In Re Mullinix

Court of Appeals of Georgia

In Re Mullinix

262 S.E.2d 540, 152 Ga. App. 215, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2873

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedNovember 7, 1979

Docket58145

StatusPublished

Cited by5 cases

This text of 262 S.E.2d 540 (In Re Mullinix) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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In Re Mullinix, 262 S.E.2d 540, 152 Ga. App. 215, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2873 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979).

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Opinion

Smith, Judge.

Appellant, a married woman with a minor child, filed a petition in the Superior Court of Floyd County for a change of name. See Code § 79-501. Appellant desires to have her maiden name restored, primarily because she is an only child and wants to preserve her family name. Appellant has been happily married for ten years, and neither her husband nor her child objects to the name change. No objections were made at the hearing to the proposed change. There is no evidence that the change is intended to defraud anyone. The lower court denied appellant’s petition, finding "that such a change of name for this wife and mother would set the stage for serious confusion, misunderstanding, complications, and above all embarrassment, particularly for the minor child who would be put in a very strange situation.” We reverse and remand with direction.

"The action of a superior court in granting or refusing a proper application to change the name of a person is based solely on a sound legal discretion . . .” Binford v. Reid, 83 Ga. App. 280 (63 SE2d 345) (1950). In the instant case, the petition was denied solely because of the trial judge’s belief that where a change of name results in a mother and child bearing different surnames, the latter is necessarily confused and embarrassed. This reason alone is not a valid basis for denying a change of name. We conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying appellant’s petition inasmuch as appellant met the statutory criteria for a change of name and no objections whatsoever were raised at the hearing. The case is remanded to the lower court with direction to enter an order granting appellant’s petition for change of name.

Judgment reversed and remanded with direction.

Quillian, P. J., and Birdsong, J., concur. *216 W. Gene Richardson, for appellant.

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Smith, Judge.

Appellant, a married woman with a minor child, filed a petition in the Superior Court of Floyd County for a change of name. See Code § 79-501. Appellant desires to have her maiden name restored, primarily because she is an only child and wants to preserve her family name. Appellant has been happily married for ten years, and neither her husband nor her child objects to the name change. No objections were made at the hearing to the proposed change. There is no evidence that the change is intended to defraud anyone. The lower court denied appellant’s petition, finding "that such a change of name for this wife and mother would set the stage for serious confusion, misunderstanding, complications, and above all embarrassment, particularly for the minor child who would be put in a very strange situation.” We reverse and remand with direction.

"The action of a superior court in granting or refusing a proper application to change the name of a person is based solely on a sound legal discretion . . .” Binford v. Reid, 83 Ga. App. 280 (63 SE2d 345) (1950). In the instant case, the petition was denied solely because of the trial judge’s belief that where a change of name results in a mother and child bearing different surnames, the latter is necessarily confused and embarrassed. This reason alone is not a valid basis for denying a change of name. We conclude that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying appellant’s petition inasmuch as appellant met the statutory criteria for a change of name and no objections whatsoever were raised at the hearing. The case is remanded to the lower court with direction to enter an order granting appellant’s petition for change of name.

Judgment reversed and remanded with direction.

Quillian, P. J., and Birdsong, J., concur. *216 W. Gene Richardson, for appellant.

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262 S.E.2d 540, 152 Ga. App. 215, 1979 Ga. App. LEXIS 2873, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-mullinix-gactapp-1979.

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