NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 240466-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is July 2, 2024 NO 4-24-0466 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re M.L., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Tazwell County Plaintiff-Appellee, ) No. 20JA260 v. ) Amber L., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellant). ) Timothy J. Cusack, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE VANCIL delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Harris and Zenoff concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The appellate court granted appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirmed, concluding no issue of arguable merit could be raised on appeal.
¶2 In May 2023, the State filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of respondent,
Amber L., as to her minor child, M.L. (born in 2017). In March 2024, the trial court terminated
respondent’s parental rights and changed the permanency goal to adoption. M.L.’s father is not a
party to this appeal.
¶3 Respondent appealed. This court appointed counsel to represent respondent.
Counsel filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), arguing
respondent’s appeal presents no potentially meritorious issues for review. This court gave
respondent the opportunity to respond to the motion, and respondent filed a response. We grant
the motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND ¶5 In September 2020, the State filed a petition to adjudicate M.L. neglected under the
Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2020)), alleging
M.L. was in an environment injurious to her welfare (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2020)). In
July 2021, the State filed an amended petition generally alleging, (1) in response to an
environmental neglect call, an investigator for the Illinois Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) reported respondent engaged in “bizarre” behavior, leading to a safety plan being
put in place, during which respondent did not comply with the plan, (2) respondent later expressed
thoughts of harming her family and, after initially refusing to comply with the safety plan, allowed
herself to be committed for psychiatric treatment, and (3) respondent had a lengthy history of
indicated reports with DCFS. The petition at times referred to M.L.’s older sibling, J.D.
Allegations concerning J.D. are not at issue in this appeal. Respondent generally stipulated to the
allegations.
¶6 In July and August 2021, the trial court adjudicated M.L. neglected, found
respondent unfit, made M.L. a ward of the court, and placed guardianship and custody with DCFS.
The court ordered respondent to complete multiple tasks to correct the conditions leading to the
adjudication and removal of M.L. Respondent appealed. The record shows the appellate court
initially dismissed the appeal for failure to timely file a brief. However, on March 9, 2023, the
appellate court, in relevant part, affirmed the trial court’s determination M.L. was neglected,
finding the determination was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re M.L. and J.D.,
2023 IL App (3d) 210375-U.
¶7 In May 2023, the State filed a petition for termination of parental rights, alleging
respondent was unfit under section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i), (ii)
(West 2022)) for failing to make reasonable progress toward the return of M.L. to her care within
-2- nine months after the adjudication of neglect. The State alleged a nine-month period of August 12,
2022, to May 12, 2023.
¶8 In December 2023, the trial court conducted a fitness hearing. Jacob Razo testified
he was the caseworker on the matter from March 11, 2022, to February 1, 2023. Regarding services
required of respondent, Razo testified respondent lived at “the Dream Center in Peoria,” which the
record reflects was a homeless shelter, and did not have her own residence. Respondent had
inconsistent communication and “mixed cooperation” with Razo due to missed home visits.
Respondent had missed some drug drops and tested positive for tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) in
the drops she completed. However, respondent had completed a drug assessment without treatment
being recommended. She also completed a psychological evaluation and was engaged in
counseling.
¶9 Razo testified respondent’s visits with M.L. were suspended before the nine-month
period at issue because M.L. experienced negative reactions after visits, such as nightmares and
skin picking. M.L.’s behaviors improved after visits with respondent stopped, and visits had not
resumed during the time-period at issue. Razo never had a specific conversation with respondent
about returning M.L. to her care. He believed a return home was possible but not likely. Razo
further testified respondent was employed. Overall, he believed respondent made reasonable
progress at times but did not apply what she learned in services to her actions and communications.
