In re Naquin

775 So. 2d 1060, 2000 La. LEXIS 3385
CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana
DecidedDecember 15, 2000
DocketNo. 00-B-3082
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 775 So. 2d 1060 (In re Naquin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Naquin, 775 So. 2d 1060, 2000 La. LEXIS 3385 (La. 2000).

Opinion

[1061]*1061ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

JjPER CURIAM.

This disciplinary matter arises from a petition for consent discipline filed by respondent, Lester J. Naquin, III,1 following the institution of formal charges by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”). The ODC concurred in respondent’s petition, and the disciplinary board recommended the proposed consent discipline be accepted.

UNDERLYING FACTS

On April 12, 1999, Keith Segura was killed in an industrial boating accident in Terrebonne Parish. Mr. Segura was survived by his wife, Jayne, and the couple’s daughter, who was then two years old. Following her husband’s death, Mrs. Segu-ra contacted the family’s attorney, Warren Perrin of Lafayette, for advice. On April 21, 1999, Mrs. Segura formally retained Mr. Perrin to represent her in a wrongful death action.

On April 22, 1999, Mrs. Segura was contacted at her home by an unknown and unfamiliar man who identified himself as Samuel Small. Mr. Small represented himself to be an investigator working for respondent. According to Mr. Small, respondent had already conducted an extensive investigation into Mr. Segura’s death, li>had secured confidential photographs through a special contact with the Department of Wildlife & Fisheries, and had also secured a confidential videotape with statements from company employees allegedly responsible for Mr. Segura’s death.2 To further entice Mrs. Segura, Mr. Small explained to her that one had to be “in the clique” to get anything accomplished in Terrebonne Parish. ' Mr. Small represented that he and respondent had those special types of relationships which could inure to Mrs. Segura’s benefit if she retained respondent. Mr. Small then asked Mrs. Segura if he could meet with her to discuss respondent’s undertaking her representation. When Mrs. Segura declined, explaining that she was already represented by counsel, Mr. Small informed Mrs. Segura that she should discharge her current attorney and retain respondent because he had already investigated the case and because he “knew all the judges.” Mr. Small further informed Mrs. Segura that she “needed an attorney from the area” where the accident occurred because “politics had a lot to do with it” and that giving special attention to judges often prompted them “to sometimes do favors for you.”

On April 30, 1999, Mr. Small again contacted Mrs. Segura. Notwithstanding that Mrs. Segura had already informed Mr. Small that she was represented by counsel, Mr. Small indicated that he had spoken with respondent and that respondent [1062]*1062wanted to meet with Mrs. Segura the following day. On May 1, 1999, Mr. Small, his wife, and respondent appeared at Mrs. Segura’s home.3 During the meeting, respondent overtly solicited Mrs. Segura’s wrongful death claim, which he contended would be | “& slam dunk.” He also indicated that he had a “girl in the Clerk’s Office” who would ensure that all the cases he designated would be specially assigned to “his judge.”4 The “girl in the Clerk’s Office” was later identified as Jill Junot, a deputy clerk of court for the 32nd Judicial District Court for the Parish of Terre-bonne.5 Respondent further asserted that “his judge” would award Mrs. Segura and her daughter a “wheelbarrow full of money” in the wrongful death action because the judge was “sympathetic to the small person and not in cahoots with insurance companies or oil companies.” Respondent showed Mrs. Segura a retainer agreement, which he asked her to review and execute, and showed her a blank check, which he offered to fill in and sign if she would agree to retain him.

On May 6, 1999, Mr. Small once again contacted Mrs. Segura. During the conversation, which Mrs. Segura tape recorded, Mr. Small indicated that contact had already been made with respondent’s “judge” and that “big bucks” were going to be paid to Mrs. Segura. Mr. Small also suggested that the judge had “talked to a federal judge that’s gonna impose a serious fine” on the defendants.

On May 7, 1999, during a telephone call between respondent and Mrs. Segura, respondent reiterated that he had somebody “in the Clerk’s Office” who would see to it that Mrs. Segura’s case would be allotted to the right judge.

| DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

Formal Charges

On August 11, 1999, the ODC filed one count of formal charges against respondent, alleging that his conduct violated Rules 4.2 (communicating with a person known to be represented by counsel), 5.3 (responsibilities regarding non-lawyer assistants), 7.2 (improper solicitation of prospective clients), 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct), 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation), and 8.4(e) (stating or implying an ability to improperly influence a judge, judicial officer, governmental agency, or official) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. On November 16, 1999, the ODC supplemented the formal charges to allege that respondent’s contact with Ms. Junot constituted the commission of a criminal act in violation of Rule 8.4(b) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Respondent answered the formal charges, denying any misconduct.

Prior to a formal hearing in the matter, respondent filed a petition for consent discipline, seeking the imposition of disbarment. The ODC concurred in the petition.

Disciplinary Board Recommendation

The disciplinary board found that respondent breached duties owed to the legal [1063]*1063system and the profession, and has engaged in knowing and intentional misconduct. The board further found that respondent’s actions caused actual injury to the legal system and the profession, given that his actions have eroded the trust and confidence which the public must have in the legal system for it to function properly. The board noted that there are no aggravating or mitigating factors set forth in the petition for consent discipline.

|BIn light of the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the board found the proposed sanction is appropriate:

Respondent violated his duty to the legal profession by knowingly and openly soliciting professional employment from Ms. Segura, both through a third party and in person. Respondent compounded this misconduct by doing so with the full knowledge that Ms. Segura was already represented by counsel. The injury resulting from such activities is well recognized by the court.6
By improperly communicating with Ms. Junot and disregarding a standing court rule dictating the method by which cases were assigned, the Respondent knowingly violated his duty to the legal system. While the degree [to which] Respondent’s conduct influenced or interfered with the legal proceedings involved may be difficult to' accurately ascertain, at the very least, there existed the potential for significant interference. Additionally, as noted by the ODC, Respondent’s actions have harmed “... the reputation of the state court judges of Terrebonne Parish, the reputation of the Clerk of Court’s Office in Terrebonne Parish, and has seriously tarnished the image of the legal profession and the public confidence in our judicial system.”

Accordingly, the board recommended the court accept the petition for consent discipline and disbar respondent from the practice of law.

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Bluebook (online)
775 So. 2d 1060, 2000 La. LEXIS 3385, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-naquin-la-2000.