In re N.D

Opinion

2026 IL App (4th) 260207-U NOTICE FILED This Order was filed under July 7, 2026 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-26-0207 Carla Bender not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

In re N.D., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Adams County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 23JA82 v. ) Benjamin B., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) John C. Wooleyhan, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE VANCIL delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Grischow and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed the judgment of the trial court terminating respondent’s parental rights, finding the appeal presented no potentially meritorious issues for review.

¶2 On January 20, 2026, the trial court terminated the parental rights of respondent,

Benjamin B., to his minor child, N.D. (born in 2023). Respondent appealed, and counsel was

appointed to represent him. Counsel filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing that the appeal presented no potentially meritorious issues for review.

Respondent did not file a response.

¶3 We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 On August 15, 2023, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship of N.D.

The petition listed N.D.’s parents as Melissa M. and Corey D. It alleged that N.D. was neglected and/or abused because, at the time of N.D.’s birth, Melissa and Corey had another child, E.D., who

was removed from their care due to their substance abuse issues, and neither parent had made

enough progress to have E.D. returned. See 705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2024). The petition

alleged that it was in the best interest of N.D. to be adjudged a ward of the court. On the same day,

a temporary custody order was entered, placing N.D. in the care of the Illinois Department of

Children and Family Services (DCFS).

¶6 At a hearing on October 19, 2023, Melissa and Corey admitted to the allegations in

the State’s petition. Based on the admissions, the trial court entered an order finding N.D. to be

neglected in that he was in an environment injurious to his welfare.

¶7 On January 11, 2024, the trial court entered a dispositional order finding it was in

N.D.’s best interest to be made a ward of the court. It found Melissa and Corey to be unfit based

on “substance abuse issues that [had] legal consequences” and continued custody and guardianship

of N.D. with DCFS. Additionally, the court noted that Corey had been excluded as the biological

father of N.D. It ordered that DNA testing be completed on respondent.

¶8 At a permanency review hearing on August 15, 2024, the trial court stated that DNA

testing had identified respondent as the biological father of N.D. The petition for the adjudication

of wardship of N.D. was amended to include respondent. His address was listed as Robinson

Correctional Center in Robinson, Illinois.

¶9 On September 18, 2025, the State filed a motion to terminate Melissa’s, Corey’s,

and respondent’s parental rights over N.D. With respect to respondent, the petition alleged that he

was an unfit parent in that he (1) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that

were the basis for N.D.’s removal (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2024)), (2) failed to make

reasonable progress toward the return of N.D. within any nine-month period following the

-2- adjudication of neglect (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)), (3) failed to make reasonable progress toward the return

of N.D. within any nine-month period following the initial nine-month period after the adjudication

of neglect (id.), and (4) was depraved as the term is defined in the Adoption Act (id. § 1(D)(i)).

The State specified that its petition related to the following nine-month periods: October 19, 2023,

to July 19, 2024; July 19, 2024, to April 19, 2025; and April 19, 2025, to January 17, 2026.

¶ 10 On January 20, 2026, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s petition. The State

presented the testimony of Kasey Gooding, a former employee of Lutheran Child and Family

Services of Illinois (LCFS). Gooding testified that N.D. was two years old at the time of the hearing

and his half-brother E.D. was three years old. She stated that she began working with the family

in April 2023. A service plan covering the period from October 2023 to April 2024 was admitted

into evidence. Gooding explained that because respondent was incarcerated during this period, his

only requirements under the plan were to complete DNA testing and cooperate with LCFS. She

stated that he was compliant with these requirements.

¶ 11 Haileigh Rife, an employee of LCFS, testified that she began working with the

family in July 2024. Three services plans authored by Rife were entered into evidence. The first

covered the period from April 2024 to October 2024. Because respondent was released from

incarceration in early October 2024, his requirements under this plan were only to cooperate with

LCFS and complete an integrated assessment. Rife testified that respondent completed the

assessment upon his release.

