DISCIPLINARY ACTION
PER CURIAM
These two disciplinary cases arise from the same underlying incident involving out-of-state lawyers’ written solicitation in this state of the families and the victims of a 1992 airplane crash. Before us now for our consideration are proposed agreed judgments, submitted by the Disciplinary Commission and the respondents, offering agreed resolution of the verified complaints for disciplinary action pending in these matters. As it is the exclusive province of this Court to regulate professional legal activity in this state,
we now must decide whether to accept the proposed judgments as acceptable means to dispose
of the allegations of misconduct pending against the respondents.
Respondent Murgatroyd is an attorney in good standing in the state of California, having been admitted there in 1983. Respondent Sterns is also an attorney in good standing in the state of California, having been admitted there in 1960. Each concentrates his practice in the area of “mass tort” litigation. Neither is or has ever been admitted to the practice of law-in the state of Indiana. Neither has ever sought or obtained admission to the Indiana bar pursuant to a
pro hac vice
appointment, pursuant to Ind.Admission and Discipline Rule 3(2).
Accordingly, both respondents asserted at some length that this Court does not possess either subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over them. They also sought to dismiss the Commission’s request for injunctive relief aimed at preventing practices that might be contrary to Indiana law. These issues were resolved against the respondents in both state and federal court.
In the Matter of George W. Murgatroyd, III,
No. 98S00-9303-DI-307 (Ind., Oct. 29, 1993) (motion to dismiss on grounds of jurisdiction and motion to dismiss request for injunction both denied);
In the Matter of Gerald C. Sterns,
No. 98S00-9303-DI-310 (Ind., Oct. 29, 1993) (same);
Sterns v. Lundberg,
922 F.Supp. 164 (S.D.Ind.1996) (complaint alleging lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction dismissed).
The facts are not in dispute. On February 6, 1992, a military aircraft crashed in Evansville, Indiana. A number of fatalities occurred both among the aircrew and others on the ground as a result of the crash. Employees or someone under the control of both Respondent Sterns and Respondent Murgatroyd, respectively, caused to be delivered by United States mail written solicitations to prospective clients in connection with the crash. Those submissions were not transmitted to the Commission and did not contain the words “advertising material” thereon. The respondents did not regularly solicit prospective clients in this state before the plane crash and do not regularly solicit clients in this state. They did not investigate, or cause to be investigated, the requirements of Indiana law with respect to targeted mail solicitations at or before the time the written solicitations were transmitted to Indiana, although that failure was not for the intentional purpose of committing misconduct under our
Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law.
Their solicitations never resulted in either being retained by any client. In cases where the respondents have represented clients in a jurisdiction where they are not admitted, they have associated themselves with local counsel with specific goals of complying with all procedural, substantive and ethical laws of the forum jurisdiction. The respondents’ selection of and affiliation with qualified local counsel, however, is a step which commonly occurs after they have made the decision to undertake an attorney-client relationship with a prospective plaintiff or group of plaintiffs. The respondents do not customarily associate with local counsel prior to being retained by specific clients.
The verified complaints for disciplinary action in both cases each contain two counts. Count I of each complaint charges that the respondents violated
Indiana’s Rules of Professional Conduct
pertaining to the form and procedure with which lawyers’ written solicitations of clients in this state must comply. In the alternative, count II of each complaint alleges that by the act of causing the solicitations to be dispersed to prospective clients in this state, the respondents engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in this state.
Notwithstanding the fact that the respondents hold no Indiana law licenses and therefore are not subject to this
Court’s usual disciplinary sanctions for licensed Indiana attorneys who engage in professional misconduct, any acts which the respondents take in Indiana that constitute the practice of law are subject to our exclusive jurisdiction to regulate professional legal activity in this state.
By directing the solicitations to the prospective clients, the respondents communicated to those persons that they were available to act in a representative capacity for them in Indiana courts to address loss or injury associated with the plane crash. As such, they held themselves out to the public as lawyers in this state when neither was admitted to practice here.
Those acts constituted professional legal activity in this state subject to our regulatory authority.
See Fletcher,
655 N.E.2d 58, 59.
Available procedural routes for use in addressing charges of unauthorized practice of law in this state include referral to the Commission and an original action in the Supreme Court pursuant to Ad-mis.Disc.R. 24 governing the unauthorized practice of law.
See Matter of Mittower,
693 N.E.2d 555 (Ind.1998) (unauthorized practice of law after order accepting resignation from state bar constituted indirect contempt of this Court);
Cincinnati Ins.
