In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-20-00156-CV __________________
IN RE MOUNTAIN VALLEY INDEMNITY COMPANY AND PROSTAR ADJUSTING __________________________________________________________________
Original Proceeding 60th District Court of Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. B-204896 __________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In a petition for mandamus, Mountain Valley Indemnity Company and Prostar
Adjusting contend the trial court abused its discretion by granting James Stutts’
motions resisting their discovery. The discovery the Relators complain about in this
proceeding consists of the request for production they served on Stutts and five
subpoenas, accompanied by duces tecums, who they served on witnesses that they
argue know about facts relevant to the arguments they intend to present in the case.1
1 See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221; see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. We note the discovery that the Relators served on Stutts consisted of more than just two separate requests to produce. The record reveals the discovery the Relators served 1 For the reasons explained below, we conclude the arguments Relators present
to support their petition fail to show the trial court abused its discretion by granting
Stutts’ motions opposing the discovery at issue here. As a result, we deny their
petition for relief.
Background
In December 2017, a pipe burst in the attic of James Stutts’ home. Water that
escaped from the pipe damaged Stutts’ home as well as some of its contents. Stutts
was not home when the pipe burst, but his mother called him and told him there was
water in his house after she saw it while picking up his mail. Stutts’ mother contacted
a family friend, who went to Stutts’ house and shut the water off by closing the main
valve. That same day, Stutts reported the claim to Mountain Valley. 2
Mountain Valley hired Prostar to investigate Stutts’ claim. For the next two
years, Stutts and Mountain Valley never agreed to the reasonable value of the
damages caused by the water that damaged Stutts’ home. In December 2019, Stutts
demanded that Mountain Valley participate in the appraisal process that was
on Stutts included interrogatories and requests for admission too. But in this proceeding, the Relators have phrased their complaint more narrowly as they focus their complaint on their “subpoenas and requests for production [of] documents seeking information about the damages and repairs to plaintiff’s property[.]” 2 According to Stutts’ Second Amended Petition, his live pleading, water damaged his home when water escaped from a broken pipe in his attic in December 2017. In his petition, Stutts alleged he “promptly reported the loss and submitted a claim to Mountain Valley.” 2 required by the policy Mountain Valley issued on his home. 3 That same day, Stutts
asked the 60th District Court, by motion, to appoint an umpire based on the policy’s
appraisal provisions. In March 2020, after conducting the appraisal, the umpire
issued a ruling appraising the losses Stutts incurred to his dwelling and its contents
at $225,302. 4 The umpire’s award makes clear that the award does not account for
any deductibles that apply to the loss or any credits for the advances Mountain
Valley made against the obligations it has under its policy. The award also clarifies
3 Appraisal is a dispute resolution process that allows parties to insurance policies to resolve differences about the reasonable value for an insured’s loss, but the process does not generally resolve if the policy covers the loss. The appraisal provision in Stutts’ policy provides:
If you and we fail to agree on the amount of loss, either may demand an appraisal of the loss. In this event, each party will choose a competent and impartial appraiser within 20 days after receiving a written request from the other. The two appraisers will choose an umpire. If they cannot agree upon an umpire within 15 days, you or we may request that the choice be made by a judge of a court of record in the state where the ‘residence premises’ is located. The appraisers will separately set the amount of loss. If the appraisers submit a written report of an agreement to us, the amount agreed upon will be the amount of loss. If they fail to agree, they will submit their differences to the umpire. A decision agreed to by any two will set the amount of loss. Each party will:
1. Pay its own appraiser; and
2. Bear the other expenses of the appraisal and the umpire equally. 4 We have rounded all numbers mentioned in the opinion to the nearest whole number. 3 that the award did not decide whether the policy covered the appraised loss. In other
words, the appraisal award decided only the gross value of Stutts’ losses based on
the information the parties submitted during the appraisal process.
In April 2020, Mountain Valley and Prostar served Stutts with interrogatories,
requests to produce, and requests for admission. Soon after, Mountain Valley and
Prostar notified the parties that they intended to take depositions, by written
questions of several nonparties, through subpoenas with requests to produce. In their
petition for mandamus relief, Mountain Valley and Prostar argue the witnesses they
seek to depose have “knowledge of the repairs, damages, delays, and renovations”
performed on Stutts’ home.