¶ 10 LaDonna Boken-Buckley testified she was the caseworker from February 1, 2023,
to the date of the hearing. Boken-Buckley stated she did not think it was appropriate to restart
visits between respondent and M.L. during that time. Respondent continued to reside at the Dream
Center, which was not an appropriate home for a child. M.L. had also done better after the visits
stopped. Meanwhile, respondent was not fully cooperating in addressing issues with her own
-3- mental health. Respondent continued to miss drug drops and test positive for THC without showing
a valid prescription. There were also issues with communication and, on one occasion when
Boken-Buckley asked respondent to provide a work schedule to corroborate the reason for missed
drug drops, respondent became demanding, yelled and cursed, and was disrespectful, causing
Boken-Buckley to end the call.
¶ 11 Boken-Buckley testified respondent violated a no-contact order regarding J.D. At
the beginning of May 2023, respondent also would not sign releases for Boken-Buckley to receive
information from her doctor but said she would obtain her own letter from the doctor. Overall,
respondent was unable to make any demonstrable steps towards returning M.L. to her care, and
Boken-Buckley rated respondent as having unsatisfactory progress on her service plan.
¶ 12 On cross-examination Boken-Buckley testified respondent engaged in counseling
but did not take accountability for her mental health when it came to stating she wanted to hurt her
family. The record indicates Boken-Buckley had also been informed respondent inappropriately
claimed M.L. as a dependent on her tax return.
¶ 13 Respondent testified she had a medical marijuana card prescribed by her
rheumatologist for fibromyalgia pain. She testified she informed her caseworker about the
prescription. Respondent stated she was seeing her psychiatrist and using her paychecks while
living at the Dream Center to pay off debts to improve her credit score so she could obtain housing.
¶ 14 Respondent testified she believed family counseling was recommended, but she
was told she could not attend due to the no-contact order. However, she sought out family
counseling on her own. Respondent was also recovering from a bus accident, which resulted in a
severe concussion, torn ligaments, and required three months of physical therapy. Respondent
sought additional counseling for trauma and nightmares related to the accident and was prescribed
-4- oxycodone for pain. She informed her caseworker about the medication and took it as directed.
Respondent denied claiming M.L. as a dependent on her tax return. Respondent admitted she had
contact with her son, J.D., in violation of a court order, but she stated it was initiated by him. She
also was ordered not to have contact with M.L., but she did not believe M.L.’s behavior should be
attributed to her and stated her psychiatrist believed “DCFS tears families apart.” Respondent
testified she had provided releases for her doctors to her caseworker. She also discussed her
progress in therapy, including learning to manage stress and improve communication. Respondent
provided letters written on her behalf from her psychologist, her supervisor at her employment,
and a person associated with the Dream Center.
¶ 15 The State and the guardian ad litem asked the trial court to find respondent unfit.
The court found respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of M.L. to her
care during the nine-month period at issue. The court discussed the evidence at length, noting in
particular respondent made some progress but consistently remained unfit, with the latest service
plan rated unsatisfactory. The court noted respondent had no stable housing, missed drug drops,
was unable to resume visits with M.L., and violated a no-contact order. Ultimately, the court found
there was no progress toward the return of M.L. to respondent’s care and found respondent unfit.
¶ 16 On March 8, 2024, the trial court accepted a best interest report prepared by
Boken-Buckley. The report noted M.L. had been in her current foster placement since October
2020. The foster parents met M.L.’s basic needs of safety and welfare including food, shelter,
clothing, health, and education. M.L. had an Individualized Education Program (IEP) for
developmental delays and speech. M.L. had a bond with her foster parents, who were willing and
able to adopt her. The report further noted respondent had not completed services, and M.L. needed
permanency. Accordingly, Boken-Buckley recommended the court terminate parental rights and
-5- change the permanency goal to adoption. Boken-Buckley testified consistently with her report.
She added M.L. had her own room at the foster home, a television, and many toys. M.L. referred
to her foster parents as “[m]om and dad.” She looked to them for comfort and considered three
other foster children in the home to be her siblings.
¶ 17 M.L.’s foster mother testified about M.L.’s care and IEP. She also testified M.L.
had anxiety that was diagnosed when she began having problems following visits with respondent.
