NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 250205-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is July 29, 2025 not precedent except in the NOS. 4-25-0205, 4-25-0206, cons. Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re M.M. and H.M., Minors ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Sangamon County Petitioner-Appellee, ) Nos. 20JA121, v. ) 20JA316 Daje M., ) Respondent-Appellant). ) Honorable ) Dwayne A. Gab, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE ZENOFF delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Doherty and Lannerd concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights where the court did not consider improper evidence and neither the court’s unfitness nor best-interest findings was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 Respondent, Daje M., is the mother of M.M. and H.M. In 2021, the State filed a
motion to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Following hearings in 2022, the trial court denied
the State’s motion, finding that the State failed to prove that respondent was unfit by clear and
convincing evidence. In 2024, the State filed a renewed motion to terminate respondent’s parental
rights. Following hearings on that motion, the court ruled that respondent was unfit and that it was
in the best interest of M.M. and H.M. to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Respondent
appeals, arguing that the court erred in (1) admitting and considering evidence from the 2022
termination hearings, (2) finding her unfit, and (3) finding that terminating her parental rights was in the minors’ best interest. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. Juvenile Neglect Petitions and Dispositional Hearings
¶5 On May 20, 2020, the State filed a petition alleging that H.M., who was two years
old, was a neglected minor pursuant to section 2-3(1)(a)-(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987
(Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(a)-(b) (West 2020)) because (1) she was “not receiving the proper
care and supervision necessary for her wellbeing in that [respondent] failed to make a proper care
plan” and (2) her “environment [was] injurious to his [sic] welfare as evidenced by the domestic
violence between [respondent] and [her] paramour.” At the shelter care hearing held the same day,
the trial court found shelter care to be necessary for H.M. because of “domestic violence.” The
court entered an order placing H.M. in shelter care and granting temporary custody and
guardianship of H.M. to the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), with
authority to place her.
¶6 On August 6, 2020, the trial court found H.M. neglected as alleged in the first
allegation of the petition because “police [were] called to [respondent]’s home on [a] report of
domestic violence between [respondent] and [her] paramour, [and the] minor was present during
dom[estic] viol[ence].” On September 2, 2020, the court held a dispositional hearing and entered
an order adjudicating H.M. a ward of the court. The court’s order advised respondent to “cooperate
and show progress in services including domestic violence services[,] counseling, [and]
parenting.”
¶7 Respondent gave birth to another child, M.M., in late November 2020. On
December 1, 2020, the State filed a petition alleging that M.M. was a neglected minor pursuant to
section 2-3(1)(b) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2020)) in that her environment was
-2- injurious to her welfare as evidenced by (1) M.M.’s “siblings being adjudicated neglected and
[respondent]’s failure to make reasonable progress towards having the children returned to [her]
care and remaining in the care of DCFS” and (2) “the domestic violence between [respondent] and
her paramour.”
¶8 On December 2, 2020, the trial court held a shelter care hearing and found there
was probable cause to believe M.M. was neglected and that shelter care was necessary for her
protection. The court entered an order placing M.M. in shelter care and granting temporary custody
of M.M. to DCFS, with the right to place her. On January 20, 2021, the court entered an order
adjudicating M.M. neglected based on “the second allegation” in the petition. The court’s order
stated that respondent and her “live-in paramour have a long-standing history of domestic
violence,” which also caused H.M. to be taken into custody. Additionally, respondent “reported
multiple incidents of domestic violence during her pregnancy, and had bruises corroborating her
account.”
¶9 The trial court held a dispositional hearing on February 3, 2021. At that time, the
court adjudicated M.M. a ward of the court and admonished respondent to “cooperate with DCFS,
comply with the terms of the service plan, and correct conditions that require [M.M.] to be in care,
or risk the termination of [her] parental rights.”
¶ 10 B. Subsequent Hearings and First Termination Proceeding
¶ 11 At the permanency review hearing on July 7, 2021, the trial court found it was in
the best interest of M.M. and H.M. for the permanency goal to be “return home.” At the next
permanency review hearing on December 8, 2021, the court changed the permanency goal to
“substitute care pending termination.”