Co. v. Wills,
717 N.E.2d 151, 154 (Ind.1999). A law license issued by another state is not subject to sanction by this Court.
Fletcher,
655 N.E.2d at 61. However, this Court may impose penalties appropriate to punish or prevent misconduct that occurs in Indiana.
Id.
Count I of each complaint alleged that the form and content of the respondents' solicitations were defective under Indiana rules governing such communications. As a general proposition of law, the practice of targeted mail solicitation of prospective clients by lawyers is permitted.
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
As
sociation,
486 U.S. 466, 108 S.Ct. 1916, 100 L.Ed.2d 475 (1988). However, the Commission alleged that the solicitations did not comply with Indiana law governing the content of lawyer advertising. Specifically, the Commission alleged that the solicitation letters were not labeled “advertising material,” as required by Prof.Cond.R.
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DISCIPLINARY ACTION
PER CURIAM
These two disciplinary cases arise from the same underlying incident involving out-of-state lawyers’ written solicitation in this state of the families and the victims of a 1992 airplane crash. Before us now for our consideration are proposed agreed judgments, submitted by the Disciplinary Commission and the respondents, offering agreed resolution of the verified complaints for disciplinary action pending in these matters. As it is the exclusive province of this Court to regulate professional legal activity in this state,
we now must decide whether to accept the proposed judgments as acceptable means to dispose
of the allegations of misconduct pending against the respondents.
Respondent Murgatroyd is an attorney in good standing in the state of California, having been admitted there in 1983. Respondent Sterns is also an attorney in good standing in the state of California, having been admitted there in 1960. Each concentrates his practice in the area of “mass tort” litigation. Neither is or has ever been admitted to the practice of law-in the state of Indiana. Neither has ever sought or obtained admission to the Indiana bar pursuant to a
pro hac vice
appointment, pursuant to Ind.Admission and Discipline Rule 3(2).
Accordingly, both respondents asserted at some length that this Court does not possess either subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over them. They also sought to dismiss the Commission’s request for injunctive relief aimed at preventing practices that might be contrary to Indiana law. These issues were resolved against the respondents in both state and federal court.
In the Matter of George W. Murgatroyd, III,
No. 98S00-9303-DI-307 (Ind., Oct. 29, 1993) (motion to dismiss on grounds of jurisdiction and motion to dismiss request for injunction both denied);
In the Matter of Gerald C. Sterns,
No. 98S00-9303-DI-310 (Ind., Oct. 29, 1993) (same);
Sterns v. Lundberg,
922 F.Supp. 164 (S.D.Ind.1996) (complaint alleging lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction dismissed).
The facts are not in dispute. On February 6, 1992, a military aircraft crashed in Evansville, Indiana. A number of fatalities occurred both among the aircrew and others on the ground as a result of the crash. Employees or someone under the control of both Respondent Sterns and Respondent Murgatroyd, respectively, caused to be delivered by United States mail written solicitations to prospective clients in connection with the crash. Those submissions were not transmitted to the Commission and did not contain the words “advertising material” thereon. The respondents did not regularly solicit prospective clients in this state before the plane crash and do not regularly solicit clients in this state. They did not investigate, or cause to be investigated, the requirements of Indiana law with respect to targeted mail solicitations at or before the time the written solicitations were transmitted to Indiana, although that failure was not for the intentional purpose of committing misconduct under our
Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law.
Their solicitations never resulted in either being retained by any client. In cases where the respondents have represented clients in a jurisdiction where they are not admitted, they have associated themselves with local counsel with specific goals of complying with all procedural, substantive and ethical laws of the forum jurisdiction. The respondents’ selection of and affiliation with qualified local counsel, however, is a step which commonly occurs after they have made the decision to undertake an attorney-client relationship with a prospective plaintiff or group of plaintiffs. The respondents do not customarily associate with local counsel prior to being retained by specific clients.
The verified complaints for disciplinary action in both cases each contain two counts. Count I of each complaint charges that the respondents violated
Indiana’s Rules of Professional Conduct
pertaining to the form and procedure with which lawyers’ written solicitations of clients in this state must comply. In the alternative, count II of each complaint alleges that by the act of causing the solicitations to be dispersed to prospective clients in this state, the respondents engaged in the unauthorized practice of law in this state.
Notwithstanding the fact that the respondents hold no Indiana law licenses and therefore are not subject to this
Court’s usual disciplinary sanctions for licensed Indiana attorneys who engage in professional misconduct, any acts which the respondents take in Indiana that constitute the practice of law are subject to our exclusive jurisdiction to regulate professional legal activity in this state.
By directing the solicitations to the prospective clients, the respondents communicated to those persons that they were available to act in a representative capacity for them in Indiana courts to address loss or injury associated with the plane crash. As such, they held themselves out to the public as lawyers in this state when neither was admitted to practice here.
