[Cite as In re M.P., 2023-Ohio-1732.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
In re M.P., S.P. Court of Appeals No. L-23-1012
Trial Court No. JC 20282152
DECISION AND JUDGMENT
Decided: May 23, 2023
*****
Anthony R. McGeorge, for appellee.
Autumn D. Adams, for appellant.
MAYLE, J.
I. Introduction
{¶ 1} In this appeal, I.P., the mother and appellant herein, appeals a final judgment
of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division that terminated her
parental rights and granted permanent custody of her children, M.P. and S.P., to Lucas
County Children Services (“LCCS”), the appellee herein. For the following reasons, we
affirm. II. Background
A. The Family’s Involvement with LCCS
{¶ 2} M.P. and S.P. are fraternal twins, who were born on August 18, 2020. One
month after their birth, LCCS received a referral concerning allegations that father was
heard “screaming at mother and the babies” and had stopped taking his medication for
bipolar disorder and borderline personality disorder. The Toledo Police were called to do
a “well check.” According to LCCS, however, “[the] referral did not meet the criteria for
an investigation” by the agency.
{¶ 3} On October 22, 2020, LCCS received a second referral alleging that S.P.
“was observed to have bruising on her lower back, upper posterior thighs and buttocks.”
Initially, the parents blamed the child’s bruises on her crib. When challenged about
whether a crib could cause that type of bruising, the parents accused two different
relatives. They also “asked numerous questions about child development.” Ultimately,
father admitted to becoming “panicky when the child cries a lot and [that] he hits the
child on the back.” Father was also observed “not being very gentle with the child.”
B. LCCS files a complaint, and a case plan is developed.
{¶ 4} LCCS filed a complaint on November 23, 2020. By motion, the agency also
requested emergency temporary custody of the children, which was granted. The
children were placed with their paternal aunt and uncle.
2. {¶ 5} An adjudicatory hearing was held on January 14, 2021. The purpose of an
adjudicatory hearing is “to determine whether a child is * * * abused, neglected, or
dependent or is otherwise within the jurisdiction of the court.” Juv.R. 2(B). At the
hearing, the parents consented to a finding of dependency with regard to M.P., and a
finding of abuse with regard to S.P.
{¶ 6} Mother’s case plan required her to complete a psychological evaluation,
obtain suitable housing and attend the following classes: parenting, “nonoffending
parenting,” and survivors of domestic violence. Following her evaluation, mother was
diagnosed with depression and attachment disorder, and mental health services were
recommended. Mother was granted Level 1 visitation with the children, which is the most
restrictive and requires visits to be monitored by security at the agency.
{¶ 7} Pursuant to the case plan, the children were referred for a developmental
assessment at Help Me Grow, which recommended occupational and speech therapy.
{¶ 8} Initially, father was included in the case plan and asked to complete a
psychological evaluation, a dual diagnostic assessment, batterer’s intervention and anger
management services. Father did not complete any of those services. He was removed
from the case plan sometime in 2021 after he “stopped meeting with [the case manager].”
Between July of 2021 and August of 2022, there was no contact between father and
LCCS. Father also failed to visit his children over a similar 13-month period. Although
3. father emailed LCCS requesting to “reengage,” in August of 2022, he had no
“meaningful contact” with the agency after that time.
C. LCCS moves for permanent custody, and a trial is held.
{¶ 9} On August 29, 2022, LCCS filed a motion for permanent custody of M.P.
and S.P. With regard to mother’s case plan, LCCS claimed that mother had completed
some, but not all of her case planning services, had insufficient contact with her therapist
and continued to maintain a relationship with father, who had abused her and S.P., and
failed to progress beyond the most restrictive type of visitation.
{¶ 10} A trial was held on December 6, 2022. In all, 4 witnesses testified: LCCS
caseworker, Delisha Osley; the guardian ad litem, Heather Pentycofe; mother; and Terri
Timmons, a caseworker from Harbor Behavioral Healthcare. A summary of the relevant
testimony follows:
The LCCS Caseworker
{¶ 11} Delisha Osley served as the ongoing caseworker for the duration of this
case and testified mainly about mother’s participation in case-planning services.
