NOTICE 2021 IL App (4th) 210049-U FILED This Order was filed under NO. 4-21-0049 June 11, 2021 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is Carla Bender not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
In re M.K., a Minor ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of (The People of the State of Illinois, ) Livingston County Petitioner-Appellant, ) No. 19JA71 v. ) Mark Z., ) Honorable Respondent-Appellee). ) Jennifer H. Bauknecht, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices DeArmond and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court that denied the State’s expedited petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights because the trial court’s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 Respondent, Mark Z., is the father of M.K. (born March 2010). In December
2019, the State filed an amended petition for adjudication of wardship seeking to terminate
respondent’s parental rights in an expedited manner. See 705 ILCS 405/1-2 (West 2018). In
November 2020, the trial court found M.K. was a neglected minor and respondent was an unfit
parent pursuant to section 1(D) of the Adoption Act. 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(g) (West 2018).
¶3 In December 2020, the court conducted a dispositional hearing and adjudicated
M.K. a ward of the court. However, the court denied the State’s request to terminate
respondent’s parental rights because it found (1) the Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) did not make reasonable efforts at reunification, (2) the State had not shown an aggravating circumstance, and (3) termination was not in M.K.’s best interest.
¶4 The State appeals, arguing that the trial court’s findings regarding (1) reasonable
efforts and (2) aggravating circumstances were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We
conclude that the trial court properly declined to terminate respondent’s parental rights because
the court found that termination was not in M.K.’s best interest.
¶5 I. BACKGROUND
¶6 A. Procedural History
¶ 7 In November 2019, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship, alleging in relevant
part that M.K. was a neglected minor, as defined by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705
ILCS 405/2-3(2)(i) (West 2018)), in that respondent “inflicts, causes to be inflicted, or allows to
be inflicted upon such minor physical injury, by other than accidental means, which causes ***
impairment of physical health[.]” The State further alleged that respondent created a substantial
risk of physical injury and an environment injurious to M.K.’s welfare due to domestic violence.
On the same day that the petition was filed, the trial court conducted a shelter care hearing and
placed temporary custody and guardianship with the guardianship administrator of DCFS.
¶8 In December 2019, the State filed an amended petition requesting the court
terminate respondent’s parental rights because he was an unfit parent in that he “failed to protect
the minor from conditions within her environment injurious to the minor’s welfare, pursuant to
750 ILCS 50/1(D)(g) [(West 2018)].” The State further alleged it was in M.K.’s best interest to
have respondent’s parental right terminated and sought that determination on an expedited basis.
¶9 B. The Joint Adjudicatory and Parental Termination Hearing
¶ 10 In June 2020, the trial court conducted an adjudicatory hearing at which it also
considered whether respondent’s parental rights should be terminated because he was an unfit
-2- parent as alleged in the amended petition. We note that a report of proceedings for the hearing
does not appear in the record. The docket entry for that date indicates that the State presented the
testimony of two witnesses and the court admitted into evidence (1) a DVD of an interview with
respondent and (2) pictures of M.K. depicting bruising on her face.
¶ 11 In July 2020, the trial court conducted a continued adjudicatory hearing at which
respondent moved for a directed finding on the issue of unfitness. The court continued the matter
and allowed the parties to submit written arguments. In his brief in support of his motion for
directed finding, respondent argued that the State had failed to demonstrate that aggravating
factors existed to justify the expedited termination of parental rights and “there was no showing
that reasonable efforts are inappropriate and unsuccessful.”
¶ 12 The State responded that section 2-21(5) of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2-21(5) (West
2018)) controlled and set forth the procedure for expedited termination proceedings. At the
adjudicatory stage, the State was required to prove (1) by a preponderance of the evidence that
the child is abused or neglected and (2) by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is an
unfit person. The State maintained that whether an aggravating factor existed and reasonable
efforts had been made were issues to be proved at the dispositional or best interest stage of the
expedited proceedings. The State explained, “Because this case is currently in the adjudicatory
phase of the proceedings the State will make no further argument regarding reasonable efforts or
aggravating circumstances and will merely assert that the State has every intention of providing
such evidence at the appropriate stage of the proceedings: the dispositional/best interest hearing.”
