[Cite as In re N.B., 2026-Ohio-2612.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
IN RE N.B. : No. 115748 Minor Child :
[Appeal by J.F., Mother] :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 9, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case No. AD21906920
Appearances:
Wargo Law, LLC, and Leslie Wargo, for appellant.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, Michelle Myers, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
Appellant, J.F. (“mother”), appeals the judgment of the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division (“juvenile court”), that awarded
permanent custody of her minor child N.B. to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “the agency”) and terminated her
parental rights. After careful review, we affirm the juvenile court’s decision.
On August 12, 2021, CCDCFS filed a complaint alleging that N.B. was
abused and neglected and seeking temporary custody to the agency. In September
2021, N.B. was committed to the predispositional temporary custody of CCDCFS,
and in November 2021, N.B. was adjudicated to be abused and neglected and was
committed to the temporary custody of the agency. In August 2022, temporary
custody to CCDCFS was terminated, and N.B. was placed in mother’s legal custody
under protective supervision of the agency. Following a six-month extension of
protective supervision, N.B. again was committed to the emergency predispositional
custody of CCDCFS on November 28, 2023, after an incident that occurred on
November 23, 2023, when N.B. was found wandering down the street from mother’s
home alone, without socks, shoes, or a coat, and police intervention was required.
N.B. was again committed to the temporary custody of the agency on February 12,
2024. On October 4, 2024, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify temporary custody to
permanent custody. After hearing testimony and accepting evidence in the matter,
the magistrate issued a decision on September 12, 2025, that recommended N.B. be
placed in the permanent custody of CCDCFS.
Mother filed an objection to the magistrate’s decision, which was
opposed by CCDCFS. No transcript was filed with the juvenile court. On September
29, 2025, the juvenile court issued a judgment entry that granted CCDCFS’s motion,
awarded permanent custody to the agency, and terminated all parental rights. The juvenile court also issued a journal entry that overruled mother’s objection to the
magistrate’s decision and approved and adopted the magistrate’s decision.1
Mother’s appeal is now before us for review.
Under her sole assignment of error on appeal, mother claims that the
juvenile court erred in overruling her objection to the magistrate’s decision and that
the juvenile court’s judgment is not based on sufficient clear and convincing
evidence, is against the manifest weight of the evidence, and is not in the child’s best
interest. Ordinarily, when reviewing a juvenile court’s award of permanent custody
and termination of parental rights, “the proper appellate standards of review to
apply . . . are the sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-
evidence standards, as appropriate depending on the nature of the arguments that
are presented by the parties.” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 18.
As an initial matter, we recognize that both mother and CCDCFS
extensively refer to testimony that was presented at the permanent-custody hearing
in their appellate briefing. However, during oral argument, counsel for CCDCFS
raised the issue of mother’s failure to file a transcript in the juvenile court. We
caution counsel for CCDCFS about failing to assert the issue in their appellate brief.
Nonetheless, our own review of the record shows that mother objected to the
magistrate’s decision pursuant to Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b), but she did not file a transcript
of the hearing or an affidavit of the evidence with the juvenile court in accordance
1 Because this entry was entered after mother’s notice of appeal was filed, a limited
remand was issued by this court solely for the trial court to reenter its ruling. with Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iii). Although mother subsequently filed the transcript for
the appellate record, as this court has previously indicated, “this court cannot
consider a transcript that the trial court had no opportunity to review.” In re A.G.,
2025-Ohio-4371, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), citing In re R.O., 2025-Ohio-374, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.).
Furthermore, pursuant to Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iii) and (iv), mother has waived her
right to challenge the juvenile court’s adoption of the magistrate’s factual findings
on appeal, beyond arguing plain error. See In re S.M., 2025-Ohio-5144, ¶ 15 (8th
Dist.); In re G.H., 2024-Ohio-4943, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.).2 We limit our review
accordingly.