¶ 12 Under the second service plan, which covered the period from October 2024 to

April 2025, respondent was given the following tasks: maintain a legal means of support and

adequate housing, complete parenting classes, demonstrate positive parenting skills through visits

with N.D., complete a mental health assessment and follow all recommendations, complete a

-3- substance abuse assessment and follow all recommendations, complete domestic violence classes,

and complete random toxicology screens. Rife testified that during this period, respondent had

supervised visits with N.D., was engaged in mental health services, completed a substance abuse

assessment, engaged in substance abuse counseling, and engaged in domestic violence classes.

She stated that he did not begin parenting classes and did not submit to drug testing consistently.

When he did submit to drug testing, he tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinol.

¶ 13 Under the third service plan, covering the period from March 2025 through

September 2025, there were no changes to respondent’s tasks. Rife testified that respondent was

employed at this time, but his house was not appropriate for children, as there was no space for

N.D. and “[t]here was an individual living in the home that didn’t have a safe background.”

Respondent also had visits with N.D. suspended by court order in April 2025 due to his

inconsistency in attending visits and his lack of progress in completing services. Rife stated that

during this period, respondent was dropped from his parenting class due to nonengagement, was

not engaged in mental health treatment, and remained inconsistent in submitting to drug tests. He

was rated satisfactory with respect to his domestic violence classes, although he “struggl[ed] with

some of his attendance.” On cross-examination, Rife stated that respondent had reengaged with

both parenting classes and mental health counseling since the completion of that service plan.

¶ 14 Respondent testified that he had been consistent with mental health treatment since

April 2025 and had completed a 16-week parenting course the week before the hearing. He stated

that he only had to take a final exam, which would “seal the parenting class.” He stated that he

lived with his girlfriend and her three children in a three-bedroom apartment. He proposed that if

N.D. came to live with him, he could “condense my room, maybe move it out to the living room

and make my room his room.” He stated that prior to visits with N.D. being suspended, he saw

-4- him once a week for two hours.

¶ 15 Following arguments from the parties, the trial court gave its decision. It found all

three parents unfit. With respect to respondent, the court noted that at the time of adjudication in

N.D.’s case, he was incarcerated, and therefore, “due to his own actions,” he was “basically unable

to be involved in any real services under the service plan.” The court found that while respondent

engaged in some services following his release, “he was never able to obtain the type of progress

that’s contemplated under the statute for minors to be considered to be placed back with a parent.”

It further noted that visits between respondent and N.D. were never able to progress to being

unsupervised and eventually were suspended entirely due to respondent’s lack of progress. The

court stated, “[W]e’re in a situation where for 27 consecutive months ***, there was never any

substantial or reasonable progress made by any parent that would be a basis for either unsupervised

visits or having the [minor] placed back into the custody of the parent.” The court found respondent

unfit based on the failure to make reasonable efforts or progress but declined to make any findings

on the allegations of depravity.

¶ 16 The trial court immediately conducted a best-interest hearing. Rife testified that

N.D. and E.D. were in a foster placement together with a relative of Corey. She stated that N.D.

had been in this placement since his case opened and E.D. had been in the placement since October

2024. It was the only placement that N.D. had ever been in. She stated that she believed the minors

to be bonded to their foster parent based on her observations. She stated, “Their interactions with

the foster parent are very loving on both ends. When they follow [sic] themselves during visits,

because they’re roughhousing together, then they’ll seek comfort in the foster parent.”

¶ 17 When asked if either child had medical issues, Rife stated that E.D. needed to be

tested for autism. She stated that the foster parent ensured that E.D. attended his daily educational

-5- program and worked with the doctors regarding his testing. The following exchange took place

between the State and Rife:

“Q. Has this foster placement shown a willingness to adopt this child?

A. Yes.

Q. Have they signed a permanency commitment for this child?

Q. Is it the intent of [DCFS] and LCFS to have the minor remain in this

foster placement and be adopted by this foster parent?

A. Yes.”

¶ 18 The State presented no further evidence. During argument, the State asserted that

the testimony had established that both minors were having their needs met in their foster home.