Stutts moved to quash the deposition notices and asked the trial court to
excuse him from responding to “written discovery seeking information concerning
and related to the valuation of” any losses valued in the appraisal process. According
to Stutts’ motions, Mountain Valley never disputed that its policy covered the losses
he suffered when the water escaped from the pipe and damaged his home. He also
argued that, given the appraisal provision in Mountain Valley’s policy and the fact
the parties had completed an appraisal through that process, they could no longer
dispute the value set by the appraiser because under the policy, the parties agreed
they would use the appraisal process to “set the amount of loss.”
4 In their response, Mountain Valley and Prostar argued that there are
“substantial coverage issues” at issue in the case and the discovery was relevant to
the affirmative defenses they planned to advance in a “forthcoming motion to set
aside the appraisal award due to fraud, mistake, or accident.”
In May 2020, the trial court ordered the discovery quashed and signed a
protective order. The protective order prevents Mountain Valley and Prostar from
pursuing any more written discovery that
pertain[s] to repairs to the property or alleged remodeling/renovation from the loss made the subject of this lawsuit, damages or repairs or construction work to the property occurring before or after the loss made the basis of the lawsuit, amount/scope/extent of damage and loss of property from the loss made the basis of this lawsuit, depreciation, communications with [four of the six individuals and entities named in depositions on written questions] concerning the amount and extent of loss and damages/repairs/depreciation or the maters reference above.
From the order, we imply the trial court granted Stutts’ motion after finding that
Mountain Valley and Prostar did not have the right to challenge the validity of the
appraisal award without a pleading raising affirmative defenses to avoid the legal
effect of the award.
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In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-20-00156-CV __________________
IN RE MOUNTAIN VALLEY INDEMNITY COMPANY AND PROSTAR ADJUSTING __________________________________________________________________
Original Proceeding 60th District Court of Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. B-204896 __________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In a petition for mandamus, Mountain Valley Indemnity Company and Prostar
Adjusting contend the trial court abused its discretion by granting James Stutts’
motions resisting their discovery. The discovery the Relators complain about in this
proceeding consists of the request for production they served on Stutts and five
subpoenas, accompanied by duces tecums, who they served on witnesses that they
argue know about facts relevant to the arguments they intend to present in the case.1
1 See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 22.221; see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. We note the discovery that the Relators served on Stutts consisted of more than just two separate requests to produce. The record reveals the discovery the Relators served 1 For the reasons explained below, we conclude the arguments Relators present
to support their petition fail to show the trial court abused its discretion by granting
Stutts’ motions opposing the discovery at issue here. As a result, we deny their
petition for relief.
Background
In December 2017, a pipe burst in the attic of James Stutts’ home. Water that
escaped from the pipe damaged Stutts’ home as well as some of its contents. Stutts
was not home when the pipe burst, but his mother called him and told him there was
water in his house after she saw it while picking up his mail. Stutts’ mother contacted
a family friend, who went to Stutts’ house and shut the water off by closing the main
valve. That same day, Stutts reported the claim to Mountain Valley. 2
Mountain Valley hired Prostar to investigate Stutts’ claim. For the next two
years, Stutts and Mountain Valley never agreed to the reasonable value of the
damages caused by the water that damaged Stutts’ home. In December 2019, Stutts
demanded that Mountain Valley participate in the appraisal process that was
on Stutts included interrogatories and requests for admission too. But in this proceeding, the Relators have phrased their complaint more narrowly as they focus their complaint on their “subpoenas and requests for production [of] documents seeking information about the damages and repairs to plaintiff’s property[.]” 2 According to Stutts’ Second Amended Petition, his live pleading, water damaged his home when water escaped from a broken pipe in his attic in December 2017. In his petition, Stutts alleged he “promptly reported the loss and submitted a claim to Mountain Valley.” 2 required by the policy Mountain Valley issued on his home. 3 That same day, Stutts
asked the 60th District Court, by motion, to appoint an umpire based on the policy’s