¶ 12 On December 21, 2021, the State filed a “Motion for Termination of Parental
-3- Rights.” The motion alleged that respondent was unfit for failing to (1) maintain a reasonable
degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to M.M.’s and H.M.’s welfare (750 ILCS
50/1(D)(b) (West 2020)), (2) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis
for removal of the minors from March 8, 2021, to December 8, 2021 (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i)
(West 2020)), and (3) make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors to her from March
8, 2021, to December 8, 2021 (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2020)).
¶ 13 Proceedings on the motion were held on July 28, 2022, and November 3, 2022. On
November 3, 2022, the trial court ruled that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that respondent was unfit for any of the reasons alleged by the State. The court
admonished respondent to continue following the service plan and maintain contact with DCFS.
¶ 14 On November 3, 2022, the trial court entered a permanency review order indicating
that the permanency goal for M.M. and H.M. was “Return Home [within] 12 months.” However,
at the permanency review hearing on December 13, 2023, the permanency goal was changed to
“Substitute Care Pending Court Determination.”
¶ 15 C. Second Termination Proceeding
¶ 16 On January 17, 2024, the State filed a “Renewed Motion for Termination of
Parental Rights.” In that motion, the State alleged that respondent was unfit because she failed to
(1) maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility for M.M.’s and H.M.’s
welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2024)), (2) make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions
that were the basis for the removal of M.M. and H.M. from her during any nine-month period
following “an adjudication of Neglect/Abuse” (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2024)), and
(3) make reasonable progress toward the return of M.M. and H.M. to her during any nine-month
period following “an adjudication of Neglect/Abuse” (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024)). The
-4- nine-month periods alleged were (a) August 6, 2020, to May 6, 2021, (b) May 6, 2021, to February
6, 2022, (c) February 6, 2022, to November 6, 2022, (d) November 3, 2022, to August 31, 2023;
(e) November 6, 2022, to August 6, 2023, and (f) April 6, 2023, to January 6, 2024.
¶ 17 1. Unfitness Hearing
¶ 18 The unfitness hearing began on August 15, 2024. Before any evidence was
presented, the State informed the trial court as follows:
“The State’s intent is to introduce evidence for the purposes of the Court
making a finding as to [respondent] *** for timeframes occurring after November
3rd of 2022.
The State also will introduce some information *** for events occurring
prior to November 3rd of 2022, for the purposes of context and providing the Court
information only. Not for the judge to make any findings as to whether they are fit
or not.”
The State indicated that it “would like the court to take judicial notice of all of the testimony and
evidence that was provided to this Court on July 28th, 2022, and November 3rd of 2022, during
the hearing on the adjudication on the motion for termination of parental rights.” The court
reserved ruling on the State’s request. Before offering any evidence, the State indicated its intent
to proceed only on the allegations that respondent was unfit for failing to make reasonable efforts
and reasonable progress during two of the time periods alleged in the renewed motion:
(1) November 3, 2022, to August 31, 2023, and (2) April 6, 2023, to January 6, 2024. The State
withdrew its allegations related to all other time periods contained in its renewed motion.
¶ 19 The State’s first witness was Dr. Judy Osgood, a licensed clinical psychologist who
evaluated respondent on March 21, 2023. Osgood testified that she discussed with respondent the
-5- results of a substance abuse evaluation respondent completed in November 2022. As a result of
that evaluation, respondent was diagnosed with a “substance abuse disorder” and recommended to
complete “intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment.” According to Osgood, respondent
“denied that she had any problems with substance abuse” or that “she needed treatment.”
Respondent also denied using alcohol or marijuana, which Osgood found inconsistent with
respondent’s toxicology screenings, which were positive for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC).
¶ 20 Osgood testified that respondent was “very defensive about her DCFS case, her
history of substance abuse, [and] domestic violence.” Osgood testified that respondent “denied
that she needed any treatment or services” and denied needing “help with anything; parenting, or
*** mental health issues.” Respondent refused to “engage in any kind of a meaningful discussion
*** about her DCFS case, [or] her children” with Osgood. Respondent repeatedly told Osgood
that she “hadn’t learned anything” from the services she completed, including domestic violence
treatment and counseling. Respondent was unable to “identify specific coping skills that she had
learned or developed or was utilizing.”