It further noted that “[t]he foster placement [had] signed a permanency commitment form” and

argued that it was in the minors’ best interests to have the rights of their parents terminated so that

this adoption could be completed. As a final note, it stated that respondent had not made the

necessary progress to have N.D. returned to his care.

¶ 19 The trial court found:

“[The minors] are placed in a relative foster placement home. The minors appear

to be bonded to the foster parent. The home appears to be safe and appropriate for

the minors with all their needs, including any special needs, are being met there. It

is considered a pre-adoptive relative placement. There has not been any evidence

presented on this issue to show what relationship, if any, currently exists between

either of the minors and any of the natural parents. Likewise, no evidence has been

presented to show when, if ever, any of the natural parents would be able to provide

-6- stable residence for any of the minors any time in the near future.

The Juvenile Court Act requires to try to achieve permanency for the minors

as soon as that can be done. In this particular case, there is a plan in place through

the agency to have the minors be adopted by the current foster parent. The court

would not be in a position today to trade that opportunity for permanency required

by the statute for some unknown date in the future.

The court therefore found it was in the minors’ best interests to terminate all three parents’ rights.

¶ 20 This appeal followed.

¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22 Respondent appealed the termination of his parental rights of N.D. Neither Melissa

nor Corey are parties to this appeal.

¶ 23 Counsel for respondent has moved to withdraw, arguing that the appeal presents no

meritorious issues for review. In addition to the motion, counsel filed a brief discussing the trial

court’s unfitness and best-interest findings and asserting that any argument that either finding was

against the manifest weight of the evidence would be meritless. Respondent has not filed a

response despite having the opportunity to do so.

¶ 24 We agree with counsel, grant the motion to withdraw, and affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

¶ 25 A. Unfitness

¶ 26 The involuntary termination of parental rights is a two-step process. In re J.H., 2020

IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 67. First, the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that a

parent is “unfit” under one of the grounds provided in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act. Id.; see

750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2024). After an unfitness finding, the trial court must determine if the

-7- termination of parental rights is in the minor child’s best interest. J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150,

¶ 67. We review an unfitness finding under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of

review. Id. ¶ 68. Under this standard, we will not reverse the trial court’s findings unless it is

unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented. Id. ¶ 85.

¶ 27 A parent may be found unfit for failing to make reasonable progress toward the

return of the child during any nine-month period following the adjudication of neglect. 750 ILCS

50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024). “Reasonable progress is an objective review of the steps the parent

has taken toward the goal of reunification and examines the demonstrability and quality of those

steps.” In re Dar. H., 2023 IL App (4th) 230509, ¶ 53. Reasonable progress exists where a court

can conclude that a child can be returned to the parent in the near future. Id.

¶ 28 Here, the trial court found respondent unfit for failing to make reasonable progress

toward the return of N.D. within the following nine-month periods: October 19, 2023, to July 19,

2024; July 19, 2024, to April 19, 2025; and April 19, 2025, to January 17, 2026. This finding was

not against the manifest weight of the evidence. As the State needed to prove that respondent failed

to make reasonable progress during only one of these periods, we will focus on the final

nine-month time span, from April 19, 2025, to January 17, 2026. During this time, respondent was

dropped from parenting classes due to nonengagement and had ceased engaging in mental health

treatment. Although he testified that he later resumed both of these services, this does not negate

his previous noncompliance. Indeed, due to respondent’s failure to comply with the terms of his

service plan and his inconsistency in visitation, his visits with N.D. were suspended and, at the

time of the hearing on the petition to terminate parental rights, had not been reinstated. Further

still, throughout this nine-month period, respondent remained inconsistent in submitting to drug

testing, just as he had been since his release from jail over a year prior. Finally, respondent failed

-8- to maintain housing that was appropriate for N.D. We acknowledge that respondent put forth at

least some effort in completing his services. However, considering his overall lack of progress, the

trial court could not have ordered N.D. returned to respondent’s care in the near future. Therefore,

we agree with counsel that no nonfrivolous argument may be raised that the trial court’s finding

of unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 29 Because the statutory grounds of unfitness are independent, we may affirm the trial

court’s unfitness finding where the evidence supports a finding of unfitness as to any of the alleged

grounds. Id. ¶ 51. Because we affirm the trial court’s finding of unfitness for lack of reasonable

progress, we need not address its finding that respondent was also unfit for failing to make

reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that brought N.D. into care.

