Filed 3/23/26 In re M.M. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re M.M., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E086209
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J300791)
v. OPINION
M.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Cara B. Hutson,
Judge. Affirmed.
Neale B. Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Tom Bunton, County Counsel, and Joseph R. Barrell, Deputy County Counsel for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 Defendant and appellant M.M. (father) challenges the juvenile court’s ruling,
made at his six-month review hearing, that plaintiff and respondent San Bernardino
County Children and Family Services (department) provided reasonable services. We 1 reject the argument and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Father’s three children are A.S. (born 2012), J.M. (born 2015), and M.M. (born
2018). The children’s four siblings are part of the dependency case, as are the seven
children’s mother, but only father is a party to this appeal. Some of the children, as well
as both parents, are deaf.
The children were referred to the department after one went to school with choke
marks on their neck and other bruises. That child said they got into an altercation with
mother’s boyfriend, who slapped them, threw them to the ground, choked them, and
kicked them several times. Mother witnessed the incident but did not intervene, telling
the child the incident was their fault. One of the other siblings said mother’s boyfriend
has also hit two of the other children and that the physical abuse has been occurring for
three years.
In April 2024, the department filed section 300 petitions alleging as to father that
his children were at substantial risk of serious physical harm from his willful or negligent
failure to supervise or protect the children from a custodian’s conduct. (See § 300, subd.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 (b).) The department’s jurisdiction and disposition report noted that father was aware of
multiple instances of his children getting hit by mother’s boyfriend but refused to
intervene.
In July 2024, the trial court declared the children dependents of the court and
ordered reunification services for father.
Also in July 2024, the children again were referred after five of the children
alleged sexual abuse by mother’s boyfriend. Two of father’s children were examined for
sexual abuse, the second such examination taking place in December 2024. After the
children denied any such abuse and the examinations came back normal, the referral was
closed as unfounded.
Father was referred to individual therapy and parenting education classes. He
completed individual therapy in August 2024 and parenting education classes in
November 2024. In a January 2025 report, the department said the agency providing
father’s individual therapy and parenting education classes had not provided progress
reports or certificates of completion even though the department had requested them.
Those items were provided, however, as part of a March 2025 report.
In late January 2025, despite having already completed individual therapy and
parenting education classes, father was referred for additional individual therapy and for
family therapy. The record does not clearly disclose what caused the second referral.
Father asserts in briefing that the additional referrals were made due to the sexual abuse
allegations. The transcript from the six-month review hearing suggests that the therapist
3 for the initial sessions did not believe more sessions were necessary and that the social
worker disagreed. Father completed his initial round of individual therapy just two
weeks after the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing. He began the additional
individual therapy sessions soon after the referral was made and said at the six-month
hearing that he had only a few sessions remaining.
Attempts to begin family therapy appear so far to have been unsuccessful. A
February session did not take place because the American Sign Language interpreter
stated she never received the online meeting information. A March session could not be
held because the interpreter was busy assisting other people. A later March session did
not occur because father could not attend. An April session did not happen because the
children’s caregiver forgot to have the children log on to participate in the remote
session.
At the six-month review hearing in April 2025, father requested additional
transportation assistance for his in-person visits with his children. He noted that the
distance between his home and where the visits were taking place required a two-and-a-
half-hour drive and that he had limited income. He also asked the court to find that
reasonable services were not provided to him. The juvenile court disagreed, finding that
reasonable services had been provided and ordering that reunification services continue.
II. DISCUSSION
“At the six-month review hearing, ‘[i]f the child is not returned to their parent or
legal guardian, the court shall determine by clear and convincing evidence whether
4 reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent or legal guardian in overcoming
the problems that led to the initial removal and the continued custody of the child have
been provided or offered to the parent or legal guardian . . . .’ [Citation.] ‘When a
finding that reunification services were adequate is challenged on appeal, we review it for
substantial evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘In general, when presented with a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence associated with a finding requiring clear and convincing
evidence, the court must determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of
high probability demanded by this standard of proof.’ [Citation.] ‘The adequacy of the
reunification plan and of the department’s efforts to provide suitable services is judged
according to the circumstances of the particular case.’” (In re A.O. (2025) 111
Cal.App.5th 1048, 1061-1062.) “‘In almost all cases it will be true that more services
could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect.