¶ 21 Based on her assessment, Osgood recommended that respondent (1) continue to
have supervised visits with her children, (2) participate in “ongoing individual therapy,”
(3) “complete an assessment and monitor[ ] her mental health,” (4) “participate in domestic
violence services,” including “support groups,” (5) “develop a relapse prevention plan” because
of “her extensive history of domestic violence,” (6) complete “substance abuse treatment,” and
(7) “participate in community-based substance support groups.” Osgood testified that she was
concerned that respondent “was using alcohol and THC to self[-]medicate her mental health.”
¶ 22 Osgood observed respondent interact with M.M. and H.M. and believed that
respondent sincerely loves her children and has a bond with them but noted that respondent’s bond
-6- with M.M. is “[l]imited” because M.M. has never lived with respondent. Osgood determined that
respondent “has never demonstrated the capacity to care for the safety and security of her children”
based on her interview with respondent and DCFS records she reviewed.
¶ 23 The hearing continued on December 5, 2024. Jeremy Roberts, a Springfield police
officer, testified that he was dispatched to respondent’s residence on October 5, 2024, for “a
criminal damage report.” When Roberts arrived, respondent told him that the day before she and
her boyfriend, Steven Bryerson, had an argument during which Bryerson grabbed her by the throat
“and shoved her forehead into the front siding of the house, causing a minor contusion.”
¶ 24 Laura Kuehnel, a caseworker at Family Service Center, testified that she has been
M.M.’s and H.M.’s caseworker since May 2023. Prior to that, Lauren Masten was the children’s
caseworker. Before Kuehnel took over the case, Masten talked to Kuehnel and provided her with
the history of the cases. According to Kuehnel, H.M. was taken into care when she was two years
old “[d]ue to domestic violence” and was now seven years old. M.M. was taken into care “right
after birth” due to “continued concerns of [domestic violence]” and was four years old.
¶ 25 The State moved to admit the service plans Kuehnel reviewed and maintained for
M.M. and H.M. dated November 3, 2022, to December 13, 2023. The trial court admitted the
service plans over no objection. Kuehnel testified that pursuant to those plans, respondent was
required to cooperate with DCFS, visit M.M. and H.M., obtain and maintain stable housing and
income, participate in substance abuse treatment, participate in mental health services, and engage
in “domestic violence perpetrator services.” Domestic violence perpetrator services were
recommended because respondent was involved in two incidents of “physical aggression” against
two individuals “in the same day” in April 2023. Kuehnel testified that she referred respondent to
a domestic violence service provider in December 2023, but respondent never contacted that
-7- provider. In March 2024, Kuehnel referred respondent to a new provider. Respondent completed
an assessment with that provider in May 2024, but respondent never completed any sessions.
¶ 26 Respondent was employed in May 2023, but as far as Kuehnel knew, respondent
did not maintain consistent employment from May 2023 to December 2024. Kuehnel testified that
respondent failed to communicate with her regarding her employment despite Kuehnel’s requests
that she do so. Kuehnel testified that while she was the caseworker for M.M. and H.M., only three
family team meetings took place. Kuehnel attempted to schedule more, but respondent often failed
to respond to her.
¶ 27 According to Kuehnel, respondent did not engage in mental health services or
counseling after January 2023. Kuehnel provided respondent with a referral for counseling in
November 2023, but respondent never participated in any counseling sessions, and the service
provider unsuccessfully discharged respondent in February or March 2024. Kuehnel provided
respondent with another counseling referral in April or May 2024, but respondent never attended
any counseling sessions with that provider.
¶ 28 Because of “allegations of alcohol abuse,” respondent was ordered to complete a
substance abuse assessment, which she did in late 2022. As a result of that assessment, respondent
was ordered to participate in outpatient substance abuse services, but she never did so. Sometime
in 2023, respondent was ordered to complete a second substance abuse assessment but never did
so. Respondent was also ordered to engage in toxicology screenings monthly, but she did not
complete any after December 2022.
¶ 29 Respondent’s last visit with M.M. and H.M. was in March 2024. A visit was
scheduled for April 2024, but respondent did not attend and did not call to reschedule. Respondent
had no visits after April 2024 “[d]ue to safety concerns and threats that [respondent] had made.”