appraisal provisions. In March 2020, after conducting the appraisal, the umpire
issued a ruling appraising the losses Stutts incurred to his dwelling and its contents
at $225,302. 4 The umpire’s award makes clear that the award does not account for
any deductibles that apply to the loss or any credits for the advances Mountain
Valley made against the obligations it has under its policy. The award also clarifies
3 Appraisal is a dispute resolution process that allows parties to insurance policies to resolve differences about the reasonable value for an insured’s loss, but the process does not generally resolve if the policy covers the loss. The appraisal provision in Stutts’ policy provides:
If you and we fail to agree on the amount of loss, either may demand an appraisal of the loss. In this event, each party will choose a competent and impartial appraiser within 20 days after receiving a written request from the other. The two appraisers will choose an umpire. If they cannot agree upon an umpire within 15 days, you or we may request that the choice be made by a judge of a court of record in the state where the ‘residence premises’ is located. The appraisers will separately set the amount of loss. If the appraisers submit a written report of an agreement to us, the amount agreed upon will be the amount of loss. If they fail to agree, they will submit their differences to the umpire. A decision agreed to by any two will set the amount of loss. Each party will:
1. Pay its own appraiser; and
2. Bear the other expenses of the appraisal and the umpire equally. 4 We have rounded all numbers mentioned in the opinion to the nearest whole number. 3 that the award did not decide whether the policy covered the appraised loss. In other
words, the appraisal award decided only the gross value of Stutts’ losses based on
the information the parties submitted during the appraisal process.
In April 2020, Mountain Valley and Prostar served Stutts with interrogatories,
requests to produce, and requests for admission. Soon after, Mountain Valley and
Prostar notified the parties that they intended to take depositions, by written
questions of several nonparties, through subpoenas with requests to produce. In their
petition for mandamus relief, Mountain Valley and Prostar argue the witnesses they
seek to depose have “knowledge of the repairs, damages, delays, and renovations”
performed on Stutts’ home.
Stutts moved to quash the deposition notices and asked the trial court to
excuse him from responding to “written discovery seeking information concerning
and related to the valuation of” any losses valued in the appraisal process. According
to Stutts’ motions, Mountain Valley never disputed that its policy covered the losses
he suffered when the water escaped from the pipe and damaged his home. He also
argued that, given the appraisal provision in Mountain Valley’s policy and the fact
the parties had completed an appraisal through that process, they could no longer
dispute the value set by the appraiser because under the policy, the parties agreed
they would use the appraisal process to “set the amount of loss.”
4 In their response, Mountain Valley and Prostar argued that there are
“substantial coverage issues” at issue in the case and the discovery was relevant to
the affirmative defenses they planned to advance in a “forthcoming motion to set
aside the appraisal award due to fraud, mistake, or accident.”
In May 2020, the trial court ordered the discovery quashed and signed a
protective order. The protective order prevents Mountain Valley and Prostar from
pursuing any more written discovery that
pertain[s] to repairs to the property or alleged remodeling/renovation from the loss made the subject of this lawsuit, damages or repairs or construction work to the property occurring before or after the loss made the basis of the lawsuit, amount/scope/extent of damage and loss of property from the loss made the basis of this lawsuit, depreciation, communications with [four of the six individuals and entities named in depositions on written questions] concerning the amount and extent of loss and damages/repairs/depreciation or the maters reference above.
From the order, we imply the trial court granted Stutts’ motion after finding that
Mountain Valley and Prostar did not have the right to challenge the validity of the
appraisal award without a pleading raising affirmative defenses to avoid the legal
effect of the award. We also imply the trial court found that, under the policy, the
appraisal award fixed the gross amount of Stutts’ loss.
In their petition, Mountain Valley and Prostar argue the discovery the trial
court prevented them from getting is relevant to whether the appraisal award
represents a reasonable compensation for Stutts’ loss. For instance, they argue the
witnesses they want to depose have knowledge about how much money Stutts spent 5 to repair his home. And they contend the witnesses have information relevant to
whether the damages considered in the appraisal process are all covered losses under
Mountain Valley’s policy.
