In Re: M.J.C., Appeal of: K.C.

Opinion

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: M.J.C., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA :

APPEAL OF: K.C., MOTHER :

: : : : : No. 576 EDA 2026

Appeal from the Decree Entered January 22, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Orphans' Court at No(s):

2025-A9094

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED AUGUST 19, 2026

Appellant K.C. (Mother) appeals the involuntary termination of her

parental rights to M.J.C. (Child) pursuant to a petition filed by the Bucks

County Children and Youth Social Services Agency (the Agency). Mother

claims that the Agency failed to present clear and convincing evidence that

termination of her rights would best serve Child’s needs and welfare. We

affirm.

The trial court provided the following relevant facts:

[Child] was born [in] July [of] 2019. [Child’s] natural father died . . . prior to [Child’s] birth. [Child] has two siblings, P.C. and G.C., who are 14 . . . and 16 years of age respectively. On January 3, 2024, the Agency received a referral related to Child due to [Mother’s] alleged abandonment, substance abuse[,] and homelessness. It was reported to the Agency that the family, consisting of Mother, [Child], P.C.[,] and G.C., were living in a vehicle in the Kensington area of Philadelphia. Prior to the referral, Mother [had] signed temporary guardianship paperwork appointing [K.H. and F.H., Child’s paternal aunt and uncle,] and

[K.M., Child’s paternal grandmother, as] temporary guardians of the children. On January 22, 2024, [K.H., F.H., and K.M.] reported to the Agency that they wished to be kinship resources for each of the subject children. On April 19, 2024, [Child] was adjudicated dependent and placed in the legal and physical custody of the Agency. [The Agency then placed Child] in the care of [K.M.], where [Child] currently remains.[1]

Following the Agency’s filing of the [TPR] petition[, the trial court appointed legal] counsel . . . for [Child].[2] Hearing[s] were held on the petition on January 6, 2026[ and] January 9, 2026[.] At the close of testimony, the matter was taken under advisement.

Trial Ct. Op., 3/16/26, at 1-2 (citations omitted and some formatting altered).

On January 22, 2026, the trial court issued a decree terminating

Mother’s parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(5), (a)(8),

and (b) of the Child Custody Act (the Act). See Trial Ct. Order. 1/22/26.

Mother filed a timely notice of appeal and both Mother and the trial court

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Mother raises the sole question of whether “[t]he trial court

abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law by involuntarily terminating

Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S [§§] 2511(a)(5) and (8) and

2511(b)[,] in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that termination

would best serve the needs and welfare of [Child].” Mother’s Brief at 6.

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1 Child’s siblings, P.C. and G.C., were placed with K.H. and F.H. See N.T., 1/9/26, at 19.

2 The Agency filed the TPR petition on September 12, 2025. See Agency’s Pet., 9/12/25. On October 21, 2025, the trial court appointed Timothy J. Barton, Esq., as Child’s legal counsel and Emily Ward, Esq., as Child’s guardian ad litem (GAL). See Trial Ct. Orders, 10/24/25.

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Mother argues that the Agency failed to present clear and convincing

evidence that termination would best serve Child’s needs and welfare pursuant

to Sections 2511(a)(5), (a)8), and (b). See id at 10-11, 15. Specifically,

Mother contends that in conducting its needs and welfare analysis the trial

court “failed to evaluate the extent of Child’s bond with Mother and the effect

that terminating this bond would have on [Child].” Id. at 13-14. Addressing

the quality of her bond with Child, Mother argues that Child looked forward to

visits with her, that a caseworker testified that “ongoing contact [with Mother]

was necessary and beneficial to [] Child,” and that Child “refers to Mother as

Mom and knows who she is.” Id. at 14 (citing N.T., 1/9/26, at 24, 30, 34-35,

50).