-8- According to Kuehnel, respondent “was threatening to go and find her children in the community
and take them or go to the foster parents’ home as well as [Kuehnel’s] home.”
¶ 30 Kuehnel rated respondent’s cooperation with the agency as satisfactory in August
2023. Kuehnel agreed that M.M. and H.M. were excited to see respondent during visits and were
comfortable around her. Kuehnel testified that respondent attended three family meetings between
May and December 2023 and was cooperative during those meetings.
¶ 31 Kuehnel was notified that respondent was charged with battery against two
different victims on April 15, 2023, and was alleged to have been drinking since 9 a.m. that day.
Respondent was also charged with driving under the influence (DUI) on April 21, 2022. Over
respondent’s attorney’s objection, the trial court took judicial notice of (1) a certified copy of
respondent’s DUI conviction, dated November 18, 2022, granting respondent court supervision
provided that she complete 10 hours of “Alcohol & Drug Remedial Education” and 12 hours of
“Alcohol/Drug Out Patient Treatment” within 10 months; (2) the State’s petition to revoke
supervision, dated September 26, 2023, because respondent (a) failed to provide proof of
outpatient treatment and (b) on July 2, 2023, was charged with unlawful possession of cannabis
and driving on a suspended license; and (3) the order, dated August 14, 2024, granting the State’s
petition to revoke.
¶ 32 Kuehnel testified to an incident that occurred in court in August 2023. On that date,
Judge Tharp asked respondent to shut off her phone. Respondent refused to do so and became
“disrespectful and angry.” As she exited the courtroom, respondent was “[b]eing rude and
disruptive,” “combative, [and] yelling.” When respondent attempted to come back into the
courtroom, she was asked to leave again. After that, Kuehnel heard respondent “yelling and
screaming in the hallway.” Kuehnel testified that respondent was arrested in the hallway and
-9- appeared to be resisting officers during her arrest.
¶ 33 Owen Hamelin, a Springfield police officer, testified that he responded to a call on
April 15, 2023, from a woman named Zaleigh Grigsby. When he arrived at Grigsby’s residence,
he saw that she had a “small laceration to her bottom lip.” Grigsby told Hamelin that respondent
punched her face with a closed fist. Grigsby showed Hamelin footage from her Ring video camera.
According to Hamelin, the footage showed Jaron, Grigsby’s ex-boyfriend and respondent’s
boyfriend in April 2023, at Grigsby’s door and then returning to his car. After that, respondent got
out of Jaron’s car, walked up to Grigsby’s house, “pound[ed] aggressively on the door” and then
walked back to the car. Following a verbal altercation between respondent and Grigsby, respondent
“came back up to the door aggressively, and then *** you could see her body coming into the door
fairly quickly, and then you could just hear a physical altercation.” Hamelin could not see the
physical altercation in the footage, but in Grigsby’s home, Hamelin observed “numerous items
scattered throughout the main entry and the kitchen/dining area,” “a broken table,” and “a foot-
wide diameter hole in the wall just inside the entryway.” According to Hamelin, Jaron and
respondent were at Grigsby’s home to pick up Jaron’s children, who were in the car at the time of
the altercation.
¶ 34 Hamelin testified that when he tried to locate respondent on April 15, 2023, he
learned that she was in the Sangamon County jail after being arrested for another unrelated battery
that day. When Hamelin spoke to respondent at the jail, she told Hamelin that “it was just a verbal
altercation between her and [Grigsby], and then she decided to invoke her Fifth Amendment [rights
(U.S. Const., amend. V)] and not try to incriminate herself by speaking any further.” The trial court
took judicial notice of a certified copy of respondent’s conviction, entered on August 22, 2024,
showing that respondent pled guilty to battery against Grigsby.
- 10 - ¶ 35 Respondent testified that she completed a parenting class in 2021 and always
cooperated with Family Service Center and DCFS. Respondent testified that she consistently
attended visitation with M.M. and H.M. She said she loves her children and that they love her. She
has lived in the same house since her children came into DCFS’s care. Respondent testified that
she has worked at Burger King since August and before that worked consistently as a certified
nursing assistant. Respondent testified that she completed the 10 hours of alcohol treatment
required by the court after her DUI conviction. Respondent testified that she completed 19 weeks
of mental health treatment through Southern Illinois University (SIU) Survivor Recovery Center.