The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in
an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.’” (Id.
at p. 1063.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding, based on clear and
convincing evidence, that father was provided with reasonable services. Father was
referred to, and completed, his initial individual therapy sessions weeks after the
dispositional hearing. The record does not establish why father was referred for
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Filed 3/23/26 In re M.M. CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re M.M., et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E086209
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J300791)
v. OPINION
M.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Cara B. Hutson,
Judge. Affirmed.
Neale B. Gold, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Tom Bunton, County Counsel, and Joseph R. Barrell, Deputy County Counsel for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
1 Defendant and appellant M.M. (father) challenges the juvenile court’s ruling,
made at his six-month review hearing, that plaintiff and respondent San Bernardino
County Children and Family Services (department) provided reasonable services. We 1 reject the argument and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Father’s three children are A.S. (born 2012), J.M. (born 2015), and M.M. (born
2018). The children’s four siblings are part of the dependency case, as are the seven
children’s mother, but only father is a party to this appeal. Some of the children, as well
as both parents, are deaf.
The children were referred to the department after one went to school with choke
marks on their neck and other bruises. That child said they got into an altercation with
mother’s boyfriend, who slapped them, threw them to the ground, choked them, and
kicked them several times. Mother witnessed the incident but did not intervene, telling
the child the incident was their fault. One of the other siblings said mother’s boyfriend
has also hit two of the other children and that the physical abuse has been occurring for
three years.
In April 2024, the department filed section 300 petitions alleging as to father that
his children were at substantial risk of serious physical harm from his willful or negligent
failure to supervise or protect the children from a custodian’s conduct. (See § 300, subd.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 (b).) The department’s jurisdiction and disposition report noted that father was aware of
multiple instances of his children getting hit by mother’s boyfriend but refused to
intervene.
In July 2024, the trial court declared the children dependents of the court and
ordered reunification services for father.
Also in July 2024, the children again were referred after five of the children
alleged sexual abuse by mother’s boyfriend. Two of father’s children were examined for
sexual abuse, the second such examination taking place in December 2024. After the
children denied any such abuse and the examinations came back normal, the referral was
closed as unfounded.
Father was referred to individual therapy and parenting education classes. He
completed individual therapy in August 2024 and parenting education classes in
November 2024. In a January 2025 report, the department said the agency providing
father’s individual therapy and parenting education classes had not provided progress
reports or certificates of completion even though the department had requested them.
Those items were provided, however, as part of a March 2025 report.
In late January 2025, despite having already completed individual therapy and
parenting education classes, father was referred for additional individual therapy and for
family therapy. The record does not clearly disclose what caused the second referral.
Father asserts in briefing that the additional referrals were made due to the sexual abuse
allegations. The transcript from the six-month review hearing suggests that the therapist
3 for the initial sessions did not believe more sessions were necessary and that the social
worker disagreed. Father completed his initial round of individual therapy just two
weeks after the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing. He began the additional
individual therapy sessions soon after the referral was made and said at the six-month
hearing that he had only a few sessions remaining.
Attempts to begin family therapy appear so far to have been unsuccessful. A
February session did not take place because the American Sign Language interpreter
stated she never received the online meeting information. A March session could not be
held because the interpreter was busy assisting other people. A later March session did
not occur because father could not attend. An April session did not happen because the
children’s caregiver forgot to have the children log on to participate in the remote
session.
At the six-month review hearing in April 2025, father requested additional
transportation assistance for his in-person visits with his children. He noted that the
distance between his home and where the visits were taking place required a two-and-a-
half-hour drive and that he had limited income. He also asked the court to find that
reasonable services were not provided to him. The juvenile court disagreed, finding that
reasonable services had been provided and ordering that reunification services continue.