¶ 13 In November 2020, the trial court concluded the adjudicatory hearing and entered
a written order finding that the State had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that M.K.
was abused and neglected. The docket entry stated as follows: “Court finds that State has met the
-3- burden of proof by preponderance of evidence and finds minor abused and that there is clear and
convincing evidence that State has met the burden of proof on counts with mother and father.”
The court continued the case for a best-interest and dispositional hearing.
¶ 14 C. The Dispositional Hearing
¶ 15 In December 2020, the trial court conducted a dispositional hearing and
considered whether it was in M.K.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
¶ 16 1. The State’s Evidence
¶ 17 Taylor McDonald testified that she was the caseworker on the case since it was
opened in November 2019. McDonald testified that M.K. was involved in a prior termination
case when she was three years old, seven years before the instant hearing. That case was opened
because M.K.’s mother had substance abuse problems. Respondent stated to McDonald that, in
that prior case, he completed domestic violence, anger management, and parenting services. The
outcome of the case was that M.K. was returned home to respondent.
¶ 18 McDonald testified that throughout the entire life of the case, M.K. had been with
her maternal grandmother, who wished to adopt M.K. McDonald stated that M.K.’s grandmother
(1) provided for all of her material needs, (2) was with her every day, and (3) helped her go to
school, doctor’s appointments, and counseling. McDonald stated M.K. had a strong bond and
relationship with her grandmother, and M.K. told McDonald that she wanted to remain in that
placement.
¶ 19 McDonald further testified that M.K. was in school but the school was conducting
e-learning. M.K. “has some acquaintances at school.” Regarding ties to the community,
McDonald stated that M.K. had a babysitter and friends in the neighborhood.
¶ 20 On cross-examination, McDonald acknowledged that since the beginning of the
-4- COVID-19 pandemic, no parenting classes had been offered. Regarding “substance abuse or
mental health programs, outpatient counselling,” “[t]hey are doing everything virtually,
assessments and everything.” McDonald testified that she made a referral to “IHR” for
respondent. (We note that IHR stands for the Institute of Human Resources, also known as IHR
Counseling Services, which provides mental health and substance abuse services in Pontiac,
Illinois.) McDonald agreed that respondent gets frustrated easily, is dyslexic, and has a hard time
comprehending what he reads, all of which adds to his frustration. McDonald acknowledged she
did not know whether respondent had access to the internet “but the virtual classes are usually
over [a] phone call or Zoom.” McDonald did not know if respondent was familiar with Zoom.
(We note that “Zoom” is an online video conferencing program which requires an internet
connection to operate.) McDonald stated respondent had not had any visitations with M.K.
because there was a no-contact order from a criminal case that arose out of the physical abuse
that opened the parental termination case.
¶ 21 2. The Respondent’s Testimony
¶ 22 Respondent testified that he had an eleventh grade education and had a hard time
reading—including the things the caseworker gave him—because he was dyslexic. Respondent
loved his daughter and wanted to remain in her life. Respondent stated he was willing to go to
classes, take counseling, and do anything else DCFS wanted him to do, and he would “try my
best as much as I can.” Respondent stated that he had completed those services before when he
first got custody of his daughter. Respondent said the process was difficult because of his
dyslexia but with hard work he was able to do it and would be able to do it again.
¶ 23 Respondent stated that he lived “out of town this time” in Graymont, Illinois,
which did not have any counselors or facilities where he could receive services. Respondent
-5- stated it was difficult for him to get to Pontiac to take classes through IHR. Respondent testified
that he had never done a “Zoom meeting” and did not even know what Zoom was. Respondent
added that he recently got a new phone and was willing to try Zoom if his phone could operate
the program.
¶ 24 Respondent admitted that he gets frustrated easily, which creates a problem, but
he was willing to take direction from a counselor or teacher to learn better methods.
¶ 25 Respondent testified that when he got along with M.K., they enjoyed doing
outdoor activities together. Respondent stated that M.K. was a good, loving, smart, fun child, but
she also had problems. Respondent stated he believed he could deal with those problems, “but
sometimes I think I need to work on myself, too.” Respondent stated, “We need to bond a lot
more. We need more time with one another.” Respondent said he could discipline M.K. safely
and would avoid corporal punishment as much as possible.
¶ 26 On cross-examination, respondent stated that he told his caseworker he was
willing to engage in services and had asked for transportation to an appointment at IHR.
Respondent did not understand what the meeting was for, and it caused him frustration,
particularly because “I had to drive in illegally because I was trying my hardest to get there.”