Respondent testified that she completed a domestic violence victim class, as well as a domestic
violence assessment over the phone with a “lady,” who did not recommend her for further domestic
violence treatment. Respondent believed she had completed all her services and asked the trial
court to return M.M. and H.M. to her.
¶ 36 On cross-examination, respondent agreed that she attended 18 sessions with SIU
Survivor Recovery Center between 2021 and 2023 and canceled or failed to show up for 16
sessions during that same time period. Respondent admitted that she had a physical altercation
with Grigsby on April 15, 2023, during which she entered Grigsby’s home without her permission
and punched Grigsby several times. When asked about the incident in court on August 30, 2023,
respondent denied (1) becoming upset because the judge asked her not to use her cell phone in
court, (2) being excused from the courtroom, (3) shouting and screaming, and (4) being arrested
by court security. On redirect examination, respondent denied having an alcohol or anger problem.
She also denied threatening Kuehnel.
¶ 37 The State argued that respondent should be found unfit because she “has not made
substantial efforts or progress throughout the time frames that are alleged in our petition, and
- 11 - because she has not demonstrated interest or concern or responsibility over her children.” Before
hearing from respondent’s counsel, the trial court clarified that in considering the evidence, it was
“only looking from November 3[, 2022,] forward because we haven’t dealt with any issues on
things prior to that in regards to legalities of what I can consider and can’t consider.” Respondent’s
counsel argued that respondent “loves her kids” and “they love her” and asked the court to deny
the State’s motion. M.M. and H.M.’s guardian ad litem (GAL) asserted that the State met its
burden of proving that respondent failed to make reasonable progress and efforts during the two
nine-month periods and “has not shown responsibility for the welfare of her children based on her
actions.”
¶ 38 Before making its ruling, the trial court stated that it did not consider the second
battery charge against respondent from April 15, 2023, because there was no conviction. The court
also did not consider Hamelin’s testimony about the Ring camera footage he viewed. However,
the court did consider respondent’s conviction for battery against Grigsby. The court found that
“there are anger management, mental health, and domestic violence [issues] all over the place
here.” The court determined that respondent’s efforts with respect to anger management, domestic
violence and drug/alcohol abuse were “limited” and that her progress in those areas was
“nonexistent.” The court ruled that the State met its burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence that respondent failed to make reasonable efforts and progress during the two nine-month
periods of November 3, 2022, to August 31, 2023, and April 6, 2023, to January 6, 2024, and
“failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to both minors’
welfare for that same period of time.” The court entered a written order finding respondent unfit
for those reasons. That order indicated that H.M.’s father was previously found unfit and that
M.M.’s father previously surrendered his parental rights.
- 12 - ¶ 39 2. Best-Interest Hearing
¶ 40 On February 27, 2025, the trial court held the best-interest hearing. Kuehnel
testified that M.M. and H.M. were in different foster homes with nonrelatives. They had been in
the same homes since they were taken into DCFS custody, which was more than four years ago.
Kuehnel said both children were bonded with their respective foster families, participated in
various activities, and attended community events. The girls interacted with and visited each other
often, and their foster families were meeting their medical, educational, and social needs.
¶ 41 M.M. lived in a home with a foster mother, foster father, two foster sisters, and one
foster brother. M.M.’s foster parents were willing to adopt her. H.M. lived with a foster mother,
who was willing to adopt her. M.M. called her foster parents “mom” and “dad,” and H.M. called
her foster mother “mom.” M.M. and H.M. had not seen respondent in almost a year because of
threats she made. As a result of those threats, M.M.’s and H.M.’s foster parents sought and
obtained orders of protection on behalf of M.M. and H.M. against respondent. The trial court took
judicial notice of those orders of protection.
¶ 42 Kuehnel testified that M.M.’s and H.M.’s placements were in their best interest.
H.M. wanted to stay in her current foster placement and did not want to see respondent. Kuehnel
believed it was in M.M.’s and H.M.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
According to Kuehnel, M.M. and H.M. were thriving in their current foster homes.
