E.J. stated
that on Saturdays, he usually tried to take the minor child to his mother, and since his
mother resided close to his work, he would spend his break with the minor child. E.J. stated
that he had been taking the minor child to school for the most part since November 2021,
but that the respondent would take him if he was too tired. Since November 2021, E.J.
stated that 70% of the time, he was the one who got the minor child up in the morning, fed
him breakfast, took him to school, and then picked him up after school. The respondent
would do it 30% of the time.
8 ¶ 20 E.J. testified that he had seen the respondent a few times at her mother’s residence,
but that the respondent had stated to him that she was residing at her father’s home. E.J.
testified that the respondent had spent the night once or twice a week at her mother’s house
while he had resided there, but not with him. E.J. stated that he did not keep track of the
respondent and did not know where the respondent actually resided. When asked whether
he had any concerns about the minor child residing with the respondent, E.J. stated “[j]ust
the time that she spends with him.” E.J. stated that he was aware that the respondent was
busy trying to get her life together and trying to do everything right.
¶ 21 E.J. also stated that he was concerned about the respondent’s boyfriend, who was a
codefendant in the respondent’s criminal case. E.J. testified that he had spoken with the
respondent concerning her relationship with her codefendant, and that she did not deny it,
but basically told him to mind his own business. E.J. stated that the last time he spoke with
the respondent concerning her codefendant was a few months prior to the hearing. E.J.
stated that the respondent’s codefendant was currently in custody, but that he was
concerned that the codefendant would be around the minor child upon his release.
¶ 22 E.J. went on to testify that there were services he was required to do, such as
individual counseling, but that he did not have enough time because of his work hours. E.J.
stated that he did participate in an interview and that the counselor indicated that she would
work with his schedule. E.J. also stated that he was required to take drug tests for both
DCFS and for his parole, and that he had completed five or six drug tests for DCFS. E.J.
9 stated that, also as part of his parole, he was participating in treatment 3 and that he had four
more sessions to complete. E.J. further stated that DCFS had requested that he participate
in a parenting group, but that the group met while he was working. E.J. stated that he would
like to participate, but could not because of the timeframe.
¶ 23 Finally, E.J. testified that he and the respondent were communicating with regard to
the minor child and that he thought they were doing pretty well coparenting. E.J. also
testified that he believed that the respondent was a “a pretty fit mother.” E.J. stated that the
respondent was “on her own” and “doing good for herself.” E.J. further stated that he did
not believe that the respondent was using or selling substances now, but that he did believe
that she was maintaining a relationship with her codefendant.
¶ 24 The final witness called to testify at the dispositional hearing was Sophia Fiorenza,
a caseworker with Children’s Home & Aid, acting on behalf of DCFS. Sophia testified that
she was the caseworker in this matter and had been since June 2022. Sophia stated that she
had spoken by telephone with both E.J. and the respondent prior to the hearing. Sophia
testified that she had called the respondent first since Sophia had been provided a recent
paystub for the respondent that indicated her address as her mother’s residence. Sophia
stated that the respondent had informed her that the paystub reflected the address the
respondent had used when filling out the application online. Sophia further stated that the
respondent had indicated that she was residing at her father’s residence. Sophia then stated
3 The type of treatment that E.J. was participating in as a condition of his parole was not provided in the testimony, but the integrated assessment report filed with the circuit court on August 19, 2022, and admitted into evidence at the hearing, indicates that he completed a substance abuse program while incarcerated and was required to participate with follow through treatment after being paroled. 10 that she had contacted E.J. and asked him if the respondent was residing with her mother
and he had answered “yes.” Sophia also stated that E.J. informed her that part of the reason
he wanted to leave the respondent’s mother’s residence was because the respondent had
been staying there “more and more.” Sophia testified that she was not sure whether E.J.’s
response regarding whether the respondent was residing with her mother referred to
currently or at the time he was living there, but that E.J. had indicated that he would not be
surprised if the respondent was currently living there.
¶ 25 Sophia testified that on August 5, 2022, the agency received an anonymous report
that the respondent was working at a daycare center, was having contact with her
codefendant, and was not living with her father. Sophia stated she was able to confirm that
the respondent was working at the daycare center, but was unable to confirm whether or
not the respondent was residing with her father or confirm whether the respondent was still
having contact with her codefendant. Sophia stated that she had not spoken with the
respondent’s mother, nor had she ever gone to the residence of the respondent’s mother.
