NOTICE FILED This order was filed under Supreme August 20, 2020 Court Rule 23 and may not be cited Carla Bender as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). 2020 IL App (4th) 200173-U Court, IL
NOS. 4-20-0173, 4-20-0174, 4-20-0175, 4-20-0176, 4-20-0177, 4-20-0178 cons.
IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re N.C.P., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Adams County Petitioner-Appellee, ) No. 16JA3 v. (No. 4-20-0173) ) Nakia P., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) _______________________________________________ ) In re N.R.P., a Minor ) No. 16JA4 ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) v. (No. 4-20-0174) ) Nakia P., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) _______________________________________________ ) In re Nai. H., a Minor ) No. 16JA5 ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) v. (No. 4-20-0175) ) Nakia P., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) _______________________________________________ ) In re Neh. H., a Minor ) No. 17JA21 ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) v. (No. 4-20-0176) ) Nakia P., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) _______________________________________________ ) In re Nay. H., a Minor ) No. 17JA22 ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) v. (No. 4-20-0177) ) Nakia P., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) _______________________________________________ ) In re Nas. H., a Minor ) No. 17JA23 ) (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Petitioner-Appellee, ) v. (No. 4-20-0178) ) Honorable Nakia P., ) John C. Wooleyhan, Respondent-Appellant). ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Holder White concurred in the judgment.
ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, granting appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and finding the trial court’s decision to deny respondent’s motion for change of venue and grant the State’s motion terminating respondent’s parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 In January 2018, we affirmed the trial court’s adjudication of neglect and
revocation of respondent Nakia P.’s continuance under supervision order. In re N.C.P., 2018 IL
App (4th) 170710-U. This matter proceeded toward resolution, with the State filing a motion for
termination of parental rights against respondent-mother in June 2019. After several
continuances at respondent’s counsel’s request, and after a full hearing, the court granted the
State’s petition for termination of respondent’s parental rights in February 2020.
¶3 On appeal, respondent’s appointed counsel filed a “Motion to Withdraw as
Counsel on Appeal,” pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating he “was
unable to construct an argument on behalf of respondent in support of a meritorious claim in her
-2- appeal.” In a supporting brief, appellate counsel explained why he concluded respondent’s
claims present no potentially meritorious issues for review.
¶4 On May 19, 2020, we notified respondent of appellate counsel’s motion and
indicated she could file a response thereto by June 9, 2020. The notice came back undeliverable
and with no forwarding address. Respondent filed no response. Therefore, we grant appellate
counsel’s unopposed motion to withdraw from representing respondent, proceed to the merits,
and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 We first note a more detailed recitation of facts preceding the appeal of the initial
adjudication and disposition was presented in N.C.P., 2018 IL App (4th) 170710-U and will not
be repeated except where relevant to the court’s ruling. There, we affirmed the trial court’s
January 2018 order revoking a previous “Continuance Under Supervision” order as well as the
dispositional order finding the minors neglected and placing custody and guardianship with the
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). In the matter currently before us, the
termination of respondent’s parental rights relate to N.C.P. (born in 2006), N.R.P. (born in 2007),
Nai. H. (born in 2009), Neh. H. (born in 2012), Nay. H. (born in 2014), and Nas. H. (born in
2014).
¶7 A. Termination of Respondent’s Parental Rights
¶8 In June 2019, the State filed a motion for termination of parental rights, seeking a
finding of unfitness and termination of parental rights of respondent. Specifically, the State
alleged respondent (1) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were the
basis for the removal of the child from the parent and (2) failed to make reasonable progress
toward the return of the child within two specific nine-month time periods after an adjudication
-3- of neglect under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1 et seq.
(West 2018)). In July 2019, the trial court held a hearing on respondent’s motion for a change of
venue regarding respondent’s two children in residential placement. After arguments, the court
denied the motion and set the case for a future status date. In November 2019, the State filed an
amended notification alleging only one nine-month time period between March 3, 2019, and
December 2, 2019, where respondent failed to make reasonable efforts and progress. The State’s
petition asked that termination be found to be in the best interests of the minors and requested
DCFS retain custody and guardianship over the minors with the authority to consent to their
adoption.
¶9 After several continuances, the trial court held a fitness hearing in February 2020.