Analysis
The scope of discovery in civil cases hinges on the plaintiff’s petition together
with any defenses the defendants may have pleaded in response. 5 When conducting
discovery, parties have a duty to reasonably tailor their requests so they include
“only matters relevant to the case.”6 When a party ask that a court limit another
party’s discovery, the guiding rule instructs the trial courts to weigh the benefits of
the requested discovery against the burdens and importance of the proposed
discovery to the issues raised by the pleadings in the litigation.7 To determine the
appropriate scope of discovery in a given case, courts look to the parties’ pleadings
to determine whether the discovery being requested “relates to the claim or defense
of the party seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any other party.” 8
Mountain Valley’s and Prostar’s arguments are unsupported by the record
they filed in this Court. The record they filed does not include the defendant’s
answers, so the record before us simply does not allow us to determine whether
5 Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.3 6 In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. 1998). 7 See Tex. R. Civ. P. 192.4(b). 8 Id. 192.3(a). 6 Mountain Valley’s or Prostar’s pleadings allege any affirmative defenses to the
appraisal award, since the award, based on Mountain Valley’s policy, “set the
amount of the loss.” Without the defendant’s answers, we cannot tell whether the
trial court abused its discretion by finding that Mountain Valley and Prostar had no
right to litigate coverage or the validity of the appraisal award. These are matters the
trial court would not allow the factfinder to consider without pleadings to support
arguments about them. 9 And more, the Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “the
party suing on [an insurance contract insuring against general hazards] shall never
be required to allege that the loss was not due to a risk or cause coming within any
of the exception specified in the contract, nor shall the insurer be allowed to raise
such issue unless it shall specifically allege that the loss was due to a risk or cause
coming within a particular exception to the general liability[.]”10 No such pleadings
are in the record before us here.
Without having a record that includes the defendants’ answers to Stutts’ suit,
we cannot now say that the trial court abused its authority by finding the discovery
Mountain Valley and Prostar wanted to pursue as outside the appropriate scope of
discovery in the case. So while Mountain Valley and Prostar argue they wanted
9 See id. 278 (requiring trial courts to submit issues to factfinders in trials based on the issues the parties raised in their written pleadings). 10 Id. 94 (requiring several enumerated defenses to be affirmatively set forth a party’s pleadings, including claims that an insurance policy does not cover the insured’s loss). 7 discovery to pursue whether the appraisal award resulted from “fraud, accident or
mistake,” the party asserting such defense must first raise them in pleadings before
discovery on them is available to the party in the case. 11 We conclude the record fails
to establish that the trial court abused its authority by restricting the discovery they
wanted to pursue to develop evidence on what we must conclude were unpleaded
claims.12
On remand, we are confident the trial court will permit Mountain Valley and
Prostar to pursue more discovery on claims raised by the pleadings should they
amend their pleadings and raise new defenses before serving Stutts with more
discovery. On this record, however, Mountain Valley and Prostar have failed to
establish the trial court clearly abused its discretion by granting Stutts’ motions, in
which Stutts opposed their respective requests.13 And the trial court had not duty to
redraw the discovery to narrow it to the issues the pleadings raised, as the burden to
draw proper discovery in the first instance lies on the party that propounds the
requests, not the courts.14
11 See id. 12 See id. 192.4(b) (authorizing trial courts to limit the scope of discovery after considering whether the benefit of the discovery is important to resolving the issue at stake). 13 In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135-36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding). 14 In re TIG Ins. Co., 172 S.W.3d 160, 168 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, orig. proceeding). 8 Conclusion
We conclude the Relators have failed to meet their burden to prove the trial
court abused its discretion by granting Stutts’ motion to quash and motion seeking a
protective order. For these reasons, we lift our stay order of June 22, 2020, and deny
the petition for a writ of mandamus.15
PETITION DENIED.
PER CURIAM
Submitted on July 24, 2020 Opinion Delivered September 24, 2020
Before Kreger, Horton and Johnson, JJ.
15 Tex. R. App. P. 52.8(a). 9