¶ 26 Sophia stated that on August 25, 2022, she had conducted a safety check at the
respondent’s father’s residence. During the safety check, Sophia stated she was shown the
respondent’s bedroom, which contained one bed and dresser with things on it, but she did
not look in any drawers or look in the closet. Sophia also stated that she had a conversation
with the respondent’s father and, during the course of the conversation, she had some
concerns regarding whether the respondent was actually residing there since, when she
asked how long the respondent had been residing there, her father appeared to have a
puzzled look on his face. Sophia acknowledged that there was “a little bit of a language
11 barrier” when speaking with the respondent’s father. Sophia testified that the respondent
had consistently reported that she had been residing with her father since January 2022.
¶ 27 Sophia went on to testify that the respondent had completed her parenting classes
and had also completed her mental health and substance abuse assessments with no services
recommended. Sophia testified that the respondent was currently participating in individual
counseling and was employed. Sophia further testified that the respondent visited with the
minor child almost daily.
¶ 28 Finally, Sophia testified that E.J. had completed a mental health assessment and was
not recommended for any services. Sophia also stated that E.J. was “just about done” with
substance abuse services and that his drug tests had all been negative for illegal substances.
Sophia stated that she had referred E.J. for a father’s program for parenting and had allowed
E.J. unsupervised visits prior to E.J. starting counseling or the parenting class.
¶ 29 The parties then presented closing arguments and the circuit court took the matter
under advisement. On October 17, 2022, the circuit court issued its decision regarding the
dispositional hearing in open court. The respondent was present and represented by
counsel. The circuit court presented its findings as follows:
“THE COURT: All right. We are set for decision on disposition this
afternoon, and I have had the opportunity to review my notes as well as the exhibits
that were admitted into evidence pursuant to the hearing.
So with regard then to [the minor child], I would find that he is adjudicated
a neglected minor under the Juvenile Court Act. I would also find that he is
adjudicated a ward of the court finding that that is in his best interest.
12 In reviewing proofs, I would find regarding [E.J.] that he is fit, able and
willing to parent [the minor child].
With regard to [the respondent], at this juncture I would find that she is unfit
due to certain services remaining to—needed to be completed as well as the pending
criminal charges being pending and unresolved. I note that I believe your housing,
I think you just moved a month and a half before we actually had the hearing on
disposition, so there has been a little bit of time.”
¶ 30 The circuit court further found that DCFS had made reasonable efforts and
appropriate services aimed at family reunification. As such, the circuit court granted
guardianship and custody of the minor child to E.J. The circuit court also entered an order
of protection prohibiting any contact between the minor child and the respondent’s
codefendant. The circuit court further gave the parties leave to initiate a family case with
the goal and plan that once any recommended services were completed, the juvenile court
proceedings could be closed, and the parties would have access to the court to modify
parenting time and to address any other issues depending on the circumstances and the
outcome of the respondent’s criminal case. Written orders reflecting the circuit court’s oral
findings were entered the same day.
¶ 31 The respondent filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the respondent raises the
sole issue of whether the circuit court’s findings that the respondent was unfit to care for
the minor child, and that the health, safety, and best interest of the minor child would be
jeopardized if he remained in the custody of the respondent, were against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
13 ¶ 32 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 33 We first note that the circuit court’s adjudication that the minor was neglected and
that it was in the minor child’s best interest to be made a ward of the court is not challenged
upon appeal. The respondent argues instead that the circuit court’s findings that the
respondent was unfit, and that the health, safety, and best interest of the minor child would
be jeopardized if he remained in the custody of the respondent, were against the manifest
¶ 34 The respondent first argues that the “Adoption Act at 750 ILCS 50/1(D) sets forth
the grounds of unfitness” and that the evidence presented at the hearing did not support a
finding that the respondent failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or
responsibility as to the minor child’s welfare within the meaning of section 1(D)(b) of the
Adoption Act. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2020). The respondent also argues that another
ground of unfitness under section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act (id. § 1(D)(m)) is the failure
to make progress towards reunification within a specific time period and that the evidence
presented at the hearing was also insufficient to demonstrate that the respondent failed to
make progress in her services.
