In re Morgan

101 F. 982, 1900 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 295
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Arkansas
DecidedMay 21, 1900
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 101 F. 982 (In re Morgan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
In re Morgan, 101 F. 982, 1900 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 295 (W.D. Ark. 1900).

Opinion

ROGERS, District Judge.

On April 4, 1899, A. O. Morgan, the bankrupt, filed an application for discharge, and notice was given creditors, returnable April 15, 1899. On that day the remonstrants filed specifications opposing the discharge. The court ordered a hearing of the application for discharge on May 10, 1899. For some reason, the case was not then heard. A demurrer, however, was interposed to the specifications, and taken in short upon the record, and on the-day of November, 1899, was conceded by the remonstrants, and they were allowed, without objections, to file amended specifications. On the 14th of November, 1899, amended specifications were filed, to which the bankrupt on November <22d interposed a demurrer and a motion to strike out. The former was over[983]*983ruled. The motion to strike is still pending and insisted upon. The question argued is whether the court has the power, after the time fixed by general order No. 32 (32 C. C. A. xxxi., 89 Fed. xiii.), in which specifications may be filed, has expired, to allow an amendment of the specifications. The question has not been decided under the present bankrupt law, so far as I know; and I am of the opinion that the allowance of an amendment is a matter of sound discretion, but should not be exercised loosely, but only to meet the ends of justice. Loveland, Bankr. pp. 603, 611, and the cases cited in the footnotes thex-eto. The motion in this case is overruled.

The bankrupt has filed an answer to the specifications, and the proofs have been taken. Only two grounds contained in the specifications for refusing the discharge need be noticed. It is charged that the bankrupt, while engaged in the banking and mercantile business at New Lewisville, Ark., contemplated the following acts of bankruptcy; that is to say:,

“(1) To convey his stock ol' merchandise at said town of New Lewisville, Arkansas, witli the intent to hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors, and to conceal his cash on hands, notes, accounts, ehoses in action, and securities, with such intent. (2) While insolvent, to transfer, to Hicks Company, Limited, who was then one of his creditors, a part of his property, with the intent to prefer said Hicks Company, Limited, over his other creditors, and also to pay to the treasurer of Lafayette county, Arkansas, the sum of money, to wit, $8,000, which the said treasurer had deposited in said Citizens’ Bank as a general deposit, and thereby preferring, while insolvent, the said treasurer over his other creditors; and that while contemplating said acts of bankruptcy, with the fraudulent intent to conceal his true financial condition, he failed to keep books of account or records, both in his business as merchant and as banker, from which his true condition might be ascertained, in this: that 1he pretended books and records produced by the said bankrupt in this proceeding, and kept by him, failed to disclose either a true statement of his assets or of Ills liabilities, or from which the amount of assets on hand and the amount of liabilities due by the said Morgan could be ascertained.”

The second ground taken in the specifications for refusing his discharge is this:,

“That the said bankrupt has committed an offense punishable by imprisonment, as is by the bankrupt law now in force provided, in this: that said Morgan did willfully and fraudulently omit from his inventory and schedule filed herein cash which he then held, or was held 'for him by others and subject to his control, in the sum of, to wit, $10,000.”

It cannot be doubted, in view of the testimony taken, that, when the bankrupt sold out liis stock of merchandise, he did so with the intent to prefer the Hicks Company, Limited, and also with the intent to prefer the treasurer of Lafayette county, Ark. He not only testifies that that was his object in selling out the stock of’ merchandise, but he testifies that after he sold out that he devoted almost the entire proceeds of the sale to the payment of the claim of the Hicks Company, Limited, and to the treasurer of Lafayette county, Ark., as he intended to do. That the sale of his stock of goods, wares, and merchandise with that intent was an act of bankruptcy, there cannot be any question, because the necessary effect of it was to hinder, delay, and defraud his other creditors. In Loveland, Bankr. p. 608, par. 3, the author says:

[984]*984■ “What is meant by' the -words ‘in contemplation of bankruptcy’ has been the subject of a good deal of discussion and difference of judicial opinion in this country and in England. In some cases it has been held to mean ‘in contemplation of insolvency,’ or a simple inability to pay as debts should become payable. In other cases it has been held that the debtor must contemplate an act of bankruptcy, or a voluntary application for the benefit of the bankrupt law. The most authoritative definition of these words in this country is contained in the opinion in Buckingham v. McClain, 13 How. 108, 14 L. Ed. 190. In that case the supreme court decided that the words ‘in contemplation of bankruptcy’ did not mean ‘in contemplation of insolvency,’ or a simple inability to pay as debts should become due and payable, but meant that the debtor must contemplate the commission of what was declared by the act to be an act of bankruptcy, or must have contemplated an application by himself to be declared a bankrupt.”

It must, therefore, in the light of this decision, be held that when Morgan sold his stock with a view of appropriating the proceeds-to the payment of the Hicks Company, Limited, and to the treasurer of Lafayette county, Ark., to the detriment and to the exclusion of his other creditors, the act was in contemplation of bankruptcy. But it is not enough, to refuse his discharge, that he made the sale of his stock of merchandise “in- contemplation of bankruptcy.” It must also appear that in 'addition thereto he had, “with the fraudulent intent to conceal his true financial condition, failed to keep books of account or records from which his true condition might be ascertained.”

The proof shows that B. R. Farrar, the county treasurer of Lafayette county, Ark., had deposited, of county funds, about $3,468.63 with the Citizens’ Bank, which bank was the property of Morgan, and that Morgan had assumed to pay Hicks Company, Limited, about $900, which was due it from the firm of whom Morgan had bought both the bank and a small stock of merchandise, including a large amount of outstanding accounts. It further appears from the bankrupt’s evidence that when he sold his stock of goods, wares, and merchandise to Millwee, who was a traveling salesman for a St. Louis firm, which firm was a creditor of Morgan, he sold it at 50 per cent, of cost and carriage, or about $4,100, and took in payment thereof two checks on banks, — one for about $2,703.09, and one for either $900 or $1,000, — and the balance, presumably, in cash. The former check, it appears from the bank books, was deposited in the bank to the credit of the Morgan store, and, according to the testimony of Morgan’s bookkeeper, was turned over to the attorney of the treasurer of Lafayette county in part payment of Farrar’s deposit with the bank. The other check was made payable to Hicks Company, Limited, and turned over to his agent at the time it was given, and no entry made of it on either the books of the bank or the store; nor does any entry appear in the books of the store with reference to the check which was turned over to the treasurer of Lafayette county.

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Bluebook (online)
101 F. 982, 1900 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 295, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/in-re-morgan-arwd-1900.