¶ 30 B. Best Interest

¶ 31 When making a best-interest determination, a court is required to consider the

following factors within the context of the child’s age and developmental needs:

“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child’s

identity; (3) the child’s background and ties, including familial, cultural, and

religious; (4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity,

and continuity of affection, and the least-disruptive placement alternative; (5) the

child’s wishes; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for permanence,

including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with parental figures

and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks related to

substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for the

child.” In re Jay. H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1071 (2009).

Additionally, a court may also consider the likelihood of a child being adopted when making its

-9- decision. In re Aiden M., 2025 IL App (5th) 250550-U, ¶ 15. No single best-interest factor is

dispositive. See 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2024). While a trial court must consider each

statutory factor, it need not reference each individually in its decision. Aiden M., 2025 IL App

(5th) 250550-U, ¶ 15. The State must prove that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best

interest by a preponderance of the evidence. J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 85. We will reverse

the trial court’s best-interest finding only where it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Id.

¶ 32 Counsel on appeal asserts that no meritorious argument may be raised that the trial

court’s best-interest finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In support of this

position, counsel notes that (1) no evidence was introduced that respondent had any bond to the

minor, (2) respondent had only four visits during the minor’s life, (3) the foster placement was

“meeting the minor’s medical needs and working through the minor’s development,” and (4) the

minor was bonded to the foster parent.

¶ 33 To begin, we find it necessary to clarify what evidence was entered at the

best-interest hearing. Counsel argues that respondent had only four visits with N.D. during N.D.’s

life and cites various reports that were submitted to the trial court at earlier permanency reviews.

However, these reports were not entered into evidence at the best-interest hearing, and therefore,

the trial court could not consider them in reaching its best-interest determination.

¶ 34 Instead, the evidence admitted at the best-interest hearing was limited to the

testimony of the single witness that the State offered, Gooding. To that end, Gooding’s testimony

was scant and lacked specificity. She testified only that N.D. was placed with a relative, lived with

his half-brother E.D., and was bonded to his foster mother. She also testified that E.D. had certain

medical issues that the foster family was addressing, but this statement did not extend to N.D.

- 10 - Confusingly, after discussing E.D.’s medical and educational needs, the State asked a series of

questions about the potential for adoption of “this child” and “the minor.” Neither Gooding nor

the State clarified which child, E.D. or N.D., was being referenced in these statements.

¶ 35 At a best-interest hearing, “the trial court is constrained by the requirement that its

decision be solely drawn from the evidence properly admitted.” Aiden M., 2025 IL App (5th)

250550-U, ¶ 16. Failure to present sufficient evidence at a best-interest hearing results in the

State’s failure to meet its burden of proof that terminating parental rights is in a child’s best interest.

See id. ¶ 23. Despite the limited evidence admitted at the best-interest hearing in the instant case,

we nevertheless find it was enough to allow the trial court to conclude that it was in N.D.’s best

interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Gooding’s testimony showed that N.D. was

bonded to his foster mother; that he had permanency in his foster home, as it was the only one he

had ever known; that he had familial ties in the home, as he lived there with his half-brother; and

that his foster mother, having bonded to N.D., would likely wish to continue caring for him.

Additionally, Gooding testified that E.D.’s medical and educational needs were being met and that

the foster family wanted to adopt “the child.” From this exchange, the trial court reasonably

concluded that the placement was a preadoptive placement for N.D. and that he, along with E.D.,

was being cared for. We agree with counsel that no nonfrivolous argument may be made that the

court’s finding that it was in N.D.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights was

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 36 Our review of the record reveals no other potentially meritorious issues for review.

Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.

¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION

- 11 - ¶ 38 For the reasons stated, we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 39 Affirmed.

- 12 -