in Re Newpark Mats and Integrated Services, LLC and Tom Joines
This text of in Re Newpark Mats and Integrated Services, LLC and Tom Joines (in Re Newpark Mats and Integrated Services, LLC and Tom Joines) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In The
Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont ____________________ NO. 09-14-00518-CV ____________________
IN RE NEWPARK MATS AND INTEGRATED SERVICES, LLC AND TOM JOINES
_______________________________________________________ ______________
Original Proceeding ________________________________________________________ _____________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Newpark Mats and Integrated Services, LLC and Tom Joines (collectively,
Newpark) filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the 60th District Court
to transfer venue of the underlying case to Harris County, Texas. See Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.0642 (West 2002). Newpark contends the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to enforce a mandatory venue agreement found in
its contract with the plaintiff, Kilgore Construction, LLC, d/b/a Kilgore Industrial.
According to Newpark, the venue provision in the parties’ agreement is
enforceable under the major transaction statute. See id. § 15.020 (West Supp.
1 2014) (“In this section, ‘major transaction’ means a transaction evidenced by a
written agreement under which a person pays or receives, or is obligated to pay or
entitled to receive, consideration with an aggregate stated value equal to or greater
than $1 million.”).
The record before the trial court indicates that Kilgore Construction signed
an application for extension of credit in favor of Newpark to allow Kilgore to rent
equipment, oil field mats. The contract does not expressly state how much credit
the parties contemplated that Newpark might extend to Kilgore under the
agreement. The parties’ contract includes a venue provision, fixing venue for
disputes arising out of the agreement in Harris County.
Newpark concedes that Kilgore owed it less than one million dollars when
Kilgore filed its suit, but it contends that all of Kilgore’s credit transactions with
Newpark after the parties entered into contract should be aggregated in calculating
the value of the contract. According to Newpark, the parties’ dispute qualifies as a
major transaction because between September 2012 and September 2013, Kilgore
paid Newpark $1,024,204.24, and Kilgore owed Newpark an additional
$658,857.54 when Kilgore filed suit. Thus, Newpark contends the aggregate value
of the contract is approximately $1,683,000.
2 In response to the petition, Kilgore contends the business that it did with
Newpark under the agreement at issue does not qualify as a “major transaction.”
According to Kilgore, the credit application that it signed in Newpark’s favor does
not expressly require Newpark to loan it one million dollars, nor does the
agreement contain a provision expressly stating the aggregate value of the credit
that Kilgore was entitled to receive. According to Kilgore, the agreement at issue
contains no “aggregate stated value;” it concludes that given the Legislature’s
definition for a “major transaction,” its various transactions with Newpark do not
qualify under the statute as a “major transaction.” See id. § 15.020.
After carefully reviewing the petition, the mandamus record, the response,
and the reply, we conclude that Newpark has not established the trial court clearly
abused its discretion in the manner it applied the definition the Legislature gave the
term “major transaction” to Newpark’s motion challenging Kilgore’s choice of
venue. See In re Fisher, 433 S.W.3d 523, 530 (Tex. 2014) (utilizing a common
sense analysis to determine whether section 15.020 applies); In re Togs Energy,
Inc., No. 05-09-01018-CV, 2009 WL 3260910, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 13,
2009, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (providing that the aggregate stated value of
the consideration must be stated in the agreement for section 15.020 to apply).
Accordingly, we deny the petition for writ of mandamus.
3 PETITION DENIED.
PER CURIAM
Submitted on December 15, 2014 Opinion Delivered January 15, 2015
Before Kreger, Horton, and Johnson, JJ.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Related
Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
in Re Newpark Mats and Integrated Services, LLC and Tom Joines, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-newpark-mats-and-integrated-services-llc-and-texapp-2015.