The Agency disputes that Kaitlyn Howey, Child’s caseworker in this

matter, testified that “the contact between [Child] and [Mother] was

necessary and beneficial”; rather, the Agency contends that the caseworker’s

response to this question was “no.” Agency’s Brief at 8-9 (citing N.T., 1/9/26,

at 27).

In reviewing the involuntary termination of parental rights, we

accept the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record, but are not required to accept the lower court’s inferences or conclusions of law. To the extent an issue raises purely a question of law or statutory interpretation, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis. Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the

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parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child.

We need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), to affirm an order terminating parental rights.

In re T.L.H., 336 A.3d 1069, 1079-80 (Pa. Super. 2025) (citations omitted

and some formatting altered).

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act provides, in relevant part:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:

* * *

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

* * *

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.

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* * *

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(5), (a)(8), and (b).

“With respect to Section 2511(b), our analysis focuses on the effect that

terminating the parental bond will have on the child. In particular, we review

whether termination . . . would best serve the developmental, physical, and

emotional needs and welfare of the child” and the “effect on the child of

permanently severing any such bond.” In re Adoption of K.M.G., 219 A.3d

662, 674 (Pa. Super. 2019) (some formatting altered and citations omitted).

Further, the existence of a bond between parent and child does not preclude

termination. Id. at 675.

Our Supreme Court has stated that “if the child has any bond with the

biological parent, the court must conduct an analysis of that bond.” In re

K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1106 (Pa. 2023) (citation omitted). In conducting a

Section 2511(b) analysis, a trial court “must consider more than proof of an

adverse or detrimental impact from severance of the parental bond,” as “the

parental bond is but one part of the overall . . . analysis, which includes a

determination of whether the bond is necessary and beneficial to the child,

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i.e., whether maintaining the bond serves the child’s developmental, physical,

and emotional needs and welfare.” Id. at 1113. Specifically, trial courts must

consider

the child’s need for permanency and length of time in foster care[;] . . . whether the child is in a preadoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster home meets the child’s developmental, physical and emotional needs, including intangible needs of love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.

Id. (footnote omitted).

Here, in considering whether termination of Mother’s parental rights

best served Child’s needs and welfare, the trial court took into account that

Child knew who Mother was and enjoyed visitations with Mother. See Trial

Ct. Op., at 17. The trial court noted that “Mother admitted that [Chil]d has

lived a substantial portion of his life with his paternal grandparents, who

presently provide him with a safe and loving home.” Id.; see also N.T.,

1/6/26, at 26 (wherein Mother agreed that Child was “doing well with his

grandparents”). The trial court also found that “Mother’s actions are the

primary barrier to reunification.” Trial Ct. Op., at 18. Ultimately, the trial

court concluded “that termination would serve [Child’s] developmental,

physical[,] and emotional needs” and was, therefore, “appropriate pursuant

to Section 2511(b).” Id.3

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3 In its discussion of the parent-child bond, the trial court referenced Mother’s

testimony and quoted the arguments made by Attorney Barton and Attorney Ward. See Trial Ct. Op. at 17-18 (citing N.T., 1/9/26, at 46-53). Attorney Barton’s argument, as quoted by the trial court, referenced the testimony of (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Mother for the most part concedes that the Agency met its evidentiary

burden for the grounds for termination under Sections 2511(a)(5) and (a)(8)

and only challenges the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in Child’s

best interests under the needs and welfare analysis required by Sections

2511(a)(5), (a)(8), and (b). See Mother’s Brief at 10-15. With regard to the

quality of the parent-child bond, however, the record does not support

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fact witnesses, such as Ms. Howey’s testimony about the quality of Child’s bond with Mother compared to his bond with his grandparents. See id. at 17. Attorney Ward’s argument, as quoted by the trial court, concluded that termination was in Child’s best interests because he was doing “incredibly well” in his grandparents’ care and “he’s been in care for far too long.” See id. at 18.

The trial court “noted” Attorney Barton’s argument, which relied on the testimony of the Agency’s witnesses. See id. at 17. The trial court did not indicate that the court itself credited this testimony.