II. DISCUSSION
“At the six-month review hearing, ‘[i]f the child is not returned to their parent or
legal guardian, the court shall determine by clear and convincing evidence whether
4 reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent or legal guardian in overcoming
the problems that led to the initial removal and the continued custody of the child have
been provided or offered to the parent or legal guardian . . . .’ [Citation.] ‘When a
finding that reunification services were adequate is challenged on appeal, we review it for
substantial evidence.’ [Citation.] ‘In general, when presented with a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence associated with a finding requiring clear and convincing
evidence, the court must determine whether the record, viewed as a whole, contains
substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the finding of
high probability demanded by this standard of proof.’ [Citation.] ‘The adequacy of the
reunification plan and of the department’s efforts to provide suitable services is judged
according to the circumstances of the particular case.’” (In re A.O. (2025) 111
Cal.App.5th 1048, 1061-1062.) “‘In almost all cases it will be true that more services
could have been provided more frequently and that the services provided were imperfect.
The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in
an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.’” (Id.
at p. 1063.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding, based on clear and
convincing evidence, that father was provided with reasonable services. Father was
referred to, and completed, his initial individual therapy sessions weeks after the
dispositional hearing. The record does not establish why father was referred for
additional therapy. However, father says in briefing the second referral was due to the
5 children’s allegations of sexual abuse by mother’s boyfriend, accusations that were later
deemed unfounded. The examinations relating to those accusations were not completed
until December 2024, and the second referral was made in January 2025. Father began
additional individual therapy sessions soon after the second referral was made, and as of
the six-month hearing, he had only a few sessions remaining. We find nothing
unreasonable about either the initial therapy sessions or the referral for additional
therapy.
Father focuses on the delay in initiating family therapy sessions. Even though the
referral for family therapy was made in January 2025, it does not appear that family
therapy sessions have taken place. The delay, however, was not the result of any single
incident or cause. Two sessions did not take place because the interpreter either never
received the online meeting information or needed to assist other people. One session
failed because the children’s caregiver forgot to have the children log on. And one
session never occurred because father could not attend. Although “[s]ome effort must be
made to overcome obstacles to the provision of reunification services” (In re Alvin R.
(2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 973), father has not identified what the department should
have done differently, given that the delay is the result of the collective failure of several
people, father included. And in any event, contrary to what father contends, this case is
not similar to T.J. v. Superior Court (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 1229, disapproved on other
grounds in Michael G. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 609, 631, footnote 8, where
the court found insufficient evidence of a reasonable services finding based on a much
6 longer delay in initiating therapy. (See id. at p. 1244 [“from September 2016 until July
2017, Mother was provided with no individual therapy”].)
Father contends that the services he was provided were not reasonable because
they failed to properly account for his hearing disability. (See In re J.P. (2017) 14
Cal.App.5th 616, 625 [“The reunification plan must be appropriate for each individual
family and based on the unique facts relating to that family”].) Generally, father had the
assistance of an interpreter during the reunification period, whether because the record
directly states as such or because the record shows a social worker was able to document
interactions with father. Any failures are either uncorroborated by the record or minimal.
Father refers to his counsel’s statement, made at a January 2025 hearing, that he was “not
receiving communication from the social worker.” This statement does not identify any
specific incident (or incidents), and father does not point us to any place in the record that
would corroborate this claim. Father also notes that an interpreter was once 30 minutes
late to a video visit with the children and did not appear at an April 2025 individual
therapy session. Overall, however, there is substantial evidence that his case plan
accounted for his hearing disability.
Father also contends that reasonable services were not provided because he
received insufficient transportation assistance from the department. There is no
indication in the record, however, that father raised this issue with the department before
the six-month review hearing when the reasonable services finding was made. Because
there is no reason to believe that the department was aware of father’s transportation
7 concerns before the six-month review hearing, father may not rely on it in arguing that
the services provided were unreasonable. (See In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th
404, 416 [“If Mother felt during the reunification period that the services offered her
were inadequate, she had the assistance of counsel to seek guidance from the juvenile
court in formulating a better plan: ‘“The law casts upon the party the duty of looking
after his legal rights and of calling the judge’s attention to any infringement of them. If
any other rule were to obtain, the party would in most cases be careful to be silent as to
his objections until it would be too late to obviate them, and the result would be that few
judgments would stand the test of an appeal.”’”].)
In sum, although “the services provided were imperfect” (In re A.O., supra, 111
Cal.App.5th at p. 1063), they were reasonable under the circumstances, and sufficient
evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding in that regard.
III. DISPOSITION
The April 15, 2025, orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL J.
We concur:
RAMIREZ P. J.
FIELDS J.