¶ 43 Respondent’s mother, Tunisia H., testified that she has lived in San Diego,
California, for six years and works at the University of San Diego. She testified that she first asked
for M.M. and H.M. to be placed with her at least two years ago. She testified that since then, she
has been “getting the run around.” Tunisia testified that she wanted M.M. and H.M. to be with her
because she is family and “capable, willing and able to care for them.” She testified that she visited
- 13 - M.M. and H.M. two or three times during the four years they had been in foster care and last saw
them two years ago.
¶ 44 Respondent testified that she currently works at Krispy Kreme. She said she loved
her children and believed they loved her. Respondent testified that if M.M. and H.M. could not be
returned to her, she wanted her mother to have custody of them. Respondent denied ever telling
anyone that she did not want M.M. and H.M. to be placed with her mother and said she has been
asking for them to be placed with her family “[s]ince day one.” Respondent agreed that none of
her family lives in Illinois.
¶ 45 The State argued that it was in the best interest of M.M. and H.M. for respondent’s
parental rights to be terminated because “they are stable and happy” in their current placements.
Respondent’s attorney asked for H.M. and M.M. to be placed with Tunisia, “who can teach them
their heritage, [and] can keep them involved with their family.” The GAL argued that it was in the
minors’ best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights because M.M. and H.M. “have been
in care for over four years in the same placement where they are thriving, bonded and loved.”
¶ 46 In making its ruling, the trial court noted that M.M. and H.M. “need stability and
permanence.” The court found “ample credible evidence” that M.M. and H.M.’s needs for love,
attachment, and a sense of being valued are met in their current placements. The court noted that
at no prior hearing, including the 2022 hearings on the original motion to terminate respondent’s
parental rights, did anyone raise the possibility of M.M. and H.M. being placed with Tunisia. The
court found that removing M.M. and H.M. from their current placements would not be in their best
interest and “would be a very traumatic experience” for them because M.M.’s foster home is the
only home M.M. “has ever known” and H.M. has been in her foster home for “a significant amount
of time.” The court concluded that the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it was
- 14 - in M.M.’s and H.M.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. Following the
hearing, the court entered an order terminating respondent’s parental rights and setting the
permanency goal of adoption. This appeal followed.
¶ 47 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 48 A. Trial Court’s Admission and Consideration of Evidence
¶ 49 Respondent argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to present evidence
from the first termination proceeding and considering that evidence when ruling on the renewed
motion. The State responds that the record refutes respondent’s contentions and that respondent
forfeited this issue by failing to cite the record to support her argument.
¶ 50 Initially, we agree with the State that respondent has forfeited this argument. Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) provides that an appellant’s brief must contain
“[a]rgument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor, with
citation of the authorities and the pages of the record relied on.” Failing to provide proper citations
to the record violates Rule 341(h)(7) and results in forfeiture of the argument. In re Je. A., 2019
IL App (1st) 190467, ¶ 57. In her brief, respondent argued that the trial court admitted and
considered evidence from the first termination hearing but never specified what evidence the court
allegedly admitted and considered. Additionally, respondent failed to cite any portion of the record
where the court admitted or considered evidence from the first termination hearing. Thus,
respondent has forfeited this argument on appeal. See Je. A., 2019 IL App (1st) 190467, ¶ 57.
¶ 51 Forfeiture notwithstanding, the record contradicts respondent’s contentions. On the
first day of termination proceedings on the State’s renewed motion to terminate respondent’s
parental rights, the State indicated its intent to introduce evidence about “events occurring prior to
November 3rd of 2022, for the purposes of context and providing the Court information only.”
- 15 - Specifically, the State asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the transcripts from the first
termination hearing. The court did not immediately grant or deny the State’s motion but reserved
its ruling. Neither the court nor the parties ever explicitly mentioned this request again, and the
court never admitted the transcripts from the first termination hearing into evidence. Furthermore,
on the second day of proceedings, on the State’s renewed motion, the court stated that in
considering the evidence, it was “only looking from November 3[, 2022,] forward.” Thus, the
record refutes respondent’s contentions that the court admitted and considered evidence introduced
at the first termination hearing.