{¶ 12} Over the two-year life of this case, mother was “inconsistent” and
ultimately deemed “noncompliant” in obtaining mental health services. And, because of
mother’s “lack of progress” in that area, she was never referred to either parenting class.
Under cross-examination, Osley agreed that mother claimed to have taken a parenting
class on her own but never provided a certificate of completion.
4. {¶ 13} Mother’s case plan required her to identify someone who could “support”
her in her parenting (excluding father), and Osley frequently inquired about who could
serve in that role. Although mother mentioned her own mother [“grandmother”] as
someone who could assist her, she never provided the agency with any contact
information. Consequently, grandmother could never be linked to the case plan.
Mother also failed to identify any potential placements for the children.
{¶ 14} In November of 2021, Mother successfully completed her domestic
violence class. Osley expressed concern that, despite completing the class, mother had
failed to “absorb” what was taught there, given that mother stayed in her relationship
with father for over a year, until November of 2022, which was also four months after
acknowledging to Osley that father had caused their daughter’s injuries.
{¶ 15} Osley and her supervisor met with mother and told her that, although they
could not “tell [her] who to be with,” they were concerned that mother would stay with
someone who was known to be abusive. Mother was “not * * * honest with the Agency
about remaining in [her] relationship [with father].” Osley knew mother was lying after
seeing some social media posts that showed mother and father “hugging and kissing” and
looking “happy in * * * videos.” Osley testified that it was “difficult to assist [mother]
when she was not being honest about being in a relationship with [father]. Even when
she was confronted, she was still denying, denying, denying that she was in a relationship
with [him].” Osley added, “[i]t’s difficult to help someone [like that].”
5. {¶ 16} Housing was also an issue. There is no dispute that mother lived in a
home, for some amount of time in 2021, that can only be described as grotesque. The
record suggests that the children also lived there, before their removal. Pictures of the
home, taken in November of 2021 by the Humane Society, were admitted at trial. The
photos show “a pile of 20 dead cats,” two cats “close to starvation,” and trash,
everywhere, including in the “twins’ bedroom.” When Osley asked about the cats,
mother said that her “friend” was supposed to clean them up because mother “had to go
to work.”
{¶ 17} The record is less-than-clear as to where mother lived after November of
2021, but by June of 2022, mother told LCCS that she was living with her cousin.
Mother would not allow Osley to “come out” and inspect the home for Osley to assess its
suitability.
{¶ 18} Throughout the life of the case, mother made “multiple” allegations that
aunt and uncle were sexually abusing the children. Osley testified that this was “an
ongoing issue,” and the allegations “just [became] more disgusting” over time. Each
time, Osley recommended that aunt and uncle take the children to be examined. Osley
estimated that the children were forced to undergo “over 20” physical exams as a result
and that there was never any evidence to substantiate any of mother’s claims.
{¶ 19} Based upon “mother’s mental health, her not making any significant
progress in any case plan services, * * * her allegations [against] the caregivers * * * and
6. her ongoing relationship with her paramour, [i.e. father],” Osley concluded that
terminating mother’s parental rights would be in the children’s best interests.
{¶ 20} Osley also testified that the children, who have lived with aunt and uncle
since they were three months old, are “very happy” and “bubbly” and “adventurous”
children who “love learning new things.” Their placement with aunt and uncle has “most
definitely” been beneficial for them. Osley testified that the children have made
“significant progress” at Help Me Grow.
Mother
{¶ 21} According to mother, when she first moved into the cat-infested home, it
“was a nice home,” but she agreed that it was possible that the dead cats had lain there for
months before she moved out. Mother claimed that she attempted to “clean up” the dead
cats, but father “put his hands on [her] and told [her] not to.”
{¶ 22} At the time of the hearing, mother claimed to be living with her cousin,
although later in the hearing, she said she was “staying at [her] mom’s” because her
cousin was having his home “remodeled.” Mother admitted that she refused Osley to
access her cousin’s home, once she learned that LCCS had moved for permanent custody.