(We note that the dispositional report stated that respondent had spent time in prison for driving
on a revoked license.) Respondent was further frustrated because each time he went to IHR,
someone there asked him questions about M.K. that respondent could not answer because he had
a no-contact order.
¶ 27 Respondent agreed that he first met with McDonald over a year ago and at the
meeting, he told her that he did not intend to engage in services because he had completed them
once before. Respondent acknowledged that McDonald had told him “[f]rom day one” that he
-6- needed to complete services. Respondent stated he tried to get into classes but he did not
understand what “they” wanted from him and could not provide answers to their questions.
Respondent stated that he had been to IHR three times. Respondent did not know what his
appointments were for, whether to complete assessments or do counseling. Respondent stated, “I
don’t know what’s going on over there. That’s why I was getting frustrated because they kept
telling me the same stuff over and over,” and respondent did not understand any of it.
¶ 28 Respondent testified that he could deal with M.K.’s mental health and behavioral
problems, although he also stated that “people” did not know what her problems were and they
were still trying to figure it out. Respondent clarified that he “heard what they [diagnosed M.K.
with]; but they keep throwing different stuff at her. So, I don’t know.” The State asked, “How
are you going to deal with [M.K.’s] problems if you don’t know what they are?” Respondent
answered, “Well, it looks like I’ve got to go to counseling and figure that stuff out.”
¶ 29 3. Arguments of Parties
¶ 30 The trial court asked the State for clarification on how to proceed given the dual
purpose of the hearing: dispositional and best interests. The State said the best way to handle the
issues was by addressing them separately and taking them in order. Regarding the dispositional
hearing, the State requested a finding that M.K. be adjudicated a ward of the court, that DCFS
had made reasonable efforts to prevent or eliminate the need for removal, and that respondent be
declared unfit (for reasons other than financial circumstances alone) to care for, protect, or
discipline the minor and that it was in M.K.’s best interest for custody and guardianship to be
granted to DCFS.
¶ 31 Regarding the termination portion of the proceedings, the State recommended that
it was in M.K.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights. The State argued that
-7- aggravating circumstances were present based on respondent’s domestic abuse, which the State
characterized as “a pattern.”
¶ 32 As to reasonable efforts towards reunification, the State argued that reasonable
efforts had been made because respondent (1) had completed identical services several years ago
but still abused M.K., (2) stated multiple times he refused to participate in services, and (3) had
not started any services in the six months since McDonald made referrals. The State also argued
that the statutory best interest factors all weighed in favor of keeping M.K. with her grandmother
and against returning her to respondent.
¶ 33 In response, respondent argued that “the uniqueness and I think the risks attendant
here being in substitute care I don’t believe favors the State; and I think it favors denying the
petition in this particular case.” Respondent noted that the dispositional report painted a very
different picture than the State. Far from “flourishing” in foster care, M.K. was “not making
significant progress in therapy, continues to struggle with relationship permanency, unable to
maintain friends because of bullying, often has outbursts and throws things, hits the foster parent,
spits in her face. *** That to me is not a young lady that *** is flourishing in her current
placement to me.”
¶ 34 Respondent further argued that (1) the State had not demonstrated an aggravating
circumstance and (2) the case was similar to any other physical abuse case. Respondent
emphasized that the purpose of the Act was to reunify families when possible and argued that
because M.K. and respondent both had problems, respondent should be allowed a fair chance to
engage in services. Respondent was not familiar with technology and had transportation
problems, both of which exacerbated his difficulties engaging in services because of COVID-19
restrictions. Respondent concluded that he thought termination was premature and not in M.K.’s
-8- best interest.
¶ 35 Regarding the dispositional portion of the proceedings, the guardian ad litem
(GAL) agreed that the State had met its burden that M.K. should be adjudicated a neglected
minor and made a ward of the court. Regarding termination and the child’s best interests, the
GAL acknowledged that the State could “list off all the checkmarks.” However, the GAL added
the following, “I think a strong argument can be put forward in this particular case that there was
never an attempt to reunify this family. There was never an attempt really to see what could or
couldn’t be completed. I understand that there was services that were offered in this particular
case; and I understand that those services were not completed; but I can’t say that there was a
real attempt at reunification of this family.” For those reasons, the GAL recommended that it was
not in M.K.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights.