¶ 35 By setting forth these arguments, it appears that the respondent has confused the
dispositional “unfit” finding with the “unfitness” finding in a parental rights termination
proceeding. A proceeding seeking to divest a parent of custody and guardianship following
a finding of abuse or neglect and a proceeding seeking the termination of parental rights
are different, and the stringency of the requisite “unfitness” as it relates to each proceeding
is also different. In re A.R., 2022 IL App (3d) 210346, ¶ 17. Where the State is not seeking
14 to terminate the parental rights of a respondent, the State need only demonstrate the
respondent “unfit” under the ordinary meaning of that term. Id. As such, there was no
requirement for the State to demonstrate the respondent’s unfitness as defined in the
Adoption Act at the dispositional hearing. Further, the circuit court made no findings,
whatsoever, regarding the respondent’s fitness as defined in the Adoption Act.
Accordingly, these arguments are without merit and will not be addressed by this court.
¶ 36 The proceedings in this matter are governed by the Act (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq.
(West 2020)), which provides a systematic framework for determining when a minor child
may be removed from his or her parents and made a ward of the State. In re A.P., 2021 IL
113875, ¶ 18. First, the circuit court must make a finding of abuse, neglect, or dependence
regarding the child. 705 ILCS 405/2-21 (West 2020). If the circuit court finds a child is
neglected, then the circuit court conducts a dispositional hearing at which the “court shall
determine whether it is consistent with the health, safety and best interests of the minor and
the public that he be made a ward of the court.” Id. § 2-21(2). When a minor is made a
ward of the court, the circuit court must also determine the proper disposition that best
serves the health, safety, and interest of the minor child and the public. Id. § 2-22. A proper
disposition may include the removal of the minor child from the custody of his or her parent
if the court determines that the parent is unfit, unable, or unwilling, for some reason other
than financial circumstances alone, to care for, protect, train, or discipline the minor child,
and that the health, safety, and best interest of the minor would be jeopardized if the minor
child remained in the custody of his or her parent. Id. § 2-23.
15 ¶ 37 Along with the arguments addressed above, the respondent argues that the circuit
court’s finding of unfit was against the manifest weight of the evidence since the
respondent had completed all of her required services except one, in which she was
currently engaged and consistently attended. The respondent argues that the circuit court
found her unfit due to certain services remaining to be completed, but found the natural
father to be fit even though there remained services that he had not begun and had not
completed. As such, the respondent argues that the circuit court’s unfit finding was an
arbitrary decision in favor of the natural father and against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
¶ 38 The respondent further argues that there was no evidence presented at the
dispositional hearing that her pending criminal charges affected her fitness or that the
health, safety, and best interest of the minor child would be jeopardized if he was restored
to the custody of the respondent during the pendency of her criminal case. The respondent
argues that in September 2022, the respondent was approved for unsupervised visits with
the minor child, indicating that the respondent was fit and able to care, protect, and/or train
the minor child. Therefore, the respondent argues that the circuit court’s findings that
respondent was unfit, and that the health, safety, and best interest of the minor would be
jeopardized if the minor child remained in the custody of the respondent due to the pending
criminal charges, were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 39 A circuit court’s finding at a dispositional hearing will only be reversed if the
findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence or the circuit court
committed an abuse of discretion by selecting an inappropriate dispositional order. In re
16 J.W., 386 Ill. App. 3d 847, 856 (2008). A circuit court’s finding is against the manifest
weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where its finding is
unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented. In re Al. S., 2017 IL App
(4th) 160737, ¶ 41. Further, wide discretion is vested in the circuit court judge to an even
greater degree in child custody cases than any ordinary appeal to which the familiar
manifest weight principle is applied. In re Martin, 31 Ill. App. 3d 288, 293 (1975).
¶ 40 The circuit court stated that the basis for its finding that the respondent was unfit
was “due to certain services remaining to—needed to be completed as well as the pending
criminal charges being pending and unresolved.” The evidence, however, demonstrated
that the only service that the respondent had not completed was her individual counseling,
in which she was engaged and consistently attended. The evidence further established that
the natural father, however, had only completed his initial interview and had yet to engage
in counseling. The natural father had also not yet completed his substance abuse services
nor attended the recommended parenting group. Further, the one service that the
respondent was engaged in, but had not yet completed, was the same service that the natural
father had not even begun. Even giving the highest deference to the circuit court, we find
that the circuit court’s finding that the respondent was unfit for failure to complete one
service, while the natural father was found fit while also not having completed the same
service and several other services, to be arbitrary and against the manifest weight of the
¶ 41 That leaves the respondent’s pending criminal charges as the remaining basis for
the circuit court’s finding of unfit. A review of the record on appeal substantiates that the
17 respondent’s pending criminal charges, along with the circumstances of her arrest and the
minor child being brought into protective custody, were set forth within the various reports
filed with the circuit court. These various reports, along with a copy of the respondent’s
bond report, were admitted into evidence at the dispositional hearing. The record on appeal,
however, does not demonstrate any evidence being presented at the hearing, either through
exhibits or testimony, regarding the effect of the pending charges on the respondent’s
fitness or how the pending charges jeopardized the health, safety, and best interest of the
minor child if he was restored to the custody of the respondent during the pendency of her
criminal case.