In mother’s words, “there was no point because what’s the point of coming out * * * if
permanent custody is just going to go to [aunt and uncle] anyway.”
{¶ 23} Mother described aunt and uncle, whom she has known for years, as “nice,
calming people.” Mother testified that she “made the accusations” against them as a way
7. of “lash[ing] out” after her children were “ripped away from” her because she was afraid
that she would “never” get her kids back.
{¶ 24} Mother agreed that she could have contacted Osley for assistance on a
variety of matters but did not because their communication was not “the best” and the
two would often “butt heads.”
{¶ 25} Mother testified that she was actively engaged in obtaining mental health
treatment. Mother sees a “psych doctor” and a counselor on a regular basis. And, as a
result of completing her one-hour domestic violence course, mother now knows what
abuse looks like. After identifying many examples of abusive behavior, including
physical and sexual abuse, mother testified that “[e]verything that [father] has done to me
was all abuse.” Despite her education, mother stayed with father for an entire year after
completing the course. Mother explained that it “can take up to seven times [before] a
woman * * * can leave a domestic violence relationship.” Mother also said that she
stayed with father as long as she did because he threatened to “slit everyone’s throat in
[mother’s] family” if she left him. Mother expressed “regret” for not leaving him sooner.
{¶ 26} Mother testified that it would not be in the children’s best interest if her
parental rights were terminated and that she deserved a “second chance” for making “so
much” progress with regard to her mental health, housing and parenting.
8. Mother’s witness
{¶ 27} Mother called her case manager from Harbor, Terri Timmons, to testify on
her behalf. Timmons confirmed that mother has been receiving treatment at Harbor for
over three years, since before the children were born and the agency’s involvement in this
case. Timmons “linked” mother with various community resources, including a food
pantry and “clothing.” Timmons described mother as “warm and caring” and “really
sweet and nice.”
{¶ 28} According to Timmons, mother recently began receiving “day treatment”
and attended “pretty consistent[ly].” Mother was also one of the first to sign up for a peer
support group, which was “brand new” to Harbor. Because Timmons is not licensed, she
could not render an opinion as to mother’s progress but could only testify that mother had
“been attending those groups regularly [and] has been participating.” According to
Timmons, mother has expressed being “frustrat[ed]” and “upset[]” over being separated
from her children.
The Guardian Ad Litem
{¶ 29} Lastly, the guardian ad litem, Heather Pentycofe, testified. Pentycofe has
served as the GAL for the entirety of the case, and her report was admitted as an exhibit
at trial.
{¶ 30} According to the GAL, aunt and uncle were no longer willing to serve as
legal custodians to the children, in light of mother’s repeated “unfounded allegations” of
9. abuse against them. In addition to making claims of sex abuse, mother also claimed that
the children’s “caregiver * * * put the bruises on [S.P.] and not [father].” As result of
mother’s claims, aunt was investigated by her employer. At trial, the GAL testified that
she was unmoved by mother’s recent apology because mother continues to make “more
allegations,” specifically that the children are “not being tested” or “cared for” regarding a
genetic hemoglobin issue.
{¶ 31} The GAL visited aunt and uncle’s home “several times.” She described it
as “very clean [and] appropriate, especially given two toddlers running around.” The
GAL also verified that the children were progressing in their case plan services at Help
Me Grow. The GAL would support foster parents’ petition to adopt, if such a motion
were filed.
D. The court grants LCCS’s motion for permanent custody.
{¶ 32} On December 15, 2022, the juvenile court granted LCCS’s motion,
terminating mother and father’s parental rights and awarding permanent custody of M.P.
and S.P. to LCCS. Mother appealed and raises a single assignment of error for our
review1:
I. It was against the manifest weight of the evidence for the Trial
Court to grant LCCS’ motion for permanent custody.
1 Because father did not attend the hearing or file an appeal, we confine our discussion to the issues raised by mother in her appeal.
