In Re Nieves Requenez v. the State of Texas

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 18, 2025
• Docket: 04-25-00234-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

Fourth Court of Appeals San Antonio, Texas

CONCURRING OPINION No. 04-25-00234-CR

IN RE Nieves REQUENEZ

From the County Court at Law No. 12, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2025CC003760 Honorable Yolanda T. Huff, Judge Presiding

PER CURIAM Concurring Opinion by: Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice Lori Massey Brissette, Justice

Delivered and Filed: June 18, 2025

Based on the current state of the law, the majority decides that relator has not established

the two-part test for mandamus relief to be appropriate. See State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Jud. Dist.

Ct. of Apps. at Texarkana, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). I concur, but write

separately to draw attention to imposing additional “no notice” bail conditions on a defendant in

light of the Damon Allen Act.

On March 3, 2025, relator was arrested for driving while intoxicated. The same day, a

magistrate judge set her bail at $1,000; no other conditions were imposed. The following week, on

March 11, 2025, without holding a hearing, taking evidence, or providing notice to relator, the trial 04-25-00234-CR

court imposed a special condition of release on relator’s bond by requiring her to install an ignition

interlock device on her vehicle.

In 2021, the legislature passed the Damon Allen Act, establishing, as relevant here, that a

magistrate must make a bail decision within 48 hours of a person’s arrest and that the decision

must be based on an “individualized consideration of all circumstances and of the factors required

by Article 17.15(a).” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.028(a). Critically, the act created a rebuttable

presumption that the magistrate’s initial bail and decision on whether to impose conditions of

release “are sufficient to reasonably ensure the defendant’s appearance in court as required and the

safety of the community, law enforcement, and the victim of the alleged offense.” See id. art.

17.028(c); see also TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 13.

Generally, once established, a rebuttable presumption remains valid until the presumption

is “rebutted” through the introduction of evidence. See e.g. Cooks v. State, 240 S.W.3d 906, 911

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Fuentes v. State, No. 04-17-00749-CR, 2018 WL 6517147, at *2 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio Dec. 12, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Here,

once the magistrate set relator’s bond at $1,000 and chose not to impose any other condition, there

was a rebuttable presumption that the magistrate’s decision was sufficient to satisfy the

constitutionally permissible purposes of bail. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.028(a), (c); see also

TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 13. Nevertheless, the trial court imposed an additional condition on

bond—requiring an ignition interlock device—without that presumption being properly rebutted.

Although I understand the practicality of the trial court’s actions, I cannot conflate the Damon

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Allen Act with allowing a trial court to continue to impose additional conditions on bond without

the proper evidentiary procedures being followed, nor notice being provided to relator. 1 0F

Notwithstanding the foregoing, I acknowledge that mandamus is relief reserved for

extraordinary circumstances where both parts of the test are satisfied. See Young, 236 S.W.3d at

210; see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 11.01, 11.05. For this reason, I concur.

Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

1 Prior to the Damon Allen Act, no such rebuttable presumption existed and a judge or magistrate, on their own accord, was permitted to “order the accused to be arrested and require the accused to give another bond in such amount as the judge or magistrate may deem proper” if the judge or magistrate “finds that the [existing] bond is defective, excessive or insufficient in amount, or that the sureties, if any, are not acceptable, or for any other good or sufficient cause.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.09, § 3.

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