¶ 36 4. The Trial Court’s Findings
¶ 37 The trial court first discussed the State’s arguments that aggravating
circumstances were present. The court “d[id]n’t think from a factual standpoint that this rises to
the level of I’m going to say aggravating circumstances as argued by the State for a couple of
reasons.” First, the court disagreed with the State’s characterization of the physical abuse.
Instead of a “beating,” the court found that respondent’s actions constituted “excessive corporal
punishment.” Further, the court noted that the State was not proceeding on a theory of repeated
abuse, of which the court further noted it had no competent evidence, just the two original
instances.
¶ 38 The trial court agreed that there had not been reasonable efforts at reunification.
The court noted that M.K. had problems dating back to before she was born and her mother used
heroin (“And I see [grandmother] agreeing with me because she knows that I know a lot about
-9- [mother].”). The court stated that there was not a reasonable effort to reunify the family and the
conduct of respondent was not “so abhorrent and so aggravating that he is not entitled to at least
an opportunity to correct that condition.”
¶ 39 The court noted that respondent had learning disabilities, “really can’t read; and
that makes it extremely difficult for him; and I believe whenever he’s been in court he’s been
respectful but obviously is limited in regards to his cognitive abilities to understand a lot of
things that happen.” The court believed that under those circumstances, it expected more help to
be offered, but “instead we have him kind of flailing out there with COVID and everything is
shut down. Nobody can for periods of time get into whatever type of services that they need.”
¶ 40 The trial court found that respondent clearly had an interest in M.K., noted that
respondent twice considered surrendering parental rights but ultimately decided not to, “and I
think that’s because he genuinely does not understand some of the stuff that’s being thrown at
him on a regular basis in connection with this case.” The court continued, stating as follows:
“So, I do not think this is a situation where early, or expedited termination is
appropriate. I do think that *** the system made a decision to fast track this for
termination; and all of the efforts and eggs were put in that basket and to the
detriment of [M.K.] who now has zero relationship with her dad; and now we
have a huge uphill battle to not only try to correct that relationship but also
provide the services for dad so that he can hopefully reunify with his daughter.
So, I do, I do not believe that the services that have been offered to date
have been reasonable or geared towards a return home goal. I do believe as father
sits there that h[e] is unfit and unable to care for the minor child and that the
return or that the goal should be return home within 12 months.”
- 10 - ¶ 41 The trial court added that it was not addressing visitation because M.K.’s
counselor needed to be consulted and communication figured out, stating, “And dad also hit the
nail on the head because he understands that he also has his own issues to work on, and so this is
a very good time for you to do that and focus all your efforts on that.” The court warned
respondent that if he did not start services quickly and was not engaged in them by the time the
court held another permanency hearing, “we are back where we’re at right now.” The court
admonished respondent that he needed to cooperate with DCFS, participate in services and
referrals to correct the conditions that led to M.K.’s removal, and if he failed to make progress,
his parental rights could be terminated.
¶ 42 The trial court entered a written order in which it found that it was in the best
interest of M.K. and the public that M.K. be made a ward of the court and adjudicated a
neglected minor. The court further found respondent “unfit” and it was in the best interest of the
minor to remove the minor from his custody. The court found that “reasonable efforts and
appropriate services aimed at family preservation and reunification have not been made.” The
court placed guardianship and custody with the guardianship administrator of DCFS.
¶ 43 This appeal followed.
¶ 44 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 45 The State appeals, arguing that the trial court’s findings regarding (1) reasonable
efforts and (2) aggravating circumstances were against the manifest weight of the evidence. We
conclude that the trial court properly declined to terminate respondent’s parental rights because
the court found that termination was not in M.K.’s best interest.
¶ 46 A. Aggravating Circumstances
¶ 47 As an initial matter, we conclude the State waived any argument that the trial
- 11 - court erred by requiring the State to show aggravating circumstances to terminate respondent’s
parental rights at the dispositional hearing. To be clear, we fully agree with the State that no such
showing is required. See In re Tyianna J., 2017 IL App (1st) 162306, ¶ 63, 70 N.E.3d 282. All of
the necessary elements are set forth in section 2-21(5) of the Act. Nonetheless, at all times before
the trial court, the State argued that it had demonstrated aggravating circumstances and failed to
argue that it need not prove an aggravating circumstance. Indeed, in its brief to the trial court at
the adjudicatory hearing, the State informed the court that evidence of aggravating circumstances
should be considered at the dispositional hearing and the State intended to make such a showing.