M.L. also had seizures triggered by stress. M.L.’s anxiety improved when visits with respondent
stopped, and she had not had a seizure since September 2022.
¶ 18 Tammy Burtch, respondent’s counselor, testified as to improvements she had seen
in respondent and disputed some of the previous allegations concerning respondent’s mental
health. Several additional witnesses testified on behalf of respondent, including her former
employment supervisor, an employee of the Dream Center, and her sister.
¶ 19 Respondent testified she was not told why her visits with M.L. were stopped and,
when she asked if she could continue visits, Razo told her she had to wait until her next court
hearing. She stated she was not provided with family counseling as ordered by a previous judge.
Respondent testified she had received a settlement related to her bus accident and had bought a
home, but it was under renovation and was not yet suitable for children. However, she said it would
be completed by June and suggested M.L. could stay at her sister’s house before that. However,
respondent had previously stated her sister’s house would be “too tight” for them. Respondent also
made various claims about providing her work schedule to her caseworker that contradicted earlier
statements. Respondent had quit her job because she did not have transportation. She stated she
quit using THC in September 2023. However, she tested positive for THC in December 2023.
-6- Respondent was unable to state the name of M.L.’s teacher, neurologist, or primary care physician.
She stated she was not allowed to know the names of the medical providers.
¶ 20 The trial court found it was in M.L.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s
parental rights. The court noted it considered the statutory factors. The court found M.L. had spent
almost half of her life in foster care and required permanence. While the court credited respondent
for attempting to make progress, the court noted she still could not provide adequate food, shelter
and safety for M.L., especially in light of M.L.’s special needs. Further, M.L. was bonded with her
foster family, who took care of her needs, and she had made enormous strides in their care.
Accordingly, the court terminated respondent’s parental rights and changed the permanency goal
to adoption.
¶ 21 This appeal followed.
¶ 22 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 23 Respondent’s appellate counsel moves to withdraw. Counsel supports her motion
with a memorandum of law providing a statement of facts, a discussion of potential claims, and
arguments why those issues lack arguable merit. Notice of counsel’s request to withdraw was sent
to respondent’s last known address. This court advised respondent she had until May 28, 2024, to
respond to the motion. Respondent filed a response on May 28, 2024. The State indicated it would
not file a brief in this case.
¶ 24 Counsel first submits it would be frivolous to argue the trial court erred in finding
respondent unfit. We agree.
¶ 25 Under section 2-29(2) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-29(2) (West
2022)), the involuntary termination of parental rights is a two-step process. First, the State must
prove by clear and convincing evidence the parent is “unfit,” as defined in section 1(D) of the
-7- Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)). In re Donald A.G., 221 Ill. 2d 234, 244, 850
N.E.2d 172, 177 (2006). If the State proves unfitness, it then must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child. In re D.T., 212
Ill. 2d 347, 363-66, 818 N.E.2d 1214, 1226-28 (2004).
¶ 26 A determination of parental unfitness involves factual findings and credibility
determinations the trial court is in the best position to make because “the trial court’s opportunity
to view and evaluate the parties *** is superior.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re M.I.,
2016 IL 120232, ¶ 21, 77 N.E.3d 69. A trial court’s finding of parental unfitness will not be
reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 29,
115 N.E.3d 102. A decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite
conclusion is clearly apparent. N.G., 2018 IL 121939, ¶ 29.
¶ 27 Under section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act, a parent may be found unfit for
failing “to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent during any
9-month period following the adjudication of neglected or abused minor.” 750 ILCS
50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022). “Reasonable progress” has been defined as “demonstrable movement
toward the goal of reunification.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Reiny S., 374 Ill. App.
3d 1036, 1046, 871 N.E.2d 835, 844 (2007).Reasonable progress exists when the trial court
“can conclude that *** the court, in the near future, will be able to order the child
returned to parental custody. The court will be able to order the child returned to
parental custody in the near future because, at that point, the parent will have fully
complied with the directives previously given to the parent in order to regain
custody of the child.” (Emphases in original.) In re L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d 444,
461, 577 N.E.2d 1375, 1387 (1991).