By this time, the only father who had been specifically identified and present for some of the
proceedings had already executed surrenders of parental rights as to his children. None of the
other alleged fathers ever appeared. Respondent failed to appear for this hearing; her attorney,
representing she moved out of the area, requested a continuance. The trial court noted the case
had been pending for some time, having been open since January 2016, with the State’s motion
for termination being filed June 2019. The court further noted the last order of the court sent to
respondent was returned “showing that it could not be delivered as addressed and it was unable
to be forwarded.” After citing the numerous delays by the parties and that proper notice was
provided to respondent, the court proceeded with the hearing. At the request of the State, the
court took judicial notice of the petitions for adjudication, the order of findings and adjudication,
the dispositional order, and that respondent’s visitation rights were suspended in May 2019 and
never reinstated.
-4- ¶ 10 The State’s first witness, Robin Lease, was a visitation specialist for Chaddock
Foster and Adoption (Chaddock), responsible for transporting children to visits with their
biological parents and observing their interactions. She assisted in visitation supervision for the
minors and respondent. She testified she was scheduled to supervise a visit between respondent
and the minors on March 6, 2019, but respondent failed to attend. Respondent was scheduled to
have two other visits in March, but they never took place because respondent failed to contact
the agency and confirm the visitation appointment as she was required to do. Due to her previous
failures to appear for visitation, respondent was to contact the visitation supervisor to confirm
she would appear. Lease recalled three other visits scheduled for April 2019, and ultimately
canceled due to respondent’s failure to contact the agency and confirm them. All visits were to
be supervised and respondent never progressed to the point where she had unsupervised
visitation. Lease explained how sometimes when respondent failed to show up for visits, the
minors were already transported to the scheduled meeting place waiting for her. Initially, the
minors would be upset their mother failed to arrive, but eventually they were “used to the parents
not coming to see them.” She did not supervise any more visits after April 2019 because
respondent’s visitation was suspended.
¶ 11 Katie Brink, another visitation specialist at Chaddock helped coordinate and
supervise visits from February 2019 to April 2019. She testified she informed respondent she
was responsible for bringing a meal for the children during visits. She recalled a visit in March
2019 where respondent brought hair products but no food. Instead, Brink obtained sack lunches
for the children because they were hungry. During the time Brink supervised visits, respondent
failed to show for four visits in March and four visits in April. Like the scheduled visits with
Lease, the minors would arrive at the scheduled meeting destination waiting for respondent, who
-5- never came. Brink said when respondent failed to show up, the minors were “sad, they would
cry, they felt let down.”
¶ 12 Christopher Powell, a child protection specialist at Chaddock for the previous
seven and a half years, was assigned to provide case management services to respondent and her
children. He was present and able to verify the surrenders executed by respondent-father, I.H.,
with regard to four of the six children. He explained the process for conducting an integrated
assessment and formulating a service plan. Powell explained how the terms of respondent’s
September 5, 2019, service plan included cooperating with the agency, maintaining consistent
appointments with the caseworker, complying with court orders, maintaining stable and
appropriate housing to suit the needs of the minors, and to cooperate with any assessments or
evaluations for mental health counseling, parenting classes, or domestic violence services,
perform random drug screens, and complete any recommended services. Powell testified
respondent was rated unsatisfactory as to parenting and visitation because “she had missed
several of her visits with her children” and some of the visits she did attend were terminated
early due to her behavior. She was never consistent in attending visits, which resulted in the
suspension of visitation “because of her lack of involvement in her visits.” Powell testified he
also rated her unsatisfactory for her cooperation with the agency. He stated she was very
unreliable in meeting with him on a consistent basis and, when they did meet, she was difficult to
engage and very uncooperative. He also rated respondent unsatisfactory in housing, mental
health, and domestic violence services. He stated that her small one-bedroom apartment was
often dirty and unsuitable to house her six children. She was inconsistent in her attendance for
her mental health treatment to the point where she was unsuccessfully discharged, and she never
engaged in domestic violence services. Powell said the permanency goal by the time of the
-6- September 5, 2019, service plan had been changed by the trial court to “substitute care pending
court determine [sic] of termination of parental rights.”