¶ 42 While the respondent could be convicted of the pending charges, and face a lengthy
period of incarceration, there is also the possibility that the respondent could be acquitted
of the pending charges. As such, any potential outcome of the respondent’s pending
criminal charges would be speculation on the part of the circuit court. There was no
testimony at the dispositional hearing, nor any exhibits admitted, that the conditions of the
respondent’s bond, or the pending criminal charges, interfered with her fitness to parent
the minor child or jeopardized the health, safety, and best interest of the minor child.
Further, while the respondent was released from jail on bond, we note that the natural father
was released from prison on parole, which subjected both parties to potential incarceration
should they violate the conditions of their bond or parole.
¶ 43 While we acknowledge that the respondent invoked her fifth amendment rights to
several questions regarding the pending criminal charges at the hearing, those questions
pertained to the search warrant executed at her mother’s residence and her codefendant.
18 The respondent was extensively questioned regarding her current living situation, services,
and interactions with the minor child. The other witnesses at the hearing also testified to
the respondent’s services and interactions with the minor child. The various reports filed
with the circuit court and admitted into evidence noted the respondent’s pending criminal
charges, but made no mention that the charges affected, or interfered in any manner with,
the respondent’s ability to parent the minor child since the initial incident. The only
evidence of the pending criminal charges interfering in any manner was the respondent’s
loss of her first employment at a daycare center. The respondent, however, was able to
subsequently find full-time employment, and there was no evidence that, due to her
pending criminal charges, the respondent would not be able to properly support the minor
child.
¶ 44 Because there was no testimony at the dispositional hearing, nor any exhibits
admitted, that the conditions of the respondent’s bond, or the pending criminal charges,
interfered with her fitness to parent the minor child or jeopardized the health, safety, and
best interest of the minor child, we find that the circuit court’s finding that the respondent
was unfit based on her pending criminal charges was against the manifest weight of the
¶ 45 Finally, we note that the State argues that this court should conclude that the circuit
court’s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence for one or all of the
following reasons: the large amount of drugs located in the respondent’s previous
residence, that the caseworker believed that the respondent was not being honest about her
living situation, that the respondent had one drug test that came back diluted, that the
19 respondent worked at a daycare center despite knowing that she was prohibited from being
around children, and that she falsely reported that she had never previously been arrested,
when she had in fact been previously arrested 4 on multiple occasions.
¶ 46 While this court may affirm a circuit court’s decision on any basis supported by the
record, regardless of the reasoning employed by the circuit court, we decline to affirm the
judgment based on any of the above reasons. In re Marriage of Morreale, 351 Ill. App. 3d
238, 241 (2004) (appellate court may affirm the trial court’s decision on any basis
supported by the record). The circuit court had the best opportunity to view and evaluate
the parties and their testimony, and this court does not reassess the credibility of the
witnesses. See In re M.A., 325 Ill. App. 3d 387, 391 (2001). At the dispositional hearing,
the circuit court heard the evidence, including the testimony of the witnesses, and did not
cite any of the above reasons for its finding of unfit, or in regard to the health, safety, and
best interest of the minor child. We further note that the circuit court specifically stated that
it had no concerns regarding the respondent’s current residence. As such, this court will
not go beyond the stated findings of the circuit court in search of a means in which to affirm
the circuit court’s judgment, and the State is free to bring one or all of the above reasons to
the attention of the circuit court upon remand.
¶ 47 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 48 For the preceding reasons, we find that the circuit court’s findings that the
respondent was unfit, and that the health, safety, and best interest of the minor child would
4 People’s exhibit 24 is a copy of a Boone County pretrial service bond report dated July 9, 2021, that states that the respondent had two previous arrests for retail theft: one in 2013 and the other in 2015. 20 be jeopardized if he remained in the custody of the respondent, were against the manifest
weight of the evidence. As such, we reverse that portion of the dispositional judgment of
the circuit court of Boone County and remand for further action.
¶ 49 Reversed and remanded.