-8- ¶ 28 We have emphasized “ ‘reasonable progress’ is an ‘objective standard.’ ” In re
F.P., 2014 IL App (4th) 140360, ¶ 88, 19 N.E.3d 227 (quoting L.L.S., 218 Ill. App. 3d at 461). A
trial court may only consider evidence from the relevant time period in determining a parent’s
fitness based on reasonable progress. Reiny S., 374 Ill. App. 3d at 1046 (citing In re D.F., 208 Ill.
2d 223, 237-38, 802 N.E.2d 800, 809 (2003)).
¶ 29 Here, the trial court found respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward
the return of M.L. to her care during the nine-month period at issue. The court discussed the
evidence presented at length, noting in particular respondent had made some progress but
consistently remained unfit, with the latest service plan rated unsatisfactory. As the court noted,
respondent had no stable housing, missed drug drops, was unable to resume visits with M.L., and
violated a no-contact order. Thus, it was clear the court could not conclude it would, in the near
future, be able to order M.L. returned to respondent’s custody. Thus, the court’s determination
respondent was unfit was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 30 Counsel next submits it would be frivolous to argue it was not in M.L.’s best interest
to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
¶ 31 When a trial court finds a parent unfit, “the court then determines whether it is in
the best interests of the minor that parental rights be terminated.” D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 352. “[A]t a
best-interests hearing, the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield
to the child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364. The State must prove
by a preponderance of the evidence termination of parental rights is in the minor’s best interest.
D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 366. In making the best interest determination, the court must consider the
factors set forth in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West
2022)). These factors include:
-9- “(1) the child’s physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the
child’s identity; (3) the child’s background and ties, including familial,
cultural, and religious; (4) the child’s sense of attachments, including love,
security, familiarity, and continuity of affection, and the least-disruptive
placement alternative; (5) the child’s wishes; (6) the child’s community
ties; (7) the child’s need for permanence, including the need for stability
and continuity of relationships with parental figures and siblings; (8) the
uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care;
and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child.” In re
Jay. H., 395 Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1071, 918 N.E.2d 284, 291 (2009) (citing
705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2008)).
“The court’s best interest determination [need not] contain an explicit reference to each of these
factors, and a reviewing court need not rely on any basis used by the trial court below in affirming
its decision.” In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19, 8 N.E.3d 1258. On review, “[w]e
will not disturb a court’s finding that termination is in the [child’s] best interest unless it was
against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re T.A., 359 Ill. App. 3d 953, 961, 835 N.E.2d
908, 914 (2005).
¶ 32 Here, the evidence demonstrated M.L. had a strong bond with her foster family.
The foster parents provided for M.L.’s needs, including food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.
The foster parents wanted to provide permanency for M.L. While respondent had made efforts to
correct the circumstances that led to M.L.’s removal, as the trial court noted, she still was not able
to provide adequate food, shelter, and safety for M.L., especially in light of M.L.’s special needs.
Indeed, visits with M.L. had never resumed, and the evidence showed previous visits caused
- 10 - anxiety for M.L. The court considered the evidence in relation to the statutory best interest factors
and found they weighed in favor of terminating respondent’s parental rights. We cannot conclude
the evidence in the record “clearly calls for the opposite finding” or is such that “no reasonable
person” could find as the court found. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re J.H., 2020 IL App
(4th) 200150, ¶ 68, 162 N.E.3d 454. Accordingly, the court’s best interest determination was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 33 After examining the record, the motion to withdraw, the memorandum of law, and
respondent’s response, we agree with counsel that this appeal presents no issue of arguable merit.
Accordingly, we grant the motion to withdraw as appellate counsel and affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
¶ 34 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 35 For the reasons stated, we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 36 Affirmed.
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