Nonetheless, it is clear the trial court took into account the portions of Mother’s own testimony that supported a finding that the quality of the parent-child bond did not preclude termination of Mother’s parental rights. See id. Further, the Agency presented ample evidence, including the testimony of Ms. Howey and Mother’s visitation coach, Logan Shoemaker, that the bond between Child and Mother was not necessary and beneficial for Child’s needs and welfare. See generally, N.T., 1/6/26, at 69-78; N.T., 1/9/26, 5-45.

Accordingly, the record clearly supports the trial court’s finding that the bond between Child and Mother was not of such nature as to stave off termination of Mother’s parental rights. See T.L.H., 336 A.3d at 1079. We remind the trial court, however, that the role of this Court is not to make findings of fact but, rather, to review the trial court’s findings. See id. In performing this function, we rely on trial courts to make the basis of their findings part of the record. See id. (stating that this Court accepts “the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record”); see also Smith v. Smith, 281 A.3d 304, 311 (Pa. Super. 2022) (noting that this Court “cannot make independent factual determinations [and] must accept the trial court’s finding[s] that are supported by the evidence” (citation omitted)).

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Mother’s characterization of the evidence that “[t]he caseworker testified that

ongoing contact through visitation was necessary and beneficial to . . . Child.”

Id. at 14 (citing N.T., 1/9/26, at 34-35). Instead, the record reflects that,

when asked whether contact with Mother was “necessary and beneficial” to

Child at this stage in his life, Ms. Howey, Child’s caseworker, answered “no.”

N.T., 1/9/26, at 27-28, 34.4

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4 The relevant excerpts of Ms. Howey’s testimony regarding the bond between

Child and Mother are as follows. On direct examination, Ms. Howey testified:

Q: [D]o you believe that [Mother’s] one once-a-week for twohour visit, that contact is necessary and beneficial to [Child] at this time?

A: No.

Q: And why do you believe that?

A: Given . . . that [Child] has been in care, . . . 21 months, I think the need for permanency for [Child] right now outweighs . . . the need for reunification . . . He’s been living with his grandparents [for] quite some time on and off, as [much] as five days a week sometimes, throughout the week. He is in a routine. He’s in a schedule. He attends school. He likes the school that he’s at. He’s in first grade now, so he’s made friends. He has a strong connection and bond with his grandparents who he looks to for daily needs, medical needs, for love, comfort.

* * *

Q: And do you believe that there would be a detrimental effect to [Child] if [Mother’s] rights were terminated?

A: I don’t believe that there would be a detrimental effect, no. . . . [Child] enjoys going to visits with [Mother]. . . However, he has been with his grandparents since . . . 2022, 2023 . . . . He looks to them for comfort. He enjoys going to the visits with [Mother]. There’s no issues with him leaving the visits and going (Footnote Continued Next Page)

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After our review, we find no abuse of discretion or legal error in the trial

court’s decision. See re T.L.H., 336 A.3d at 1079-80. The evidence Mother

marshals in support of her claim of a ‘necessary and beneficial’ bond with

Child, as confirmed by the record, illustrates the shallowness of that bond, as

Mother only states that Child looked forward to visits with her and that Child

addresses her as “Mom and knows who she is.” Mother’s Brief at 14 (citations

omitted). See K.M.G., 219 A.3d at 674-75; see also K.T., 296 A.3d at 1106,

1113. On this record, we conclude that the trial court properly terminated

Mother’s parental rights to Child.

Decree affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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back to grandparents’ house. He goes, and he . . . gets all of his needs met there.

N.T., 1/9/26, at 27-28. On cross-examination, Ms. Howey testified:

Q: [Do you believe that Mother’s] once-a-week visit . . . is necessary and beneficial?

A: . . . No, I don’t, because if we’re talking about terminating parental rights, then I don’t think – no. . . . I think [Child] enjoys the interaction with [Mother].

Id. at 34.

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Date: 8/19/2026