¶ 48 The doctrine of invited error bars a party from requesting the trial court to proceed
in a certain manner and later claiming on appeal that the trial court erred by following that
request. People v. Cox, 2017 IL App (1st) 151536, ¶ 73, 89 N.E.3d 898. It is well settled that a
party cannot complain of an error it injected into the proceedings, induced the court to make, or
to which that party consented. Id.; see also In re S.R., 2014 IL App (3d) 140565, ¶ 26, 24 N.E.3d
63. Generally, the State is subject to waiver and forfeiture the same as any other litigant (see
People v. Sophanavong, 2020 IL 124337, ¶ 21), and we hold it to that standard here.
¶ 49 B. Requirements for Expedited Termination
¶ 50 Even if we excused the waiver, the outcome would be the same. As we explain,
the trial court found that the State failed to prove an essential element in section 2-21(5)—
namely, reasonable efforts at reunification—and that finding was not against the manifest weight
of the evidence.
¶ 51 1. The Law
¶ 52 Section 2-21(5) of the Act provides the requirements that must be satisfied for a
trial court to terminate parental rights at a dispositional hearing. In essence, that section provides
- 12 - a road map for expedited termination proceedings in the trial court. That section provides as
follows:
“The court may terminate the parental rights of a parent at the initial dispositional
hearing if all of the following conditions are met:
(i) the original or amended petition contains a request for termination of
parental rights and appointment of a guardian with power to consent to adoption;
and
(ii) the court has found by a preponderance of evidence, introduced or
stipulated to at an adjudicatory hearing, that the child comes under the jurisdiction
of the court as an abused, neglected, or dependent minor under Section 2-18; and
(iii) the court finds, on the basis of clear and convincing evidence admitted
at the adjudicatory hearing that the parent is an unfit person under subdivision D
of Section 1 of the Adoption Act; and
(iv) the court determines in accordance with the rules of evidence for
dispositional proceedings, that:
(A) it is in the best interest of the minor and public that the child be
made a ward of the court;
(A-5) reasonable efforts [at reunification] are inappropriate or such
efforts were made and were unsuccessful; and
(B) termination of parental rights and appointment of a guardian
with power to consent to adoption is in the best interest of the child
pursuant to Section 2-29.” 705 ILCS 405/2-21(5) (West 2018).
¶ 53 In this case, the State filed an amended petition seeking termination in December
- 13 - 2019. At the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court first found M.K. was an abused and neglected
minor by a preponderance of the evidence. Then, after considering that same evidence, the court
determined that respondent was unfit by clear and convincing evidence.
¶ 54 At the dispositional hearing, the court needed to consider (1) whether it was in the
best interest of M.K. and the public that she be made a ward of the court, (2) whether reasonable
efforts at reunification were inappropriate or were made and were unsuccessful, and (3) whether
termination of respondent’s parental rights was in M.K.’s best interest.
¶ 55 2. Best Interest Finding
¶ 56 The State complains that the trial court never made any findings about whether
termination of respondent’s parental rights was in M.K.’s best interests. However, the court
essentially made that finding when it determined that reasonable efforts at reunification had not
been made and that respondent and M.K. should have the opportunity to work towards
reunification.
¶ 57 This court has long held that trial courts are not required to recite and evaluate
every best interest factor either orally at the hearing or in a written order. In re Tajannah O.,
2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19, 8 N.E.3d 1258. “To the contrary, our law is clear that a trial
court need not articulate any specific rationale for its decision, and a reviewing court need not
rely on any basis used by a trial court below in affirming its decision.” In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill.
App. 3d 239, 263, 810 N.E.2d 108, 127 (2004).
¶ 58 A reviewing court “will not disturb a trial court’s decision that terminates an
individual’s parental rights at the best-interest stage of a combined hearing under section 2-21(5)
of the Act unless that decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence.” In re N.B., 2019
IL App (2d) 180797, ¶ 43, 125 N.E.3d 444. A decision is against the manifest weight of the
- 14 - evidence when the opposite conclusion is clearly the proper result. In re Nylani M., 2016 IL App
(1st) 152262, ¶ 48, 51 N.E.3d 1067.