10. III. Law and Analysis
A. The statutory framework
{¶ 33} R.C. 2151.414 sets forth “specific findings a juvenile court must make
before granting an agency’s motion for permanent custody of a child.” In re A.M., 166
Ohio St.3d 127, 2020-Ohio-5102, ¶ 18, citing In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-
1104, 862 N.E.2d 816, ¶ 22. As relevant here, the court must find by clear and
convincing evidence “(1) that one or more of the conditions in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)
through (e) applies and (2) that a grant of permanent custody is in the child’s best
interest. R.C. 2151.414(B)(1).” Id. All of the court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414 must
be by clear and convincing evidence. “Clear and convincing evidence” is evidence
sufficient for the trier of fact to form a firm conviction or belief that the essential
statutory elements for a termination of parental rights have been established. Cross v.
Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus; In re
Tashayla S., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-03-1253, 2004-Ohio-896, ¶ 14.
{¶ 34} In this case, the juvenile court found—as to the first requirement—that
R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and (d) applied, i.e. that the children cannot and should not be
placed with either of the parents within a reasonable time and that the children have been
in the temporary custody of LCCS for 12 or more months of a consecutive 22 month
period. Specifically, the court found that the children had been in LCCS’s temporary
custody for “a consecutive 19 months of a consecutive [22]-month period,” i.e. from
11. January 14, 2021 until August 29, 2022, when LCCS filed its motion for permanent
custody. (Dec. 15, 2022 J.E. at 7). The court further found that, because Section
(B)(1)(d) applied, “analysis pursuant to [Section] (B)(1)(a) is not necessary.” But, it was
“important” to the court to say that, even if the children had not been in LCCS’s custody
for 12 or more months, it “still would have found” that the children cannot, or should not,
be returned to either parent, under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a). In reaching that conclusion,
the court considered and found that R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and (4) applied, as to mother.
{¶ 35} On appeal, mother concedes that “the first prong of the permanent custody
test has been met.” (Appellant’s brief at 4). Mother’s only challenge on appeal is the
juvenile court’s finding as to the second prong, i.e. that a grant of permanent custody to
LCCS was in the children’s best interest. Accordingly, we confine our decision to that
issue. Accord In re A.M. at ¶ 18.
{¶ 36} An agency that seeks permanent custody of a child bears the burden of
proving that the grant of permanent custody is in the child’s best interest. In re B.C., 141
Ohio St.3d 55, 2014-Ohio-4558, 21 N.E.3d 308, ¶ 26. The relevant statute, R.C.
2151.414(D)(1), provides:
In determining the best interest of a child * * *, the court shall
consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following:
12. (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home providers, and
any other person who may significantly affect the child;
(b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or
through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity of
the child;
(c) The custodial history of the child * * *;
(d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and
whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
permanent custody to the agency;
(e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this
section apply in relation to the parents and child.
{¶ 37} R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) does not require a juvenile court “to expressly discuss
each of the best-interest factors.” In re A.M. at ¶ 31. “Consideration is all the statute
requires, [but] a reviewing court must be able to discern from the magistrate’s or juvenile
court’s decision and the court’s judgment entry that the court satisfied the statutory
requirement that it consider the enumerated factors.” Id. at ¶ 31.
{¶ 38} We review a trial court’s determination in a permanent custody case under
a manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. In re P.W., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-12-1060,
2012-Ohio-3556, ¶ 20. In doing so, we must weigh the evidence and all reasonable
13. inferences, consider the credibility of the witnesses, and determine whether the trier of
fact clearly lost its way in resolving evidentiary conflicts so as to create such a manifest
miscarriage of justice that the decision must be reversed. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio
St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). But, while we review the evidence and consider
the witnesses’ credibility, we must be mindful that the juvenile court, as the trier of fact,
is in the best position to weigh evidence and evaluate testimony. In re P.W. at ¶ 20. Its
discretion in determining whether an order of permanent custody is in the best interest of
a child “should be accorded the utmost respect, given the nature of the proceeding and the
impact the court’s determination will have on the lives of the parties concerned.”
(Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) In re C.P., 10th Dist. Franklin No.
08AP-1128, 2009-Ohio-2760, ¶ 10.
B. The manifest weight of the evidence supports the trial court’s finding that an award of permanent custody to LCCS is in the children’s best interest.