¶ 13 Powell also said during the time he was supervising her case, respondent would
not provide reliable telephone numbers and he could not conduct a home visit since she was
never present and would not contact him after he left contact information for her to do so. He
described his unsuccessful attempts to notify her of an administrative case review meeting and
provide her a copy of her service plan, testifying that even after scheduling a home visit with
respondent, she failed to appear. When he was eventually able to contact her and express his
concern for her failures to appear at scheduled visits, she acknowledged receiving the copy of the
service plan; however, she explained that “she was mad at the format of how the visits were set
up.” Powell said she was scheduled to see two children each visit with three visits scheduled
during any given week. This came about because of the “chaotic” nature of visits if they were all
together, as well as “concerns with some of the older children sexually perpetrating on the
younger children.” He said respondent had been asked to provide a copy of her work schedule
and never did. When she expressed “disagreements” with her service plan, she was advised to
attend the family team meeting to address her concerns. She did not attend. When she said she
had “health issues” which prevented her from attending many of the missed visits, Powell
testified he told her he “needed medical records to verify any visit or any meeting that she had
missed that would correlate and correspond with a medical event.” Although respondent said she
understood and would provide the necessary documentation, other than one record, which did
not correspond with a missed visit, she failed to do so. When she provided the same excuse for
missing the family team meetings where she could discuss her concerns with DCFS staff, Powell
-7- informed her of the need to provide documentation of the medical reasons for her absence, which
again was never forthcoming.
¶ 14 In April 2019, Powell was eventually successful in conducting a home visit of
respondent’s apartment, which he found “cluttered,” and “things were kind of piled up and
packed together.” He also found she was using the stove as a heat source for the apartment
because she had no electricity. Returning in May 2019, Powell again advised her to clean up the
residence. When he saw her in July 2019, during a visit with one of the fathers, respondent said
she was not staying in her own apartment at that time because she had no electricity. His efforts
to meet with her in September, October, and November 2019 were unsuccessful. Although he
attempted to contact respondent using the telephone numbers she provided, he was not able to do
so. Respondent’s last contact with Powell was an e-mail at the end of November 2019 to inform
him she was no longer in the Quincy area. She refused to provide him with an address or
location.
¶ 15 No other evidence was presented. The trial court noted the adjudication took place
on August 10, 2017, and the dispositional hearing was on September 18, 2017 (two years and
five months before). After finding each putative father unfit, the trial court looked to the relevant
nine-month period from March 2019 to December 2019, and it found the evidence indicated the
mother’s failure to attend visits during the months of March and April 2019 resulted in visitation
being suspended “pending further order of the Court until such time as the mother would become
fully engaged in services. That apparently never happened.” The court went on to point out that
after the visits were suspended, they were never reinstated and “there was no request for
reinstatement of services by the mother after May of 2019.” Her contact with her caseworker was
sporadic, and the caseworker went to great lengths in his attempt to contact her through personal
-8- visits, e-mail, and phone calls, which usually went unanswered. The mother never maintained
suitable housing, participated in mental health or domestic violence counseling, and lacked
sufficient progress to return the minors back to the home. The court noted one of the very few
times respondent contacted the caseworker was to inform him that she left the area and would
not provide him with any contact information or where she was staying. The court found each of
the allegations of unfitness alleged in the motion was proved by clear and convincing evidence,
specifically finding respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to correct conditions that
formed the basis for removal and failed to make any reasonable progress to warrant the return of
the minors within the relevant nine-month time period.
¶ 16 B. Best-Interests Hearing
¶ 17 After a brief recess in the proceedings, the court proceeded to a best-interests
hearing. The State recalled Christopher Powell, who described where each of the respondent’s
six children were placed, noting “they all have some behaviors and have some issues” that
require some level of specialized care. They all exhibited medical or mental health problems
when they came into foster care.
¶ 18 Powell testified Nay. H and Nas. H., both five years old, have been in their
original specialized foster care placement since May 2017 and they have a relationship with their
foster parents that is “extremely good,” viewing them as “mom and dad.” Powell visits them
three times a month. Powell described them as being in a nurturing environment where their
educational, medical, and mental health needs are being met. They were both diagnosed with
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and Nay. H. also has an oppositional defiant
disorder (ODD) diagnosis. They have been integrated into the extended family. They have
individualized education plans, and their foster parents follow up with all necessary
-9- appointments and services, taking part in their education and their overall well-being. The foster
parents have expressed a willingness to adopt. Powell described Neh. H., age seven, similarly,
testifying his foster parents “give him a lot of affection,” are involved with his education, and
make sure all of his medical and counseling needs are met. He has been at this placement
approximately one and a half years, having been moved several times due to difficult behaviors.
Powell sees him “at least once a month.” Neh. H. has gone on family vacations with his foster
family and is very close to them as well as their extended family. Neh. H. was discovered to have
ADHD, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and reactive attachment disorder once he
came into care. His foster parents ensure he receives the necessary therapy and counseling to
address his mental health issues, as well as his psychiatric medication management. They follow
up with all his appointments and participate in his education and have also expressed a
willingness to adopt. Nai. H., age 10, has been at her residential facility placement for
approximately one and a half years. She previously had very aggressive behaviors in foster care,
which led to residential placement. Powell sees her once a month and testified she “seems to be
pretty happy” in her current placement. Although it was an adjustment, Powell said “she is very
bonded to staff there,” has good peer relationships, and is having all her medical, emotional, and
educational needs met. She has contact with her extended family and has regular communication
or visits with family or previous foster parents. Nai. H. has a diagnosis of ADHD and ODD. She
is receiving therapy, counseling, and psychiatric medication management. The residential staff
ensure she attends all counseling and appointments. For the future, DCFS is looking at
specialized foster care for Nai. H. Powell testified N.R.P, age 12, is placed at a residential facility
in Peoria, where he has resided for the last two years. Because of developmental delays and some
aggressive behaviors, his need for a more structured environment with additional services
- 10 - eventually ruled out foster placement. Powell sees him once a month. He continues to need “a lot
of services,” and although he has “a few” positive staff relationships, they are more so at school
than in his “cottage” or home. He has been approved for a psychological evaluation, which
should help determine his needs. N.R.P. has some contact with an aunt who talks to him by
phone and has visited and has other aunts from his father’s side of the family who have shown an
interest. N.R.P. has a diagnosis of ADHD and ODD and receives therapy, counseling, and
psychiatric medication management through the facility. DCFS is currently investigating a “step
down” placement, which could involve guardianship by a relative or possible foster placement
with fictive kin. N.C.P., who is 14 years old, initially had a number of different placements due
to her behaviors, both in school and at home, but has “really excelled with her maternal
grandmother” in Indiana since May 2019 according to Powell. He sees her every six months
since hers is an interstate compact case, monitored monthly by the Indiana Department of Child
Services. Since residing with her grandmother, N.C.P.’s behaviors, health, attitude, and grades
have improved. She continues to have contact with extended family. N.C.P. is the only child who
does not have a mental health diagnosis. The grandmother has expressed her willingness to
adopt. Powell stated none of the minors have had contact with respondent since May 2019 after
her visitation was suspended.
¶ 19 The trial court found that the four children who reside in foster placements have
bonded with their foster parents and family, that all of their needs are being met, and the foster
parents have stated a willingness to provide permanency for those minors through adoption.
Regarding the two minors in residential placements, the court found they are bonding with
people in their respective placements and those placements are meeting all their needs. The court
acknowledged the agency’s plan to have them transition to “non-residential placements of a pre-
- 11 - adoptive nature.” The trial court found there was no evidence showing respondent had a recent
relationship with any of the children or would be able to provide them a permanent and stable
home anytime in the near future. Noting the statute requires the minors to receive permanency as
soon as possible, the court found the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence it is in the
best interests of the minors to terminate respondent’s parental rights and their best opportunity
for permanence is with their current respective placements.
¶ 20 This appeal followed.
¶ 21 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 22 On appeal, respondent’s attorney filed a motion to withdraw as counsel with a
supporting memorandum.
¶ 23 In the matter before us, respondent’s attorney suggests any appeal in this cause
would be frivolous because he found no appealable issues in this case. Reviewing the
proceedings on the motion for change of venue, the unfitness hearing, and the best-interests
hearing, counsel saw no irregularities in the trial process or other potential errors that could be a
basis for a meritorious argument on appeal. Furthermore, counsel noted the State’s evidence
during the unfitness and best-interests hearing went uncontroverted since respondent failed to
appear for both proceedings. Our review of the record and the applicable law leads us to
conclude counsel is correct. Accordingly, we grant his motion to withdraw.
¶ 24 A. Venue
¶ 25 Counsel argues there are no appealable issues extant in the trial court’s denial of
respondent’s venue motion. We agree. The Juvenile Court Act states venue lies in the county
where the minor resides or is found. 705 ILCS 405/2-2(1) (West 2018). Section 2 relates to
transfers, providing: “If proceedings are commenced in any county other than that of the minor’s
- 12 - residence, the court in which the proceedings were initiated may at any time before or after
adjudication of wardship transfer the case to the county of the minor’s residence ***.” 705 ILCS
405/2-2(2) (West 2018). “[T]he legal residence of the child does not technically affect the
jurisdiction of the court [considering a neglect petition], so long as the child is physically present
within the State.” In re Gonzales, 25 Ill. App. 3d 136, 143, 323 N.E.2d 42, 47 (1974).