Although it is well established that the right to parent one’s child is a
fundamental right, the government has broad authority to intervene to protect a
child’s health or safety. In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 28, citing Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000); R.C. 2151.01. Ultimately, the natural rights of a parent are
always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the controlling principle
to be observed. In re B.C., 2014-Ohio-4558, ¶ 20, citing In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio
St.2d 100, 106 (1979). To that end, “the best interests of the child are paramount in
any custody case” and courts “are to liberally interpret the statutes” under R.C. Ch.
2 We reiterate herein that juvenile courts should be mindful of the delays created
when magistrate’s conduct hearings in permanent-custody cases and that “if the trial judge would conduct the evidentiary hearing . . ., this process would not only remove the additional hurdle of objecting to a magistrate’s decision and preserve a party’s ability for full appellate review, but it would more importantly remove the delays — delays that only hinder the goals of stability and permanency for these children.” In re S.M. at ¶ 47 (Keough, J., concurring). 2151 “to provide for the care and protection of the child[.]” In re A.B., 2006-Ohio-
4359, ¶ 32, citing R.C. 2151.01(A).
“Under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), a juvenile court may grant permanent
custody of a child to the agency that moved for permanent custody if the court
determines, ‘by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the
child’ to do so and that one of five factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)
through (e) applies.” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 7, quoting R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).
In this case, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence
that the factor under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) applies and that “the child cannot be
placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be
placed with either parent.” The juvenile court found that N.B.’s continued residence
in or return to the home of either parent would be contrary to the child’s best interest
and that although reasonable efforts were made by the agency and relevant services
were provided, mother had not fully complied with or sufficiently benefitted from
case-plan services.
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[Cite as In re N.B., 2026-Ohio-2612.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
IN RE N.B. : No. 115748 Minor Child :
[Appeal by J.F., Mother] :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: July 9, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Juvenile Division Case No. AD21906920
Appearances:
Wargo Law, LLC, and Leslie Wargo, for appellant.
Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, Michelle Myers, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services.
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J.:
Appellant, J.F. (“mother”), appeals the judgment of the Cuyahoga
County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division (“juvenile court”), that awarded
permanent custody of her minor child N.B. to the Cuyahoga County Division of Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “the agency”) and terminated her
parental rights. After careful review, we affirm the juvenile court’s decision.
On August 12, 2021, CCDCFS filed a complaint alleging that N.B. was
abused and neglected and seeking temporary custody to the agency. In September
2021, N.B. was committed to the predispositional temporary custody of CCDCFS,
and in November 2021, N.B. was adjudicated to be abused and neglected and was
committed to the temporary custody of the agency. In August 2022, temporary
custody to CCDCFS was terminated, and N.B. was placed in mother’s legal custody
under protective supervision of the agency. Following a six-month extension of
protective supervision, N.B. again was committed to the emergency predispositional
custody of CCDCFS on November 28, 2023, after an incident that occurred on
November 23, 2023, when N.B. was found wandering down the street from mother’s
home alone, without socks, shoes, or a coat, and police intervention was required.
N.B. was again committed to the temporary custody of the agency on February 12,
2024. On October 4, 2024, CCDCFS filed a motion to modify temporary custody to
permanent custody. After hearing testimony and accepting evidence in the matter,
the magistrate issued a decision on September 12, 2025, that recommended N.B. be
placed in the permanent custody of CCDCFS.
Mother filed an objection to the magistrate’s decision, which was
opposed by CCDCFS. No transcript was filed with the juvenile court. On September
29, 2025, the juvenile court issued a judgment entry that granted CCDCFS’s motion,
awarded permanent custody to the agency, and terminated all parental rights. The juvenile court also issued a journal entry that overruled mother’s objection to the
magistrate’s decision and approved and adopted the magistrate’s decision.1
Mother’s appeal is now before us for review.