{¶ 39} In her sole assignment of error, mother argues that the juvenile court’s best
interest determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We address each
of the juvenile court’s findings below.
1. Children’s Interactions and Interrelationships
{¶ 40} With respect to the best interest factor set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a),
regarding the children’s relationship with others, the court found,
Mother has consistently visited with the children, but she has made
numerous unfounded allegations against the caregivers. These allegations
14. have harmed the children to the extent that they have undergone invasive
medical examinations to determine if these allegations are correct. Mother
acknowledged that these medical examinations are invasive for the
children, and she was aware when she alleged that the children were
sexually or physically abused that medical examinations would be invasive.
The paternal aunt and uncle have been the caregivers of these children
throughout the li[fe] of this case and by all accounts the children have
thrived in their care. Both children have been meeting their developmental
milestones and the caregivers have been insuring that the children attended
their appointments when they required special care. (Judgment Entry at
11).
{¶ 41} On appeal, mother argues that the trial court failed to adequately account
for the “the bond the children have with Mother.”
{¶ 42} Upon review, it is more than clear that mother “loves [her] kids with
everything [she] has,” but the record is silent with respect to whether the children were
“bonded” with her. Perhaps this is because the children were removed at such a young
age (aged three-months) or because mother’s visits were limited to just one hour per
week. And, although the GAL testified that the visit she observed between mother and
the children was “appropriate,” in that the “kids didn’t seem fearful or apprehensive,” she
did not testify that mother and children exhibited any signs of being “bonded.”
15. Conversely, the GAL testified that the children have received excellent care from aunt
and uncle and are “absolutely” bonded with them. Likewise, the caseworker
characterized the home environment at aunt and uncle’s as “very loving,” where the
children’s “basic needs are being met,” and that the children are “bonded” with them.
{¶ 43} The record also supports the trial court’s finding that mother’s “unfounded”
allegations of abuse “harmed” the children. Indeed, mother’s accusations set off a chain
reaction that resulted in the children having to undergo “over 20” medical examinations,
ultimately requiring aunt having to be investigated by her employer. We also reject
mother’s argument that LCCS was “under no obligation” to have the children examined
following her claims of abuse.
{¶ 44} Ironically, mother continues to maintain that there is a “legitimate concern
regarding the children’s medical care that was going ignored.” Curiously, mother does
not identify that concern by name or point to any evidence that “it” was being ignored.
But, the GAL testified at trial that mother continues to make “more allegations,”
specifically that the children are “not being tested” or “cared for” regarding a genetic
hemoglobin issue. According to the GAL, it’s not a “new thing” and “it’s been addressed
and its been addressed to [mother] that [the children have] been medically evaluated.”
The GAL added that “it’s not something that we’re going to keep going down with these
children.”
16. {¶ 45} Upon review, we find that the evidence clearly supports the trial court’s
conclusion that mother’s actions jeopardized the well-being of the children in this case.
We further find that the evidence supports the court’s conclusion that the children are
well-adjusted in their foster home placement and bonded to aunt and uncle. Accordingly,
we conclude that the weight of the evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings and
that the court properly considered R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a).
2. The Children’s Wishes
{¶ 46} With respect to R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b), the trial court found that the
children “are two years old, and they are unable to express their wishes. However, the
GAL testified that she believed that a grant of permanent custody to LCCS [was in the
best interests of the children] so they could be placed for adoption by the paternal aunt
and uncle.” See also Dec. 6, 2022 Tr. at 98.
{¶ 47} At hearing, the GAL testified that a grant of permanent custody in LCCS’s
favor would be in the children’s best interest. She explained that, in the two years since
the case was opened, mother made little progress. The GAL cited the fact that mother is
still limited to the most restrictive visits and failed to “utilize[] services” to end her
relationship with father and instead “consistently” remained with him, despite the fact
that he abused her and their daughter. The GAL testified that it was her “duty” as
guardian ad litem to protect M.P. and S.P., who—at two years-old—are “too young to
17. verbalize harm.” She expressed concern that, if the children were returned to mother’s
care, that they “would be back in harm’s way.”
