In re Murray
This text of 462 A.2d 33 (In re Murray) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Judicial Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The Maine Children’s Home for Little Wanderers appeals from a judgment of the Somerset County Probate Court ordering the Home to disclose information to petitioner Louis Alton Murray. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the Probate Court could order disclosure of adoption records and information within the possession of a licensed, private, child adoption agency. We reverse the judgment and instruct the Probate Court to dismiss the petition.
Louis Alton Murray was born in Water-ville in 1946, and subsequently adopted by his foster parents. In July of 1982, he filed a petition in the Probate Court requesting records and information at the Maine Children’s Home for Little Wanderers in Waterville pertaining to his adoption. The Home filed an objection to Murray’s petition which prayed that the petition be dismissed with prejudice. Following a hearing, the Probate Court granted Murray’s petition and ordered the Home to disclose medical and genetic information relating to Murray, as well as any information relating to the identity of Murray’s father. The Home filed a timely appeal.
Even assuming jurisdiction in this matter, the Probate Court lacks the authority to order the Home to disclose the records Murray seeks to obtain. Murray incorrectly relies upon 19 M.R.S.A. § 534 (Supp.1982-1983).1 Under that statute, the Probate Court’s authority to disclose adoption information extends only to court records.
The Probate Court is a statutory court of special and limited jurisdiction. E.g., Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013, 1017 n. 5 (Me.1979). The court’s jurisdiction over adoption proceedings is derived from 4 M.R.S.A. § 251 [35]*35(1979)2 and 19 M.R.S.A. § 531 (1981).3 This jurisdiction includes powers necessary or ancillary to execution of an adoption proceeding. E.g., Harmon v. Fagan, 130 Me. 171, 178, 154 A. 267 (1931); see 4 M.R.S.A. § 201 (1979). In Murray’s case, the Probate Court originally exercised its adoption jurisdiction pursuant to a 1947 adoption petition. At that time, the Probate Court might have had the power to order the Home to disclose its records to the court as part of the adoption action. The action at bar, however, is neither necessary nor ancillary to an adoption proceeding.
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment and instruct the Probate Court to dismiss the petition.
The entry is:
Judgment reversed.
Case remanded for entry of an order dismissing the petition.
All concurring.
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
462 A.2d 33, 1983 Me. LEXIS 729, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-murray-me-1983.