¶ 26 Although the record does not contain respondent’s motion for change of venue, it
does contain the proceeding and the trial court’s ruling of July 11, 2019. From the record, it
would appear respondent’s counsel filed, on the day the matter was set for appearances on the
termination motion, a motion for change of venue as to two of the six children due to their then-
current residential placement outside the county. The trial court correctly noted the transfer of
venue was permissive, not mandatory. Further, since neglect proceedings are considered civil in
nature, even improper venue would not deprive the court of jurisdiction to decide the motion for
termination. See In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 535, 543, 232 N.E.2d 716, 720 (1967). The court also
indicated the children were currently placed in residential facilities outside the county but that
there was no indication in the record how long those placements might last. Since the granting or
denial of a petition for a change of venue will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion
(Gouker v. Winnebago County Board of Supervisors, 37 Ill. 2d 473, 475, 228 N.E.2d 881, 882
(1967)), there is nothing in this record to suggest it was an abuse of discretion to deny the
motion. The case was, and had been, pending in Adams County since its inception. The four
remaining children were all placed locally, and service providers were local as well. The court’s
decision to deny the motion was a proper exercise of its discretion. We agree with appellate
counsel that it would be fruitless to pursue this issue on appeal.
¶ 27 B. Termination of Parental Rights
- 13 - ¶ 28 Appellate counsel also found no arguable issues in either the procedure or the trial
court’s findings at the termination hearing. We agree. The Juvenile Court Act and the Adoption
Act (750 ILCS 50/1 et seq. (West 2018)) govern how the State may terminate parental rights.
In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 494, 777 N.E.2d 930, 940 (2002). Together, the statutes outline two
necessary steps the State must take before terminating a person’s parental rights—the State must
first show the parent is an “unfit person” and then the State must show terminating parental
rights serves the best interests of the child. D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 494-95 (citing the Adoption Act
(750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 1998)) and the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West
1998))). “A parent’s rights may be terminated if even a single alleged ground for unfitness is
supported by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d 340, 349, 830 N.E.2d
508, 514 (2005). A trial court’s finding of parental unfitness will not be overturned unless the
finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 208, 752
N.E.2d 1030, 1045 (2001). “Under a manifest weight of the evidence standard, we give
deference to the trial court as the finder of fact because it is in the best position to observe the
conduct and demeanor of the parties and the witnesses ***.” D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 498-99. In
relevant part, section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2018))
provides:
“D. ‘Unfit person’ means any person whom the court shall find to
be unfit to have a child, without regard to the likelihood that the
child will be placed for adoption. The grounds of unfitness are any
one or more of the following, except that a person shall not be
considered an unfit person for the sole reason that the person has
relinquished a child in accordance with the Abandoned Newborn
- 14 - Infant Protection Act:
***
(m) Failure by a parent *** (ii) to make reasonable progress
toward the return of the child to the parent during any 9-month
period following the adjudication of neglected or abused minor
under Section 2-3 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 or dependent
minor under Section 2-4 of that Act.”
¶ 29 Only evidence within that nine-month period alleging the respondent failed to
make reasonable progress toward the return of the child may be considered by the trial court.
In re Brianna B., 334 Ill. App. 3d 651, 656, 778 N.E.2d 724, 729 (2002).
¶ 30 We have provided the following guidance for evaluating reasonable progress.
“ ‘ “Reasonable progress” ’ is an objective standard which exists
when the court based on the evidence before it, can conclude that
the progress being made by a parent to comply with directives
given for the return of the child is sufficiently demonstrable and of
such a quality that the court, in the near future, will be able to
order the child returned to parental custody. The court will be able
to order the child returned to parental custody in the near future
because, at that point, the parent will have fully complied with the
directives previously given to the parent in order to regain custody
of the child.’ ” (Emphases in original.) In re A.P., 277 Ill. App. 3d
592, 598, 660 N.E.2d 1006, 1011 (1996) (quoting In re L.L.S., 218
Ill. App. 3d 444, 461, 577 N.E.2d 1375, 1387 (1991)).
- 15 - ¶ 31 We first note respondent failed to appear for the unfitness and the best-interests
proceedings. During the hearing, the trial court heard testimony from two different visitation
specialists that during March and April 2019, respondent failed to appear for approximately 12
visits with her children. Respondent’s failure to show up for visits upset her children. When she
did participate in visits, she failed to see the children’s needs were met, i.e., she failed to provide
them with food. Due to respondent’s constant failure to appear at visitation appointments, her
visitation privileges were suspended in April 2019 and never reinstated.