Those acts constituted professional legal activity in this state subject to our regulatory authority.
See Fletcher,
655 N.E.2d 58, 59.
Available procedural routes for use in addressing charges of unauthorized practice of law in this state include referral to the Commission and an original action in the Supreme Court pursuant to Ad-mis.Disc.R. 24 governing the unauthorized practice of law.
See Matter of Mittower,
693 N.E.2d 555 (Ind.1998) (unauthorized practice of law after order accepting resignation from state bar constituted indirect contempt of this Court);
Cincinnati Ins.
Co. v. Wills,
717 N.E.2d 151, 154 (Ind.1999). A law license issued by another state is not subject to sanction by this Court.
Fletcher,
655 N.E.2d at 61. However, this Court may impose penalties appropriate to punish or prevent misconduct that occurs in Indiana.
Id.
Count I of each complaint alleged that the form and content of the respondents' solicitations were defective under Indiana rules governing such communications. As a general proposition of law, the practice of targeted mail solicitation of prospective clients by lawyers is permitted.
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar
As
sociation,
486 U.S. 466, 108 S.Ct. 1916, 100 L.Ed.2d 475 (1988). However, the Commission alleged that the solicitations did not comply with Indiana law governing the content of lawyer advertising. Specifically, the Commission alleged that the solicitation letters were not labeled “advertising material,” as required by Prof.Cond.R. 7.3(c).
It charged that they contained statistical data or other information based on past performance or a prediction of future success, which statements are prohibited by Prof.Cond.R. 7.1(d)(2).
It charged that the respondents did not file the materials with the Commission at or prior to disseminating them, as required by Prof.Cond.R. 7.3(c).
It further charged that Respondent Murgatroyd’s solicitation materials contained endorsements of and testimonials about him and that it used language appealing primarily to a lay person’s fear, greed, desire for revenge, or similar emotion, in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 7.1(d).
The agreed judgments provide for the dismissal of each count I, but the remaining operative language of each agreed judgment provides that the respondents, pursuant to Admission and Discipline Rule 24, shall be enjoined to comply with various terms and conditions attaching to any future solicitations and/or representations they may make or undertake this state. Those terms and conditions are as follow: 1. Any future solicitation of prospective clients by means of targeted communications which are transmitted by any medi-
urn into the state of Indiana shall comply with the then-current requirements of Indiana’s
Rules of Professional Conduct
or any successor rules as promulgated by his Court.
2. Before the initiation of any attorney-client relationship with any Indiana resident, or before undertaking a representation involving a cause of action with a venue within the state of Indiana, the respondents shall familiarize themselves with the then-current version of Indiana’s
Rules of Professional Conduct
or any successor rules as promulgated by this Court and comply with said rules.
3. Within a reasonable time after undertaking a representation involving a cause of action in any court in this state, the respondents shall associate themselves with a member in good standing of the Indiana bar and shall apply for
pro hac vice
admission in accordance with all the provisions of Admis.Disc.R. 3 or its successor rule.
4. The respondents shall put reasonable measures in place to ensure that the conduct of their law partners, associate lawyers, non-lawyer support staff, experts or independent contractors comports with the terms of their agreements and Indiana’s
Rules of Professional Conduct.
The respondents shall be vicariously responsible for the conduct of those under their supervision and direction who violate such rules.
We find that the agreed injunctions in these cases represent adequate remedies for the respondents’ sending to prospective Indiana clients targeted written solicitations. The terms of the injunction are sufficient to ensure that, should the respondents ever again send written solicitations to prospective clients in this state, their solicitations will comply with Indiana’s
Rtdes of Professional Conduct
or any rules of conduct applicable at that time. The terms also ensure that, should future solicitations ever evolve into an attorney-client relationship between the respondents and any Indiana clients, the respondents will become properly admitted to the practice of law in this state for the resulting representation. We note, however, that, had these cases been litigated, the judgments imposed by this Court would not necessarily have been the same as the agreed judgments we have accepted.
It is, therefore, ordered that the proposed agreed judgments in these matters are hereby accepted.
It is further ordered that Count I of the verified complaints for disciplinary action filed in
Matter of Sterns
and
Matter of Murgatroyd
are hereby dismissed, without prejudice.
The Clerk of this Court is directed to provide notice of this order in accordance with Admis.Disc.R. 23(3)(d) and to provide the clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the clerk of each of the United States District Courts in this state, and the clerks of the United States Bankruptcy Courts in this state with the last known address of respondent as reflected in the records of the Clerk.
Costs of this proceeding are assessed against the respondents.