Under her sole assignment of error on appeal, mother claims that the
juvenile court erred in overruling her objection to the magistrate’s decision and that
the juvenile court’s judgment is not based on sufficient clear and convincing
evidence, is against the manifest weight of the evidence, and is not in the child’s best
interest. Ordinarily, when reviewing a juvenile court’s award of permanent custody
and termination of parental rights, “the proper appellate standards of review to
apply . . . are the sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-
evidence standards, as appropriate depending on the nature of the arguments that
are presented by the parties.” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 18.
As an initial matter, we recognize that both mother and CCDCFS
extensively refer to testimony that was presented at the permanent-custody hearing
in their appellate briefing. However, during oral argument, counsel for CCDCFS
raised the issue of mother’s failure to file a transcript in the juvenile court. We
caution counsel for CCDCFS about failing to assert the issue in their appellate brief.
Nonetheless, our own review of the record shows that mother objected to the
magistrate’s decision pursuant to Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b), but she did not file a transcript
of the hearing or an affidavit of the evidence with the juvenile court in accordance
1 Because this entry was entered after mother’s notice of appeal was filed, a limited
remand was issued by this court solely for the trial court to reenter its ruling. with Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iii). Although mother subsequently filed the transcript for
the appellate record, as this court has previously indicated, “this court cannot
consider a transcript that the trial court had no opportunity to review.” In re A.G.,
2025-Ohio-4371, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), citing In re R.O., 2025-Ohio-374, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.).
Furthermore, pursuant to Juv.R. 40(D)(3)(b)(iii) and (iv), mother has waived her
right to challenge the juvenile court’s adoption of the magistrate’s factual findings
on appeal, beyond arguing plain error. See In re S.M., 2025-Ohio-5144, ¶ 15 (8th
Dist.); In re G.H., 2024-Ohio-4943, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.).2 We limit our review
accordingly.
Although it is well established that the right to parent one’s child is a
fundamental right, the government has broad authority to intervene to protect a
child’s health or safety. In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 28, citing Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000); R.C. 2151.01. Ultimately, the natural rights of a parent are
always subject to the ultimate welfare of the child, which is the controlling principle
to be observed. In re B.C., 2014-Ohio-4558, ¶ 20, citing In re Cunningham, 59 Ohio
St.2d 100, 106 (1979). To that end, “the best interests of the child are paramount in
any custody case” and courts “are to liberally interpret the statutes” under R.C. Ch.
2 We reiterate herein that juvenile courts should be mindful of the delays created
when magistrate’s conduct hearings in permanent-custody cases and that “if the trial judge would conduct the evidentiary hearing . . ., this process would not only remove the additional hurdle of objecting to a magistrate’s decision and preserve a party’s ability for full appellate review, but it would more importantly remove the delays — delays that only hinder the goals of stability and permanency for these children.” In re S.M. at ¶ 47 (Keough, J., concurring). 2151 “to provide for the care and protection of the child[.]” In re A.B., 2006-Ohio-
4359, ¶ 32, citing R.C. 2151.01(A).
“Under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), a juvenile court may grant permanent
custody of a child to the agency that moved for permanent custody if the court
determines, ‘by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interest of the
child’ to do so and that one of five factors enumerated in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)
through (e) applies.” In re Z.C., 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 7, quoting R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).