¶ 32 The trial court also heard evidence from respondent’s caseworker about her
missed visitation appointments and her overall inconsistent visitation attendance. During the
numerous times he confronted her and expressed concerns about her failure to visit her children,
respondent provided a variety of excuses to explain her absence. At different times, she told her
caseworker she was upset with the manner in which visitation was structured, she had medical
appointments (for which she provided no verification), or that “it had been crazy busy.” Also,
even when she did attend, the visits sometimes had to be cut short due to her behavior. He stated,
“her visits ended up being suspended because of her lack of involvement.” On several occasions
she would not be at her residence during a scheduled home visit and was uncooperative with him
when they did meet. She was financially unstable and had a one-bedroom, often dirty apartment,
not suitable to house six children. She was unsuccessfully discharged from her mental health
counseling and failed to engage in any domestic violence services. The caseworker attempted to
make contact with her during the months of September and October 2019, without success. The
last communication he received from her was in November, when she informed him she moved
from the area and refused to provide her current address or contact information. All of this
evidence was uncontroverted. Her absence from the area was further corroborated by the court’s
- 16 - observation at the outset of the hearing that the last order entered by the court had been sent to
her last known address and returned as undeliverable and unable to be forwarded. Accordingly,
based on the record before us, we cannot find the trial court’s finding of unfitness was against the
manifest weight of the evidence, and therefore, we agree with appellate counsel this is not a
meritorious issue to pursue on appeal.
¶ 33 C. Best-Interests Hearing
¶ 34 Counsel likewise finds no appealable issues in the trial court’s best-interests
hearing or its ruling, and we agree. Once a trial court finds a parent an “unfit person,” it must
next consider whether terminating that person’s parental rights serves the child’s best interests.
“[A]t a best-interests hearing, the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship
must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364,
818 N.E.2d 1214, 1227 (2004); see also In re Julian K., 2012 IL App (1st) 112841, ¶ 80, 966
N.E.2d 1107 (stating once the trial court finds the parent unfit, “all considerations, including the
parent’s rights, yield to the best interests of the child”). When considering whether termination of
parental rights serves a child’s best interests, the trial court must consider several factors within
“the context of the child’s age and developmental needs.” 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018).
These factors include:
“(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of
the child’s identity; (3) the child’s familial, cultural[,] and religious
background and ties; (4) the child’s sense of attachments, including
love, security, familiarity, continuity of affection, and the least
disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes and long-
term goals; (6) the child’s community ties; (7) the child’s need for
- 17 - permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of
relationships with parent figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of
every family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and
(10) the preferences of the person available to care for the child.”
In re Daphnie E., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1052, 1072, 859 N.E.2d 123,
141 (2006); see also 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2018).
¶ 35 A trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best
interests will not be reversed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.
In re Dal. D., 2017 IL App (4th) 160893, ¶ 53, 74 N.E.3d 1185. The court’s decision will be
found to be “against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is
clearly apparent or the decision is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.” In re
Keyon R., 2017 IL App (2d) 160657, ¶ 16, 73 N.E.3d 616.
¶ 36 During the best-interests hearing, the caseworker described how each of the
minors were doing in placement. All of the minors have positive relationships of varying levels
in their current placements and are having their needs met. Even those with problems sufficiently
severe to require structured residential placement were doing better and were ensured to be
receiving all necessary services. The respective foster parents have signed written permanency
commitment forms with a willingness to adopt the minors. None of the children have had contact
with respondent since May 2019. This evidence was also uncontroverted. The trial court noted
how the minors in foster placements have bonded with the families, who are willing to provide
permanence, and the minors in residential placement have bonded with staff and are having their
needs provided. There was no evidence that respondent was going to be able to provide a stable
home anytime in the near future. Based on this evidence, the trial court agreed it was in the
- 18 - minors’ best interests to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Accordingly, we cannot find the
trial court’s decision terminating respondent’s parental rights to be “unreasonable, arbitrary, or
not based on the evidence.” Keyon R., 2017 IL App (2d) 160657, ¶ 16. For this reason, we agree
with appellate counsel that an appeal in this cause would be frivolous and presents no
meritorious issues.
¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 38 For the reasons stated, we grant respondent attorney’s motion to withdraw and
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 39 Affirmed.
- 19 -