Filed 7/10/14 In re N.H. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re N.H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D064892 THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J234321)
v.
N.H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Richard R.
Monroy, Judge. Affirmed.
Kristen Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Andrew
Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. The sole issue presented in this juvenile delinquency case is whether the trial court
erred in denying deferred entry of judgment pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 7901 on the petition charging N.H. with one count of grand theft (Pen. Code,
§ 487, subd. (a)). As we will explain, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in deciding against deferred entry of judgment, and we accordingly affirm the
judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 7, 2103, N.H. and two adults took a laptop computer, an iPhone, and
approximately $7,400 of iPad tablets from a school classroom.
A juvenile wardship petition filed against N.H. pursuant to section 602 alleged one
count of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)) in excess of $950. The petition gave
notice that the district attorney determined N.H. was eligible for deferred entry of
judgment under section 790.
At the readiness hearing, the trial court ordered the probation department to submit
a report to determine N.H.'s suitability for deferred entry of judgment.
The probation officer's report concluded that "[t]he minor's history of drug use and
past behavioral problems resulting in numerous suspensions from school does not
demonstrate the behavior that is required for a recommendation for a Deferred Entry of
Judgment." Among other things, the probation officer's report stated that N.H. had been
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 suspended at least five times in the past for behavioral problems at school, including
fighting, and that N.H. reported using marijuana on a monthly basis, including one day
prior to his arrest. The probation officer stated that "[N.H.'s] actions demonstrate that he
requires additional attention and more-restrictive measures to prevent further criminal
activity."
At the next hearing, the trial court considered and denied deferred entry of
judgment. The trial court then accepted N.H.'s admission to the grand theft count,
adjudged N.H to be a ward of the court pursuant to section 602, and placed N.H. on
probation. The district attorney agreed not to oppose a motion to reduce the offense to a
misdemeanor upon successful completion of probation.
II
DISCUSSION
N.H. contends that the trial court improperly denied him deferred entry of
Pursuant to section 790, subdivision (b), a trial court may grant deferred entry of
judgment2 to a minor who meets all of the eligibility requirements when the court finds
the minor is "suitable for deferred entry of judgment and would benefit from education,
2 Under deferred entry of judgment, in lieu of jurisdictional and dispositional hearings, "upon the successful completion of the terms of probation, as defined in Section 794, the positive recommendation of the probation department, and the motion of the prosecuting attorney, but no sooner that 12 months and no later than 36 months from the date of the minor's referral to the program, the court shall dismiss the charge or charges against the minor." (§ 791, subd. (a)(3).)
3 treatment, and rehabilitation efforts."3 The probation department's report to the court on
whether to grant deferred judgment shall "take into consideration the [minor's] age,
maturity, educational background, family relationships, demonstrable motivation,
treatment history, if any, and other mitigating and aggravating factors in determining
whether the minor is a person who would be benefited by education, treatment, or
rehabilitation," but the trial court makes the final determination on whether the minor
would benefit from education, treatment, and rehabilitation. (§ 791, subd. (b).) "[D]enial
is proper only when the trial court finds the minor would not benefit from education,
treatment and rehabilitation." (Martha C. v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 556,
561 (Martha C.).) It is the role of the trial court to "exercise . . . discretion based upon
the standard of whether the minor will derive benefit from 'education, treatment, and
rehabilitation' " as provided under deferred entry of judgment, "rather than a more
restrictive commitment." (In re Sergio R. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 597, 607, italics added
(Sergio R.).)
3 A minor is eligible for deferred entry when he or she meets the requirements in section 790, subdivision (a): "(1) The minor has not previously been declared to be a ward of the court for the commission of a felony offense. [¶] (2) The offense charged is not one of the offenses enumerated in subdivision (b) of Section 707. [¶] (3) The minor has not previously been committed to the custody of the Youth Authority. [¶] (4) The minor's record does not indicate that probation has ever been revoked without being completed. [¶] (5) The minor is at least 14 years of age at the time of the hearing. [¶] (6) The minor is eligible for probation pursuant to Section 1203.06 of the Penal Code." (§ 790, subd. (a).) There is no dispute that N.H. met the eligibility requirements.
