In Re Minor Child

Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 370 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION III

No. CV-25-674

IN THE MATTER OF MINOR CHILD Opinion Delivered August 26, 2026

APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND

COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

[NO. 26PR-25-537]

HONORABLE LYNN WILLIAMS,

JUDGE

AFFIRMED

BART F. VIRDEN, Judge

In this one-brief appeal, Micaela Sanchez contends that the circuit court erred as a matter of law by refusing to find that her minor daughter’s best interest is served by remaining in the United States. Micaela further argues that the circuit court violated her due-process rights by denying her request for a hearing. We affirm.

I. Relevant Facts

On August 4, 2025, Micaela filed a petition for guardianship of her fourteen-year-old daughter, MC, relying on Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-204(a) (Supp. 2025). Micaela asserted that MC’s father, Benedicto Remigio Sanchez Aquino, whose whereabouts are unknown, abandoned MC shortly after her birth and had not contacted MC or provided any support since then. Micaela explained that she needed to establish sole legal guardianship of MC “to obtain medical treatment, obtain passports, travel, and make other necessary decisions

2

related to the child’s life without the biological father’s consent.” In Micaela’s declaration attached to the petition, she explained that because Benedicto is named as the father on MC’s birth certificate, his consent is required for MC to obtain a passport, travel, and receive medical treatment. She also contended that there is no one in Guatemala to care for MC. In MC’s declaration attached to the petition, she explains that her father abandoned her and has never contacted her or supported her in any way. Micaela requested that the circuit court find that it is in MC’s best interest to remain in the United States with her, and reunification with Benedicto is not viable due to his neglect and abandonment.

On August 18, the circuit court entered the order appointing Micaela as MC’s guardian, finding that guardianship is appropriate to protect MC’s interests, and reunification with Benedicto is not viable due to abandonment and neglect.

On August 21, Micaela filed a motion for a hearing and specific findings. Micaela contended that in her guardianship petition, she asked the court to find that it is in MC’s best interest to remain in the United States with her and not return to Guatemala. She explained that because the court omitted the finding that it is in MC’s best interest to remain in the United States, MC could not apply for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) status pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J). Micaela asserted that for MC to obtain SIJ status, a state court must first find that she cannot be reunified with the absent parent due to abandonment, and it is not in her best interest to return to her country of nationality or last habitual residence. Micaela contended that her statement that no one in Guatemala could care for MC was sufficient for the court to make

3

the requested finding pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 9-17-102 (Repl. 2020), and the guardianship order, as it stands, is insufficient to confer legal status in the United States.

On August 25, the court entered an order denying Micaela’s motion as “unnecessary and unauthorized.” The circuit court found that Micaela’s “request is well taken but has no basis in Arkansas law.” The court specifically found that the requested guardianship was granted pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. §§ 28-65-201 et seq. (Repl. 2012 & Supp. 2025), and “[t]he citizenship of the ward is not mentioned in the petition. She alleged the biological father was Benedicto Remigio Sanchez Aquino, last known to reside in Guatemala. No further proof of paternity was alleged.” The court further explained that Micaela did allege that her sole guardianship was required to have authority to obtain passports, seek medical treatment, and travel without Benedicto’s consent; however, Micaela did not rely on or cite the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court found that the Probate Code does not address the Immigration and Nationality Act, and Micaela’s citation to Ark. Code Ann. § 9- 27-102 is misplaced because it concerns juvenile, not probate, proceedings. Micaela timely filed her notice of appeal, and this appeal follows.

II. Discussion

For her first point on appeal, Micaela contends that the probate court erred as a matter of law when it found that it lacked jurisdiction to find that it is in MC’s best interest to remain in the United States. Micaela explains that the best-interest finding regarding MC’s remaining in the United States is necessary for MC’s SIJ application. Micaela is correct that the finding is necessary for applying for special status pursuant to 8 U.S.C.A. §

4

1101(a)(27)(J); however, the issue in this case is whether the court was clearly erroneous in refusing to amend the guardianship order by making the requested finding of fact. We find no error and affirm.

We review probate proceedings de novo, but we will not reverse a finding of fact by the circuit court unless it is clearly erroneous. In re Guardianship of W.L., 2015 Ark. 289, 467 S.W.3d 129. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.

The court granted the guardianship pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-214(a)

(Supp. 2025), which provides that the order “shall contain findings of fact that the respondent is an incapacitated person and is in need of a guardian[.]” 1 The court fulfilled the statutory requirement when it determined that MC “is incapacitated by virtue of her age, and thus, is incapable of caring for herself or her estate. A guardianship is desirable to protect the interests of the incapacitated minor child.” The court also correctly noted that in her motion, Micaela relied on the Juvenile Code, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-102, in asking for the specific best-interest finding that would allow MC to obtain SIJ status pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality Act.2 The court found that Micaela’s reliance on Ark. Code

2 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(a)(27)(J) provides in part that

[t]he term “special immigrant” means . . . an immigrant who is present in the United States—

5

Ann. § 9-27-102 was misplaced because it applies to juvenile proceedings, not probate proceedings.

Simply put, the court was not required to make a specific finding regarding whether it is in MC’s best interest to remain in the United States. Micaela’s argument that the probate statutes should be read in harmony with the Juvenile Code and legislative intent and in light of the principle of in pari materia is unavailing. The probate code specifically designates the best-interest findings required for granting a petition for guardianship, and the court made the necessary findings.

For the reasons discussed above, we are not left with a firm conviction that the circuit court made a mistake in refusing to find that MC’s best interest is served by remaining in the United States. To be clear, we are not holding that the court did not have the authority to make the best-interest finding that MC’s best interest is served by remaining in the United States. We note that 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 authorizes Micaela to file a petition at any time,

(i) who has been declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United States, and whose reunification with 1 or both of the immigrant’s parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law;

(ii) for whom it has been determined in administrative or judicial proceedings that it would not be in the alien’s best interest to be returned to the alien’s or parent’s previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence[.]

6

allowing her to present additional evidence showing that it is in MC’s best interest to remain in the United States.

Additionally, Micaela contends that the court erred as a matter of law by denying her request for a hearing pursuant to the provision in Ark. Code Ann. § 28-65-106(g) (Supp. 2025), which provides that “[a] ward or guardian may request at any time a hearing before the court on any particular areas of concern.” Micaela raises the due-process argument for the first time on appeal; thus, we will not address it. We have long held that even constitutional arguments are unpreserved for our review if not raised below. See Elliott v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 526, at 6, 565 S.W.3d 487, 491 (“We will not consider arguments made for the first time on appeal, even constitutional arguments, because doing so deprives the circuit court of the opportunity to fully develop the issue.”). Moreover, Micaela is incorrect. Arkansas Code Annotated section 28-65-106(g) is permissive and does not require that the court grant the hearing.

Accordingly, we affirm.

Affirmed.

WOOD and BROWN, JJ., agree.

Lindsay Hearn, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Linsday N. Barrett, for appellant.

One brief only.