¶ 52 B. Unfitness
¶ 53 Respondent next argues that the trial court erred in finding that the State proved by
clear and convincing evidence that she was unfit.
¶ 54 The involuntary termination of parental rights involves a two-step process. 705
ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West 2024). The State must first prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the respondent is unfit. In re C.M., 305 Ill. App. 3d 154, 163 (1999). A parent can be found unfit
for failing
“(i) to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the
removal of the child from the parent during any 9-month period following the
adjudication of neglected or abused minor ***, or (ii) to make reasonable progress
toward the return of the child to the parent during any 9-month period following
the adjudication of neglected or abused minor.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i)-(ii) (West
2024).
Either ground is independently sufficient to support a finding of unfitness. In re J.P., 261 Ill. App.
3d 165, 174 (1994).
- 16 - ¶ 55 Reasonable progress is assessed under an objective standard and exists when a
parent’s compliance with the service plan and the trial court’s directives “is sufficiently
demonstrable and of such a quality that the court, in the near future, will be able to order the child
returned to parental custody.” (Emphasis in original.) In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444, 461 (1991).
A parent fails to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child when the parent fails “to
substantially fulfill his or her obligations under the service plan and correct the conditions that
brought the child into care.” 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2024). Importantly, there is “a significant
difference between going through the motions, checking off the boxes, and mechanically doing
what is asked of the parent and actually changing the circumstances that brought the children into
care.” In re Ta. T., 2021 IL App (4th) 200658, ¶ 56.
¶ 56 We will not reverse a trial court’s finding of unfitness unless it is against the
manifest weight of the evidence. In re Dar. H., 2023 IL App (4th) 230509, ¶ 54. A court’s finding
is against the manifest weight of the evidence only “when the opposite conclusion is clearly
apparent.” Dar. H., 2023 IL App (4th) 230509, ¶ 54. Under this standard, “we give deference to
the trial court as the finder of fact because it is in the best position to observe the conduct and
demeanor of the parties and the witnesses and has a degree of familiarity with the evidence that a
reviewing court cannot possibly obtain.” In re D.F., 201 Ill. 2d 476, 498-99 (2002). We “must not
substitute [our] judgment for that of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses, the weight
to be given to the evidence, or the inferences to be drawn.” D.F., 201 Ill. 2d at 499. We may affirm
the trial court’s finding of unfitness if the evidence supports any ground. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d
405, 422 (2001). Thus, we will focus our analysis only on whether respondent made reasonable
progress.
¶ 57 The evidence supported the trial court’s finding that respondent was unfit for failing
- 17 - “to make reasonable progress toward the return” of M.M. and H.M. during the relevant time
periods. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2024). According to Kuehnel’s testimony and the
service plans admitted into evidence, during the relevant periods, respondent was to (1) maintain
contact with and cooperate with DCFS, (2) successfully complete substance abuse treatment,
(3) undergo monthly toxicology screenings, (4) participate in and successfully complete
counseling, and (5) successfully complete a domestic violence perpetrator course. The evidence
established that during the relevant periods, respondent failed to engage in substance abuse
treatment and continuously denied that she had a substance abuse problem. She also failed to
undergo any toxicology screenings during the relevant periods, never completed a domestic
violence perpetrator course, and failed to engage in counseling.
¶ 58 Even more troubling than respondent’s failure to complete many of her required
services was respondent’s attitude toward them. Respondent reported to Osgood that she did not
need any of the services and “hadn’t learned anything” from the services she completed.
“The point of requiring parents to attend classes and engage in services is not just
so the parents can say they attended; it is so parents apply what they learn in their
lives, in the real world, such that the court can be confident that the children will
be safe in their care.” (Emphasis in original.) Ta. T., 2021 IL App (4th) 200658,
¶ 56.
Because respondent claimed to learn nothing from the services she completed, the court could
presume that respondent would not apply any new skills to care for and protect her children,
placing M.M. and H.M. in the same dangerous conditions that led them to be removed from her
care.
¶ 59 Furthermore, while respondent completed a domestic violence victim course prior
- 18 - to November 3, 2022, respondent continued to be involved in physically violent relationships.