{¶ 48} The trial court’s reliance upon the GAL’s testimony and written report
when considering the best interests of the children was appropriate under section
(D)(1)(b), and mother does not specifically challenge that evidence. We find that the
juvenile court’s finding under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b) was not against the manifest
weight of the evidence.
3. Custodial History
{¶ 49} With respect to Section (D)(1)(c), regarding the “custodial history” of the
children, the court found that “the children have been in the care of their paternal aunt
and uncle for the vast majority of their short life. When they were in the care of their
parents for approximately three months [S.P.] was abused by her Father. Neither parent
progressed in their case plan services.”
{¶ 50} At hearing, the GAL testified that, since their removal at age three-months,
the children “[have] been placed with [aunt and uncle].” She described “the only home
they’ve really known” as a “very clean * * * especially given two toddlers running
around.” She said that each child has his or her own space, room, and bed.
{¶ 51} In sum, the facts support the trial court’s finding—that R.C.
2151.414(D)(1)(c) weighed in favor of granting permanent custody to LCCS.
18. 4. Legally Secure Permanent Placement
{¶ 52} With respect to Section (D)(1)(d), regarding the children’s “need for a
legally secure placement,” the court made the following findings:
The children deserve a legally secure permanent placement.
However, that permanent placement cannot be achieved without a grant of
permanent custody to LCCS. Mother and Father have been presented with
ample opportunities to remedy the issues that caused the removal of their
children. As noted above, the parents have made little to no progress and
reunification with their parents cannot occur within a reasonable time.
Perhaps more concerning to this Court than the parents lack of progress in
ameliorating the concerns that caused the children to be removed is
Mother’s unfounded allegations resulting in continued harm to the children
by subjecting them to invasive medical examinations. These children
cannot be compelled to wait forever to have permanency. These children
deserve to be in a legally secure placement, and this cannot occur without a
grant of permanent custody to LCCS.
{¶ 53} On appeal, mother argues that “the only reason” permanent custody was
sought in this case was to make aunt and uncle’s life “more convenient.” Mother’s claim
flies in the face of her previous apology for maliciously accusing them of sexual abuse.
And, while mother’s false accusations were indeed a factor in LCCS’s decision to seek
19. permanent custody, it had nothing to do with “convenience” but rather the well-being of
the children and their caregivers. At hearing, the GAL expressed why aunt and uncle felt
the current arrangement was no longer workable:
I think one [reason] is fear [for] [t]hese children—[that] they’re
never going to be able outside of a supervised setting, with the allegations
that have been repeatedly made and exposing them to multiple medical
appointments as well as the allegations to [aunt and uncle] themselves. It
opens them up to having to deal with that and not being comfortable to
being supervised. So you’re exposing these children to be supervised most
of their lives [absent terminating the children’s parental rights.]
{¶ 54} The caseworker echoed the sentiment that mother had “burn[ed] her
bridges” and aunt and uncle “didn’t want to deal with [mother] for the rest of the twins’
lives.”
{¶ 55} On a different subject, mother also argues that the court’s consideration—
that she moved four times in two years—is akin to a finding that “any parent that moves,
such as a military family, does not provide stable housing for their children simply by
moving.” She claims to have been punished for being “too poor to afford [her] own
housing.”
{¶ 56} But, there is no indication that mother’s housing issues were the result of a
lack of means. First, mother testified that she was employed and “more than capable of
20. keeping a place” for herself and her children. Ironically, mother testified that she
provided food for the cats because she “was the only one working.” In the court’s view,
mother’s testimony as to why she cohabitated with decaying cats—because “she had to
go to work” or because father “put his hands on her”—raised more questions than
answers, and the juvenile court was clearly troubled by it, too. Furthermore, while
mother may indeed have secured suitable housing by June of 2022, when she moved in
with her cousin “Brandon,”—whose last name she could not pronounce—the fact is she
prohibited the agency from ever seeing the house. Mother acknowledged that her
decision not to allow the caseworker access to the home made reunification with the
children impossible. In any event, it was these issues, and not mother’s economic
circumstances that caused the trial court to conclude that she failed to demonstrate that
she could provide a safe and stable home.