¶ 59 Here, the trial court engaged in a lengthy and detailed discussion about the issues
argued by the parties. Although the parties, and consequently the court, focused on
(1) aggravating circumstances and (2) reasonable efforts at reunification, the court’s discussion
clearly sets forth—and supports—its conclusion that termination of respondent’s parental rights
was not in M.K.’s best interest. The trial court’s determinations on these factors necessarily
reflect its conclusion that termination of respondent’s parental rights was not in M.K.’s best
interest.
¶ 60 In particular, the trial court stated “unfortunately the delay [caused by COVID-19]
only made things worse for the relationship between [respondent] and [M.K.]” The court
repeatedly expressed frustration that “everything is shut down” due to the pandemic and both
respondent and M.K. suffered as a result of their unique circumstances. The court also
emphasized that (1) M.K. “has a lot of problems,” (2) those problems stem from the mother
using heroin while pregnant, and (3) those problems “go back much further than this incident.”
The court further emphasized that “[t]here’s a lot of work to be done here,” and respondent
“clearly has an interest in [M.K.].” “So, I do not think this is a situation where early, or expedited
termination is appropriate.” “[A]ll of the efforts and eggs were put in [the expedited termination]
basket and to the detriment of [M.K.] who now has zero relationship with her dad; and now we
have a huge uphill battle to not only try to correct that relationship but also provide the services
for dad so that he can hopefully reunify with his daughter.”
¶ 61 In sum, the trial court expressed a clear belief that it was in M.K.’s best interest to
have the opportunity for a relationship with and to return home to respondent. The court
- 15 - recognized that respondent had difficulties but believed they could be overcome and classes
could be completed. Additionally, the court emphasized that respondent had successfully
completed services in the past and was hindered by a no-contact order from the criminal case,
also before the same judge. Further, the court recognized that M.K. had many of her own
difficulties which presented challenges for her grandmother. Given the uniqueness of these
circumstances, the court concluded that it was not in M.K.’s best interest to terminate
respondent’s parental rights without further efforts at reunification. That decision was not against
the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 62 3. Reasonable Efforts Towards Reunification
¶ 63 Alternatively, the trial court’s finding that reasonable efforts were not made was
also not against the manifest weight of the evidence. In this case, respondent had stable housing,
had successfully completed services in the past, and cared for M.K. for several years before she
was removed from his care. The court expressed clear concern that respondent was not given a
sufficient opportunity to engage in services due to (1) his dyslexia and resulting illiteracy,
(2) lack of transportation, and (3) lack of availability of services due to COVID-19. The court
believed that extra care was required from DCFS because it was clearly aware of respondent’s
literacy problems. The court also noted that DCFS should have been more helpful and diligent in
helping defendant arrange services remotely because of the pandemic.
¶ 64 Certainly, DCFS had made some efforts, and the trial court considered the
adequacy of those efforts. The court credited respondent’s testimony that he did not know what
was required and the DCFS was not explaining it to him in a way he could understand.
¶ 65 We give extra deference to trial courts when they consider competing versions of
events and find one credible. See In re Ta.T., 2021 IL App (4th) 200658, ¶ 57. The trial court is
- 16 - in the best position to determine what was reasonable under the circumstances. In re Jay H., 395
Ill. App. 3d 1063, 1070, 918 N.E.2d 284, 290. The court is intimately familiar with (1) the
parties, (2) the locality, (3) conditions on the ground, etc. See id.; Williams v. Williams, 2018 IL
App (5th) 170228, ¶ 64, 120 N.E.3d 167. At the dispositional and best-interest stage, the court is
allowed to consider anything it finds helpful. Jay H., 395 Ill. App. 3d at 1069-70. We do not
substitute our judgment for that of the trial court or second-guess what information it determined
was helpful and appropriate to consider because we are not in a position to do so. In re
Parentage of W.J.B., 2016 IL App (2d) 140361, ¶ 25, 68 N.E.3d 977.
¶ 66 The trial court’s findings are abundantly clear that it believed respondent was
unfit and M.K. should not be returned to his care. But the court was equally clear that it believed
termination of respondent’s parental rights was not in M.K.’s best interests because there had not
been sufficient efforts towards reunification. Given this context and our highly deferential
standard of review, we conclude that the trial court’s findings at the dispositional hearing were
not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 67 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 68 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 69 Affirmed.
- 17 -