4 "When the juvenile court denies a request for [deferred entry of judgment] where
the minor is statutorily eligible, we review the decision under the abuse of discretion
standard." (In re Damian M. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.)
Here, in denying deferred entry of judgment, the trial court noted the sophisticated
nature of the crime and explained that based on the history of substance abuse by N.H.
and some past negative behavior demonstrated by suspensions from school, "this is a
situation where the parents would actually be supported by probation, to address things
like substance abuse." The trial court explained that formal probation was appropriate
because "if there is a hiccup here or there with regard to substance abuse, probation then
functions to address those issues, to stop a minor from heading toward a path of
incarceration and further punishment." The trial court also explained that N.H. could still
have the petition dismissed in the future under section 782 and could still take advantage
of the opportunity to rehabilitate himself, even if he was not given deferred entry of
judgment. A decision that the minor requires more formal supervision than provided
under deferred entry of judgment based on the nature of the crime and the minor's social
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Filed 7/10/14 In re N.H. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re N.H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. D064892 THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. J234321)
v.
N.H.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Richard R.
Monroy, Judge. Affirmed.
Kristen Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Andrew
Mestman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. The sole issue presented in this juvenile delinquency case is whether the trial court
erred in denying deferred entry of judgment pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code
section 7901 on the petition charging N.H. with one count of grand theft (Pen. Code,
§ 487, subd. (a)). As we will explain, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in deciding against deferred entry of judgment, and we accordingly affirm the
judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 7, 2103, N.H. and two adults took a laptop computer, an iPhone, and
approximately $7,400 of iPad tablets from a school classroom.
A juvenile wardship petition filed against N.H. pursuant to section 602 alleged one
count of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)) in excess of $950. The petition gave
notice that the district attorney determined N.H. was eligible for deferred entry of
judgment under section 790.
At the readiness hearing, the trial court ordered the probation department to submit
a report to determine N.H.'s suitability for deferred entry of judgment.
The probation officer's report concluded that "[t]he minor's history of drug use and
past behavioral problems resulting in numerous suspensions from school does not
demonstrate the behavior that is required for a recommendation for a Deferred Entry of
Judgment." Among other things, the probation officer's report stated that N.H. had been
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code. 2 suspended at least five times in the past for behavioral problems at school, including
fighting, and that N.H. reported using marijuana on a monthly basis, including one day
prior to his arrest. The probation officer stated that "[N.H.'s] actions demonstrate that he
requires additional attention and more-restrictive measures to prevent further criminal
activity."
At the next hearing, the trial court considered and denied deferred entry of
judgment. The trial court then accepted N.H.'s admission to the grand theft count,
adjudged N.H to be a ward of the court pursuant to section 602, and placed N.H. on
probation. The district attorney agreed not to oppose a motion to reduce the offense to a
misdemeanor upon successful completion of probation.
II
DISCUSSION
N.H. contends that the trial court improperly denied him deferred entry of
Pursuant to section 790, subdivision (b), a trial court may grant deferred entry of
judgment2 to a minor who meets all of the eligibility requirements when the court finds
the minor is "suitable for deferred entry of judgment and would benefit from education,
2 Under deferred entry of judgment, in lieu of jurisdictional and dispositional hearings, "upon the successful completion of the terms of probation, as defined in Section 794, the positive recommendation of the probation department, and the motion of the prosecuting attorney, but no sooner that 12 months and no later than 36 months from the date of the minor's referral to the program, the court shall dismiss the charge or charges against the minor." (§ 791, subd. (a)(3).)
3 treatment, and rehabilitation efforts."3 The probation department's report to the court on
whether to grant deferred judgment shall "take into consideration the [minor's] age,
maturity, educational background, family relationships, demonstrable motivation,
treatment history, if any, and other mitigating and aggravating factors in determining
whether the minor is a person who would be benefited by education, treatment, or
rehabilitation," but the trial court makes the final determination on whether the minor
would benefit from education, treatment, and rehabilitation. (§ 791, subd. (b).) "[D]enial
is proper only when the trial court finds the minor would not benefit from education,
treatment and rehabilitation." (Martha C. v. Superior Court (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 556,
561 (Martha C.).) It is the role of the trial court to "exercise . . . discretion based upon
the standard of whether the minor will derive benefit from 'education, treatment, and
rehabilitation' " as provided under deferred entry of judgment, "rather than a more
restrictive commitment." (In re Sergio R. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 597, 607, italics added
(Sergio R.).)
3 A minor is eligible for deferred entry when he or she meets the requirements in section 790, subdivision (a): "(1) The minor has not previously been declared to be a ward of the court for the commission of a felony offense. [¶] (2) The offense charged is not one of the offenses enumerated in subdivision (b) of Section 707. [¶] (3) The minor has not previously been committed to the custody of the Youth Authority. [¶] (4) The minor's record does not indicate that probation has ever been revoked without being completed. [¶] (5) The minor is at least 14 years of age at the time of the hearing. [¶] (6) The minor is eligible for probation pursuant to Section 1203.06 of the Penal Code." (§ 790, subd. (a).) There is no dispute that N.H. met the eligibility requirements.
4 "When the juvenile court denies a request for [deferred entry of judgment] where
the minor is statutorily eligible, we review the decision under the abuse of discretion
standard." (In re Damian M. (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1, 5.)
Here, in denying deferred entry of judgment, the trial court noted the sophisticated
nature of the crime and explained that based on the history of substance abuse by N.H.
and some past negative behavior demonstrated by suspensions from school, "this is a
situation where the parents would actually be supported by probation, to address things
like substance abuse." The trial court explained that formal probation was appropriate
because "if there is a hiccup here or there with regard to substance abuse, probation then
functions to address those issues, to stop a minor from heading toward a path of
incarceration and further punishment." The trial court also explained that N.H. could still
have the petition dismissed in the future under section 782 and could still take advantage
of the opportunity to rehabilitate himself, even if he was not given deferred entry of
judgment. A decision that the minor requires more formal supervision than provided
under deferred entry of judgment based on the nature of the crime and the minor's social
history — as the trial court did here — is a sound reason for denying deferred entry of
judgment. (See Sergio R., supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 608 ["The evidence established
that appellant was not a suitable candidate for deferred entry of judgment, and required
more formal, restrictive measures."]; Martha C., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 562 ["a
court might find that the circumstances of a crime indicate a minor is not amenable to
rehabilitation"].) Therefore, the trial court acted within its discretion to deny deferred
entry of judgment.
5 N.H. makes much of the fact that the trial court commented that N.H. would still
have access to services to help him rehabilitate himself even under formal probation.
N.H. contends that this comment shows that the trial court viewed N.H. as being
amenable to education, treatment and rehabilitation and that the trial court therefore was
required to grant deferred entry of judgment. We disagree with N.H.'s characterization of
the trial court's comments. The trial court made its comments in response to defense
counsel's argument that public policy supports providing education, treatment and
rehabilitation to minors where possible. The trial court was simply commenting that
those same policies would still be served to a large degree under formal probation rather
than deferred entry of judgment. The trial court was also clear, however, that because of
N.H.'s background, including the nature of the crime, his substance abuse and his
behavioral problems at school, N.H. would not be amenable to the more informal
supervision provided by deferred entry of judgment and that the more formal supervision
of probation was appropriate. Put simply, although the trial court noted that the policies
of rehabilitation might still be served by formal probation, it concluded that because of
N.H.'s background, the proper approach was to provide "a more restrictive commitment"
(Sergio R., supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 607) than would be afforded under deferred entry
of judgment. Based on the evidence in the record, the trial court was well within its
discretion to reach that conclusion, and — as we have explained — it followed the
correct legal standard in doing so.
6 DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
HALLER, Acting P. J.
McINTYRE, J.P