Officer Roberts testified that just two months before the trial court’s hearing on December 5, 2024,
respondent reported that her then-boyfriend grabbed her by the throat and shoved her head into the
side of her house. While respondent reported that incident to police, she did so only to make a
report of damage to her home. Additionally, during both relevant time periods, respondent became
a perpetrator of violence herself by committing a battery against Grigsby in April 2023. Thus,
respondent did not “actually chang[e] the circumstances that brought the children into care.”
Ta. T., 2021 IL App (4th) 200658, ¶ 56. Based on respondent’s actions and statements, the court’s
finding that respondent did not make reasonable progress toward the return of M.M. and H.M.
during the relevant period was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 60 C. Best Interest
¶ 61 Respondent also argues that the trial court’s best-interest finding was against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 62 If a parent is found to be unfit, the State must then prove that terminating parental
rights is in the minor’s best interest. In re J.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190537, ¶ 31. At this step, the
focus shifts from the parent to the child. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 364 (2004). “The issue is no
longer whether parental rights can be terminated; the issue is whether, in light of the child’s needs,
parental rights should be terminated.” (Emphases in original.) D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364.
Consequently, at a best-interest hearing, “the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child
relationship must yield to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364.
¶ 63 The burden is on the State to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
termination of a parent’s rights is in the best interest of the child. D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 366. When
determining a minor’s best interest, the trial court must consider, “in the context of the child’s age
- 19 - and developmental needs,” the following factors:
“(a) the physical safety and welfare of the child, including food, shelter,
health, and clothing;
(b) the development of the child’s identity;
(c) the child’s background and ties, including familial, cultural, and
religious;
(d) the child’s sense of attachments, including:
(i) where the child actually feels love, attachment, and a sense of
being valued (as opposed to where adults believe the child should feel such
love, attachment, and a sense of being valued);
(ii) the child’s sense of security;
(iii) the child’s sense of familiarity;
(iv) continuity of affection for the child;
(v) the least disruptive placement alternative for the child;
(e) the child’s wishes and long-term goals, including the child’s wishes
regarding available permanency options and the child’s wishes regarding
maintaining connections with parents, siblings, and other relatives;
(f) the child’s community ties, including church, school, and friends;
(g) the child’s need for permanence which includes the child’s need for
stability and continuity of relationships with parent figures, siblings, and other
relatives;
(h) the uniqueness of every family and child;
(i) the risks attendant to entering and being in substitute care; and
- 20 - (j) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child, including
willingness to provide permanency to the child, either through subsidized
guardianship or through adoption.” 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2024).
¶ 64 The trial court’s best-interest determination will not be disturbed on appeal unless
it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. J.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190537, ¶ 33. We afford
great deference to the court’s determination, as it is in the best position to view the witnesses and
judge their credibility. J.B., 2019 IL App (4th) 190537, ¶ 33.
¶ 65 Here, the evidence established that M.M. and H.M. had been in foster care with the
same foster families for more than four years and each family wanted to adopt them. Both girls
were bonded with their foster families and happy in their current placements. While M.M. and
H.M. were in separate homes, they visited each other often. The evidence showed that although
M.M. and H.M. appear to love respondent, they had not visited her in over a year, H.M. did not
want to see respondent, and M.M.’s bond with respondent was “[l]imited” because she had never
lived with respondent.
¶ 66 Respondent contends that the trial court’s best-interest finding was against the
manifest weight of the evidence because her mother, Tunisia, was willing and able to take custody
of M.M. and H.M. However, the court properly found that taking M.M. and H.M. from the only
homes they have known for four years and placing them in a new environment with someone they
barely knew would not only not be in their best interest but would be traumatizing to them. The
court carefully considered the best-interest factors and emphasized M.M.’s and H.M.’s needs for
“stability and permanence” (see 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05)(g) (West 2024)), which their foster
families could provide through adoption, as well as “ample credible evidence” that M.M. and H.M.
feel love, attachment, and a sense of being valued by their foster families (see 705 ILCS 405/1-
- 21 - 3(4.05)(d)(i) (West 2024)). Based on the facts of this case, the court’s determination that it was in
M.M.’s and H.M.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights was not against the
¶ 67 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 68 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 69 Affirmed.
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