{¶ 57} Although the Ohio Revised Code does not define the term, “legally secure
permanent placement,” courts have generally interpreted the phrase to mean “a safe,
stable, consistent environment where a child’s needs will be met.” In re M.B., 4th Dist.
Highland No. 15CA19, 2016-Ohio-793, ¶ 56, see also In re K.M., 10th Dist. Franklin
Nos. 15AP-64 and 15AP-66, 2015-Ohio-4682, ¶ 28 (observing that legally secure
permanent placement requires more than stable home and income but also requires an
environment that will provide for child’s needs). In sum, the record does not support
21. mother’s claim that LCCS unfairly considered her lack of stable housing or her alleged
poverty in its best interest finding.
{¶ 58} We find that the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d)
weighed in favor of granting permanent custody to LCCS and were not against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
5. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e)
{¶ 59} The final factor with respect to a trial court’s best interest evaluation
concerns “[w]hether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) through (11) of [R.C.
2151.414] apply in relation to the parents and child.” Those factors involve, respectively,
a parent’s having been convicted of or having pled guilty to specific criminal offenses; a
parent’s withholding of medical treatment or food from the child; a parent’s repeatedly
placing the child at substantial risk of harm because of alcohol or drug abuse; a parent’s
abandoning the child; and a parent’s having had parental rights as to the child’s sibling
involuntarily terminated. See In re A.M. at ¶ 19.
{¶ 60} With respect to this factor, the trial court found, “[a]s set forth above, R.C.
2151.414(E)(10) [abandonment] applies with respect to children’s father.” It did not find
that any those factors applied as to mother. And, the record contains no evidence that any
of those factors apply, and mother has not argued otherwise. Id. at ¶ 36, citing In re K.H.,
9th Dist. Summit No. 27952, 2016-Ohio-1330 (“Because no evidence was presented to
the trial court that any of the factors set forth in Sections 2151.414(E)(7) through (11)
22. applied, * * * the trial court was not required to discuss or make findings under” R.C.
2151.414(D)(1)(e)).
{¶ 61} While mother does not refer to any of the factors referenced in Section
(E)(7)-(11), she does assert—with regard to the trial court’s best interest finding—that
the court erred in finding that mother failed to “substantially remedy the conditions
causing the children to be placed outside the home” and further erred in finding that
mother “demonstrated a lack of commitment toward the children.” Mother’s arguments
pertain to the court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) and (4), respectively, which are
not factors to be considered under a best interest analysis. Instead, they are factors to be
considered in evaluating whether the children “cannot be placed with either parent within
a reasonable time or should be placed with either parent” under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a),
i.e. the first element in a permanent custody analysis. Mother concedes that the “first
prong of the permanent custody test [was] met in this case.” Accordingly, her
arguments—with regard to the trial court’s findings under Section (E)(1) and (E)(4) are
not relevant vis-a-vis its best interest finding.
{¶ 62} In determining whether a trial court based its decision upon clear and
convincing evidence, “a reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether
the trier of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of proof.”
In re C.M., 4th Dist. Athens Nos. 17CA16, 17CA17, 2017-Ohio-9037, ¶ 73, quoting
State v. Schiebel, 55 Ohio St.3d 71, 74, 564 N.E.2d 54 (1990). Having examined the
23. record, we conclude that the court had sufficient evidence, and that its decision was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we find that mother’s
assignment of error—that the trial court’s best interest determination was against the
manifest weight of the evidence—is not well-taken.
IV. Conclusion
{¶ 63} For the reasons expressed above, we find that the juvenile court’s decision
was supported by clear and convincing evidence and was not against the manifest weight
of the evidence. We find that mother’s assignment of error is without merit. Therefore,
the December 15, 2022 judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile
Division, is affirmed. Pursuant to App.R. 24, costs of this appeal are assessed to mother.
Judgment affirmed.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
Thomas J. Osowik, J. ____________________________ JUDGE Christine E. Mayle, J. ____________________________ Gene A. Zmuda, J. JUDGE CONCUR. ____________________________ JUDGE
This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
24.