In this case, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence
that the factor under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) applies and that “the child cannot be
placed with one of the child’s parents within a reasonable time or should not be
placed with either parent.” The juvenile court found that N.B.’s continued residence
in or return to the home of either parent would be contrary to the child’s best interest
and that although reasonable efforts were made by the agency and relevant services
were provided, mother had not fully complied with or sufficiently benefitted from
case-plan services. As found by the juvenile court in this case:
Mother’s case plan services included domestic violence, parenting, mental health, substance abuse, and housing. Mother completed a domestic violence course in 2021. But concerns continued throughout the case. In 2023 and October 2024, Father threatened to kill mother and mother had little urgency to protect herself. Mother was offered other services but only recently re-engaged with domestic violence services in August 2025. Regarding parenting, Mother was referred to the Hough Collaborative and Ohio Guidestone, and Mother completed both courses, but Mother obtained limited benefit. The child needs one on one attention, and mother has no urgency as to the need to be attentive to the child. Child consistently runs off from Mother and she has no urgency to keep up with the child. Mother was referred to Signature Health for mental-health services. Mother did engage with individual and group therapy and completed anger management. Mother’s behaviors have only changed minimally. Mother still has explosive behaviors. Mother was referred to Signature Health for substance abuse. Mother has no sobriety to date. Since September 2024, Mother has had only one negative drug screen. The child is in need of a drug-free caregiver. Mother currently has appropriate housing and works consistently to meet the basic needs of the child.
The juvenile court specifically determined that factors under R.C.
2151.414(E)(1), (2), and (3) applied in relation to mother’s failure to remedy the
conditions that caused N.B.’s removal, her chronic chemical dependency and
chronic mental illness, and her neglect of the child between the date of the original
complaint filing and the date of the filing of the motion for permanent custody.
In determining the best interest of the child, the juvenile court
considered all relevant best-interest factors, including the factors listed under R.C.
2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e), which are specifically set forth in the juvenile court’s decision.
“There is not one element that is given greater weight than the others pursuant to
the statute.” In re Schaefer, 2006-Ohio-5513, ¶ 56. The juvenile court further
recognized the child’s guardian ad litem recommended that the child be committed
to the permanent custody of CCDCFS. Additionally, the juvenile court determined
that all of the factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(2) applied, in which case the statute
mandates that “permanent custody is in the best interest of the child, and the court
shall commit the child to the permanent custody of [the agency.]” Ultimately, the
juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that “it is in the best interest
of the child to be placed in the Permanent Custody of CCDCFS.” Mother maintains that she was consistently engaged in and
substantially completed her case-plan services, that a one-time event in which N.B.
was found wandering from mother’s home does not warrant the decision to grant
permanent custody in this matter, that mother consistently visited with N.B., that
there was no evidence that her use of marijuana affected her ability to parent, and
that she has a stable home and can provide for N.B.’s basic needs. Mother also
challenges CCDCFS’s claim of mother’s alleged lack of benefit from the services. She
argues that N.B. is a young child with special needs, that N.B. was previously
returned to mother with protective supervision, and that the agency did not have
N.B. tested for autism in order for mother to obtain wraparound services. She raises
other challenges in this case. However, mother has waived the right to assign error
to the juvenile court’s adoption of the magistrate’s factual findings, and we otherwise
are not persuaded by any of her arguments.
There is no dispute that the agency first became involved with N.B. in
2021, and mother’s other children had been in the agency’s custody in the past.
Although mother engaged in case-plan services and was reunified with N.B. with
protective supervision to CCDCFS, N.B. was again placed in the agency’s temporary
custody following the incident where N.B. was found wandering alone outside
mother’s home. The magistrate’s factual findings, which the juvenile court properly
adopted, reflect that this was not the agency’s only concern in the case, that mother
obtained limited benefit from case-plan services, that mother had no sense of
urgency with the child, that she still has explosive behaviors, that she has no sobriety date, and that the child is in need of a drug-free caregiver. The guardian ad litem for
the child recommended a grant of permanent custody to the agency. Mother has not
argued, let alone demonstrated, plain error with regard to the juvenile court’s
adoption of the magistrate’s factual findings in this case. Furthermore, the juvenile
court’s decision shows that it considered all relevant best interest factors and made
the proper statutory determinations.
Upon our review, we find no plain error in the juvenile court’s
decision. We also conclude that the juvenile court’s decision to grant permanent
custody of N.B. to CCDCFS was supported by clear and convincing evidence and is
not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Mother’s assignment of error is
overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court, juvenile division, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
__________________________ SEAN C. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE
KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J. and EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR